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Abstract
This thesis is centrally concerned to provide a detailed theological and interdisciplinary
account of how the dynamic relationality between humans and nonhumans may be registered
and accounted for in a Trinitarian and geographical framework. The method of this study is
to establish a mutually critical and enlightening conversation between the fields of
Trinitarian theology, science studies, and human geography. The thesis then takes as its
primary interlocutors Trinitarian theologian Colin E. Gunton, and science studies
theoretician Bruno Latour. A detailed discussion of each author's respective diagnoses of the
Enlightenment's cultural, philosophical and theological fallout is offered. The study lends
particular focus to the way in which each interlocutor has detailed the modern movement to
fragment or distance the realms of God, humans, and nonhumans. Further in this vein, the
study then moves to consider a critical comparison of each author's respective positive
programs - 'Trinitarianism' and 'nonmodernism' respectively - for navigating our way out
of the many pitfalls of modern thought.
The study concludes with an attempt to bring the insights ofGunton's Trinitarian thought
and Latour's 'nonmodern' project into conversation with the human geographical concept of
place/placing. Here it is argued that a theological adoption of the geographical concept of
place/placing would allow for a more detailed account of nonhuman participation in
sociality, nonhuman agency/actancy, and nonhuman participation in human personhood. The
culmination of these efforts is to be found in the construction of a specifically Trinitarian
theo-geographical concept of place/placing that would allow for a theology capable ofmore
fully registering the dynamic relationality that exists between persons and things, humans
and nonhumans, culture and nature. By engaging Trinitarian theology in a mutually critical
conversation with the fields of science studies and human geography, it is argued that we are
better able to construct a distinctly theological means of registering the deep relationality that
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Introduction
They sat and looked at it and burned it into their memories. How'll it be not to know
what land's outside the door? How ifyou wake up in the night and know - and know
the willow tree's not there? Can you live without the willow tree? Well, no, you can't.
The willow tree is you. The pain on that mattress there - that dreadful pain - that's
you.1
John Steinbeck, The Grapes ofWrath
The Grapes ofWrath is a story which elegantly reveals and unravels the relational
fabric which embeds and connects humans to the many geographical contexts ofwhich they
are a part. To say 'geographical' in this instance is to suggest several things, each playing off
of geography's traditional triad of space-place-nature. First, these relationships are most
certainly of a spatial character and thereby implicate time(ing) as well. Secondly, and perhaps
more important for our purposes, these relationships exist in the vibrating and dynamic
movement between humans and nonhumans, culture and nature. That is to say, that within the
dynamism of human interaction with the material world, as Steinbeck powerfully illustrates,
boundaries between people and things seem to become porous and at times altogether
uncertain. Third, to say that these relationships are geographical is to suggest that they acquire
the locus of their dynamism in a particularplace orplacing. In fact, we are reminded that one
of geography's central mantras is to declare that 'place is powerful', or that 'geography
matters '!2 And certainly, as Steinbeck illustrates, place is a powerful force in the constitution
of human personhood and identity. To be clear, we are here saying that the multiplicity of
nonhumans that are distributed throughout the fabric of space-time are inextricably linked to
our own personal being - we might say that we participate in one another so as to be co-
constitutive. Indeed, we could adopt another mantra from the growing field of science studies:
'there is no humanity without inhumanity!'
This thesis has grown out of a deep desire to speak theologically of the relational
dynamism that exists between human persons and the constellations of nonhuman things -
'natural' things, 'technical' things, and 'artificial' things included - which populate and
intimately participate in our lives. To be certain, Christian theology has not always taken the
varieties of relationship between humans and the nonhuman world as its central locus of
concern. Therefore, I take it as granted that theology must look outside of itself in an effort to
engage other disciplines which seek to account for the complex relationality that exists
between humans and nonhumans. As Daniel Hardy has argued, if theologians 'are to remain
in touch with the factors which are formative ofmodern life and understanding, we cannot so
1 John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath (New York: Viking, 1939; Arrow Books Ltd., 1998), p. 101.
2 The slogan belongs to geographer Doreen Massey.
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easily distance ourselves from the empirical and theoretical considerations of other
disciplines.. .we must probe and test them.'3 This thesis may be understood to as an effort to
take this charge very seriously. In light of Hardy's observation, the method which this thesis
has adopted is deeply interdisciplinary in its overall trajectory. Therefore, in addition to a
specifically theological inquiry, this study will also draw heavily from the fields of science
studies and human geography. Of all the academic fields which touch on the relationship
between humans and their material emplacements, few have added more detail to our
understanding of this dynamism than the practitioners of these two overlapping fields. As a
field of inquiry ultimately concerned with understanding how the practice of the sciences
works to bring nonhuman entities into partnership with human endeavors, the field of science
studies has offered a growing and rich account of the co-participation of human and
nonhuman worlds. Human geographers, for their part, have been eager to adopt many of the
insights of science studies while adding to these emerging theories a distinctly spatial or
geographical content. All of this works to suggest that both of these fields would easily lend
themselves as partners to a fruitful interdisciplinary conversation with Christian theology, but
in such a way as to be mutually enlightening.
The form of this detailed analysis of human/nonhuman relationality takes its shape
around two primary interlocutors. The theological content of this thesis will largely draw on
Colin Gunton's Trinitarian theology of creation and culture. The work ofColin Gunton is
very well suited to this study for several reasons. First, Gunton's body ofwork is certainly
extensive enough to warrant a detailed study. That is to say, there is no lack of source material
from which to construct a detailed critical evaluation. Moreover, Gunton has clearly been one
of the more significant theologians of the late 20th century, especially in his native England.
Secondly, Gunton has been one of the few theologians to have dedicated several studies to the
investigation of human and nonhuman relationality. Throughout his wide body ofwork one
may easily identify an unceasing concern to reflect on the relationship between the doctrine of
creation, theological anthropology, and the trinitarian doctrine of God. Thinking through these
three main areas of theological inquiry has clearly been the mark ofGunton's overall theology
of creation and culture. Whether Gunton was entirely successful in these efforts will be a
major topic which this thesis is ultimately concerned to review in some detail. Thirdly, it is
surprising that there have been rather few critical assessments ofGunton's work that are of
any sustained length. Therefore, Gunton's work is rather well suited to this theological
inquiry into human and nonhuman relationality.
The second primary interlocutor for this study is representative of the growing field
of science studies. French theoretician Bruno Latour has also dedicated a career to
3 Daniel W. Hardy, God's Ways with the World: Thinking andPractising Christian Faith (Edinburgh:
T&T Clark, 1996), p. 70.
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understanding the varieties of relationship which exist between human and nonhuman realms.
I have chosen Latour as a primary interlocutor for this study for three main reasons. First, I
am aware of only one or two truly theological studies that have given Latour's work more
than a briefmention.4 I find this oversight to be rather striking for several reasons. Primary
amongst these would be the fact that Latour has become one of the most widely known, and
widely read, thinkers of our time. He is, in fact, a truly international figure that has had, and
continues to have, a very deep impact on a vast spectrum of disciplines throughout the
university. His neglect by theologians is particularly striking on the account that he is himself
a product of philosophical and theological training, as it was through these disciplines that
Latour made his entry into academic life. One may also easily identify numerous theological
undercurrents throughout his work, and these distinctly theological lines of thought most
certainly deserve comment, refinement, and critique from the theological community. The
second reason for selecting Latour as a suitable conversation partner for the Trinitarian
theology of Colin Gunton is to be found in what I take to be their remarkable compatibility.
For instance, they both share a concern to adequately understand the philosophical and
cultural evolution which resulted in the modern period. Further along these lines each of our
thinkers share a deep uneasiness with what we might call the alienating and fragmenting
tendencies ofmodem and late-modem thought and culture. Moreover, both of our
interlocutors have proposed detailed responses to the pitfalls ofmodernity and its postmodern
offspring. As I hope to make clear throughout this thesis, there are several points where these
often parallel projects might be employed in such a way as to be mutually illuminating.
Finally, I have chosen to focus on the work of Latour on account of his unwavering desire to
take things into account. By this I mean to indicate that Latour is untiring in his mission to
create a philosophy - we may also say a 'politics of nature' or a 'cosmopolitics' - that seeks
to strictly detail the dynamic relationship that exists between what he refers to as 'humans and
nonhumans'. This is something I fear theologians have yet to fully grasp. That is, the
importance of giving a thorough going account of the deep, and ontologically constitutive,
relationship that exists amongst persons and things. By theologically engaging with the work
of Latour, we are forced to take what Gunton has called 'horizontal relationality' very
seriously.
There is, perhaps, a third interlocutor to be found in the final part of this thesis. In the
last two chapters we bring the insights ofGunton's trinitarian and Latour's nonmodern
4 Simon Oliver, "The Eucharist Before Nature and Culture," Modern Theology 15, 3 (July 1999);
Lambert Van Poolen, "Towards a Christian Theology of Technological Things," Christain Scholar's
Review 33, 3 (2004). Oliver's article gives only brief mention to Latour's We Have Never Been Modern
and then focuses more directly on the work ofDonna Haraway. Van Poolen's article is rather
interesting but it also clearly lacks theological content as he is a professor of engineering rather than a
theologian.
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projects into conversation with the human geographical concept of place/placing. In doing
this we bring the two projects into a particularly geographical, that is spatio-temporal, focus.
The culmination of these efforts is to be found in the construction of a specifically trinitarian
theo-geographical concept of place/placing that will allow us to fully register and account for
the dynamic relationality that exists between persons and things, humans and nonhumans.
This thesis may then be divided into three distinct parts and five chapters in total. Part
1 consists of two chapters which are dedicated to reviewing the overall projects ofGunton
and Latour respectively. In chapter 1, we review Gunton's detailed diagnosis of the ills of
modernity, with particular emphasis on the ways in which modernity may be seen to be an
outgrowth of a poorly conceived doctrine of creation. We also trace Gunton's diagnosis of the
Enlightenment project as one which served to fragment the realms of God, humans and
nonhumans in such a way as to engender alienation. In the second half of the first chapter we
review Gunton's constructive trinitarian suggestions towards the construction of a theological
amendment to the pitfalls of the modern project. In chapter 2 we largely follow the outline of
chapter 1 by introducing the sweeping project of Bruno Latour and his diagnosis of the
'modern Constitution'. In the second half of the chapter we turn our attention to outlining
Latour's constructive proposals for navigating our way out ofmodernity's failures by way of
his 'nonmodern constitution'.
Part 2 of this thesis consists of one rather large chapter which is fully dedicated to the
construction of a critical dialogue between the often parallel projects ofGunton and Latour.
The chapter could have been split into two separate chapters, but not without significantly
reducing the clarity and overall unity which the single chapter provides. Therefore, I have left
this chapter rather long but I believe with good cause. Chapter 3 sets out to compare the
trinitarian and nonmodern projects on three specific points of contact, each of which revolves
around the three-fold relationship ofGod, humans, and nonhumans. Here we compare Gunton
and Latour's respective approaches to the related concepts of ontology and otherness,
mediation and relation, as well as unity andmultiplicity. The chapter concludes with a mutual
critique of the two projects, using each to correct the shortcomings or blindspots of the other.
Part 3 consists of two chapters each of which is dedicated to the development of what
I have called a theo-geographical concept of placing. In chapter 4 we trace out the
geographical adoption of Latour's nonmodem thought with particular reference to the
emerging nonmodern concept of placing. Here the concept of placing serves to counteract the
alienating currents ofmodernity and helps us to reconsider human embodiment in a world
saturated with socio-material content. Finally in chapter 5 we move to consider recent
theological adoptions of the human geographical concept of place. Our concern here is to
illustrate the profound shortcomings of these recent adoptions, illustrating that they have done
little to overcome specifically modern forms of alienation. The chapter concludes with
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suggestions towards the construction of a theo-geographical concept of the placing which
adopts a particularly trinitarian logic. In proposing a trinitarian concept of geographical
placing it is hoped that we may be better equipped to register the intimate relational
dynamism that exists between humans and nonhumans as they find their shape in relation to
the Triune God of creation.
In sum, the overall trajectory of this thesis may be summarized in the following
terms. First, this thesis presents a critical review ofColin Gunton's trinitarian theology of
creation and culture, and Bruno Latour's nonmodern thought. Secondly, the thesis attempts to
use both of these projects in such a way as to be mutually enlightening and corrective of their
respective blindspots or pitfalls. Third, by reviewing both of our interlocutor's diagnosis of
the fragmentation and alienation attendant to the Enlightenment, and then pairing the projects
in mutual critique, this thesis seeks to add depth to each of our interlocutors accounts of
modernity, and the Church's culpability in instigating the currents ofmodernity. Fourth, we
are here deeply committed to understanding how a trinitarian theology may be able to register
and account for the participation of nonhumans in sociality and non-anthropomorphic agency.
Fifth, this thesis seeks to critically adopt the human geographical concept of place in an effort
to construct a trinitarian theology ofplacing that may fully account for the intimate
relationality that exists between God, humans, and nonhumans.
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Part I - Trinitarian Theology and Nonmodern Thought
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Chapter 1
Colin Gunton's Trinitarian Theology of Creation and Culture
'In the light of the theology of the Trinity, everything looks different.'
- Colin E. Gunton
Introduction
Until his sudden death on May 6, 2003, Colin E. Gunton was Professor of Christian
Doctrine at King's College, University of London, and associate pastor at his beloved
Brentwood United Reformed church. It was here that Gunton built an extremely successful
theological career that spanned more than 30 years and in the process gave renewed life to the
practice of classical academic theology in his native England. This was not at all a minor
achievement considering that at the time when Gunton's theological project was truly
beginning to find its feet - the early nineteen eighties - theology in the English university was
largely on the retreat, as it slowly fell victim to the cultural and academic fashions of the day.
As Douglas Knight has observed, Colin Gunton began his theological project in the English
university at a time when Christian truth claims were being evaluated in order to reveal which
Doctrines 'insulted the dignity of "modern man" and ought to be expunged. Tradition,
imagination and the indeterminability of the relationship of language and world had to be
laboriously defended'.1
The faithful community was consequently working within a framework which it
found to be altogether foreign, but as Gunton would strongly illustrate, it was a framework in
which the Church itself had a hand in building. Due to the onslaught ofmodernity and its
postmodern fallout, faith and reason were now understood to exist at opposite ends of a
dichotomy that was bought wholesale by many theologians within the academy of the time. In
response to the hyper-rationalism of these modern philosophical currents, theology grew to
become overly occupied with the rapid deconstruction and sanitization of its own central
doctrines.2 As all knowledge was reported to be passing away, and the Christian tradition was
being increasingly left behind, fears of a full-blown crisis began to ripple through the
academy, while voices of calm were altogether rare.
Colin Gunton was one theologian who proved to be unalarmed by the 'newness' of
the times. In Yesterday and Today (1983), Gunton outlines his analysis of the 'crisis' that
currently exercised a stranglehold on theology in the English university. In this book he
1
Douglas Knight, "From Metaphor to Mediation: Colin Gunton and the concept ofmediation," Neu
Zeitschrift Fur Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 43 (2001), pp. 118.
2 For instance, John Hick ed. The Myth ofGod Incarnate, (London: SCM, 1977).
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outlined his proposition that the contemporary crisis facing the confessing community was by
no means a new phenomenon in the wide scope of church history. Instead, Gunton was to
propose that it was closely akin to the cultural and philosophical climate that surrounded the
early church fathers at the very beginnings of the Christian Church. Not unlike our
contemporary situation, the Fathers 'lived at a time when old orders were crumbling, and
found themselves not only thinking the foundations of the Christian tradition but also
rethinking the nature and reality of human knowledge'.3 After all, the cultural collapse that
was now challenging the Church was the collapse of the same culture that had been largely
constructed upon the foundation laid by the Western Fathers. Gunton's great insight was to
further highlight the continuities and discontinuities between ancient and modern thought,
claiming centrally that our familiar 'post-Kantian dualism and the dualistic thinking of the
Greeks that provided the background ofmuch ancient Christology - as well as the foreground
of ancient heresy - are one and the same intellectual phenomena.'4 Although being cut from
the same philosophical cloth, ancient and modem philosophies still embody elements of
discontinuity. As Gunton would repeatedly rehearse in Yesterday and Today, and in much of
his later work, the early Fathers were largely concerned with illustrating Jesus ofNazareth's
participation in eternity, whereas modem theologians have been equally concerned with
illustrating his participation in temporality. Western culture has thus been continually locked
in two competing sides of a dualism, and theology has ever since fallen into two competing
methodologies: theologies 'from above' and theologies 'from below'.
Throughout his career, Gunton repeatedly returned to this question of how Christian
theology should conceptualize God's continuing relation with this created realm. After
detailing the pitfalls of the equally problematic extremes of theology from 'above' and
'below', Gunton grew to become increasingly convinced that the answer to the God/world
relationship was to be found in the doctrine of the Trinity. As his now classic study The One,
the Three, and the Many has masterfully detailed, the Trinity became for Gunton the key to
navigating our way out of our particularly Western dualisms in an effort to reveal the dynamic
relationship between eternity and time, Creator and creation, unity and particularity. In this
book the Trinity emerges - more fully than it did in Yesterday and Today - as the key to
understanding the proper continuity of the Church's response to its cultural milieu, whether it
is that of the ancients, modems, or even postmodems. Gunton finds that it is when the
Church tradition has been unable to maintain the properly trinitarian shape of its confession
that it has soon lost the ability to maintain the proper tension between theologies from 'above'
and 'below'.
3 Colin E. Gunton, Yesterday and Today: A Study ofContinuities in Christology, 2nd (London: Darton,




Thus the task of constructing a 'fully Trinitarian theology', to use the subtitle to one
of his last books, would be the hallmark of nearly all ofGunton's work following the
publication of Yesterday and Today. For him it was absolutely clear that the Church tradition,
since the time of the early Fathers, had slowly begun to lose its distinctly trinitarian character.
And it is for this reason that Gunton would often single out the work of Augustine as being
particularly detrimental for theology in the West due to his culpability in the diminishing of
the Trinity. One can detect throughout Gunton's many works a rather pronounced element of
displeasure with Augustine's inability to fully grasp, appreciate, and ultimately express the
Trinitarian being of the Godhead.
In The Promise ofTrinitarian Theology, Gunton highlights three points upon which
Augustine's theology fails in this important regard. First, buy seeking to find trinitarian
analogies in the threefold pattern of human mental experience and the human soul, completely
outside of God's 'economy of salvation - what actually happens in Christ and with the
Spirit—Augustine introduces a tendency to draw apart the being of God—what he is
eternally—and his act—what he does in time'.5 Therefore, we find in Augustine a
fundamental failure to understand God's historical action towards the creation as being
mediated through both Christ and the Holy Spirit. Elsewhere Gunton argues that following
Augustine this task ofmediation was to be more deeply Platonized as it was 'increasingly, to
be performed by the universals, which were traditionally conceived to be a timeless
conceptual structure informing otherwise shapeless matter'.6 Secondly, and closely related to
the first objection, Gunton argues that Augustine goes too far in emphasizing the notion that
the economic actions of the Trinity are essentially undivided. Here again we find the role of
Son and Spirit being diminished as the Trinitarian being of the Godhead is pushed into a
unified, and monistic, whole. The result is that the Trinitarian character of the economic
Trinity is almost entirely lost. Finally, Gunton highlights the failure of Augustine to treat the
concept of the person in a sufficiently Trinitarian manner. On the whole Augustine seems to
lean towards a more unitarian vision ofGod's personae as he tends to locate God's
personhood in his unified oneness, rather than his unified threeness.
The 'cultural collapse' with which Gunton paints modernity and its symptoms - the
various species of postmodernity and its attendant fragmentation - are in no small measure
the outgrowth of this insufficiently trinitarian theology we find in Augustine and his medieval
and modern offspring. To the three theological pitfalls we have outlined above, we may add
another two that weigh heavily in Gunton's more recent critique. First, the paradoxes of
modernity and post-modernity have had much to do with a theological failure to properly
relate creation to redemption. Augustine's insufficiently trinitarian theology is once again
5
Gunton, The Promise ofTrinitarian Theology, 2nd ed., (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991, 1997), p. 3-4.
6
Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, p. 55.
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instructive, for it was he who strongly emphasized the doctrine of predestination, stressing, as
he did, the election and salvation of a select few people from the overall mass of humanity.
The result was a view of the salvation of a few human beingsfrom the created order, rather
than an understanding of the redemption of 'man in and with the whole created order'.7
Secondly, and perhaps one of the most important harbingers ofmodernity, we find in
Augustine an account of creation that emphasizes the arbitrary will of the creator. As the role
of the Son and Spirit are downplayed in the act of creation, and the overwhelming will of the
One God is stressed, we find that the theology which emerges sets the stage for modern forms
of deism and atheism, as Hans Blumenberg and Michael Buckley have argued.8
It is, however, important at this early stage that we recognize the fact that Gunton has
come under some important criticism concerning his often sweeping historical analysis of
what he considers to be the loss of the trinitarian shape of theology in the West. As we will
discuss more fully at the end of the next section, Gunton's critics have been particularly
concerned to illustrate that he has, perhaps, deeply misunderstood and misrepresented the
trinitarian shape ofAugustine and Aquinas's respective theological programs. Gunton's
critics have sometimes accused him of erecting something of a straw-man portrait of
Augustine and Aquinas only for the purpose ofmore easily offering his 'fully trinitarian'
remedy to the many ills ofmodernity. To be certain, many of these criticisms appear to have
some teeth, but again, we will return to these points after detailing Gunton's own account of
the theological and philosophical pedigree of our modern predicament.
For now we may conclude by summarizing the overall problem which Gunton finds
in Augustine and his medieval successors by reiterating his claim that their theologies are all
too 'other-worldly' and ultimately marked by an inability to fully affirm this world of created
space and time. The antidote to such 'other-worldly' theologies will find its shape firmly
rooted, according to Gunton, in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and by once again
seeking to understand the roles ofboth Son and Spirit in the mediation between God and
world, and similarly between personal creatures (humans in the image ofGod) and the non-
personal. Seeking to describe these relationships is, for Gunton, at the very heart of the
theological project. Moreover, because the
theology of the Trinity has so much to teach about the nature of our world and life
within it, it is or could be the centre of Christianity's appeal to the unbeliever, as the
good news of God who enters into free relations of creation and redemption with his
world. In the light of the theology of the Trinity, everything looks different.9
7 Gunton, "The Doctrine ofCreation," chap, in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 150.
8 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, translated by Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge,
MA, and London: MIT Press, 1983); Michael Buckley, At the Origins ofModern Atheism (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1987).
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In an effort to add depth to this claim we will now turn our attention to the elucidation of
Gunton's Trinitarian theology of creation and culture. Here we will seek to find the specific
ways in which Gunton defines and relates the realms of human and nonhuman creation,
society and nature, as well as God and world. Our overall purpose is to discover the particular
form and shape of human and nonhuman relationality within the Trinitarian matrix which
Gunton has outlined. Furthermore, we are interested in discovering the shape which these
relationships take within space and time specifically.10 We begin by outlining what has been
lost in modernity's account of these important relations. Here Gunton's overriding thesis may
be characterized thusly: there is, he argues, a fundamental relation between the 'way the
doctrine of creation was formulated in the West and the shape modern culture has taken'.11
I. Our Modern Inheritance
As we have already alluded, Gunton finds very little that is distinctively new in this
current era known as modernity, or, perhaps, past-modernity or /ate-modernity. In fact, what
we have found in the modern period is nothing more than the ancient but familiar Gnostic
worldview, reformulated and re-presented in new clothes. Posing as a new intellectual
alternative to the failed theologies 'from above', modernity turned its attention to the
distinctly human sphere, and thereby lost touch with the essence ofwhat makes Christian
theology particularly Christian— that is, the gospel of the incarnate Christ.12 It can be said
without exaggeration that the bulk of Gunton's theological program has been directed towards
offsetting the theological and cultural fallout ofmodernity, but particularly its tendency
towards 'fragmentation', 'homogenization', 'disengagement', 'subjectivism', and 'relativism'
all ofwhich have been so characteristic of this age.
Importantly, Gunton understands that modernity is the logical outgrowth of a flawed
doctrine of creation, but particularly the modern inability to understand creation in fully
trinitarian terms. This is a shortcoming we have already seen to be most clearly expressed,
according to Gunton, in the theology of Augustine. Again the continuity between the church
of today and the early church can be found in the fact that each has been forced to develop
and defend a trinitarian account of relationality. This is because each of these eras has sought
to 'play the one against the many, or the many against the one, in such a way that the rights of
10
Although there are very pronounced consistencies within the wide breadth ofGunton's many
publications, his unexpected death abruptly ended his plans to publish a full systematic theology. What
we do have in his staggering amount ofpublished work remains, to a large degree, in the 'occasional'
English style. Thus in our attempt to fully embody and give structure to Gunton's theological program,
which clearly evolved over the course of his career, we will necessarily be required to draw from a
wide variety of his published works in an attempt to reveal some the finer points and continuities
within his trinitarian theology of creation and culture.
11
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both are often lost'.13 And just as the early fathers were forced to confront the Greek and
Arian onslaught, such as the view of Protagoras that all truth is relative to the particular
perceiver, so too must the church of today stand in opposition to the cultural currents of
subjectivism and relativism. Moreover, as the problems of this era are the outgrowth of a
flawed theology, then it follows that the Church's response - its witness - should also consist
of the presentation and elucidation of the orthodox and Trinitarian creed. 'Modernity', Gunton
writes, 'is like all cultures, in being in need of the healing light of the gospel of the Son of
God, made incarnate by the Holy Spirit for the perfecting of creation.'14
It is perhaps rather difficult to pin down the date to which Gunton attributes the
genesis of the Enlightenment, maintaining as he did that modernity was really little different
to much of ancient Greek thought. Recognizing the rather ambiguous historical origins of
modernity, Gunton argues that it had certainly found its fulcrum by the middle of the
eighteenth century in thinkers like Immanuel Kant. Its earliest genesis, however, can be traced
further back to the thought of those early philosophers of science, Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
and Rene Descartes (1596-1650). The task of dating modernity's genesis is further
complicated by the fact that modernity itself consists ofmany ideas, movements,
philosophies, and theologies. This is why Gunton will argue that modernity is much more a
'family of dogmas and practices' than a single entity. Among these diverse dogmas and
practices Gunton includes postmodernity, which he prefers to call late modernity, as he sees it
as no more than a symptom ofmodernity proper.15 For Gunton it is beyond question that
modernity represents no less a threat to the church than did the Arian controversies which
originally spawned the Trinitarian defense of Christian truth claims. The sum weight of these
various modern dogmas and practices has created, in Gunton's estimation, four particular
detrimental movements or tendencies: disengagement and the fragmentation of culture, the
severing of belief from truth, the displacement of God, and an impoverished notion of
personhood. It is to a brief elucidation of these four pitfalls that we now turn, while holding
over until the second halfof the chapter Gunton's specifically Trinitarian and theological
response to these modern cultural and intellectual currents.
Modern Ontology: the Un-Substantiality ofthe Many
The first aspect of the modern paradox consists of its loss of any sense of true
substantiality in the created world - the world of reality. As is well known, Gunton appeals,
as heuristic device, to the contrasting ancient Greek philosophies ofHeraclitus and
Parmcnides who seem to have held opposing ontological positions on the 'nature' ofmatter
13
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itself. These interlocutors are useful in that they clearly express the ancient question
concerning the relationship of the one and the many. To begin with, Heraclitus has long been
associated with the view of reality as flux, plurality, multiplicity, and motion. He is then, the
original philosopher of the many overcoming the unifying movement of the one. Parmenides
stands at the opposite pole of this ancient dichotomy, positing instead that reality is
unchanging, timeless, and on an ontologically basic level, unified. Ultimately, for
Parmenides, the 'many do not really exist, except it be as functions of the One'.16
The problem of the one and the many is an ancient one, and is of no less a concern
today than it was for the ancient Greek philosophers. In fact, Gunton maintains that every age
since the genesis of this ancient Greek debate has continued to trade upon privileging either
the one or the many. The Greeks appear to have allied more closely with the Parmenidian
philosophy, tending towards monism. For our age, Gunton finds that the two philosophies
continue to compete for prominence, and often collapse into indistinguishability - thus the
'modern paradox'. He also points out that the question of the one and the many is not limited
to cosmology alone - the question ofwhether the universe is ultimately plural or singular -
but is implicated to an equal degree in our social ordering. Moreover, it is in the modern
period that we have seen a wavering between collectivist (communist totalitarianism) and
individualist (Western capitalism) social orderings. Going against the main thrust of the
modern paradox, Gunton proposes that we must once again seek to find ways of relating these
realms to one another - the cosmological and the social.
As we have already mentioned, for Gunton, the Enlightenment sought to sever our
cosmological ontology - the being of the universe - from the way in which we understand our
personal particularity, and our social ordering. We will recall that the Modern desired to be
free from any natural determination, and thus denied any perceived bondage to God or the
material world. Therefore, the ontological fallout within the social realm (the personal)
closely followed the modern metaphysics ofmaterial or worldly reality (the nonhuman)
within which personal life is lived. If the ' inscape' within which modern life took place was
thought to be ultimately unsubstantial, like the impermanence ofHeraclitus, then personal
reality within this world would also ultimately reflect this cosmological ontology. As is so
often the case, epistemology closely follows our accepted ontology. Being 'uneasy with those
people and things which make up the manyness of reality', Gunton argues, modernity has
ultimately proven incapable of affirming the status of either the one or the many.17
Plato is, for Gunton, highly instructive on this point, as it was he who was first to
offer a sustained account of the one and the many, and has subsequently had a lasting impact






account ofmaterial reality that reflects the flux and insubstantiality that so consumed
Heraclitus. In the Timeaus Plato teaches of a two stage creation. First, we learn that there was
a perfectly timeless circular mass ofmatter 'constructed from fire, water, air and earth'.18
Therefore, the first stage is one of pure formless matter that is filled with the divine soul and
is eternal. The second stage consisted of the introduction of time to the formless material.
This 'realm of the forms' added shape and pattern to all of the particulars within the creation,
however imperfectly. The material world then becomes much like a flawed facsimile of the
divine and eternal world of the forms. The outcome, as Gunton explains, is that 'material
things are only half real, existing as they do mid-way between being and non-being'.19 Within
this dualistic ontology we come to find that to be material is to partake in a lesser form of
being.
In order to counter-act the unsubstantiality of the material particulars, we also find a
Parmenidean element in Plato's philosophy. Here we learn that it is the rational mind which
raises the material human being into the realm of the universal forms. Therefore, it is the
human mind, through the exercise of reason, which brings unity to the fleeting multiplicity
found in the material realm. As Gunton explains, it is not the 'otherness-in-relation' of the
material particular that is 'constitutive of their real being, which is seen to lie in a universal
whose tendency is to render them homogeneous'.20 As the Platonizing of the Western mind
has been passed down, especially through the Platonized Christian theologies of Origen and
Augustine, the result has been what Gunton refers to as the 'double mind' of the West.
The 'double minding' of the West is, as Gunton argues, largely the result of a
Platonizing of the Christian God and the Christian doctrine of creation. For it is in Plato and
his medieval Christian offspring that we find a movement towards celebrating particularity
and variety but in a way that ultimately subverts that very particularity. What is lost is
something like Irenaeus' conception of God's particularizing will that is mediated through
both the Son and the Spirit. Instead, what the Platonizing tradition accomplished was a
diminishing of this particularizing will, replacing it instead with the 'general conceptual
forms' ofPlato.21 This has been clearly expressed in the medieval and modern
'substantializing of the divine image' - a movement which envisions a shared 'God stuff, or
singular internal characteristic such as rationality or soul, that precludes relationality.22 It is
this element ofmodernity, according to Gunton, that would ultimately be taken up and
18 Gunton, The Triune Creator. A Historical and Systematic Study, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), p.
30.
19 Ibid., p. 29.
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expanded upon by the nominalist theologies of the late medieval and early modern periods.
We will return to this extremely important point on modern nominalism later in this chapter.
For now we may conclude this section by commenting on the modern notion of
substance, or substantiality, as it is expressed in modern aesthetics and artistic representation.
Gunton's work is widely concerned with aesthetic matters, arguing as he has, that the 'realm
of arts also provides an excellent illustration of the way in which the modern world does not
seem to know where it stands in reality'.23 And it is here that we find the work of the
Impressionists - modern as they were - to be instructive. Gunton, commenting on the thought
ofG.K. Chesterton, argues that the works of the Impressionists depict a world which 'appears
to have no backbone, and some analyses of late modernity appear to confirm the judgment
that a loss of substantiality is at the heart of the matter'.24 The confused and fragmented
images of the impressionists ultimately posit a world devoid of particularity or substantiality.
In an interesting meditation - interesting in anticipation of our later discussion of
place - Gunton relates these observations concerning the modern aesthetic to its fuller
expression in modern architecture. The problem of particularity reveals itself in what has
become a common anti-modern complaint. That is, that places are becoming homogeneous
under the crushing force of 'one size fits all' attitude of global capitalism. Everywhere we go
it is the same thing, the same aesthetic - Starbucks and golden arches. Yet anti-modern, or
perhaps non-modern, architects such as the celebrated Frank Lloyd Wright sought to build
architectural structures that were suited for their particular environments. Anti-modern
architects, like Wright, sought to establish an aesthetic which found importance in
particularity, seeking the 'way a building fits into its setting'.25 One ofWright's most famous
homes, Falling Water, clearly counters the modern forces of homogenization. Built to perch
perilously atop a rocky outcrop with a small 'natural' stream running through it, Wright's
masterpiece is celebrated for its attention to particularity - it was made to fit into that
particular place. But like the modern metaphysical scheme as a whole, the modem aesthetic
is largely allergic to particularity of this kind. It is for this reason that the words 'modem
architecture' are so quick to conjure thoughts ofbland and soulless structures that look as if
they were made for another world, or in fact, anyplace. The charge being that the underlying
modem ontology is essentially place-less, tending as it does towards homogeneity.
Modern Epistemology: The Problem ofPerception
We may now address the problem concerning how we are to rely on our embodied
senses to communicate the marginally-real material realm to our universalizing capacity to






reason. Here we encounter the issue concerning what Gunton calls the 'commerce' between
the human person and the world that is perceived through the senses. As noted above, we find
here an ontological argument concerning the 'nature' ofmaterial reality closely implicating an
attendant epistemology. For if our metaphysical scheme informs us that the material realm is
somehow less-than-real, and the human senses are themselves material, it then follows that
our sense perceptions of that material realm will be similarly flawed. On this account there is
little faith to be instilled in the human senses. What subsequently develops in Greek
philosophy is an understanding that 'perception is necessarily inferior to reason and is
accordingly strongly contrasted to it'.26 The result is, as Gunton argues, a radical human
alienation from a material realm (the world) due to the absence of a mediating third factor. In
this section we will seek to trace some of the major movements concerning the problem of
perception in the modem tradition.
In his coming to understand the modem characterization of the 'commerce' between
humans and the nonhuman creation (reality), Gunton highlights the peculiar modem tendency
to distinguish between passive sensation and active reason. Again, Plato is instmctive on
these points, as he was an early harbinger ofwhat was to come in the Enlightenment. The
perception of the material world by the senses was for Plato, not to be trusted. The reasons for
this are two-fold. First, as we have noted above, Plato saw in materiality only impermanence
and flux. Therefore, that which partook of the material realm was thought to be only
marginally real. This is the ontological argument. Secondly, Gunton argues, that for Plato,
perception 'is what happens when there is an interrelation taking place in time between that
which acts (the world) and that which is acted upon (the person)'.27 It is here that we meet for
the first time what will become an important theme throughout this thesis. That is, the ability
or inability of the nonhuman realm to exercise some form of agency - the ability to act upon -
in regard to the human person.28
Plato understood the perception of a particular happening in the material world to be
just that, particular, having no share in what is general or universal. In perception it is the
material particular which acts upon the human senses whether it is willed or unwilled by the
human person. Perception is then additionally understood to be apassive faculty. The human
mind, however, was understood to exercise reason (actively) which brought unity to the
imperfect particulars which populated reality. It was towards this end of the dualism that Plato
attributed human agency to the commerce between humans and the world. 'Thus', as Gunton
26
Gunton, Enlightenment andAlienation, p. 14-15.
27 Ibid., p. 14.
28 As will be made clear in subsequent chapters, Bruno Latour's project and that ofmany geographers,
is greatly concerned with giving some account of nonhuman agency or 'actancy
16
writes, 'the contrast between the two mental functions centers on the fact that perception is at
least partly bodily and passive while reason, in its abstracting and evening role, is active'.29
Here again we see something of the 'double minding' that would become so
characteristic ofWestern philosophy all the way up to the Enlightenment's natural
philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries. The world is partially made up ofmarginally-real
material particulars that force themselves upon the human mind through the faulty 'windows'
of perception.30 In this manner the human mind is passive as material particulars 'impress' or
'impinge' themselves upon the mind. Secondly, the active function of the rational human
mind added the universalizing layers of form and unity - again, actively - to the multiplicity
of particulars. The result, as Gunton argues, was that there 'developed a distinction between
passive sensation and active reason, and this gave another reason for the disparagement of the
material and the sensed by contrast with the intelligible and that which was conceived
rationally'.31
Contained within this line of thought is a Greek philosophical pedigree which
Gunton, perhaps too easily, traces to early modem philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, and
Hume.32 Briefly, Gunton characterizes each of these thinkers as sharing in the Greek distrust
of sense perception due to the unsubstantiality of the material particular and the faultiness of
the material sense organs. All that presents itself to the mind, through the senses, was thought
to be questionable as it could be mere illusion or perhaps the result of intentional deceit 'by a
malign and super-human spirit'.33 Descartes' infamous response was to retreat to the
interiority of the human mind, positing as he did that it was the human mind disembodied
from the flawed senses that gave firm ground for the rational adoption of knowledge.
Moreover, Gunton points out the rather common assumption that Descartes held to a rather
dualistic understanding ofmatter and mind. Matter was to be understood as 'extension', or
that which fills space. This conception ofmatter was to be strictly distinguished from mind
which was seen to be that which was not 'extended' in space.34 Again, the effect was very
much one of distancing the rational human mind from its mechanistically conceived world.
John Locke did much to perpetuate the dualistic philosophy of Descartes by drawing
a radical distinction betweenprimary and secondary qualities. The difference between Locke
29 Ibid., p. 15.
30 The word 'windows' is, perhaps, rather appropriate in this instance as many Enlightenment thinkers
portrayed the sense organs as the windows to the mind. Windows much like that of the contemporary
technological triumph of perception known as the camera obscura or the doors to a 'cabinet' (Locke)
containing the individual mind.
31 Ibid., p. 13.
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and Descartes, according to Gunton, is found in that 'the latter held that the mind was at birth
furnished with a number of ideas by the elucidation ofwhich it was able to understand the
world'. Locke, on the other hand, 'held that the mind obtained its contents from without'.35
What both men held to was a notion that materiality, mechanistically conceived, acted upon
passive human senses at the divine behest. On this point, Gunton further highlights Locke's
conception of the mind as tabula rasa, as it vividly depicts the passivity of perception through
the senses. The material world actively presents itself to the senses, yet it is the rational
human will which works to give form to these impressions. Again, perception is here reduced
to mere sensing, while the active human reason or will is given the place of privilege. The
positive side of this is to be found in the fact that both Descartes and Locke have attempted to
account for the 'commerce' between human and nonhuman worlds. Yet they have also
engender alienation by way of positing that the material particular is not truly sensed, but
rather, it is the innate ideas - which appear unbidden upon the tabula rasa of the mind due to
the mechanistic action of the material world - that are ultimately perceived. 'But because
perception and reality are entirely separate, only agnosticism is possible about whether we
perceive what is there'.36 The additions brought in by the most radical of empiricists, David
Hume, were in a similar vein. Phenomena happen in the world 'out there' and are rendered by
the senses, whilst human reason supplies the concepts and ideas to those events. In the end,
we now have a world populated with particulars that have no true relationality between them.
As Gunton glosses; in Hume we find that 'perception and reality are further apart than ever
before'.37
In the interest of space we will limit the remainder of our review ofGunton's
understanding of the currents ofmodem epistemology to one ofmodernity's leading
spokesman, Immanuel Kant. The philosophy ofKant is instructive also for its obvious descent
from the ancient Greek thinkers. As Gunton has argued, Kant was most certainly modernity's
'leading Sophist and its Plato'.38 Gunton justifies this view by way of appeal to Kant's
adherence to a two-tiered world consisting of what he termed noumena and phenomena. The
noumena were the actual objects of thought, while the phenomena are understood to be the
things which appear to the senses. The debt to Plato is clear, for the former tier - the 'higher'
noumenal realm, containing the metaphysical divine 'ideas' - was the cause of the latter, the
mere phenomena of our personal experience.39 This, however, returns us to our ontological
question concerning what it is that is actually being sensed. We will remember Locke's
response, to which Kant is partially indebted, when he stated that our sensations are indeed
35 Gunton, Enlightenment andAlienation, p. 18.
36 Ibid., p. 20.
37 Ibid., p. 22.
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caused by some thing, but 'we know not what'. The two traditional answers to this problem
have been either God or substance. But for Kant and Locke this simply cannot be known,
'because there is no way in which the mind can penetrate beyond the appearances' - the
phenomena - 'into what is really there' - the noumena.40 For Gunton this indicates that we
may now see modern ontology and modem epistemology coming to full fruition in the
philosophy ofKant. Adopting as he did the two-tiered world of Plato, Kant goes even further
to then posit that there is no way in which we may come to know what the underlying reality
actually is.
This is not to say that absolutely nothing can be known within the Kantian
philosophical framework, but rather, that what is known of the 'outside' world is only the
product of the structured impressions of the human mind. As the manifold ofmaterial
particulars present themselves to the human senses it is, once again, the role of the active
human mind to impose upon this plurality a framework which can be understood. This is
especially true of that which cannot be directly sensed, such as the now famous examples of
space, time, and cause. In what is perhaps an ingenious amalgamation of Hume's doubt, and
Newton's mechanistic physics, Kant turned to the mechanical structuring activity of the mind
to supply the categories by which the world 'outside' is known. In the often rehearsed
example of space and time, Newton found that these were absolute features of the world.
Kant on the other hand, expressing some of the empirical doubt ofHume, found these to be
absolute in another sense - that is, 'as conditions for any experience of the phenomenal world
- the world given to our senses'.41 Space and time are then subjective conditions supplied by
the human mind in order to make sense of the world. Even if space and time were to truly
exist in the world 'outside' of the mind, we could not but be agnostic concerning their
ultimate reality. The same is again true of causality which cannot be established through
empirical observation as Hume maintained. Instead, causality, like space and time, was to be
relegated by Kant to the mechanistic patterning of the rational mind.
We may conclude with a brief summary evaluation ofwhat these movements in
Enlightenment epistemology represent for Gunton's diagnosis ofmodernity. First, Gunton
points out that the overall effect was to encourage skepticism and idealism concerning human
commerce with the 'outside' world:
skepticism because, as in Newton, it appears that the underlying real world cannot be
known at all, only the world appearing to our senses; and idealism because the weight
is placed not on knowledge of the world, but on the contribution the mind makes to






Moreover, Kant's framework is, for Gunton, far too rigid in its closing out of alternative
conceptions of knowledge making. Part of this rigidity is found in Kant's argument that all
minds contain within them unchanging and universal concepts that are strictly obedient to
mechanistic Newtonianism. It is within this vein that Kant has limited 'articulation of human
knowledge of the truth ofbeing' to the justifications of science alone - ethics and aesthetics
are then cast aside in the search for truth.43 Secondly, Gunton finds in Kant's (qualified)
idealism a pronounced drive to force God out of the phenomenal realm - the world - all
together. For Kant, God belonged fully to the noumenal realm, 'the real but intellectually
shadowy world underlying this one'.44 The outgrowth of this banishing ofGod from the
immanent sphere is clearly found in the modern movement of deism. It is to a deeper
accounting of this element ofKant's philosophy, and the wider modern project as a whole,
that we will now turn.
Theology ofModernity: The Displaced God
It can be expected that the ontological and epistemological currents of the modem
era, as powerful as they were, would dramatically impact the theology of the time as well.
This is a point which is certainly not lost to the projects of both Gunton and, as we shall see,
Latour. Both of our interlocutors are concerned to highlight the modem demand for ultimate
autonomy from authoritarian structures, whether this heteronomy be found in the monarchy,
the church, or even nature and society. The thought ofKant is again instmctive, for his work
embodied a radical distmst of the heteronomy which God was seen to have held over the
premodem. As Gunton has illustrated, Kant was not altogether anti-religious, yet he did
protest 'against any view that sees our behaviour as being imposed upon us by God' or by a
mechanistically conceived world.45 Yet, according to Gunton, this is certainly not a movement
peculiar to Kant alone, as its genesis may be traced to the middle ages, but particularly to the
thought of John Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308) and William ofOckham (c. 1285-1347). In light
of this, we will now attempt to trace the shape of this modem move to distance God from the
realm of creation as Gunton has described it.
One finds throughout Gunton's work a sustained involvement with what he has
termed the 'rootless will ofmodernity'.46 The beginnings of this rootless will can, in Gunton's
estimation, be traced all the way back to Irenaeus who stressed the absolute freedom with
which God initiated the creation. Irenaeus made this claim in light of his understanding that
God had created all things out of nothing - creatio ex nihilo. For him there could be nothing
43
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coeternal with God, for this thing, as it held to infinitude, would then 'impose necessity on the
creator' ,47 This was, however, a very different understanding of the absolute willing of
creation by the Creator than would develop in the early modem era. This is because Irenaeus
matched this stress on the will of the Creator with a mediating measure of relationality
conceived as love. On this account, creation is the outcome of the omnipotent Creator's will
brought into effect by the Trinitarian community of love. This, as Gunton highlights,
maintains 'the centrality of the trinitarian mediators of creation to ensure the purposiveness of
the creation, its non-arbitrary character. '4S
In the introduction to this chapter we reviewed some of the theological pitfalls which
Gunton has traced to Augustine's inadequate treatment of the doctrine of creation. There we
learned that Gunton found his theology inadequate in not being fully trinitarian. Once again,
Gunton finds this to be true again in Augustine's construal of God's omnipotent willing of the
creation. Where as Irenaeus carefully maintained a relationship between creation and
redemption, Augustine, according to Gunton, fails to fully appreciate God's continuing
relation - through his Son and Spirit - to the creation he had originally willed. Gunton also
points out that in Augustine's stress on the omnipotent will of the creator, he subordinates the
role of love to that of God's all-powerful will. On this account, Augustine represents a
watershed, as all Western philosophical and theological treatments of this issue would rarely
be adequate following him. In those who followed Augustine 'creation becomes very much
the product of pure, unmotivated and therefore arbitrary will'.49 For Gunton, this clearly
signaled what would become the 'Babylonian captivity' of the doctrine of creation.
It is a strange notion that a rigid theology of creation as willed by an omnipotent
creator could eventually result in atheism, but as we have seen time and again, modernity is
full ofparadox. Beginning with Irenaeus, Gunton draws a line - although not without
controversy - connecting the theology ofAugustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, concerning their
emphasis on God as the ultimate cause and will of creation. 'Modernity happens', Gunton
insists, 'when the will moves into the driving seat'.50 The thought of John Duns Scotus and
William ofOckham are also classed by Gunton as representing a watershed in the tradition's
understanding of God's relationship to the creation. Although very different thinkers, Scotus
and Ockham represent a late medieval revival of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and a new
reinforcement of a voluntarist understanding of creation.
In the Triune Creator, Gunton presents his most sustained account of the theologies
of Scotus and Ockham. In this book he shapes three main developments which Scotus brought
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to the doctrine of creation. First, he argues that Scotus represents a movement away from the
Platonized notion of God as 'supreme reason'. It is in this vein that Scotus represents a return
to the Patristic emphasis (Irenaeus) on creation as the free and personal willing of the creator
God.
The shift to an emphasis on the divine will means that for Scotus God is the creator
both of things and of their forms. Forms are not so much in the divine mind, so
partaking of a form of eternity, as more clearly a part of the created order. This, in
turn, leads to a new stress on particularity, with all its long-term epistemological
implications.51
On this account Scotus reins in a very promising ontology of the created world as being truly
real in itself. His doctrine of haecceitas, translated as 'this-ness', according to Gunton, grants
a renewed particularity to the multiplicity ofmaterial particulars which populate reality.
Secondly, Scotus introduces a renewed emphasis on the ontological homogeneity of all
created beings. According to Gunton, this stands in stark contrast to the Neoplatonic
theologies of the mediaeval period which, like that of Aquinas, stressed a hierarchy, or 'great
chain ofbeing'. In true Platonic style, these chains of being were thought to have stretched
between 'pure mind' at the top, all the way down to 'pure matter' on the bottom. It is for this
reason that some have taken Scotus' development to constitute the second overcoming of
Gnosticism.52 Equally importantly, Gunton finds in this a 'radical rejection of the pantheist
undertow ofAquinas' thought'.53 Thirdly, and perhaps most promising for a trinitarian
theology of creation, Scotus develops a concept ofmediation between God and world that is
not based on Platonic forms, but rather, on christology. As Gunton states, Scotus' 'view that
Christ is definitive for the relation of God to the whole world at least opens up the possibility
of a return to a Christological mediation of creation'.54
For Gunton, the influence of Scotus was very promising in regard to its attempt at
freeing the doctrine of creation from its 'Babylonian captivity'. However, Scotus' closest
philosophical heir, William ofOckham, would not maintain these gains toward a more
Trinitarian concept ofmediation. Although there is little evidence to intimately link Scotus
with Ockham, as they often are, there is some affinity to be found between the two scholars.
According to Gunton Ockham embodies some of the pitfalls associated with holding to the
doctrine of creation ex nihilo without attending to the ontology of the created world. The first
of these involves Ockham's position that creation, as the product of the omnipotent will of the
creator, is ultimately arbitrary and tending towards irrationality. Moreover, in contrast to
Scotus who taught that particulars were linked together by universals, Ockham held that
51 Ibid.






universals were merely the products of the mind. This is not to say that nothing can be known
of the material world, for the universals exist for Ockham, 'as proper human attempts to
generalize about the world'.55 It is for this reason, and his stressing of the contingency of
creation, that Ockham is so celebrated amongst historians of science for his part in making
scientific inquiry a legitimate pursuit.
Although both Scotus and Ockham emphasized God's personal divine willing of
creation, and thereby the contingency of creation, Ockham differs in his unsatisfactory
conception of the world's continuing relation to the omnipotent creator. It is for this reason
that Gunton feels justified in characterizing Ockham's discussion of creation as being
'entirely non-trinitarian', even to the point that he can miss the Christological significance of
creation in the opening to the Gospel of John.56 The problem, as Gunton describes it, is one of
a monistically conceived - and largely in terms ofwill - relation between the Creator and the
contingent world. Moreover, lacking the 'communal love' that was characteristic of the
Irenaean account, Ockham tends towards a 'radical theological voluntarism.' The result, as
Gunton argues,
is that for Ockham, human reason has the power to perceive neither the logical nor
the mediated, but only the contingent structuring of reality. The effect in theology is,
as Torrance says, that 'man is thrown back upon revealed truths which God provides
by his absolute power.' In other words a total disengagement of faith from reason is
threatened.57
The results of this are, according to Gunton, two-fold. First, a nominalist theology such as this
creates a radical separation of scientific and theological pursuits, since God becomes
essentially unknown, and the contingent world essentially knowable. As God becomes
irrelevant, due to His unknowability, a vacuum is created whereby the 'responsibility for
ordering the world - personal and non-personal alike - is transferred to the human from the
divine will.'58 This proved to eventually result in the much lamented severing of belief from
knowledge in the modern world. Secondly, Ockham served to undermine the doctrine of
creation by relocating the centre ofmeaning from God and placing it firmly within the
arbitrary will of the human agent. In the end we are left with a particularity without
relationality, a God relegated to the theological sidelines, and a rationalist reductionism that
would continue to shape modernity.
Like Ockham, Kant, according to Gunton, effectively relegated 'the concept of God,
which formerly had provided a basis for meaning and truth, to a realm ofwhich there could be
no knowledge'.59 We will remember that Kant's Platonizing was to be found in his mediation
55 Ibid., p. 122.
56 Ibid., p. 124.
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between noumenal and phenomenal realms by way of the transcendental structures of the
human mind, attributes which were once reserved for the deity. This represents Kant's
response to the threatened heteronomy so feared by the modems. Moreover, Kant is given
greater credit than Ockham in his being the greater force towards extending this evacuation of
God, not from the phenomenal sphere alone, but also from the wider realm of ethics.
Although we cannot exhaust the topic here, we may point out that Kant is not a subjectivist
when speaking of ethics. There is a sense in Kant's philosophy in which morals are
transcendentally 'imposed' upon the human agent by our 'rational nature'. But this is not the
re-imposition of heteronomy upon the human agent. The reason for this, Gunton explains, is
because the 'radicality ofKant's programme is that not only is ethics autonomous; the will is
also. The transcendent source of ethics is not really transcendent at all, for the source is the
will itself.'60 Here Kant clearly represents the modem movement to dislocate or distance God
from the realm of lawmaking and instead firmly locating this function within human reason
alone.
The trend would persist as modem philosophy and theology continued to develop
following Kant. To be brief, we may highlight Gunton's reference to the existential
philosophy of Sarte, who shared with Kant a 'virtual identification of the selfwith the will'.61
Moreover, Sarte would go even further than Kant in his positing that values were entirely the
creation of the autonomous individual. We may continue with a litany of examples leading to
the conclusion that the Enlightenment was a program of displacing the role of God in the
universe with the completely autonomous human will. But let us conclude with Gunton's
extremely important point that all of this modem fallout, and striving for autonomy, is the
direct result of a flawed Christian theology of creation in the West.
As Gunton makes clear in his many works, the theological pedigree of the 'rootless
will' ofmodernity can be traced directly to theologies which based their program upon the
idea that God is the omnipotent cause - or arbitrary will - of all things. Like Aquinas, who
began his theology with the understanding that God is ultimate power, thereby setting the
overall tone for the remainder of his theological work. But as Gunton insists, ifwe are to
define God as 'that upon which we are absolutely dependant' (Schleiermacher), or as the first
cause and omnipotent power (Aquinas), then 'God does appear to be an authoritarian power
against which revolt may seem an appropriate reaction.'62 It is ironic, if not tragic, that what
began as a theological attempt to ascribe absolute power to the God of creation has resulted in
modem atheism. On this point Gunton enlists the examples of Fichte, Feuerbach and
Nietzsche, all of whom rejected humanity's dependence on an omnipotent God on the
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grounds that it was ultimately dehumanizing. It is then clear, as Gunton maintains, that the
Enlightenment had legitimate complaint with its received theology of creation, but the
response it conjured was tragically misguided. What is needed, as we shall see in the next
section, is a Trinitarian conception of mediation. But before we turn to outline this central
proposal of Gunton's we will summarize this section by bringing each of these marks of the
modern condition to bear on the uniquely modern understanding of the human person or self.
TheModern Selfand Society: Disengagement and Fragmentation
There is no exaggeration in describing Colin Gunton as a theologian ofpersonhood,
as it is a theme which saturates nearly all of his works. On this point, one can often hear a
constant lamentation for the impoverished modern understanding of personhood, perhaps
better described simply as the 'modern self, lacking as it does any appreciation of true
personhood. In fact, as Knight has recently pointed out, Gunton was one of the first to insist
that the term 'person' or 'personhood', properly understood, is truly a theological term.63 In
the first chapter of The One the Three, and the Many, Gunton adopts the term
'disengagement', a term he attributes to Charles Taylor, to describe the modern movement
towards severing human embodiedness from its worldly home. Again, in the interest of tying
together the points made above, we will seek to briefly trace modernity's philosophical and
theological movements which instigated this disengagement from the material realm. Central
to this will be an elucidation of the modern theological understanding of the imago dei, as it
has also participated in this impoverished sense of self. Secondly, we will move up in scale
from modern selves to modern society. Here we will be interested in highlighting what
Gunton has described as the 'fragmentation' ofmodern culture, especially in the realms of
knowledge, ethics and aesthetics.
We have already reviewed the ontological and epistemological currents which
Gunton understands to have fueled this modern drive towards personal - or individual -
disengagement, built as it was on a pronounced distrust of substantiality and human sense
perception. As we now attempt to outline Gunton's understanding of the modern concept of
the human person, it will become clear that the ontological status ofparticular persons will
closely resemble that of the cosmos as a whole. For just as the modern movement was one of
homogenizing the material particulars of all being - the cosmos - so too is the human person
subsumed by the overwhelming force of homogeneity. Yet we can also find within the
modern milieu a pronounced sense of fragmentation between these homogenized individuals.
This is, of course, somewhat of a paradox considering the forces ofmodem consumer culture,
as Gunton indicates:
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For all its apparent pluralism, the world of the market that so dominates our lives is
actually making us all identical: all to drink coca cola and to eat at McDonald's, those
symbols of the homogenizing forces of modernity, all to wear the same only
superficially different designer clothes.64
We can now attempt to make explicit the anthropological tendencies ofmodernity which have
to this point been implicit. Following Gunton, we will trace the disengagement and
fragmentation ofmodem personhood in each of its primary manifestations, understanding that
each of these has at its heart a lack of relationality. These manifestations include the severing
ofmind from body, the diminishment of relationality between particular persons, and finally,
a diminishment of the relations between persons and the material - Gunton, as we shall see,
uses the term 'non-personal' - world.
We have already seen that the modem period was very much concerned with
establishing certainty in the face ofour flawed sense perception. That this would result in a
severing of human beings from a world understood as external to the viewer is, according to
Gunton, most clearly found in the philosophy ofDescartes. As is well known, Descartes
reintroduced many of the ancient Greek dualisms which can be blamed for this distancing of
humans from the material - mind over body, rationality over mechanism. We also find in
Descartes that the ontology of the human constitution closely reflects this dualistic vision of
the universe. The world consists of both brute matter and divine idea, and this is similarly
reflected in the godlike mind of the human, and the material body. As the godlike part of the
human, the mind 'is able by virtue of its equipment with innate ideas to comprehend by the
use of pure reason the rational structure of the machine'.65 Here we are, as Gunton says, very
close to the traditional interpretation of the imago dei as consisting in human rationality or
reason. The problems associated with such a conception of the doctrine of the image ofGod
are legion. But here we will review two primary pitfalls. First, by locating the image of God
in human reason we initiate a problematic comparative ontology. If humans are like God
because of this single internal quality, as the argument goes, then a radical discontinuity with
the rest of the nonhuman creation is initiated. Secondly, by stressing this single internal
characteristic of humanity we have discounted and preempted other equally important
characteristics of what it is that constitutes human being. Moreover, 'it encourages the belief
that we are more minds than we are bodies, with all the consequences that that has: for
example, in creating a non-relational ontology, so that we are cut off from each other and
from the world by a tendency to see ourselves as imprisoned in matter'.66
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It then becomes clear that the modern era, by first postulating a separation ofmind
from body, embraced a homogenous view of the person as individual. This is to say, that
modem understanding of personhood is ultimately severed from its relationality with other
people, and is thereby supposed to be a heralding of individual freedom. In seeking to outline
what are Gunton's observations concerning the being of the modem self, we must follow him
in drawing a distinction between the affirmation ofpersonalparticularity and its modem
cousin personal individualism. For Gunton, personal particularity consists of
the locus of distinctiveness and variety - where the many tmly are many, for
everything is what it is and not another thing - and that of the individualism which
only appears to do justice to particularity.... The paradox of individualism is that it
often reveals a genuine and powerful concern for the particular which in practice
achieves the opposite..,.67
We may then understand the modem characterization of personal particularity as tending
towards an individualism that ultimately fails to do justice to the very particularity which it
seeks preserve. Buy lacking a thorough account of the relationality - how we are each
distinctively who we are - individual particularity, according to Gunton, collapses into
undifferentiated homogeneity. Stated differently, the modem privileging of personal
independencefrom relationality has led to an understanding of the person only in terms of
their universal rational characteristics. What we are left with is a type ofpersonhood which
totally lacks a particular human face, as only the universal and interior aspects ofpersonhood
are stressed. 'What is lost', Gunton maintains, 'is a recognition of the othemess-in-relation in
which alone can particularity be tmly preserved' ,68
Gunton comes to see the modem understanding of self as essentially 'standing apart
from each other and the world and treating the other as external, as mere object'.69 It is in this
sense that disengagement and alienation begin with a basic offense against the being of the
other. Moreover, it is our 'technocratic attitude' which gives expression to this important
symptom of the modem condition, since it expresses our overriding will to employ the other
in exploitative ways. Exploitative because the other becomes purely an instmment of our own
will without understanding or appreciating the other as something that is bound up in our own
being - our own personhood. The differences on these points between modernity and
postmodemity are rather subtle. Where modernity sought to exclude the other entirely,
postmodemity has sought to simply erase the otherness of the other. For Gunton, modernity
and postmodemity betray their shared philosophical pedigree in that they are both unable to
comfortably relate particulars to other particulars. Once again, late modernity has done
nothing more than trade upon the ancient dichotomy ofHeraclitus and Parmenides.
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We can now identify two particular streams of modem disengagement that have been
implicit in the previous sections. The first has to do with epistemological commitments and
the drawing of a radical distinction between the mind 'inside' and the world 'outside', as well
as an attendant distinction between belief and knowledge. The second is a kind of ontological
alienation, characterized by the radical separation of humans from one another. Yet the
ontological separation is not limited to human social relations alone. This is because we find
an equally alienating distance being opened up between modem selves and their nonhuman
environments. Again, by locating the imago dei in the single internal human quality of
rationality, an ontological gap was further opened between human minds and bodies, as well
as humans and the multiplicity of nonhumans who apparently do not share in this imaging of
God, or its attendant rationality. We may then recognize that the modem period suffered from
an impoverished understanding of the place of humans in a world composed of individual and
homogenized persons, completely lacking any appreciation of their internal relations with the
nonhuman creation. Here again we encounter one of the many relational blindspots of the
modem era.
The negative impact of disengagement and fragmentation has certainly not been
limited to the realm of persons (individuals) alone, but extends, rather, to society as a whole.
One can locate this societal or cultural fragmentation in what Gunton describes as 'our failure
to integrate or combine the different objects of human thought and activity: in brief, science,
morals and art'.70 The reasons for this fragmentation are manifold, but here we will mention
just a few. Firstly, fragmentation can be traced to the sealing off of scientific experimentation,
ethics, and artistic expressions as activities with little or no relation to one another. In the
modem milieu they are, in fact, realms in and of themselves - fragmented into distinct
categories with little, if any, cross-over. Immanuel Kant is again instructive, for it was he
who, according to Gunton, most clearly affirmed the distinction of the realms, setting the pace
for the long line ofmodemizers who were to follow him.
Gunton further explains that Kant understood science as the action of the rational
mind working to create concepts which make sense of the world and ordered it into negotiable
reality. As we have seen, for the premodem this role was always the work of God (or gods).
Secondly, in the search for ethical principles, human reason again takes up what was once the
role of God by finding within itself the source ofmoral wisdom.71 Finally, in the realm of
aesthetic judgment we find that human subjectivity has almost fully taken over. Aesthetic
judgments here become nothing more than personal judgments of taste which fail to teach us
anything of true meaning.
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We then find in the modern era, not only a disengagement of humans from God, one
another, and the nonhuman creation, but also a fragmentation of the three realms of culture as
well - science, ethics, and art. These two movements are, for Gunton, clearly related. We may
point out with confidence that the disengagement of persons from one another as found in
Kant, and others, is directly implicated in the fragmentation of the cultural realms as well.
Perhaps most obviously in the philosophy ofKant we find the impoverished notion of
personhood coexisting with an attendant fragmentation of culture. What is at stake in the
Church's response to this fragmentation and disengagement is clearly summed up in Gunton's
belief that
it is important for the health of our culture...that we should be able to hold in some
positive relation, yet without reducing one to another, the three central dimensions of
human being: its formation by truth, goodness, and beauty. Without a measure of
integration of our knowledge, ethics and experience of beauty we are not fully what
we might be.72
Criticisms ofGunton's HistoricalAnalysis
In the introduction to this chapter we indicated that Gunton's diagnosis ofmodernity
- but particularly his historical analysis of the patristic and medieval theologians whom he
considered to be the theological harbingers ofmodem thought - has now been subjected to a
number of important criticisms. Therefore, we will now pause to consider two of the more
important critiques which have been lodged against Gunton and his sweeping historical
analysis. On these points, it has been Gunton's treatment ofAugustine and Aquinas which
have attracted the most critical attention from scholars who specialize in Augustinian and
Thomist studies. Of these critics, Augustine scholar Lewis Ayres, and Aquinas scholar Fergus
Kerr, have been some of the more vocal in their taking exception to Gunton's characterization
of these two giants of the theological tradition.
We may begin by cataloguing the protests ofAyres who has found what he takes to
be worrying misconceptions in Gunton's examination ofAugustine, and his further claim that
the Augustinian tradition has been culpable in the instigation of our modem predicament. His
criticisms have been logged in the form of two book reviews ofGunton's The Promise of
Trinitarian Theology and The One the Three and the Many. The primary points of critique
may be summarized in two main arguments. First, Ayres points out that Gunton's
examination ofAugustine is far too reliant on the single analysis of Adolph Von Hamack
whose work dates from the end of the 19th century. Here Ayres argues that Gunton would




more recent scholarship on Augustine and his theological legacy, but particularly his
understanding of the 'self which Gunton finds to be overtly internalized and individualized.73
Secondly, and perhaps most critically, Ayres is unequivocal in his claim that Gunton
has fundamentally misunderstood Augustine's understanding of the Triune being ofGod.
This misunderstanding - or even worse, this misrepresentation - has been most clearly
expressed in Gunton's consistent claim that Augustine held to a simple modalistic view of
God's relation to the world in creation and redemption. Singled out for particular criticism is
what he takes to be Gunton's overly simplified understanding ofAugustine's use of the terms
'divine substance' or 'divine essence'. As Ayres argues: 'Gunton assumes that Augustine
taught the existence of a "divine essence" as the unity of the three persons, and that the
individual persons of the Trinity have little place in Augustine's understanding of
redemption.'74 This, according to Ayres, represents a gross simplification of Augustine's true
understanding of the Trinity. With little attempt to mask his frustration, Ayres proceeds to
argue that 'it really is time that ascribing such a simplistic style of doctrine to Augustine
ceased.'75 Contrary to Gunton's diagnosis, Ayres briefly makes the point that Augustine's use
of the terms 'essence' and 'substantia' are far more complicated and nuanced than Gunton's
brief treatment is willing to allow, and therefore does not suggest the strict monism which he
has attempted to identify with Augustine. Ayres further argues that Gunton would have found
substantial counter-evidence if he were to have consulted Augustine's Iohannis euangelium
tractatus for an account of his understanding of'Christ's coming into the world created
through him, or of the centrality ofChrist as mediator in trin. IV or XIII.'76
For Ayres the point of getting Augustine's theology correct is a critical one,
especially ifwe are to follow Gunton in his criticism ofwestern Christianity as it developed
in the wake ofAugustine. As we have seen, Gunton has freely correlated Augustine's
theological heritage to the long-running western tendency to place an 'emphasis on the
individual above community and the unity of God above his relationality.'77 The point has
also been made in Gunton's consistent claim that Augustine represented a watershed in the
western understanding of self-hood as individualization, in the sense that Gunton finds in
Augustine a 'turning-inwards' of the self. Moreover, as we have seen, this is a movement of
'individualization' which Gunton then traces from Augustine all the way through to Kant. For
Ayres, 'the leap from Augustine to Kant occurs remarkably easily' and with little supporting
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evidence or argumentation.78 Again, on this point concerning Augustine's understanding of
the 'self, Ayres argues that Gunton would have found a more sympathetic reading - and
altogether less 'modem' understanding - if he were to have consulted some of the more
recent scholarship in Augustinian studies.
Fergus Kerr has issued similar criticisms concerning Gunton's rather hasty
dispatching of the Thomist doctrines of God and creation as fundamentally monist and even at
times borderline pantheist in their conception. To be certain, Gunton has offered a consistent
and strongly worded critique of the Thomist understanding ofGod's relationship to the
creation, beginning first with his Becoming and Being, continuing all the way up into his final
published works. In his recent book After Aquinas: Versions ofThomism, Kerr challenges
many of the points of critique which Gunton has brought against the thought of Aquinas. Ken-
is, however, particularly concerned to conect what he takes to be Gunton's critical
misunderstanding of Thomas's ideas concerning the doctrine of creation in terms of divine
causality. According to Ken, Gunton has oversimplified and too quickly dispatched Thomas's
understanding ofGod as a 'monistically' or 'omnicausally' ('meaning that there is no other
cause of anything that happens in the world but God alone'79) conceived First Cause. In
Gunton's understanding, Thomas's emphasis on God as the First Cause of creation actually
threatens the value and substantiality of creatures due to its seeming tendency to tie the
creator too closely to the creature in a non-personal and non-trinitarian manner. Kerr answers
Gunton's reading with two primary counter claims.
First, Kerr disputes Gunton's consistent claim that creation is for Thomas a unitary or
monistically conceived act, altogether lacking in trinitarian content. As Kerr points out, in his
book Becoming and Being, Gunton bases this claim on the observation that Thomas's
consideration of creation in ST 1.27-44 speaks of the procession of creatures from God in
such a way as to suggest a 'monotheistic' (in its pejorative form) understanding of God as
First Cause. Kerr summarizes Gunton's apparent point: 'In short, even after expounding his
doctrine of God as Trinity, Thomas goes back to God as First Cause, as if nothing significant
had happened in between.'80 Kerr's explanation for this gap in Thomas's thought - where
specifically trinitarian language seems, for a time, to fade into a distinctly omnicausal
discourse - is that we should just assume that Thomas had in mind the triune God, 'the God
whom Thomas worshiped everyday', even though he did not find it necessary to fully spell
this out for the reader.8' In short, Kerr argues that a reader more familiar with Thomas on the
78 Ibid., p. 131.
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whole would simply know that he still holds to the triunity of God even when he is not
explicitly speaking to the particular actions of the triune persons.
The second argument, which appears to be on more firm ground than the first,
concerns a more general misconception which is not at all unique to Gunton. Here Kerr makes
the point that many commentators, but Gunton in particular, have failed to register the true
intention behind Thomas's understanding of God as First Cause. Far from indicating
pantheism, monism, or an erasure of proper creaturely substantiality, the concept ofFirst
Cause was actually intended to preserve creation in its own creaturely reality or substantiality.
In response to Gunton's reading of Thomas's 'First Cause', Kerr explains that:
This is all very provocative for old-fashioned Thomists. For them, it is important,
even wildly exciting, that Thomas's concept ofGod as First Cause, far from annulling
created agents as secondary causes, actually preserves and respects them...Thomas
sees no conflict between God's working in everything and every being's doing its
own thing, so to speak.82
Following the similar criticism we found in Ayres earlier, Kerr suggests that Gunton may be
drawing too heavily on the work ofAdolf Harnack who came to similarly misguided
conclusions concerning Thomas's use of the idea ofGod as First Cause. The problem with
both Harnack and Gunton, according to Kerr, is that they find in Thomas the precise opposite
of what he is in fact trying to argue. 'What Thomas wants to maintain here', Kerr explains, 'is
a distinction between God's doing everything, omnicausality as we might say, and God's
doing everything on his own: monocausality. This latter position, which Gunton [like
Hamack] finds in Thomas, is exactly the position Thomas consistently excludes.'83
To be certain, this brief review does not represent the totality of the criticisms which
have been lodged against Gunton's overall theological project. In the next section we will
consider what I take to be some of the more important challenges to Gunton's constructive
trinitarian project which have to do with the efficacy of a trinitarian ontology. Presently,
however, we may now consider whether or not these criticisms of Gunton's deconstmctive
task are indeed terminal to his overall theological project. Upon my reading there appear to be
at least two points worth noting. The first has to do with the clear fact that Gunton has made a
practice of being somewhat hasty in his tendency to link thinkers and times with little
supporting evidence. I believe this is most apparent in his Alienation and Enlightenment and
The One, the Three and the Many, where historical lines of thought, as Ayres has argued,
appear to be traced a bit too easily from the ancient Greeks all the way up to the most
'modem' of thinkers. In my view this is remedied, to some degree, in The Triune Creator,
where the depth of argumentation which Gunton provides appears to be no less shallow than
any number systematic studies by other theologians. The fact remains, however, that there
82 Ibid., p. 43.
83 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
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persists in this work what many commentators have taken to be a misrepresentation of these
important theological figures. But to suggest that Gunton's thesis is totally negated upon the
reasoning that it is too sweeping or brief in its form, I believe, is a misguided suggestion. All
things considered, I believe there is an important place for theological studies which attempt
to trace out meta-narratives within the great traditions of thought, even if for no other reason
than to encourage further discussion and interrogation of ideas.84 Ifjudged on this merit alone,
Gunton's work may be taken to be a resounding success.
The second point to be made has more directly to do with Gunton's reading (or
misreading) ofAugustine and Aquinas in particular. Ayres, for instance, has raised the
important question as to whether or not it matters for Gunton's overall project that he may
have been wrong in his interpretation of Augustine, and for that matter, Aquinas as well. As
Ayres asks: 'does proving that Augustine did not hold these views actually affect the
argument that latter tradition's interpretation ofAugustine in the terms that Gunton outlines
led to some of the theological problems ofmodernity?' In answer to his own question, Ayres
suggest that this is indeed true but in a limited sense. He argues that '[b]y its very nature
constructing such a meta-narrative must iron out and ignore the subtlety ofhistorical
development, and the subtleties of interaction and influence.'85 In other words, it may well be
true that even ifAugustine (and we may add Aquinas) did not hold to a 'monistic'
understanding of God, they may well have been interpreted in such a way in the subsequent
tradition. The problem with Gunton, according to both of these critics, is that he simply
ignores the finer points of this complex historical development and offers little of any
evidence to support such a view. Criticism such as these must be taken seriously. But what I
believe is most regrettable in all of this is the fact that Gunton never directly addressed these
particular criticisms in any published work of which I am aware. Similarly, Ayres, to my
knowledge, has never dedicated more than two briefbook reviews to his criticisms ofGunton.
It appears to me that Ayres criticisms are on the whole well founded, but if they are truly as
important as he suggests, then they should be more fully registered so as to be made more
convincing.86 Also lacking in these critical accounts ofGunton's work is any alternative
84 This appears to be one of the primary conclusions drawn by Craig Bartholomew in his rather lengthy
review ofGunton's The One, the Three and the Many: "The Healing ofModernity: A Trinitarian
Remedy?," European Journal ofTheology 6, 2 (1997). For instance his conclusion that 'Gunton's
[book] is an exciting and important example of the type ofwork Christians must engage in ifwe are to
contribute to the healing ofmodernity/postmodernity' (p. 128). In this paper Bartholomew further
suggests that Gunton's work would be a very fruitful conversation partner for neo-Calvinist
theologians.
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suggestions or historical analysis for diagnosing the theological tradition's culpability or
innocence in the emergence ofmodern thought.
II. Trinitarian Theology of Creation and Culture: the Human and Nonhuman
Gunton 's Place within the Trinitarian Renaissance
Theologians critical or uncertain of Augustine's trinitarian legacy have usually tended
to take one of two theological directions in order to correct or amend his legacy. The first of
these may be found in the work of those Western theologians who have come to develop a
deeper conversation with Eastern trinitarian theologies. We may comfortably locate Gunton
within this first group which has sought to reach further back into the Christian tradition in
order to discover pre-Augustinian trinitarian concepts that are better equipped to register the
distinct outward or economic actions of the Son and the Spirit amongst the creation. Of
utmost importance to this group of patristic era theologians would be the significant
contributions made by the Cappadocian fathers, and in the case ofGunton, we may also add
the trinitarian theology of Irenaeus of Lyon who has also re-emerged as another pivotal
patristic theologian. The second group, as we have seen evidenced in the criticisms of Denis
Ayres, has instead sought to recover 'those aspects of Augustine's reflections that had seemed
to play a subordinate role in Augustinian trinitarianism'.87 But now in the interest of better
understanding Gunton's place within the wider 'Trinitarian Renaissance' we might do well to
briefly review the other major figures and movements responsible for returning trinitarian
thought to the center of theological practice in the late-modem era.
The first murmurings of the Western church's return to the doctrine of the Trinity
may be found in the early 19th century theological and philosophical programs of Freidrich
Schleiermacher and Georg W.F. Hegel. Although both of these important thinkers have been
subjected to rather scathing critiques by the more recent 'fathers' of trinitarian thought -
Barth and Rahner in particular - their works clearly contain the beginnings of a return to
trinitarian orthodoxy. In his major theological work The Christian Faith811 - originally
published in 1821-1822 and then revised in 1830-1831 - Schleiermacher argued for a return
to Trinitarian reflection in the interest ofproperly conceiving the nature ofGod's revelation.
And whilst Schleiermacher's work signaled a definite return to a serious thinking-through of
the trinitarian shape ofChristian theology, he is often criticized for placing his treatment of
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the doctrine of the Trinity at the end of his systematic presentation. This was a
methodological move which Barth would later criticize as a regrettable relegation of the
doctrine.89 Although Stanley Grenz has recently tried to mitigate some of the more common
charges against Schleiermacher's treatment of the Trinity,90 important reservations continue to
taint contemporary evaluations of his work. For instance, one weakness inherent to the late
treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity has been found in the fact that other doctrines,
Christology and pneumatology in particular, necessarily end up lacking in trinitarian content.
It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that the task ofbringing trinitarian thought back to
the center ofChristian thought would be more successfully carried out by a philosopher rather
than a theologian. But as a contemporary to Schleiermacher, Hegel did much to revive
scholarly interest in trinitarian thought - although admittedly through a program that was
more philosophical than it was theological. Of central importance for Hegel was the idea that
'the content of the doctrine of the Trinity was not merely a religious teaching but also lay at
the heart of the philosophical understanding of all reality.'91 This central tenant ofHegel's
philosophy would be most clearly expressed in his use of a trinitarian language which sought
to capture what he understood to be the inherent dynamism of God conceived philosophically
as 'Spirit' or 'Geisf. According to Hegel, the term 'Spirit' is, in fact, rendered meaningless if
we do not first understand God's own being by way of a clearly trinitarian logic. Although
Hegel's additions to the trinitarian conversation are numerous and rather complex, it is his
reflections on the relationship between what we now call the 'immanent' and 'economic'
trinities that has most clearly left its mark upon modern trinitarian thought. Briefly, what is
notable in Hegel's often abstract formulation of the relation between immanent and economic
trinities is his pronounced resistance to their conceptual separation. In this sense, Hegel has
done much to frame one of the more important debates which continues to occupy trinitarian
theologians who, like Gunton, have continued to negotiate the relationship between immanent
and economic trinities. We return to this important discussion ofHegel's, and Gunton's
response to it, later in the chapter. But to conclude, we may simply indicate that Hegel's
influence in the Trinitarian Renaissance can be scarcely overestimated. As Samuel M. Powell
has indicated, 'it is clear that the fact that there is any contemporary interest in the doctrine of
the Trinity at all owes a great deal to Hegel.'92
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Although the work of Schleiermacher and Hegel would prove to be essential to the
modern resurgence in trinitarian interest, few would challenge the commonly held claim that
it is to the work of the 'two Karls' - Karl Barth and Karl Rahner - that the bulk of credit is
due. While it now appears that Barth's legacy is, perhaps, the brighter burning of the two
stars, each of these thinkers has done much to encourage a return to serious trinitarian thought
amongst both the church and the academy. But in the interest of space we will here focus on
the work of Barth who was clearly the more influential of the 'two Karls' in relation to
Gunton's own theological development.
Unlike his liberal predecessors, Barth would strongly reject the anthropologically
centered 'theology from below' which so occupied Schleiermacher and Hegel, as well as
those who would come in their wake, but Feurbach in particular. Taking God's self-revelation
through his Word as the foundation of the theological task, Barth forcefully argued that
revelation - and therefore theology as a whole - always arises through the prior act ofGod
and not through human initiation. Said otherwise, the act of revelation is for Barth a trinitarian
'event' or 'happening' that always comes from 'above' rather than 'below'. Today it is
commonly held that Barth, through his development of a rigorous theology 'from above', was
better able than his liberal predecessors to maintain the required 'otherness' between God and
world so as not to risk a confusion of the two. Furthermore, this particular methodology led
Barth into a detailed discussion concerning the trinitarian character of the Word of God
which, as he consistently maintained, was indeed God's revelation of himself. In what would
become an often repeated dictum within the wider Trinitarian Renaissance - one which, as we
shall see, was also a favorite ofGunton's - Barth summarized his position thusly: 'God
reveals Himself. He reveals Himself through Himself. He reveals Himself.But in the
interest of avoiding a total identification of the eternal God with the historical act of
revelation, Barth was careful to add the point that while 'God is identical with the act of
revelation, God is not reducible to that act.'94 This is a point which, as we shall see, Gunton
has appropriated from Barth's trinitarian theology - namely, that in order to avoid the
collapse of immanent and economic trinities the theologian must equally stress God's
freedom to act in a revelatory manner. In sum, we may say that for Barth a trinitarian theology
necessarily arises out of a theological consideration of revelation. Moreover, it is through
God's free revelation of his Word that we are made a part of the intertrinitarian act, which is
itself, the outward expression of the divine life.95
There is little doubt that Gunton's own theological project was deeply influenced by,
and indebted to, the rigorously trinitarian thought ofKarl Barth. And as we have already
93 Cited in Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God, p. 39.




indicated, Gunton's early doctoral work, later published as Becoming andBeing, was at least
partially dedicated to the critical evaluation ofBarth's trinitarian legacy. But even in these
early engagements with Barth's trinitarian thought we may detect in Gunton an overall
uneasiness. As John Webster has observed, Gunton's anxiety had to do with what he took to
be Barth's 'Augustinian' tendencies. Just as Augustine diminished the particular economic
acts of the divine persons by overemphasizing their underlying divine unity, the same
criticism, according to Gunton, may be lodged against Barth's overall diminishment of the
Holy Spirit's role within the trinitarian dynamic. The outgrowth of this 'thin pneumatology'
may be identified in Barth's inability to attribute 'agency to the Holy Spirit in sustaining
Jesus' genuine humanity. The result is that Jesus can sometimes seem to function as a
Platonic form'.96
We are, then, reasonably justified in describing Gunton's own trinitarian theology as
being distinctly 'post-Barthian' as he clearly strove to appropriate, criticize, and build upon
Barth's detailed trinitarian thought. But after having painted Barth with the unenviable title of
being the last great 'Augustinian' of the Western tradition, Gunton then set about to detail his
own trinitarian project which - although still deeply indebted to Barth - would draw heavily
from those theologians which he saw as presenting an alternative trinitarian vision to that of
the Augustinian mainstream of the Western tradition. To fulfill this role, Gunton would most
frequently seek inspiration from Irenaeus, the Cappadocians (by way of John Zizioulas),
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and to a lesser extent the puritan theologian John Owen. While still
recognizing Gunton's strong relation to Barth's theological legacy, wc may now equally
identify Gunton with at least three of the other important trends which have come to surface
within the more recent Trinitarian Renaissance of the past thirty years or so.
Gunton's unique place within the trinitarian renaissance may be traced, in the first
instance, to his distinct interest in delineating the ontological implications associated with a
thoroughly trinitarian approach to the systematic task. As he indicated in the preface to the
first edition of his early assessment of trinitarian theology, The Promise ofTrinitarian
Theology, Gunton claimed that the central concern of his own trinitarian approach 'is to be
found in a quest for ontology'. He further explains that 'it is only through an understanding of
the kind of being that God is that we can come to learn what kind of beings we are and what
kind of world we inhabit.' In even stronger terms he would here make the bold proposal that
'the doctrine of the Trinity is crucial to ontology', but more precisely, 'to any ontology that
would hold together creation and redemption.'97 There are, however, at least two further
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related movements within the wider Trinitarian Renaissance that help to further place
Gunton's own unique and ontological approach within the wider trinitarian movement.
The first major trend with which Gunton may be identified has to do with the recent
upsurge in trinitarian theologies concerned to illustrate the implications attendant to the
realization that God is, in his very own being, fundamentally relational. The 'relational turn'
within the recent Trinitarian Renaissance may once again be traced back to the work of the
Barth and Rahner.98 Yet this turn to a concerted focus on relationality would not gain full
speed until the end of the twentieth century, largely due to the influence of Jurgen
Moltmann,99 Wolfhart Pannenberg,100 and Gunton's early PhD supervisor Robert W.
Jenson.101 Often considered to be the primary movers in the theological movement which
sought to take up the 'theme ofGod as the fullness of (divine) history',102 this trio of
theologians may be equally credited with bringing about a more concentrated focus on the
implications of divine relationality for contemporary trinitarian thought. As Stanley Grenz has
indicated, the methodological principle variously proposed by these three thinkers, has
centrally to do with the understanding that 'the doctrine of God cannot be constructed from
the givenness of the one divine substance but should move from the three persons to the
divine unity.' Moreover, as Grenz adds, this 'methodological commitment has been largely
responsible for elevating relationality to the lofty place it has attained in trinitarian
theology.'103
Working in the shadow ofMoltmann, Pannenburg, and Jenson, a number of new
movers within the trinitarian renaissance began to develop their own theological programs
which would take seriously the dynamic relationality of the trinitarian persons. Of the more
influential theologians in this relational vein of trinitarian thought, we may here single out the
work of Leonardo Boff,104 John D. Zizioulas,105 and Catherine Mowiy LaCugna,106 each of
98 For a thorough evaluation of the philosophical and theological precursors to the 'relational turn' see;
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whom may be said to have developed a 'social' or 'communal' trinitarian theology. And
although Gunton's own relational theology appears to draw most heavily from Zizioulas - but
particularly, as we shall see, his use of the Cappadocians to develop a distinctly trinitarian
theology of personhood, communion, and otherness - Gunton also holds much in common
with liberation theologian Leonardo Boff. There are, I believe, two important correlations to
be made between these seemingly divergent thinkers. We may first highlight the fact that both
Gunton and Boff have dedicated much of their trinitarian theology of relationality to an
exposition of its implications for the doctrine of creation.107 But closely related to this mutual
interest in applying trinitarian relationality to the nonhuman creation is their equally shared
interest in its further application to human sociality. Take, for example, Boff s explanation
that '[h]uman society is a pointer on the road to the mystery of the Trinity, while the mystery
of the Trinity, as we know it from revelation, is a pointer toward social life and its
archetype.'108 While Gunton would later distance himself from 'social trinitarians' such as
Leonardo Boff and Miroslav Volf109 - especially following some important criticisms he
received in regard to his own propositions concerning trinitarian thought and human social
structure in The One, The Three, and the Many - much of his work has also focused on
delineating the social outworkings of relational and trinitarian theology of creation and
culture.110
The final major trinitarian movement with which Gunton may be identified has much
to do with our earlier points concerning his decidedly ontological focus. Here we may place
Gunton's work amongst a number of other recent trinitarian theologies which have sought to
make a return to theorizing the 'immanent' or 'ontological' Trinity. Although we will return
to Gunton's treatment of the immanent and economic Trinities more fully later in the chapter,
we may now simply indicate that there have been several recent calls for a near total
moratorium on theological consideration of the divine nature ad intra.111 But in spite of these
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calls for a ban on theologizing the immanent Trinity, Gunton is among a small group of
theologians who have grown convinced that such theories are theologically legitimate and
altogether necessary. Of this group Hans Urs von Balthasar,112 Thomas F. Torrance,113 and
Elizabeth A. Johnson114 deserve particular mention, for it was these theologians, along with
Gunton, who 'sparked a renewed sense of the theological (and ethical) importance of
explicating the concept of God in se.,ni To be certain, this small cadre of trinitarian
theologians embody a rather diverse, and at times disparate, breadth of theological language
and methodology. Thus we may further specify that of these three theologians, Gunton's own
trinitarian thought is most closely approximate to that of T.F. Torrance, who shared with
Gunton a distinct willingness to 'devote serious thought to theological description of the
created order', yet in such a way as to remain 'undergirded by trinitarian teaching.'116
Differences aside, what all of these thinkers share in common, as Grenz points out, is a
distinct desire to uncover new ways of speaking of 'God ad intra without losing completely
the focus on divine relationality that had become such a widely held axiom of trinitarian
theology.'117
The Needfor a Trinitarian Theology
Now that we have placed Gunton's trinitarian theology in its wider context within the
Trinitarian Renaissance, we may now look more closely at Gunton's own justifications for
adopting a specifically trinitarian approach to his theology. In this regard we may first point
out that ifGunton is correct in his estimation that modernity is essentially the outgrowth of a
poorly devised doctrine of creation - and again, I do not believe his critics have adequately
proven this to not be the case - then it follows that our response as the Church must be
equally theological in nature. 'The Christian gospel', he insists, 'is that alienation is not a
necessity'.118 But before moving to outline the shape of his theological response to modernity
we must first elucidate what it is that Gunton sees as the task of theology. In other words, we
must ask: what is the basis and goal of theology today?
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The answer to this question can be found in three distinct marks of Gunton's
theological project, each of which lends itself to a trinitarian approach. First, Gunton
maintains that any theological program must be firmly rooted in the life of the worshiping
Christian community. That is to say, that the very basis of theology is to be found in the act of
worship itself. And as Gunton insists, worship expresses something of the characteristics of
the Triune God because, like God, worship is inherently relational - it is a 'happening'. 'And
the happening between persons is worship in the Son and through the Spirit' - the second and
third persons of the Triune God.119 This leads closely into the second mark of the theological
task which takes instruction from the Christian understanding that we as human persons are
related to the Father through both Son and Spirit. Moreover, it is the task of theology, and
Christian life as a whole, to realize this distinctive relationality. Here again we find that
Gunton's theology finds its basis not only in the doctrine of the Trinity alone, but rather, in a
triune understanding of creation as a whole. 'The point', Gunton argues, 'is that because we
are established in our being in the Trinity, we are enabled to thinkfrom, and, with careful
qualification, about the triune being ofGod'.120 The outgrowth of this fundamental touch-
point ofGunton's theology is that theology itself becomes a part of the Trinitarian dynamic.
From the Trinitarian being of God - through whom and in whom we are created - comes this
human articulation of the multiplicity of relationships in which we find our own being.
Theology is then the process of attempting to articulate and discover the universal shape of
this dynamism.
Finally, the theological task will have two primary functions or goals. The first of
these is again directed towards the worshipping community of the Church, and seeks to
articulate the faith of the community for its own benefit and enrichment. Gunton calls this the
'internal orientation of theology,' due to its rather inward looking goal ofmaking Christian
tmth claims obedient to and dependent upon Jesus 'who is the truth'.121 The second focus of
the theological task is directed towards bringing the truth claims of the Christian community
to those outside of the worshiping community. In this vein, theology takes on, as Gunton
explains, an 'apologetic or missionary function'. In the fulfillment of such an outward
theological project, the Church should also be bold in its presentation of the trinitarian shape
of the Gospel rather than present a watered-down monistic 'natural theology'.122 Therefore,
according to Gunton, the theologian should not see the sometimes difficult doctrine of the











related to its Creator. Without an account of the trinitarian shape of all things - divine,
human, and nonhuman - Christian theology remains empty.
Trinitarian Ontology: Personal Being
Along with many of his fellow colleagues within the Trinitarian Renaissance, Gunton
has argued for a deeper appreciation of the radical terminological revolution which the
Cappadocian fathers brought about. We have already reviewed what Gunton considers a
deficiently trinitarian theology in Augustine, whom, as Gunton cites, failed to fully
understand and appreciate the trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians - Basil the Great,
Gregory ofNazianzus, and Gregory ofNyssa. The result was that the Cappadocian
achievement would be lost to theology in the West, largely due to the overall brilliance of
Augustine's theology, aside from this major drawback. But what was this Cappadocian
achievement which Gunton and his colleagues are so fond of?
Following the Council ofNicea (325 A.D.) the terms hypostasis (person) and ousta
(essence/substance) were commonly used as cognates, both used to signify being in general.
The Nicean Creed, directed as it was towards the Arian heresy, famously adopted the term
homoousion to assert the divinity of Jesus Christ, whom they maintained is of 'one being with
the Father'. As Robert Jenson has explained, the Nicean use of homoousion (one being) has
two possible meanings. First, that 'two things are homoousios could mean that they are
exactly the same one', thereby abolishing any distinction. This is, of course, unacceptable for
it would ultimately lead to a monistic end - unity without personal particularity. Secondly, it
could mean that the Father and the Son 'perfectly instantiate the same essence' thereby
resulting in two different Gods.123 Clearly, both options are unacceptable in their tendencies
towards monism and tritheism respectively. The confusion which came out of the Council of
Nicea would set the stage for what would become the Cappadocian terminological
achievement in the decade following 370.
We may begin an exposition of this theological achievement by following Gunton in
focusing on the concepts ofperson and relation. First, we must sight the underlying problem
with the Nicean usage of homoousion, and its subsequent interpretation in Western theology
following Augustine. The problem is found in the interpretation of ousia by substantia, which
as Gunton points out is a literal interpretation of hypostasis. This interpretation served to
ultimately 'deprive the concept of the person of due weight because it introduced a stress on
the underlying reality ofGod.'124 By closely approximating ousia (being) and hypostasis
(person) the Nicean Creed, along with subsequent Western theology in general, has reduced
personal being, whether it be divine or human, to the underlying substance which makes up
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the persons - 'God-stuff or 'soul-stuff. Importantly, Gunton finds in this ancient theological
debate concerning the being ofpersons to be closely parallel to our modern struggle of the
one against the many. For what this Nicean confusion of ousia and hypostasis represents is a
fundamental privileging of the one over the many. That is to say, it privileges the one
substance of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, over against the distinct personhood of each.
The Cappadocian achievement, then, consisted of the brilliant 'desynonymizing of
ousia and hypostasis: ofmaking what were synonymous terms into words of distinct
meaning.'125 The term hypostasis would now be used to signify the concrete particular known
as a person, and the term ousia (being in general) would now become a relational
achievement - the communion of persons. This is to say that the hypostasis are no longer to
be construed as individuals, but as persons whose being (ousia) consists in their relation to
one another. In a real sense then, being is now found in a relational becoming, as Barth and
Jiingel would make popular in the last century. This is not to say that persons are simply
relations, 'but concrete particulars in relation to one another.'126
We can now see that the profound achievement of the Cappadocians was to
completely redefine the ontology of persons, both divine and human, by carefully clarifying
the terms hypostasis and ousia. From this terminological revolution came two primary
achievements. First, true trinitarian 'threeness in the oneness' could now be conceived
without reducing the particularity of each person (hypostasis) to an underlying ousia or
substance. Secondly, the Cappadocians have introduced an entirely new ontology of
communion. And here we must introduce a third term into the equation. The reason for this is
plain; for there to be true threeness in oneness, there needs to be some deeper account of this
relationality in which particular being finds itself in otherness.
The termperichoresis has often been summoned to add depth to this claim.
Perichoresis is, as Gunton highlights, essentially a 'metaphor of spatial motion which
introduces a dynamism into the eternity in which the [divine] persons are what they are in and
through one another.'127 The relationality which perichoresis represents is often characterized
as reciprocal. That is, perichoretic relations give to and receive from particular hypostases
without sacrificing their own particularity. It is relationality without the confusion,
sublimation, or indistinguishabilty that is so characteristic ofmodern and postmodern
relationality. In the divine perichorctic relations we find that the three hypostases
'dynamically constitute one another's being in what Coleridge called "an ineffable cycle of
Being, Intelligence and communicative Life, Love and Action.'"128
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For Gunton, the divine movement of pcrichoresis - for the term should always be
understood dynamically - also serves to characterize the divine involvement in space and
time. It is on this point that he has maintained the idea that perichoresis can be developed as
an analogical concept concerning the world as well, but only on a qualified and partially
apophatic basis. In fact, Gunton would like to elevate perichoresis to the level of what he has
called the Trinitarian transcendentals', noting that perichoretic relations are a mark of created
being in general. The world is then understood to be an ordering of things that is ultimately
perichoretic in that 'everything in it contributes to the being ofeverything else, enabling
everything to be what it distinctively is.'129
Yet the question remains: can we truly move from making a number of general
statements concerning the being of God - hypostasis, ousia, perichoresis, personhood - to
applying this ontology ofGod's being to the creation in general? Gunton seems to think that
we can: 'because the Trinitarian concepts reflect the being of God, we should be prepared to
find them echoed in some way in human thought and in structures of the created world.'130
Conservative as this may be - insisting as he does that the application is both analogical and
tempered with a measure of apophaticism - this assertion has probably drawn the greatest
weight of attack upon Gunton's theology, and that of his colleagues, in what has been dubbed
the 'Trinitarian renaissance'. In the next section we highlight some of the complaints by
Gunton's objectors, and detail his response to these important questions.
The Immanent and Economic Trinity
It is in Gunton's more recent work that we find him giving full attention to several
serious challenges that have arisen in the face of the 'Trinitarian renaissance' of contemporary
theology. These questions primarily concern the theological legitimacy of 'reading into' the
immanent or ontological Trinity from our essentially creaturely and contingent perspective. In
other words these critics have asked the question: Are we misguided in our efforts to project
our creaturely understanding of the economic Trinity 'up into' the immanent Trinitarian
being? First, we need to account for the terminology. Borrowing the words of T.F. Torrance,
we may understand the divine economy, or economic trinity, as 'the orderly movement in
which God actively makes himself known to us in his incarnate condescension and his
redemptive activity within the structures of space and time'.131 Or as Gunton says of the
economy by way of Irenaeus; the divine economy protects against the 'gnostic divorce of
creation from redemption', by accounting for God's agency and unity through time and
129 Ibid., p. 166.
130 Ibid., p. 211.
131 Here Gunton is quoting T.F. Torrance from his The Christian Doctrine ofGod, One Being Three
Persons (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), p. 92. Cited in Colin E. Gunton, "Eastern and Western
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space.132 On the other hand, as we have already alluded, the immanent Trinity refers to 'what
kind ofbeing God is in himself, in the eternal taxis or order of persons in relation.'133
In the recent book Father, Son andHoly Spirit, Gunton's last published work
following his untimely death, he answers two recent protests to any theology of the Trinity
which seeks to move conceptually from economic to immanent Trinities. Both Ted Peters in
his God as Trinity, and Catherine Mowery LaCugna, in her Godfor Us, have advocated a
position that bars theological inquiry into the immanent Trinity and effectively limits
theological enquiry to the economic Trinity alone.134 For these writers it is a mistake to try
and read an ontology of God's immanent being off of his economic actions in time and space.
'All talk of the Trinity must therefore be in some way a function of the economy of salvation,
so that we cannot, for example, develop a concept ofperichoresis and use it to throw light
from God's reality to ours.'135 The main thrust ofPeters and LaCugna's critique appears to be
directed towards the commendable goal of preserving God's freedom. On this account, all
that we may be justified in asserting is that God is in the process of relating to creation.
Anything more than this would infringe upon God's ultimate freedom and otherness.
Gunton finds two major flaws in the arguments ofPeters and LaCugna concerning the
limitation of theology to the economic Trinity for the sole purpose ofpreserving God's
freedom. For as Gunton argues, there is much more at stake than both of these authors seem
to claim. The first pitfall concerns Barth's argument that God's being has truly been given to
us - revealed - in the person of Jesus Christ. He is in Jesus as He is in eternity. It then
follows, according to Gunton, that the doctrine of the ontological Trinity may serve to
establish the relative independence of the Creator from the creation. 'It is because God is a
communion of love prior to and in independence of the creation that he can enable the
creation to be itself.'136 In light of this, Gunton asks whether Peters and LaCugna's
approaches are able to avoid the threat of pantheism which may result from their apparent
attempts to bring God into too close a proximity with the creation. Such as LaCugna's claim
that there 'is neither an economic nor an immanent Trinity; there is only the oikonomia'.137
The threat is a real one, since each of their formulations ultimately posits only one reality,
whereas Gunton's ontological vision, I believe correctly, emphasizes the otherness-in-relation
between Creator and creation, heaven and earth.
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Secondly, there is the important and often cited concern having to do with the
uncritical drawing of analogy from the immanent to the economic Trinity, or visa versa. On
this account the Trinity is used 'as a kind ofprinciple of explanation and ethics.'138 This has
been carried out, as Gunton highlights, in the recent theologies concerned with a 'social
Trinity' that is both immanent and economic, posited through a complex of intermediate
argumentation. The problem of course, is that moving from the immanent Trinity to the
created and contingent world is deeply problematic. As Gunton writes: 'Their chief defect is
that they turn Christ into a world principle at the expense of Jesus ofNazareth, and often
construe his cross as a focus for the suffering ofGod rather than as the centre of that history
in which God overcomes sin and evil.'139
Although Gunton has been clearly aware of this second potential pitfall to any
theological comparison between economic and immanent Trinities, he and his colleagues
have fallen victim to some measure of criticism on this point. For instance, Richard Fermer
has charged that 'in identifying God's ousia or being with the communion of the hypostases',
Gunton has essentially impaired the 'the mystery ofGod's being'.140 Fermer's concerns are
much like those ofLaCugna in that they both want to stress the mystery ofGod's internal
being on apophatic grounds. How then, Fermer asks, can we move from a hazy understanding
ofGod's being as communion and then establish this finding as a methodological principle
for theology in general? We must then inquire of Gunton; has he himself turned 'Christ into a
world principle' in a way that is ultimately offensive to the mystery ofGod's being?
Gunton's defense on these points concerning the relationship between immanent and
economic Trinities has stretched back to his earliest work concerning the theology of Karl
Barth. This is because Barth, according to Gunton's reading, stood out amongst nearly all of
his predecessors in beginning his treatment of the doctrine ofGod with an exposition of the
doctrine of the Trinity. In his doctoral thesis, later published as Becoming andBeing, Gunton
highlights Barth's logic behind his cautious movement from the economic activity ofGod to
the immanent Trinity.141 As Gunton reminds us, for Barth, all theological thought begins with
a single theological understanding: 'God reveals Himself. He reveals Himself through
Himself. He reveals Himself '142 Because God has revealed himself in his economic actions,
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theological inquiry 'will lead us inexorably from what happens in Jesus Christ to the
description of God in his triune reality'.143
This argument ofGunton's, indebted as it is to Barth, can now be seen as a major
theme in his overall theological project from beginning to end. It is perhaps both sad and
appropriate that he began his career with a defense ofBarth's Trinitarian theology, and his
careful exposition of God's being and revelatory action, and ended with another strong
defense of his own theology of revelation in his final work Act and Being. Like bookends,
these two works define the basic character ofGunton's life work. Both draw heavily on
Barth's understanding that revelation is 'something that happens', not to subjective
experiences but to events that are God, and specifically the events that come to expression in
the story of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ'.144
Ifwe are to understand Gunton's reply to his critics - Fermer, LaCugna, and Peters -
then we must look further to Gunton's Christology and Pneumatology. The key to
successfully relating the immanent and economic Trinities lies in the fact that 'the doctrine of
the Trinity must not be abstracted from the doctrine of the atonement.'145 Therefore, it is the
work of the Son and the Spirit which establishes the otherness of God and creation, yet
maintains the revelation ofGod's being economically. This is, of course, a theology of
mediation.146 Here Gunton draws heavily on the points made by Irenaeus, who characterized
the Son and Spirit as the 'right' and 'left' hands of God. What this characterization of God's
economic activity suggests is not an 'ontological subordination' of Son and Spirit to the
Father, but rather, it emphasizes 'that the Son and the Spirit are the ways by which God
himself is personally involved in the created order'.147 Important for Gunton is the freedom
which this Irenaean conception maintains for God. By the twin movements of understanding
God's economic relation to the creation as the work of Son and Spirit, and also by
maintaining the otherness of Creator and creation, the freedom ofGod is then successfully
defended. Gunton sees in this an implicit 'doctrine of the immanent Trinity, in that it
distinguishes the being ofGod from that of the world he creates' - a point which Peters and
LaCugna, according to Gunton, threaten to overstep.148
In Gunton's final book, Act and Being, he offers a sustained account of this 'implicit'
doctrine of the immanent Trinity. This work focuses primarily on the elucidation of the divine
attributes in light of God's action in the world. As we have seen Gunton comes to understand
revelation, following Irenaeus and Barth, as something that happens, revelation is found in
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the action of God in the world. Moreover, 'it is impossible to distinguish between God's word
and himself, between what God does and what he is'.149 Again, this is most clearly
demonstrated in the incarnation of Christ. For it is here that we are given God Himself as he is
fully revealed in this act, and we should therefore seek this particular source above any other
in our effort to understand who God is eternally. 'That is the order of knowing: we know God
(by his ostensive self-definition) from and in his acts. We know who God is from what he
does.'150
Against Fermer's charge that Gunton oversteps the cautious parameters of the
apophatic tradition on these points, we may remember Gunton's own notes of caution which
stop far short of declaring that nothing can be known ofGod's eternal being. As Gunton
writes: 'This does not mean that we have a private view into the being of God, but that the
general characteristics ofGod's eternal being, as persons in relation, communion, may be
known from what he has done and does in the actions that we call the economy of creation
and salvation.'151 The value of a rigorously trinitarian theology is to be found, not so much in
its privileged account of the internal being of God, but rather, in its enabling theology to gain
a renewed understanding of God's action in this world - that is, his commerce with creation
and culture alike. This is why the atonement took on a renewed emphasis in Gunton's second
edition of the Promise ofTrinitarian Theology. This doctrine, being at the center of the
particular life of Jesus, offers up a kind of criterion for trinitarian theology. Ifwe see the
atonement - in trinitarian terms - as the act 'of the one God and its many-sidedness as a work
ofGod achieved by both Son and Spirit', we may go some way towards preventing the
Trinity from becoming a 'kind of problem solving device rather than theology bound up with
repentance and worship'.152
Trinitarian Freedom: the Space and Time to be
Preserving some distinction between economic and immanent Trinities is, for Gunton,
extremely important in preserving the otherness-in-relation which preserves the integrity - the
freedom - of persons, both divine and human. There is little exaggeration in claiming that this
is one of the defining marks ofGunton's overall theology.153 What is needed, Gunton
explains, is adequate 'space' between persons. 'Freedom is to be found in the space in which
persons can be themselves in relation with other persons'.154 We find then, that freedom is
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concerned with finding the room of ones own so as not to be subsumed into the other, or as
modernity so often tended, losing the one amongst the homogenization of the many.
At the beginning of this chapter we reviewed what Gunton took to be Augustine's
pronounced inability to maintain the differentiation of the Triune persons. But as is well
known, Gunton also took issue with his former PhD supervisor, Robert Jenson, on this very
same point. Therefore, let us use this gentlemanly disagreement to further elucidate the spatial
and temporal dimensions ofGunton's trinitarian formulation.
Although to a lesser degree than Augustine, Robert Jenson's trinitarian theology has
often been brought into question by Gunton who charges; 'that there can be discerned in
Jenson's theology survivals ofWestern conceptions which at once deprive the Spirit of
particularity - especially in relation to the Son - and at the same time run the risk of
abolishing the space between God and the world'.155 The problem is found in Jenson's
supposed 'Western' subordination of the Spirit to Jesus in his use of the expression; 'the
Spirit of Jesus'. According to Gunton, the subordination is located in a failure on Jenson's
part to give full personal distinctness to the Holy Spirit - the Spirit is then seen to be
subordinate to the Son. The effect of this formulation is to diminish the space between the
persons of the Trinity, reducing them in the economic Trinity to a point where the persons
become 'functionally indistinguishable'. Gunton will alternatively assert that we must 'speak
of the Spirit's Jesus as much as of Jesus' Spirit'.156 In this, Gunton recognizes that we need a
doctrine of the Holy Spirit which maintains his personal space in distinction from that of the
Father and the Son. To fail on this theological point would invite deterministic outworkings,
and ultimately, an erasure of personal being.
We will return to Gunton's important focus on pneumatology later in the chapter, but
for now we will consider Gunton's second objection to Jenson's theology of the Trinity. This
is an objection concerning Jenson's apparent movement to draw the immanent Trinity into too
close of a spatial and temporal proximity to the world. These important points come to a head
as we consider the implications for a doctrine of creation, and thereby, for a theological
anthropology. First we must highlight that Christian theology has long struggled to properly
understand two seemingly, or potentially, contradictory claims. Gunton clearly summarizes
the conflicting claims in stating
that, first, God is the sole creator, and indeed, sole lord of what happens within that
creation's history subsequent to its creation; and that, second, as creator and redeemer
he is at the same time the one who gives that creation its proper Selbstandigkeit or




relative independence, a subsistence that it receives from its relation to God. That is
apparently to want one's cake and eat it too.'57
We will recall that this is exactly what the modem world rejected on the account that it
introduced an intolerable hegemony ofGod's agency. For the modem it is an offense to
reason to consider that God would omnipotently will and create all things, yet still allow
human agency to flourish. For the modem, this was an apparently irreconcilable dichotomy.
The only option was to then deny God and revert to one of the many modem forms of
atheism. According to Gunton, however, a sufficiently Trinitarian theology of creation can
hold these two claims in tension. In fact, as he will repeatedly argue, a rigorously trinitarian
theology is the only way to reconcile the two claims.
Gunton often appeals to Samuel Taylor Coleridge's arguments concerning the
properly trinitarian formulation of God's relation to the created world. For Coleridge there
were only two theological models to choose from: othemess-absorbing pantheism, or
otherness-affirming trinitarian theism. Only trinitarian theism could assure that sufficient
'space' between the creator and the creation was maintained so as to secure the distinction of
each, while still affirming the created order's 'continuing dependence upon God for
everything that is and takes place'.158 Certainly, as Gunton concedes, Jenson would agree to
this Coleridgian proposition. This not withstanding, there developed between Gunton and
Jenson a theological debate concerning the way in which the relation ofGod to the world
should be described. What is at stake for Gunton is the fundamental otherness of each, both
God and world, with the only choices being between an otherness affirming transcendence or
an otherness denying immanence.
Like Gunton's first objection to Jenson's trinitarian formulization of the relations
between the divine persons, here again his objections are largely Christological. In the former
case Jenson was found to subordinate the Spirit to the Son, thereby reducing the distinction of
each hypostases. And here the objection concerns Jenson's distinctively Lutheran
formulization of the Christological mediation of creation. Gunton locates the problem in
Jenson's stress on the single hypostasis of Christ's 'two natures' - both divine and creaturely.
Jenson's intention is to avoid any notion of the Christologically dangerous separation of the
two 'natures' in a dualistic manner. As Jenson explains; 'The incarnation given, what we call
the humanity of Christ and the deity ofChrist are only actual as the one sole person, so that
where the deity of the Son is, there must be Jesus' humanity, unabridged as soul and body.'159
Gunton finds in this Christology a definite risk of losing the 'distinct reality of Jesus'
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humanity' to the overwhelming oneness of the two natures. The 'tendency is to downplay the
necessary otherness of Jesus and the Father by over stressing their identity'.160
The problem can be further located in Jenson's suggested 'communion of attributes'
amongst the three persons of the Trinity. Gunton finds in this a pronounced risk of losing the
actions - the attributes - of Jesus that were distinctly human. Thus, Gunton concludes:
If Christology is to provide a matrix for an understanding of the relation between
creator and creature, must not more be done to ensure the distinct reality of Jesus'
humanity as the eternal Son become incarnate?... may it not be objected that more
effort should be devoted to demonstrating that the logos speaks as human! 161
Once again, what is threatened, Gunton maintains, is the distinct "space" of the humanity of
Jesus. Moreover, Gunton finds that the distinct otherness of the created world, as a distinct
entity that is other than the Creator, is similarly threatened. For if Christology is going to be
our basis for understanding the God-world relationship - as Jenson indicates in stating that
the 'Father's love of the Son is... the possibility of creation'162 - without falling into the
Coleridgian dichotomy of pantheism or radical deism, we must work to preserve sufficient
"space" for the humanity of Jesus. The question is now whether or not Jenson's Christology is
successful on this point. Or as Gunton would ask: is his Christology sufficiently trinitarian?
The answer to this question is, for Gunton, a qualified no. We have already reviewed
some of the reasons for this conclusion above, but Gunton also finds reason in Jenson's
metaphorical characterization of the spatiality of God and creation.163 Jenson is very careful to
make clear that the doctrine of creation is not concerned with a 'timeless' relation between
God and the world. The act of creation is rather a making of space and time for which
creation can be itself. As Jenson explains; 'God is roomy; he can make room in himself if he
chooses; if he so chooses the room he makes we call time; and that he creates means that he
chooses.'164 But as Gunton has famously objected, it is, perhaps, problematic to construe the
act of creation as the making of space and time 'within' the being ofGod rather than as pure
'externalization'. Yet Gunton will also concede that there is a strong element of creation
understood as externalization in Jenson's theology. But the question remains as to whether the
'within' which Jenson employs is the same as Barth's description of a 'temporal analogy'
between God's spatiality and the world he has created.165
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We will remember in all of this that what is at stake is the true othemess-in-relation
that maintains both God and world as distinctively themselves, and without succumbing to the
modern drive to expel God from the created realm entirely. But similarly, we must protect
against the opposite side of the modern paradox which sought to bring God and world into an
indistinguishable immanence to one another (pantheism). Interestingly for our overall project,
we find that Jenson adopts the place-language of John of Damascus to highlight the God-
world relationship which he wishes to illustrate. As Jenson explains;
We must inquire into the relation between God himself and the space he makes for us.
God is his own place. What then is the relation of God, as his own place, to the space
he makes in time for creatures? If he is not to be an absent, deist God, he must be
present to creatures in their space. How is that? 166
For Jenson, the answer to this question is to be found in Thomas Aquinas' proposition that
God is present where he is at work, or where his power and agency can be exercised. The
creation is then 'a place open to God'.167
We may find in this a sense of creation as the externalization which Gunton is
looking for. Yet Gunton remains suspicious as to whether this conception of the God-world
relationship is sufficient to maintain the otherness that is required for personal beings to truly
be themselves. Gunton is lead to ask; 'How can what is within God.. .fail to be a part of
God?'168 Indeed the problem is not just Christological, but equally pneumatological, as
Gunton finds Jenson's account to be somewhat lacking in both regards. It is in this way that
we may find the Trinitarian balance that is needed. As Gunton insist, the humanity of Jesus 'is
most satisfactorily articulated where attention is given to his relation to his Father as it is
mediated by the Spirit'.169
How then, in Gunton's estimation, are we to construe the 'spatiality' of both God and
world, immanence and transcendence? In what proved to be his final response to Jenson,
Gunton states that his 'preference would be to say that the creation takes place within Christ,
rather than within God simpliciter' .l7° Gunton bases his argument concerning this
confinement of the spatial metaphor to Christ on Colossians 1:16, which suggests again that
all things in heaven and on earth, both visible and invisible, have been created through Christ
himself. It is then, Christ alone who is 'the place where the relation between God and the
world is both realized and understood'.171 But this cannot be maintained without a supporting
account of the Holy Spirit's role in this act ofmediation between God and world. We must
then speak equally of the 'one by whose mediation the Son became incarnate and is made the
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means of the relating of the creation to God the Father'.172 As the one who relates the world to
the Father through the Son, the Holy Spirit is the omnipresence of God in the world which
enables the world to be what it is. The Spirit, as Gunton consistently highlights, is the one
who perfects creation, by mediating the multiplicity ofmaterial particulars to the Father
through the Son.
In summary, we can now say that trinitarian freedom involves the 'roominess' to be
oneself, but also the relationality, through Son and Spirit, to be an other-in-relation. Applied
to the immanent Trinity, we find that Gunton is very much concerned with attributing God's
work to one of the three particular hypostasies, rather than ascribing God's economic
activities to the Trinity in a homogeneous or undifferentiated fashion. As Gunton writes; 'We
should say, then, that the essence of the being in relation that is the Trinity is the personal
space that is received and conferred.'173 And because God is intimately involved -
economically - in the structures of space and time, he cannot be understood by negative
abstraction as solely timeless and spaceless.
Perichoresis implies an ordered but free interrelational self-formation: God is not
simply shapeless, a negatively conceived monad, but eternal interpersonal life. There
is thus a richness and space in the divine life, in itself and as turning outwards in the
creation of the dynamic universe that is relational order in space and time.174
Certainly we cannot equate space and time with God's being - God is not continuous with
space and time - they are instead part of the creation itself. It is in this way that a Trinitarian
construal ofmediation is so crucial to a doctrine of creation. For without it we have little
choice other than what we have seen as the modern dichotomy of pantheism or radical deism.
III. The Creation: Personal and Non-Personal
Now that we have some understanding of what a properly Trinitarian notion of
relationality looks like, we must now consider in some detail the shape ofwhat Gunton terms
the personal and non-personal creation. Moreover, we must ask the basic ontological
question: what kind of being is the human person? We have already seen that the modem era
had difficulty in fully understanding the significance of personhood, which, according to
Gunton, is essentially a theological term. We will also recall that the problem of the 'one' and
the 'many' is by no means particular to the modem period, as Greek philosophers equally
struggled to navigate between the affirmation ofmultiplicity or unity, the universal or the
particular, in a fashion very similar to the modems and their postmodern offspring. This split-
personality has also made its way into the modem stmggle to understand the nature of
172
Gunton, The Triune Creator, p. 142.
173
Gunton, The Promise ofTrinitarian Theology, p. 128.
174
Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, p. 164.
53
persons, as it trades upon varying views of alienating individualism (too much space) or
homogenizing collectivism (too little space).
But as we have already seen, we have at the very heart of the doctrine of the Trinity
an extremely useful and important concept of the person. Useful because it is through this
concept that we are able to formulate a Trinitarian understanding of how it is that others
participate in our very being. As persons we are empowered by others to be distinctively
ourselves; we are in fact, enabled by others through relationality. We have already spoken of
the three persona of the Trinity where we learned that being (Trinitarian ontology) is a
relational achievement found even at the very heart of the Godhead. The achievement of the
Cappadocians, however, extends beyond the inner-being of the Trinitarianpersona alone -
extending in a limited and carefully qualified sense - to those creatures made in the image of
God. We will now seek to elucidate Gunton's theological understanding of the creation,
taking in turn the human/personal sphere and then the non-human/non-personal realm of the
remainder of creation. Again, our overall concern is to begin to uncover the way in which
Gunton relates these realms to one another in and through space and time, only to continue
this project in chapter 3.
The Personal: Humanity in the Imago Dei
Theologians have long struggled to understand human 'exceptionalism' but
particularly as it has been applied to the doctrine of the image of God. As we reviewed earlier
in the chapter, the traditional response - if any single tradition can be identified - has been to
locate the image in the human capacity to reason, and we have reviewed some of the pitfalls
to such a position. It is important, however, that we follow Gunton in seeking to locate what
is at the heart of this line of inquiry. For him there are two central concerns or lines of
questioning that are at work here. First, by questioning the role of the imago dei we are
seeking to understand our special relationship, as humans, with God the Creator. And
secondly - second, both ontologically and methodologically - we find that questioning the
imago dei is also an attempt to give expression to what it is that differentiates humans from
the multiplicity of nonhuman creatures, both organic and inorganic, natural and artificial.175
We see then, for Gunton the question concerning the relationship of human persons to
God is ontologically determinative and prior to the secondary human relationship with both
human and nonhuman creation. This is because, as Gunton explains, in the image of God we
are not dealing with a single characteristic or an internal quality of the human being, but
rather with an overriding ontology. Moreover, it is God's Trinitarian being - as outlined
above - that is the determining factor of this creaturely ontology. As Gunton argues:
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To be made in the image of God is to be endowed with a particular kind of personal
reality. To be a person is to be created in the image of God: that is the heart of the
matter. If God is a communion of persons inseparably related, then surely...it is in
our relatedness to others that our human being consists.176
Gunton makes it clear that the relationality that results in human personhood finds its shape in
a 'double orientation'. We are persons first because of our relationship to God, and secondly,
because of our relationship with the remainder of creation - what he calls the 'horizontal'
relations. But as we will discover, Gunton will also insist that among 'horizontal'
relationships, human to human relationality is ontologically and methodologically prior to
human relationships with the nonhuman creation. We may now identify something of a
hierarchy of relationships develop in Gunton's theological anthropology. The first and
privileged relationship belongs to the 'vertical' human-God relationship, secondly the
'horizontal' human-human relationship (the social), and finally the human-nonhuman
relationship. We now take each of these relationships in turn.
Christology ofPersonhood
As we have already seen, for Gunton the metaphor of space sits at the very heart of
his understanding of the God-world relationship. There must, he insists, be sufficient space
amongst all relationships, both vertical and horizontal, if human personhood is to flourish
freely. We have already reviewed something of the relational space that exists between God
and the world in Gunton's trinitarian theology. But now we must ask how this space develops
in relation to the human person specifically. As we will recall, the Modems lamented the
absolute willing of the human person by an omnipotent Creator, for this appeared to be an
offence to human freedom - it collapsed the space between Creator and creature into an
immanence which denied personal particularity. Yet as Gunton will continually insist, the
space between humans and God should be understood as distinct but always in dynamic
relation. Once again, this spatially mediated relationality takes place through God's 'two
hands', the Son and the Spirit. Therefore, 'to be in the image of God', Gunton argues, 'is to be
created through the Son, who is the archetypal bearer of the image'.177 The image of God is
instilled not through an approximate sharing of space that erases otherness, but rather through
being conformed to the person of Christ through the Spirit - 'the creator of community'. We
are then sustained in our unique humanity by the 'creating and redeeming agency of the
Triune God'.178 Indeed, personhood is always to be understood as a distinctly Triune
achievement.
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What is certain is that this does not exhaust all that must be said of the 'vertical'
relations which constitute human persons in our unique particularity. The Christian
confession concerning the freedom of particular human persons from the determinism ofGod
is constantly problematic. Therefore, it is not enough to rely simply on spatial metaphors to
alley modern fears concerning the freedom of persons. Ifwe are to continue to confess, as we
must, that it is our relationship with God which sustains us in our particular being, then
something more must be said concerning human sin and human freedom.
The doctrine of sin teaches that each and every person who bears the image of God is
entrapped in a 'network of disrupted relations' with God and the world 'so that as a matter of
fact apart from redemption, they are able to replicate only the patterns of disorder'.179 And as
Gunton argues, it is by way of this disrupted relationship with God from whom our being is
given, that we are directed to consider the past, present, and future of our sinful nature.
In Christ and Creation, Gunton highlights the importance ofunderstanding the 'three
tenses' of God's preservation and conservation ofour personal being. That is to say, we are
preserved and conserved in our freedom in spite of our sinful leanings towards what Barth
famously described as 'nothingness'. The doctrine of original sin teaches that there is a past to
human rebellion against the Creator through which we have been gracefully preserved - the
past tense. Similarly, we know that we are presently in rebellion yet sustained in our being
through a graceful and personal relationship with God - the present tense. And finally, we
understand that our personal being, and the world as a whole, is destined for perfection and
completeness in Christ - the future or eschatological tense. Thus to be a creature created in
the image ofGod, is to be directed towards a future perfection in Christ through the power of
the Spirit.180
In light of this we find that the person ofChrist is determinative of our creaturely
being, and that our particular personhood is directed towards a future perfection in Christ. In
this sense, personhood is something of an eschatological category. We will truly be persons
only when God becomes all in all. Importantly, this highlights the idea that the image ofGod
is not a static quality, but rather, a dynamic happening that takes place through time. Upon
this understanding our final realization as persons is always before us.
Gunton will also place Christ at the very center of a theological anthropology,
because Christ is the one in whom we see a profound intersection of the 'vertical' and
'horizontal' relations. 'He is indeed part of the created order, and although his humanity is
that of the Son, it is no less than ours part of the general network of relationality of created
being.'181 What must be made explicit on these points is that Gunton clearly argues that
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human freedom, even the freedom found in Christ's human nature, is always a relational
achievement empowered by the Holy Spirit. The imaging of God is then an inherently Triune
act: 'the Son images the Father as through the Spirit'.182
We are then deeply misguided in seeking to locate human (personal) freedom in
some kind ofpre-given internal human quality. This is grounded in the realization that as the
true image of God, Christ accepts and takes on his freedom as a gift of the Spirit. Therefore,
Gunton understands that
Freedom is not an absolute, but something exercised in relation to other persons, and
that means in the first instance that it is the gift of the Spirit who is God over against
us, God in personal otherness enabling us to be free. It is in our relatedness that we
are free or not....183
We find in this a strong argument against the many forms ofmodern determinism that have
proven so alienating. Yet human freedom is not to be found in the 'vertical' relation alone,
but also in the 'horizontal' relations which make up human community - that is, the social
sphere.
From Persons to Sociality
As we have already indicated, 'social' relationality is the first of the two types of
'horizontal' relations which Gunton takes into consideration. Once again, we see that for
Gunton human community takes its ontological shape - as a communion ofpersons created in
the image of God - analogically from the being of the Triune God. Here Gunton makes clear
that he is not interested in a 'social theory' of the Trinity, for these tend to suggest 'three
almost independent deities'.184 Rather, Gunton finds continuity between the Trinitarian
ontology of relationally achieved being and the constitution of human sociality. As Gunton
writes:
The chief affirmation to be made here is that if persons are, like the persons of the
Trinity and by virtue of their creation in the image of God, hypostases, concrete and
particular, then their particularity too is central to their being. It is not an unfortunate
accident but our glory that we are other: each unique and different. The destruction of
forces making for homogeneity can be achieved by finding ways of allowing persons
to be particular, particular in relation indeed, but made by that very relationality
unique and free. 185
In light of our creaturely constitution as beings created in the image of God, human persons
are inherently and ontologically social beings. Like Adam, we are unable to be fully ourselves
without a social communion with like others. 'It is only when he can rejoice in the fellowship
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of one who is a true other-in-relation that he is able to transcend the merely individual state
that is a denial of human fullness.'186
Gunton criticizes all of the many historical concepts of a sociality that consist of an
artificial contract that floats above the ontologically prior individual. Thinkers such as Kant,
Hobbes, Lock, and Nietzsche, all held to a view of sociality as something artificially
contracted amongst individuals in the interest ofmaintaining peace and order. Hegel
represents something of a watershed in his holding to a view of sociality as an intrinsic part of
being human. However, Hegel's concept of the social tends to follow the same path as the
later Marxist conception of the social, both tending to collapse into a homogenization of the
individual.187
Again, Gunton turns briefly to the work of Coleridge in his effort to construct a
concept of sociality that sees relationality as intrinsic to human being and freedom, yet
maintains the space that is necessary if persons are to remain other. Coleridge categorized the
social, or sociality, as partaking in his notion of idea - a category which he invoked to capture
the commerce which exists between the human mind and reality. However, we should not
mistake the idea for static structures of the mind like the Kantian transcendental. The
Coleridgian idea is far more dynamic as it seeks to embrace the ontological interaction of
both the One and the many. Moreover, as is well known, for Coleridge the Trinity was the
'idea of ideas' from which all other ideas were to emanate.188 For Gunton's part, this notion of
idea is a far superior way of understanding sociality than is the Enlightenment's apriori
social contract. Ifwe understand sociality to be something like the Coleridgian idea, then we
are close to seeing sociality, not as a contract, but as a 'historic reality' which favors the
understanding that ecclesiology is the basis of human being. This observation will lead
Gunton into the bold claim that 'social being, of the kind embodied in ecclesia, is the deepest
expression of human reality'.189
It is now clear that for Gunton sociality takes its distinct form, not from some
legalistic notion of social contract that is added to human personhood, but from an ontology
that is most fully realized in ecclesial community - the body ofChrist - that is formed
through covenant. For Gunton, the Biblical concept of 'covenant' encapsulates 'the calling of
the human race into free and joyful partnership with God, and so with each other.'190
Importantly for our overall purpose in this study, we may now asses Gunton's
theological understanding of sociality as one which almost entirely excludes nonhuman
participation. We will have much more to say on this in chapter 3, but let us conclude for now
186 Ibid., p. 216.
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with a brief review of Gunton's disagreement with Daniel Hardy. In responding to Hardy's
article "Created and Redeemed Sociality" he further illustrates this distaste for theologies
which consider nonhuman or natural participation in sociality. For Hardy, sociality is more
than a Coleridgian idea, but is rather, a Trinitarian transcendental' that must be 'traced to the
Logos ofGod operative in creation. This divine ordering', according to Hardy, 'is what
ultimately implants in the human condition the "being-with" which is natural to it.' What is
unique in Hardy's theological understanding of sociality is his insistence that sociality not be
limited to the Church community alone. Unlike Bonhoeffer and Forsyth before him, Hardy
argues that sociality as a transcendental 'should be traced to the truth ofGodpresent in
creation.'191 On this view, sociality is understood to be a universal and natural mark of all
humanity. This further suggests that sociality 'pertains not just to redeemed being - being in
the church - but to created being as a whole.'192 For Gunton this simply will not do, for it
threatens to collapse or submerge the realm of the personal (society) into the realm of the
nonpersonal (nature) in such a way as to risk ontological continuity between the two realms.
Gunton will further argue that Hardy's doctrine of transcendental sociality would be better
applied to the realm of the personal - human and divine - alone. Thus we may summarize
Gunton's understanding of the cosmos as consisting of the human realm that is personal and
social, but most fully when realized within the church community. But secondly, the cosmos
also consists of the 'natural order' which is to be understood as ontologically distinct from the
personal and social spheres.
The Non-Personal: Nature
We now take up the task of outlining Gunton's characterization of the nonhuman
creation, but particularly in terms of four specific categories: non-personal, non-social,
contingent, and relational (or perichoretic). By unraveling these four categories we will also
be interested in determining Gunton's understanding of the dynamic commerce which exists
between human and the nonhuman creation.193 Although the two realms ofpersonal
(humanity) and non-personal (non-humanity) are to be ontologically distinguished, for
Gunton, there must be something said of the important relations which exist between humans
and their 'environments'. Indeed, he will often insist that 'we are not human apart from our
relation with the non-personal world'.194 Along these lines we may further see that the
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pronounced distinction which Gunton seeks to preserve between God and world, immanence
and transcendence, can similarly be found in his radical distinction betweenpersonal
humanity and non-personal nature. For him there is much at stake as we attempt to draw
ontological lines between persons and non-persons. The modern era, as we have already seen,
radically alienated persons from the 'natural world' by seeing the human as a mind or will that
had to jump an cpistemological void in order to access the world 'out there'. Later modern
thinkers began to propose a radical identification with the 'natural' which essentially
destroyed personal particularity - as in some breeds of Deep Ecology and naturalism. Thus
we must now ask the question; where and how do we draw the ontological lines between
personal and non-personal being?
For Gunton, the criterion which must be met for membership in the realm of persons
is rather clear-cut. We will remember that he was one of the first to make the radical claim
that the term 'person' is at its most basic level a distinctly theological category. Moreover, it
is a primitive concept derived from the Trinitarian being of God, and is closely associated
with the terms; relation, otherness, and freedom. Now we must ask to what degree Gunton is
willing to extend these properties or characteristics to nonhuman entities. We begin by
detailing what makes persons different from nonhumans, and we will conclude with some of
their important continuities.
First, we may indicate that humans and the Trinitarian hypostasis (or persons) express
personhood in 'their ability to transcend themselves, to think and act beyond the present and
the place in which they are set.'195 In Gunton's estimation, this simply cannot be said of the
nonhuman realm. In chapter three, we will see that this is why Gunton will limit the
possession of the Spirit to the personal realm alone. But for now we may compound these
thoughts by saying something of the passivity of the nonhuman creation which legitimizes
human 'dominion' over the nonhuman creation. Gunton's discussion of dominion in relation
to the nonhuman realm has more to do with eschatological dependence than it does the
stronger forms of human anthropocentrism ofwhich thinkers like Lynn White have been so
critical. Instead, Gunton argues that the non-personal realm is ontologically dependant upon
the realm of persons - 'the world is what it is by virtue of its relation to those who bear the
image of God.'196 The non-personal realm is then found by Gunton to be fully subordinate to
the realm of persons. This does not, however, mean that the non-personal realm is completely
passive in the face of human intentionality and agency. But Gunton is far from clear as to
what kind - if any - agency he is willing to extend to (non-personal) nonhumans. We shall
have more to say on this topic in chapter three.
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Secondly, we may say for Gunton that the nonhuman, and thereby non-personal
realm, does not participate in what he has deemed sociality. This is to say that personal
entities 'are social beings, so that of both God and man it must be said that they have their
being in their personal relatedness: their free relation-in-otherness.'197 But this cannot be said
of the non-personal being of nonhuman entities. To be social, is for Gunton, to be capable of
expressing the characteristics of love and freedom. Read otherwise, to be social is to carry the
marks of human and divine agency. Therefore, we may only say of the universe as a whole
that it is characterized by relationality, but not by sociality.
What then might we be able to say of non-personal - nonhuman - relationality? First,
Gunton is clear that we should be able to speak, by analogy, of a universal perichoresis at
work in and through the non-personal creation as well as the personal. 'Everything in the
universe', Gunton insists, 'is what it is by virtue of its relatedness to everything else.'198
Although he does not detail the finer points of the argument - like many philosophers are
more concerned to do - Gunton argues that all things, both personal and non-personal, are
perichoretically bound up in the being of all other things. As Gunton writes; 'The human is
like the non-human in being spatio-temporally particular, while it is also continuous with it in
being bound up perichoretically with all being.'199 But the kind of relationality which
perichoresis implies is one which works to constitute entities in their own particular being.
Once again, this is what Gunton has determined analogically - and imperfectly - from the
Trinitarian being of God who is himself constituted through the internal taxis of the divine
hypostasis.
Ifwe are to preserve relationality from deteriorating into a kind ofparticularity-
destroying homogeneity or pantheism, we must speak equally of ontological otherness. As we
reviewed earlier; all created being enjoys some measure of ontological distinction from the
Creator. Gunton explains that the 'world's otherness from God is part of its space to be itself,
to be finite and not divine'.200 In the realm of personal beings Gunton refers to this quality as
freedom -personalfreedom or personal space. And to be sure, non-personal beings enjoy a
space or otherness of their own, but this is of a subtly different quality than that of personal
beings. Along these lines Gunton argues that the
concept of freedom is transmuted into contingence when we move from the personal
to the non-personal sphere...It means that the world does not have to be what or as it
is. It is not the same as freedom, but is rather the way of speaking of the distinctive
form ofbeing of the non-personal created world.201
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The point to be drawn from this is that we are to find a qualitative difference between
personal freedom and non-personal contingency. While human persons arc created in the
image ofGod - and thereby are enabled to praise the creator - non-persons are not made in
this image, and are therefore characterized as contingent.
Non-personal entities are, like personal beings, perichoretically enabled to relate to
other beings and still retain their own particularity. But as Gunton argues, this relationality
should not be conceived as personalfreedom because the non-personal being is unable to
realize its own destiny apart from those human persons created in the image of God.202
Moreover, by describing non-personal otherness as contingency rather than freedom, he
intends to indicate that the nonhuman creation - the world - could have been created
differently. In other words there is nothing which bound the creator to create all of reality in
the manner which the sciences now struggle to understand. This effectively avoids any hints
of necessity in the created order. But the contingency of the non-personal realm goes even
further for Gunton, who also finds 'inherent contingencies' within the nonhuman creation to
this very day. Drawing on the concepts germane to chaos theory, Gunton argues that the
world is essentially chaotic yet altogether stable. The chaos which is inherent to the created
order, is for Gunton, further proof that the 'universe is not only contingent - free in its own
way; but the contingency operates so as to be creative'.203 In sum, non-personal - particular -
entities enjoy a kind of freedom that allows them to remain uniquely themselves, but this is of
a distinctly different quality than the freedom enjoyed by persons. Non-personal beings are
dependent upon human persons, created in the image of God, to become fully what they were
intended to be. As Gunton indicates, this is why the creation 'awaits with eager longing the
revealing of the children of God (Romans 8.19)'.204
To conclude this section we would do well to indicate some of the continuities
between persons and the non-personal realm. It is important that we notice that both persons
and non-persons, humans and nonhumans, are particulars constituted and preserved through
the many and various relationships in which they find their own particular being. In fact, it is
on this account that Gunton will propose relationality as a kind of transcendental - a universal
mark of all being - since we are now free to maintain that 'all created people and things are
marked by their coming and returning to the God who is himself.. .a being in relation'.203
Both persons and things are hypostatic in the sense ofbeing substantial particulars,
and rendered such by the patterns of relations that constitute them what they
distinctively are: with God in the first instance and with other temporally and
spatially related particulars in the second. It is thus that hypostasis, meaning
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substantial particular, variously taking shape as person and thing and constituted
relationally, acquires the status of a kind of transcendental.206
And as we will review in greater detail in chapter 3, Gunton finds that it is the particularizing
work of the Spirit that maintains persons and non-persons in their ontological difference.
Difference, is for Gunton, always to be conceived in a relational trinitarian fashion.
Difference is a dynamic act of the Creator, who himself embodies both otherness and relation
as three distinct hypostasis, who find their own personal being within their dynamic loving
relationality.
Conclusion
As a theologian very much concerned with bringing the Christian Gospel to bear on
our contemporary Western cultural climate, Colin Gunton has done much to re-establish the
significance of theology throughout the modern university. Although his historical analysis
has come under some important criticisms, his ability to draw attention to the possibility of a
causal relationship between insufficiently Trinitarian theologies of creation and the alienating
and homogenizing thrust ofmodernity, has greatly strengthened the call for a reengagement
of the Church with its cultural context. Moreover, it has also served to refocus attention on the
Christian doctrine of creation in such a way as to remain faithful to the orthodox shape of the
tradition, while avoiding the ultimately flawed late-modern philosophies of immanence.
These are, after all, merely symptoms (or reactions to) a doctrine of creation that had lost its
Trinitarian shape. From Gunton we have also learned to revisit the wisdom of the early
Fathers with a renewed understanding that they were vexed by the same problems that now
occupy the contemporary Church. And ifwe are to find a balance between eternity and time,
God and world, persons and things, as well as theologies from above and below, then we
might do well to follow the Fathers and seek out the Trinitarian and relational shape of all
things.
We will return to Gunton's trinitarian theology of creation and culture in chapter 3.
There we will be concerned to compare his overall diagnosis ofmodern disengagement and
fragmentation with that of Bruno Latour, as well as compare their respective responses or
prescriptions for these modern failures. But more importantly, we will seek to evaluate
whether Gunton has been able to fulfill what he declared to be one of the most pressing needs
of our culture today - namely, the need to understand how we humans are 'internally related
to the rest of the world'.207 Further, we will ask whether Gunton has been able to effectively
206 Ibid., p. 203.
207 Ibid., p. 15.
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Bruno Latour's Nonmodernism: Science Studies and the Socialized Nonhuman
We ain't sure where you stand, you ain't machines and you ain't land. And
the plants and the animals they are land. And the plants and the animals eat
each other.1
Modest Mouse, Building Something Out ofNothing
Introduction
How is it that things have become so difficult to define in relation to people? Why
must we always define humanity in strict opposition to non-humanity? How is it that there has
now developed such a wide rift between the human sciences and natural sciences? And how
could we ever have reached a point where one can ask, in all seriousness: 'How are we to
access, and speak truthfully, of the world out there'l I believe the epigraph to this chapter
accurately captures our current climate of hesitation in deciding where to draw the boundaries
between the human and non-human realms, or more importantly, whether boundaries should
be drawn at all. This overall uneasiness has now saturated (post)modem art, and has also
become the center of focus for one little known discipline within the academy. 'Science
studies', as the field has come to be know, incorporates all of these questions, and more, into
its small but growing corpus of 'hybridized' studies. Standing in the middle of an intellectual
storm dubbed the 'science wars,' science studies has sought to retrace our steps in order to
discover the point where humans attempted to step 'outside' of the world, severing
themselves from it, in order to obtain absolute and unmediated certainty ofwhat it contained.
More importantly, science studies seeks to describe exactly what it is that has been lost as we
endeavored to make what now appears to have been an impossible leap.
Bom in 1947 in Beaune, France, Bruno Latour has grown to become a global leader
in the field of science studies. His career has also closely reflected the interdisciplinary shape
of the field he now calls his own. Interestingly for our present study, Latour began his
academic career with university studies at Dijon in the fields ofphilosophy and theology.
Here and into his postgraduate studies, Latour would focus on Biblical hermeneutics, but
particularly the theology and writings of the often polemical (and socialist) Catholic
theologian Charles Peguy (1873-1914). Latour published his first professional article on
Peguy in 1973 and would later receive his doctorate in philosophy from the University of
Tours with a thesis titled Exegese et Ontology: une analyse des textes de resurrection, in
1975. Although he began his career with something of an interest in philosophical theology,
1 Modest Mouse, Building Something Out ofNothing, (Up Records, 1999).
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he has since largely left this area of inquiry behind opting instead to focus his philosophical
training on the many fields which have fed into the transdisciplinary field of science studies;
sociology, anthropology of science, and history to name just a few.2
This change of direction was likely instigated by a stint ofmilitary service in the mid
1970's which sent Latour to the Ivory Coast. It was here that he was submerged in
ethnographic studies for the French government, who had charged him with the task of
critically analyzing French methods of industrial education in the former colony. This study
would serve as Latour's introduction into the overlapping constellations of social scientific
methodology, field studies, international politics, and the technological practice of science.
For Latour, and the field of science studies as a whole, these early studies would result in an
altogether new and exciting 'ethnographic' or 'anthropological' style of studying scientists
and engineers going about their work. Moreover, it would be this new 'style' of studying
scientists and engineers 'in action' that would initially bring Latour into international
recognition. In the mid-1970's, Latour spent nearly two years visiting the Salk Institute, a
molecular biology laboratory in San Diego's growing biotech sector. It was there that Latour,
with very little scientific training of his own, set out to simply observe and meticulously
record the activities of scientists steeped in the process of 'discovery', or as Latour would
come to argue, the 'production' of facts. Through an interesting stroke of luck, Latour
happened to be studying at the Salk Institute at the same time as fellow Dijon-born scientist,
Roger Guillemin, who was there conducting his research into peptide hormones of the brain.
Guillemin's research, along with Andrew Schally, would subsequently receive a Nobel Prize
in 1977 for their ground breaking work at the Saul Institute. In 1979 Latour and Steve
Woolgar published their observations of the workings of the Salk laboratory in their
groundbreaking book Laboratory Life: The Social Construction ofScientific Facts,3 The
intention for this project, as Latour explains, was to 'become part of a laboratory, to follow
closely the intimate processes of scientific work, while at the same time to remain an 'inside'
outside observer, a kind of anthropological probe to study a scientific 'culture'— to follow in
2 In a recent lecture at the University of California at Santa Barbara, Latour publicly explained that he
had been raised Catholic but now considered himself to be 'not particularly pious'. It is clear that he
remains interested in religious matters, but I do not believe, judging from this lecture and other
writings, that he would consider himself a practicing Christian or a 'believer' in the generic sense.
Lecture titled: Another Take on the Science andReligion Debate, Templeton Series on Science,
Religion and Human Experience, UCSB, (May, 2002).
3 In its original French publication in 1979 the book carried the words 'social construction' in its
subtitle. Subsequent criticism and debate pressed Latour to drop the term 'social' from the subtitle for
its first English translation in 1986. This proved to be the last time that Latour would use the term
'social construction' in any of his work, and he maintains to this day that his usage of the term was
completely misunderstood. To be certain, Latour is, on the whole, completely opposed to the notion of
'social construction' in its common (and seemingly ubiquitous) usage.
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every detail what the scientists do and how and what they think. '4 At the time, this type of
methodology was far outside the norm of traditional social scientific study, as it seemed to
many observers of the time that the natural sciences were fundamentally immune to
sociological interrogation or study. Yet the new methodological formula proved quite
successful as the book initiated a new direction for the field of science studies, or the
'sociology of science' as the field was more commonly known at the time. Moreover, as
many observers have commented with varying degrees ofjoy or dismay, 'Latour also inspired
a different style in sociology of science, a style that might be described as elusive, self-
conscious, and literary. '5
The 1980's signaled yet another turn in Latour's career as he began to focus more
intently on the technological practices of scientific research as well as its important historical
and philosophical dimensions. This was also the decade of Latour's widespread introduction
to English readers as the revised version ofLaboratory Life was translated and republished in
1986 to a wide readership in the UK and North America. One year later Latour would publish
his first major interaction with distinctly philosophical issues concerning the sciences with his
book Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists andEngineers through Society (1987).
Then in 1988 Latour introduced his first major historical study of scientific practice with the
publication of The Pasteurization ofFrance, which was originally published in France in
1984. It was these three books in their English translation which would begin to cement
Latour's influence amongst the Anglo-American academy. But these books also signaled an
even more pronounced deviation of the 'French School'6 from the standing field of the
sociology of science which had been established by the 'Edinburgh School' in the mid
1970's. This new deviation, however, was not without its controversy as we will review in
more detail later in the chapter.
In the 1990's Latour's project took an even greater turn towards the investigation of
philosophical concerns germane to the study of nature and society as a whole. With the
publication of We Have Never Been Modern (1993), Latour began to apply the discoveries of
his small field of science studies to a more sweeping historical and philosophical
interpretation ofmodem and postmodern thought. As we will illustrate throughout this
chapter, it was this book which began Latour's project of evaluating the new relationship
between nature and society which he and his colleagues 'stumbled upon' through their
detailed ethnographic studies of scientists and engineers at work. In 1996 Latour published
4 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction ofScientific Facts, 2nd (New
York: Sage, 1979; Princeton, 1986), p. 12.
5 Peter Godfrey-Smith, Theory andReality: An Introduction to the Philosophy ofScience, (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 133.
6 Latour's 'school' is sometimes referred to as the 'French,' 'Paris,' or 'Continental' school and often
includes the work of several others including, but not exclusive to Isabelle Stengers, Donna Haraway,
Michel Callon and Michel Serres.
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Aramis, or the Love ofTechnology, which presented - in an unorthodox and perhaps
experimental style - a detailed study of a failed Parisian attempt to build a highly
computerized public transportation system. This book may be read as a case study for the
philosophical ideas which Latour had outlined in We Have Never Been Modern by seeking to
unravel the often tangled webs of relations between human societies and their nonhuman
technological creations. In Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality ofScience Studies (1999),
Latour presents what is to this date his most systematized attempt to make explicit his own
philosophical and methodological commitments within the field of science studies. This study
is also full of interesting case studies and philosophical discussion directed towards correcting
many of the important, and widespread, misconceptions concerning the position of the French
School. In a more recent major work, Politics ofNature: How to Bring the Sciences into
Democracy (2004), Latour illustrates his understanding of how nature and society - and
therefore science and politics - may be reconfigured in the wake of modernity and
postmodernity's demise. As will soon become clear, the balance of this and later chapters will
focus primarily on Latour's more recent work from 1990 onwards, due in large part to their
more philosophical and historical trajectory than his earlier work.7 In this thesis we are
primarily concerned to review and critically appropriate Latour's fascinating vision of the
relationship between nature and culture, humans and nonhumans, which has been the central
mark of these more recent works.
Outside of his prolific publishing career it is worth noting that in 1982 Latour took up
the position of professor of sociology at the Centre de sociologie de l'lnnovation at the Ecole
nationale superieure des mines in Paris, where he remains to this day. He has also taken
several visiting professorships at institutions such as the University of California at San
Diego, the London School of Economics, as well as Harvard University's history of science
department. Included in his many awards and recognitions is an honorary doctorate awarded
by the University ofLund, Sweden, in 1996. Most recently he has also begun to delve into the
philosophical aspects of artistic and architectural representation. In this vein he has served as
the co-curator for two recent art/architectural exhibits, and has been the contributing editor for
one of the exhibit's companion volume titled Iconoclash,8 Today Latour enjoys a world-wide
readership with several of his books having now been translated into more than 20 languages.
7 It is also worth noting that Latour's work in the 1990's was directed towards reworking his studies
from the 70's and 80's so as to be made more philosophically rigorous and less susceptible to
misunderstanding by his critics.
8 Iconoclash: Beyond the Image-Wars in Science, Religion andArt, was an international exhibit opened
for three months starting in May of 2002, in Karlsruhe, Germany, and was hosted by ZKM (Center for
Art and Media Karlsurhe) under the direction of Peter Weibel. Latour served as contributing editor for
the companion volume of the same name which contained both pictures and accompanying essays from
the exhibit. More recently he has been co-curator with Peter Weibel for an exhibition titled Making
Things Public - Atmospheres ofDemocracy, which was also hosted by ZKM Karslruhe, on the 19th of
March, 2005. The companion volume to this exhibition is currently in-press.
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Although his writings have received world-wide recognition, it is a strange twist of fortune
that Latour's work has found a greater welcoming in English speaking countries rather than
his native France. His eager acceptance in the United Kingdom and North America has led
Latour to translate all of his major works, and many of his shorter articles into English, and
has now begun to publish many of his more recent works exclusively in English.
We will now attempt to outline the major currents of argumentation which may be
found mnning through Latour's wide-ranging body of work.9 The outline of this chapter will
closely reflect that of the preceding chapter on Colin Gunton with but one exception; here we
will begin with an illustration of Latour's place within the sometimes difficult to grasp field
of science studies and its overall history. Secondly, and rejoining the template of the last
chapter, we will first review Latour's critical assessment ofmodernity and its failed
'Constitution'. In the second half of the chapter we will outline Latour's constructive response
to modernity and its radical shortcomings. As we will see, Latour has given the name of
'nonmodernism' to his constructive program.
I. Latour and the Field of Science Studies
The Shape ofRecent Eco-Political Thought in France
In the interest ofmore fully understanding Latour's overall project, we may
now take a moment to consider the unique national context of which his work is
representative. Long sidelined amongst Anglo-Saxon 'green' theorists for its supposedly
Cartesian character, French eco-political thought has carried a much deeper and far more
unique trajectory than the English-speaking academy has often been willing to recognize. In a
recent volume titled DividedNatures: French Contributions to Political Ecology, Kerry H.
Whiteside has made an altogether compelling evaluation of French 'ecologisms', as he calls
them, and has done much to outline the genuinely unique characteristics shared amongst
French eco-political theorists. Thus, in our effort to better understand the French context of
Latour's work, we may now follow Whiteside by delineating three of the commonly shared
characteristics ofFrench ecologism which serve to clearly differentiate it from that of the
mainstream ofAnglo-Saxon ecologism.
The first and perhaps most striking difference between French-speaking and English-
speaking ecologisms may be located in the distinctly French affinity for 'decentered' eco-
9 The task of attempting to systematize Latour's work is rather difficult considering his own
characterization of his rather 'Continental' writing style: 'I produce books, not a philosophy. Every
book I am involved with is a work ofwriting that has its own categories and its own makeup. I cannot
transform all of these books into a unified field of thought that would remain stable over time and of
which one book would simply be coherent manifestations.' Robert Crease, et. al., "Interview with
Bruno Latour," in Chasing Technoscience: Matrix for Materiality, Don Ihde and Evan Selinger
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 19.
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political thought. For at the very heart of the more recent French contributions to political
ecology is a distinct problematization of our received notions of 'nature' and 'society' or
'nature' and 'humanity'. Where Anglo-Saxon theorists have tended to begin their theorization
with a 'centered', 'reified', or even 'dualistic' understanding ofwhat constitutes 'humanity'
and 'nature', the French approach has often been to understand these two realms as
'noncentered' and more thoroughly intertwined or hybridized. To be certain, Latour's own
brand of science studies is very much within this 'decentered' French tradition.
The reason for this divergence in approach, according to Whiteside, has centrally to
do with what we might call the differing 'environmental histories' of the two cultures. In the
Anglo-Saxon world, but particularly in the United States, Canada, and Australia, 'green
theory' began with a rise in public alarm at the rapidly disappearing 'wilderness' and was
soon followed by a bifurcation of the eco-debate into the two competing philosophical camps
of 'preservationism' and 'conservationism'. Unique to the Anglo-Saxon experience was this
encounter with a seemingly un-humanized landscape which compelled preservationist
sentiments to keep these areas free of human impact. Thus, as Whiteside illustrates, English-
speaking ecologisms developed in such a way that 'humanity' and 'nature' were more fully
'centered' as two distinct ontological realms. The outgrowth of this early ontological
commitment, or 'centering', may be clearly seen in the Anglo-Saxon affinity for focusing
eco-political discussion on the question of value and inherent worth. Having left the
categories ofhumanity and nature 'centered' and unproblematized, Anglo-Saxon ecologisms
have been consumed with drawing the distinction between anthropocentric and
nonanthropocentric ecologisms, and have therefore been ultimately consumed with the
location value or worth - either in the 'human' or 'natural' realm. 'Centered theories', as
Whiteside explains, 'ground environmental values in an entity - the human subject or nature -
with a distinct and stable identity.'10 The problematic outgrowth of this centered approach to
ecologism, common in the English-speaking academy, is that 'many green thinkers regard the
locus of value, not the identity of humanity or nature, as what is most problematic for
environmental ethics.'11 Moreover, 'neither side makes reflection on the conceptual
interdependency of humanity and nature the focus of its philosophical project. We humans are
one thing; nature is another.'12
In modern France the encounter with 'nature' has been of a very different sort than
that of the English-speaking 'New World'. Where in the Anglo-Saxon experience
10
Kerry H. Whiteside, DividedNatures: French Contributions to Political Ecology (Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press, 2002) p. 18.
11
Ibid., p. 71. (emphasis added)
12 Ibid., p. 44.
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'wilderness' - or landscapes which have not yet seen high levels human domination13 - were
the central controlling factor in the development of a 'centered' ecologism, the French
ecological mindset developed in an already anciently humanized landscape. Thus, as
Whiteside points out, 'green thinkers' in France have never been occupied with the
preservation of 'wilderness' idea popular amongst the Anglo-Saxon, and have instead taken
'great pride in the beauty of their much-reworked countryside.'14 For Whiteside, this
difference in the human/nature relationship becomes the central point of explanation for the
differing directions of French and Anglo-Saxon ecologisms - decentered and centered
respectively. In the French 'culture where few hold up wilderness as quintessence of
nature.. .there is less temptation to dichotomize the human and the natural' in the fashion of
the Anglo-Saxon world.15 Instead of focusing the discussion on the 'centers' of
anthropocentrism or nonanthropocentrism, the French have turned their attention towards
understanding the complex of processes which serve to link a decentered 'humanity' and
'nature'.
In addition to the French affinity for a decentered epistemology and ontology,
Whiteside has also illustrated that there is a shared 'anthropological moment' amongst the
French ecologisms of Edgar Morin, Bruno Latour, Michel Serres, Jean-Paul Deleage, Denis
Duclos, and that of Serge Moscovici. As Whiteside explains, this anthropological moment
takes place as the 'theorist temporarily suspends belief in the truth of scientifically established
information in order to consider our knowledge of nature as a human phenomenon'.16 The
point, however, is not to merely debunk scientific claims to have harnessed reality in the
name of'social construction' or 'anti-realism'. Instead, the anthropological moment inherent
to these decentered views of scientific practice serves to further reinforce the understanding
that 'nature' is a highly contested product of knowledge-building. Thus the anthropological
moment allows for the rather mundane (and human) routine of the actual scientific research
process to become part of the overall scientific story. We will find this distinctly French
'anthropological moment' clearly expressed throughout Latour's own science studies, but
particularly in his 'generalized principle of symmetry' and his 'parliament of things' which
we review more fully in section VI of this chapter.
Whiteside has also illustrated the strong genetic lineage which is claimed amongst the
majority of these French ecologisms with the wider currents of humanism. Concerned that
English-speaking (centered) theorists will too quickly confound 'humanism' with stronger
131 am aware that the concept or idea of 'wilderness', as it has captivated the Anglo-Saxon world, is
itself highly problematic and thoroughly contested. See for instance William Cronon's fascinating
study "The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature," chap, in Uncommon
Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).
14
Whiteside, DividedNatures, p. 47.




forms of anthropocentrism - like the 'humanisms' ofDescartes, Bacon and Kant - Whiteside
is at pains to make clear that the two should be clearly distinguished, as there are important
distinctions to be drawn between the differing varieties of humanism. In the context of French
ccologisms, the term 'humanism' - along with its functional application in the term
'humanizing nature' - is more clearly grasped when it is interpreted from within the wider
French context of decentered ecologism. Here the French ecologists are not in allegiance with
what we might call 'classic humanism', but rather, with what Whiteside calls 'skeptical
humanism'. Where classical humanists 'regard the essential, law-giving power of reason' to
be 'constitutive of our humanity', the skeptical humanist tradition, drawing more heavily on
the work ofMontaigne and Pascal, is far more willing to recognize the corruptibility of
human reason.17 Thus, unconvinced by the 'law-giving power of human reason' the skeptical
humanist will 'criticize what dehumanizes our existence: vain pretensions to social
superiority; fanaticism; disregard of spiritual consequences of technical innovations; philistine
outlooks that flatten the moral terrain in the name of equality.'18 But once again the difference
between English and French approaches to ecologism is rather stark. 'In French ecologism',
as Whiteside observes, 'debates take place not between nonanthropocentrists and
anthropocentrists but rather through various notions of humanism.'19
Indeed, Latour appears to fit rather well into all three ofWhiteside's generalizations
concerning the defining marks of French ecologism; a decentering of nature and humanity,
the shared anthropological moment, as well as the shared tradition of skeptical humanism. But
what remains rather peculiar is the relatively low-impact Latour's work has had in his native
France. As he approaches soaring levels of recognition, appreciation, and criticism in the
Anglo-Saxon academy, Latour continues to fly below radar particularly, as Whiteside points
out, amongst French liberals. This is clearly evidenced in the fact that Luc Ferry, a liberal
political philosopher and one of the most outspoken critics ofAnglo-Saxon political ecology,
has yet to take much of any notice of Latour's science studies. Best known for his scathing
critique of Anglo-Saxon ecocentrism in his book The New Ecological Order, Ferry and other
French liberals have yet to apply their critical pen to the political ecologies of their own
countrymen.20 The silence on the part of French liberals is, in Whiteside's opinion, rather
regrettable. 'By concentrating their criticisms on "Anglo-Saxon" variants of green theory,' he
explains, 'they fail to perform what would be a signal service in their own linguistic
community.'21 Yet of the several decentered ecologisms currently populating the French
17 Ibid., p. 75.
18 Ibid., p. 77.
19 Ibid., p. 74.
20 Luc Ferry, The New Ecological Order, tran. Carol Volk (Chicago/London: University of Chicago
Press, 1995).
21
Whiteside, Divided Natures, p. 256.
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academy, Latour's has clearly been the most eagerly accepted in the English-speaking world.
Again, the reason for this may be credited to his compelling style of writing. But perhaps
more important is his ability to make clear what it is that undergirds the Anglo-Saxon affinity
for centered ecologisms and to then illustrate the many pitfalls attendant to such theoretical
centering. Similarly, Latour's success may also be traced to his distinctly non-Marxist and
non-socialist political ecology. It is for this reason that Latour may appear to the Anglo-Saxon
reader to be a true alternative to the 'radical ecologies' already well known to the English-
speaking theoretician.
A ShortHistory of the Field
Having now reviewed the unique qualities of the French eco-political context we may
now turn to consider the often misunderstood academic field in which Latour has established
his international reputation. The field which is today commonly known as 'science studies'
began its conception nearly 30 years ago in Britain and soon began to spread amongst social
scientists throughout the Anglo-Saxon academy. Although methodologically and
philosophically distinct from the 'old' 'sociology of science', which was firmly established in
the 1950's through the work of the eminent American sociologist Robert K. Merton, the
modern-day field of science studies owes much to Merton's earlier sociological studies of
scientific practice. However, a distinct change was initiated in the 'old' field during 1970's as
the 'Edinburgh School' - as it is now known - introduced a new methodological trajectory to
the 'old' Meritonian sociology of science. This new method of study was dubbed the 'strong
program' by its creators - Henry Barnes22 and David Bloor23 in particular - and effectively
moved the sociology of science into greater interaction with the often parallel field commonly
known as the 'philosophy of science'. Peter Godfrey-Smith describes the general
understanding of the change from 'old' to 'new' as such:
The older work wanted to describe the social structure and social placement of
science as a whole but did not try to explain particular scientific beliefs in
sociological terms. The newer approach has tried to use sociological methods to
explain why scientists believe what they do, why they behave as they do, and how
scientific thinking and practice change over time.24
Unlike the Mertonian sociology of science before them, whose methodology often assumed a
logical empiricism in his interpretation of scientific theories; the new Edinburgh School -
which adopted the name 'sociology of scientific knowledge' (SSK) - took a markedly 'anti-
positivist' turn. With a more philosophical trajectory owing much to the influence of
22
Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul,
1974).
23 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1976 [1991]).
24
Godfrey-Smith, Theory andReality, p. 125. (emphasis in the original)
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Wittgenstein, '[t]he newer sociology embraced [Thomas] Kuhn, holism about testing,
incommensurability, new ideas about observation, and various speculative views about
scientific language.'25 Perhaps most famously, the 'strong program' of the Edinburgh School
gave the overall 'impression that sociological explanation could account wholly for the
content of science. So scientific knowledge-claims about nature were represented as
'constructs' of the social processes whose outcome they were.'26 The overall effect of this
'strong' stance was to firmly affix the Edinburgh School, perhaps unfairly, with the often
unenviable label ofbeing firmly relativist in its view of scientific knowledge. As Godfrey-
Smith has explained, the strong program 'holds that science has no special authority that
extends beyond local norms. Instead, the norms and standards that govern scientific belief can
be justified onlyfrom the inside, and that is true of other, nonscientific norms as well.'27
But just as the strong program had pushed the 'old' Meritonian sociology of science
out of the picture in the 1970's, it would itself suffer the same fate by the hands ofLatour and
the French School in the 1980's. As will become clear throughout this chapter, much of
Latour's early work within science studies was taken up in direct opposition to the Edinburgh
School's strong program, but particularly its 'principle of symmetry'. We review the
Edinburgh School's 'principle of symmetry' and the French School's corrective 'generalized
principle of symmetry' later in the chapter, but for now we may simply emphasize the rift
between these two competing schools within the general field of science studies.
This simmering rivalry which spans the English Channel began with Latour's
introduction to English readers in the 1980's, and has recently peaked with a highly visible
skirmish taking place in one of the field's most popular journals, Studies in History,
Philosophy and Science, which is published by the Edinburgh School. This recent spat of
argumentation began with the publication ofBloor's now famous (or infamous) paper 'Anti-
Latour' (1999) in which he strongly claims that his work has been misunderstood and
misrepresented by Latour and the French School as a whole.28 Published in the same volume
is Latour's rebuttal which admits to some of Bloor's criticisms but is, in my opinion, an
altogether successful defense of his own position.29 In the wake of this highly charged
outbreak were a number of attempts by others within the field to bring about some measure of
peace between the two schools. For instance Eve Seguin, a British historian, argued that the
debate was not based on fundamental differences, but rather on fundamental
25 Ibid.
26 Ted Benton and Ian Craib, Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical Foundations of Social
Thought, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 62.
27
Godfrey-Smith, Theory andReality, p. 128. (emphasis in the original)
28 Bloor, "Anti-Latour," Studies in History, Philosophy and Science 30, 1 (1999).
29
Latour, "For David Bloor and Beyond: A Reply to David Bloor's 'Anti-Latour'," Studies in History,
Philosophy and Science 30, 1 (1999).
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misunderstandings.30 In the final estimation it appears that the Edinburgh School has lost
much ground since the 1970's and there is little doubt that the French School enjoys a much
more wide-ranging influence to this day.
What is rather certain, however, is that the field has come a long way since Merton's
sociology of science in the 1950's. Today the field of science studies has been influenced and
absorbed by a variety of other fields and sub-fields - Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
(SSK), Science and Technology Studies (STS), Social Studies in Science (SSS), Social
Construction of Technology (SCOT), Anthropology of Science, Philosophy of Science - each
ofwhich seems to have filtered some measure of influence into what today falls under the
umbrella term of 'science studies'.31 This comparatively young field has also cast a rather
wide net in its incorporation of interdisciplinary theorists. As we have already seen, the field
originally drew from disciplines such as sociology, philosophy, anthropology and
sociobiology, but the findings of the practitioners of science studies have now found their way
into numerous other fields such as geography, literary criticism, economics and
environmental studies to name just a few. For such a small field, it has certainly enjoyed a
rather wide transdisciplinary reception. Theologians, however, have yet to take much notice
of the field and its theoretical and empirical findings. But now that we have briefly traced the
historical development of science studies as a field, we may now address the more difficult
question concerning what it is that science studies seeks to achieve.
The Latourian Approach to Science Studies
Proposing a singular definition for an academic discipline as diverse as science
studies would be a difficult ifnot impossible task. Certainly, the undertaking would be
simplified ifwe were to limit our definition to the obvious notion that science studies is about
the study of the sciences. But a definition such as this would not go far enough in explaining
the actual practice and methodology of science studies which make it such an exciting and
innovative field.
Mario Biagioli points out that science studies differs from other fields in that it 'does
not have to define its subject matter in relation to its neighboring disciplines', for as he
illustrates, 'over the years, the scientists have done much of that work.'32 Yet this unified
object of study has not, as we might have expected, produced a unified field in terms of
disciplinary identity. Science studies is, then, a truly interdisciplinary-discipline. As Biagioli
explains; 'The fact that science is a well-delineated and established enterprise seems to have
30 Eve Seguin, "Bloor, Latour, and the Field," Studies in History, Philosophy and Science 31, 3 (2000).
31 In fact, the Edinburgh School, as a university department, has now changed its name to the 'Science
Studies Unit' of the University of Edinburgh.
32 Mario Biagioli, "Introduction: Science Studies and Its Disciplinary Predicament," in The Science
Studies Reader, Mario Biagioli (New York and London: Routledge, 1998), p. XI.
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two opposite effects on science studies: it allows the field to be simultaneously unified (in
terms of its object of study) and strongly disunified (in terms of its methodologies, research
questions, and institutional locations).'33 It is, however, safe to say that science studies is, at
its very core, interested in discovering how science works rather than what it is. In opposition
to what has become a common misrepresentation and over generalization of the work of
science studies practitioners, science studies begins from a general agreement that science
does indeed work. Too often it has been accused of the most extreme forms of iconoclasm, as
if it were seeking to debunk all scientific claims to truth and reality. While this has been true
of some thinkers within the field, the vast majority within science studies agree that the reality
of science and its accomplishments are plain for all to see - indeed, science works. Yet the
question remains: how does science work, and why has it been so successful as a
methodology?
For Latour, the field of science studies should center on the curious lives of what he
calls 'hybrids' or 'quasi-objects', for it is they who tie together heaven and earth, the global
and local, and the human and nonhuman realms. The geographical (spatio-temporal)
undercurrents to this language should, however, not be missed and will be made more explicit
in chapter four. Yet for now we will limit our inquiry to Latour's central programmatic
concern for the field of science studies itself. Latour opens We Have Never Been Modern, by
describing the proliferation of hybrids and quasi-objects through the socio-technical
mediation of the modem sciences, but as we shall see, it is a mediation that is ultimately
obscured. His primary example is that of the ozone hole - a hybrid marked by its distinctly
global scope. The ozone hole can be considered a hybrid in so far as it draws together a
number of actors/actantsM, both human and nonhuman, into its web of relations with the end
result being a single hybridized entity. Atmospheric chemists, CEO's of international
chemical companies, refrigerators, aerosols, journalists, and international treaties are all
drawn into this single network of activity. Chemical reactions are translated into political
reactions, yet the 'horizons, the stakes, the time frames, the actors—none of these is
commensurable, yet they are caught up in the same story.'35
This is just one example among many of the modem hybrid as Latour describes it.
But our distinctly modem difficulty begins to reveal itself as the compartmentalization and
fragmentation of these hybrids is allowed to obscure their true nature. As we will see, theirs is
33 Ibid.
34 The term 'actant' will be more fully addressed throughout this chapter and more directly in chapter
three, yet it is now worth pointing out how the term is used in science studies. It is a term borrowed
from semiotics in order to make clear that we do not always need to make an absolute distinction
between 'things' (objects) and 'human actors' (subjects) in terms of their ability to act on other entities.
As Latour insists, Natural forces are no more immediately given than are human agents.
35
Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans, by Catherine Porter (New York and London: Pearson
Education Ltd, 1993), p. 1.
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a nature or ontology that is best understood, according to Latour, as being ultimately variable.
This is because hybrids consist of delicate 'threads', 'rhizomes', or 'networks' that are long
and rich if left intact, but die without a trace once severed from their life blood - their
heterogeneous and mediated relations. However, these fragile threads of human and
nonhuman networks, Latour argues, will not survive in our modern [post-Enlightenment]
world. Here they 'will be broken into as many segments as there are pure disciplines. By all
means, they [the moderns] seem to say, let us not mix up, knowledge, interest, justice and
power.'36 Throughout his widely read book We Have Never Been Modern, Latour argues that
it is the 'modern Constitution' - a failed constitution as we will see - that compels us to break
the 'Gordian knot' that weaves the world into a unified whole. Yet, for the practitioners of
science studies, it is the study of these hybrids which will ultimately serve to reveal the fact
that knowledge of things has been purified and held as far from power and politics as possible
- for it is the one that guarantees the other. Therefore, Latour argues that science studies must
follow these 'imbroglios' wherever they may lead, refusing to respect the modern
Constitution's demand that things (objects, Nature) and politics (Society, subjects, culture) be
held at arms length.
We can then see that for Latour the role of science studies is to ultimately find ways
of shuttling back and forth between that which modernity could only register as a falsely
dichotomous Nature or Culture. Hence, in order to renegotiate this metaphysical impasse,
Latour's methodological brand of science studies relies on a number of terminological
inventions unique to the discipline such as 'translation,' 'networks,' 'collectives,'
'generalized symmetry,' and a 'parliament of things' to name just a few. In this and later
chapters we will take a closer look at how each of these terms functions in practice. But for
now let us continue to simply emphasize the general core of Latour's project. At its heart it is
a movement which seeks to utilize all of these terms and methodologies in order to restore
some form of unity in our approach to understanding scientific facts and hybrids. But as
Latour argues, this is a task that has been made more difficult by the recent vogue of critical
theory. The problem with critical theory is that it has produced a rather regrettable further
fragmentation of thought into three distinct approaches to speaking about the world:
naturalization, socialization and deconstructing' Once these critical methods are applied to
the hybrid or quasi-object - for instance, the ozone hole - our accounts are forced into a
deepening fragmentation, thus one account is always unable to be reconciled with the other
two. 'Can anyone imagine a study that would treat the ozone hole as simultaneously
naturalized, sociologized and deconstructed?'38 Certainly such an attempt to distill the hybrid
36 Ibid., p. 3.




into three purified forms would be folly. But according to Latour, this is precisely what our
current intellectual climate forces upon us. Epistemologists, sociologists, and
deconstructionists are all forced to fend off the assaults of one another.
Science studies, particularly that of the French school, claims to offer a developing
alternative to the intellectual culture of late-modern fragmentation. The 'networks',
'collectives', 'hybrids', and 'translations' of science studies are intended to illuminate a new
understanding of reality that is freed from the demands of the 'modern Constitution' and its
'critical' outgrowths. Through the sociological (or ethnographic/anthropological) study of
scientific practice - as expressed in Laboratory Life - science studies has stumbled upon a
way of understanding networks as 'simultaneously real, like nature, narrated, like discourse,
and collective, like society'.39
French and Edinburgh Schools
It is important that we make this methodological point explicit; for it is scientific
practice, or what is often called 'science in the making', that has taken center stage within the
French School of science studies. The impetus for this, however, was initiated from across the
English Channel by David Bloor's work in the University of Edinburgh's sociology of
scientific knowledge department (SSK) in the 1970's. As we have already seen, theorists
within the field of SSK - Bloor and Barnes in particular - were concerned with applying the
analytical devises of the social sciences to the practice of the natural or hard sciences.
Therefore, we may now take a moment to make clearer the distinction between the Edinburgh
and French Schools.
As we have seen, at the very heart of science studies (on both sides of the Channel)
there exists a fundamental questioning of the modern separation between the natural sciences
and the human sciences, or rather, between science and society as a whole. From this
perspective, we can see the birth of science studies having been firmly grounded in the human
sciences, and in sociology in particular. Moreover, Latour has argued that a major advance
took place within science studies once 'it was realized' - by the Edinburgh School - 'that,
contrary to what traditional sociology of knowledge and Meritonian sociology told us, the
content of science is fully capable of study, and the implementation of this research program
is a single task for historians, sociologists, philosophers, and economists.'40 Thus the 'strong
program' of the Edinburgh School enjoyed steady advance until it began to become clear that
the macro-perspective of sociology was poorly equipped to deal with the micro world of the
natural scientist and the engineer. Therefore, only the most over-arching of phenomena were
39 Ibid, p. 6.
40
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able to be explained through the use of the 'strong program', such as the construction of
scientific worldviews and cultures. Alternatively, research programs which sought to
approach the micro aspects of scientific practice - such as Latour and Woolger's Laboratory
Life - were beginning to appear very successful.
For Latour the deficient element in the SSK approach of the Edinburgh School was
clear. What it lacked was a rigorous account of what it is that holds societies together - that is,
what it is that makes them durable through the fabric of space and time. According to Latour,
it appears 'that either the social science is subtle enough to explain the content of science but
the making of global society is left in the dark, or that macrosociology is back in but the
details of science disappear from view.'41 Latour further diagnoses the problem as one of
lending too much focus to the 'internalist' dimension of the sociology of science.
Philosophers of science, particularly those in the English-speaking world, were myopic in
their attention to internalist accounts, which according to the Continental view, had already
been exhausted by philosophers of the history of scientific practice - Duhcm, Bachelard,
Mach. The goal, then, was to present a coherent link between sociological concerns and
politics to the microsociological studies of science. But the goal proved elusive due to the
polemical stance of those schools which claimed that the study of scientific practice was
completely unattainable as a matter of principle.42 The warring between the two camps,
according to Latour, served only to obscure the goal of a research program that was effective
on both macro and technical levels. Therefore, the delicate balance that was needed for
science studies to be effective continued to elude its theorists.
Science studies, at least in France, took as one of its departing points the bracketing
of the word 'social' within quotation marks. For it had found social constructivist accounts of
scientific content to be lacking on several levels. First, it was suddenly realized that sociology
was itself a science, and therefore open to the same critical scrutiny as the sciences it sought
to explain. Some argued that sociological accounts should be abandoned all together opting
instead for the utilization of the 'local technical content' which the practitioners themselves
employed. Said differently, many argued that there should be no appeal made to an
overarching metalanguage. It was thought instead that practitioners of science studies should
focus on the localized language of a particular scientific practice. Latour points out that
science studies began to adopt this diagnosis in full, and he sites the early forms of actor-
network theory (ANT) in particular. This 'theory', as we will discuss in more detail later in
this and subsequent chapters, proposes that networks of heterogeneous associations of
humans and nonhumans should replace the actual content of the dichotomous poles of science






'seamless webs' of actor-network theory began to confuse things even more.43 With all things
now possible, 'nothing is clear and distinct anymore. Everything being a network, nothing
is'.44
The breakthrough for science studies came about once theorists 'first began to talk
about scientific practice and thus offered a more realistic account of science-in-the-making,
grounding it firmly in laboratory sites, experiments, and groups of colleagues'.45 It is crucial
at this early stage that we make it perfectly clear that the science studies of the French School
does not wish to extend merely social explanations to the hard sciences - emphatically, this is
not its emphasis. One of the central methodological stances of French School is rather, to turn
attention to the local site, the material and mundane location of scientific practice. Therefore,
practice for Latour takes on a slightly altered connotation than that of traditional sociology.
What science studies has sought to reveal through the study of scientific practice, and with
great success, is the multiplicity of mediators that form relational networks which results in
the sciences themselves. Although there has been much confusion about its central purpose -
especially by natural scientists anxious that their fields of study are being reduced to mere
'social construction' - science studies, as Fatour sees it, has never had as its goal the
debunking of scientific claims. Nor has it sought to portray scientific findings as pure 'social
constructions'.
What has taken up a place of central importance within the field is a concerted push
towards what Fatour call a more 'realistic realism.' As he states so clearly in the opening of
his most recent summation of his vision of science studies, Pandora's Hope: 'That we are
studying a subject matter does not mean that we are attacking it. Are biologists anti-life,
astronomers anti-stars, immunologists anti-anti-bodies?'46 It is important that we make this
point clear at the very outset as there has been rampant misrepresentation of the basic
philosophical trajectory which science studies seeks to follow.47 It was also this deep
misunderstanding by natural scientists ofLatour's work that drove him to write Pandora's
Hope in an effort to make clearer the overall project of science studies as a field. Much of the
confusion appears to stem from the fact that the two camps are speaking an entirely different
language. How is it, Latour asks, that he could dedicate his career to the examination of
scientific practice in the hope of adding realism to the endeavor, yet be seen by so many as
43 Steven Shapin, "Following Scientists Around," Social Studies ofScience 18 (1988); Harry Collins
and Steven Yearly, "Epistemological Chicken," in Science as Practice and Culture, Andy Pickering
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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47 This deep-seated mistrust of the field of science studies was most infamously displayed in the now
infamous Alan Sokal 'hoax' and its continuing fallout through the 1990's.
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the worst kind of relativist, with the total destruction of the natural sciences as his ultimate
goal?
The Elusiveness ofScience Studies
In Pandora's Hope Latour outlines a number of reasons why science studies is so
difficult to pin-down and define. First, he cites that science studies occupies the void which
has been created between two separate cultures. These cultures can be traced to a division of
labor which is familiar to university campuses the world over.
One camp deems the sciences accurate only when they have been purged of any
contamination by subjectivity, politics, or passion; the other camp, spread out much
more widely, deems humanity, morality, subjectivity, or rights worthwhile only when
they have been protected from any contact with science, technology, and objectivity.
We in science studies fight against these two purges, against both purifications at
once, and this is what makes us traitors to both camps.48
Thus it is the interdisciplinary, or non-disciplinary, character of science studies which has
made it a difficult concept for the rest of the academe to grasp. But its intent comes through
clearly; it seeks to connect scientists and their work with the wider collective of humans and
nonhumans that support them. To accomplish this goal, Latour retorts, would only enhance
the work of science - it would allow it a more 'realistic realism,' as Latour is fond of saying.
The force of French School's general argument is not targeted solely in the direction
of the natural or 'hard' sciences. The second camp, the humanists, must also realize that 'the
more nonhumans share existence with humans, the more humane a collective will become.'49
For it is just as inaccurate for natural scientists to claim that their work is entirely purged of
all social/subjective characteristics, as it is for the social scientist to invent a world purified of
nonhumans - i.e. a world that is entirely 'socially constructed'. Latour admits that the more
difficult fight is with the social scientists rather than the natural scientists. While scientists are
little bothered with the work of philosophers of science, the sociologists are heavily invested
in 'freeing human subjects from the dangers of objectification and reification'.50 While
science studies tries to bridge the gap between these two polemical giants, its foundational
intentions continue to be lost or obscured by the warring parties, or what has unfortunately
come to be ealled the 'science wars'.
The final force working against science studies becoming an easily understood
movement is the perpetual conflict between what may be loosely termed 'postmodernism' and
Latour's brand of 'nonmodernism'. This dichotomy is mirrored by a similar drama being





Research.' These rival models have now established themselves within the social sciences and
the humanities, and continue to battle for privilege ofplace. As Latour explains: 'Everything
the first takes to be justification for more absence, more debunking, more negation, more
destruction, the second takes as a proof of presence, deployment, affirmation, and
construction.'51 It is then a gross distortion to place science studies - but the French School in
particular - in with the relativistic, critical, and social constructivist postmodern philosophies,
as is too easily done by some of its critics.
Certainly, one would find no support for postmodern thought within Latour's work,
but rather a constitutional distaste. In fact, science studies could be defined in some
opposition to the 'postmodern' intellectual movement. For what science studies seeks to
achieve is a theoretical and practical movement which Latour has described as nonmodern.
This is a movement which rejects the postmodern will to privilege iconoclasm. As Latour
suggests; 'The program of debunking, exposing, avoiding being taken in, steals energy from
the task that has always seemed much more important to the collective of people, things and
gods, namely, the task of sorting out the "cosmos" from an "unruly shambles.'"52 We might
say that nonmodern thinkers do not carry critical hammers. Instead, theirs is a project which
has set its aim towards a 'politics of things,' as they 'insist and insist again that there is a
social history of things and a "thingy" history of humans'.53 Therefore, it has become one of
Latour's central assertions that modernity, as it was devised, was never implemented in full
and reality and morality have never truly been severed.
In order to unpack what I see as the remarkable body of work produced by those
within the field of science studies, but particularly the work ofBruno Latour and the French
School, we will first have to examine his account of the 'modernist settlement,' or the
'modern Constitution.' For it is this concept, and Latour's now famous claim that 'we have
never been modern,' that serves as the bedrock for his program of 'adding realism to science.'
Second, we will turn our attention to Laotur's claim that this modern project was never
actually implemented according to its impossible Constitution. Following upon this, in the
third section we will outline the 'first principle of symmetry' of the Edinburgh School which
presented the first sizable challenge to the traditional sociology of knowledge and its concerns
regarding the examination of scientific practice. We then contrast the 'first principle' of the
Edinburgh School with Latour's move towards a 'generalized principle of symmetry.' One of
the central motivations behind Latour's wide body ofwork is his desire to intervene in what
has come to be known as the 'science wars.' As we shall see, Latour understands the ongoing
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epistemologists as so much catastrophic fallout from a modern settlement that never truly
was. He comes equipped with an intricate diagnosis of the deteriorating modem settlement
which has produced nothing but intellectual impasse amongst the various interests involved in
these science wars. In the fourth section we will seek to gain an understanding of what Latour
describes as the developing 'nonmodern' constitution. In this new constitution Latour
proposes a new metaphysical understanding of both humans and nonhumans, and their
variable, yet deeply relational, ontological status.
II. Latour and The Modern Constitution
As we have seen in our review of Colin Gunton, there is certainly no shortage of theories
which seek to account for what constitutes the essence ofmodernity. In fact there are
probably as many theories as there are philosophers and journalist alike. Through this morass
of opinions, Latour extracts one central element common to all of the theories concerning
modernity - namely, the passage of time. Invariably, 'modernity' has been used to denote a
peculiar quickening or acceleration in the flow of time. If the premodem times were stilted,
cumbersome and archaic, the modem stood for a radical break where history was now defined
on a continuum of progress. More than just an adjective used to explain a revolution in time,
'modem' as Latour sees it, is often employed in the midst of an argument. In this sense, it is
used to distinguish between 'winners and losers, Ancients and Modems'.54 In recent years this
once clear distinction between winners and losers has become less and less clear, as the
Ancients seem to be coming out on top just as often as the Modems. This questioning of the
modem concept ofprogress, or this 'symptom' of the modem settlement as Latour terms it,
has come to be known by the label 'postmodernity'. We have already seen that science studies
is often unjustly grouped with the postmodern movement, probably because they both seek to
challenge the modem Constitution, yet the two schools harbor deeply divergent interests and
methodologies.55 Science studies' interest in defining the modem settlement stems from its
desire to find a place for the networks and collectives it has unveiled within scientific and
technological practice. Therefore, if science studies is to fully embrace its mantra of 'follow
the networks,' it must come to understand this 'settlement' or 'Constitution' which obscures
the reality of networks, collectives, and hybrids.
In his book We Have Never Been Modern, his most detailed exemplification of the
modem settlement, Latour clearly argues that the word 'modem' designates the odd cultural
54
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practice of radically separating nature and culture into a dualistic paring, all the while
continuously 'translating' these dualistically conceived realms into a litany of hybrids.
Moreover, the word 'postmodern' designates the contemporary disenchantment which has
followed upon the realization that these two purified zones are in reality, totally confused and
increasingly hybridized. Often we find that modernity is defined in humanist terms as the
'turn to the subject,' or the 'birth ofman.' But Latour warns that this habit is itself a modern
characteristic as it reinforces a radical asymmetry which modernity has forced upon us. What
this habit obscures is 'the simultaneous birth of 'nonhumanity'—things, or objects, or
beasts—and the equally strange beginning of a crossed-out God, relegated to the sidelines'.56
Here we begin to see the two sets ofuniquely modern practices, and their dualistic
purification, come to light. First, the modern settlement is engaged in the practice of creating
hybrids through 'translation' - a term used to describe movement across the modern
settlement - thus creating novel entities which mix together the realms of nature and culture.
On the other hand, a determined purification is taking place, effectively creating a
demarcation between two ontological zones: one zone for humans and another for
nonhumans.
We may now identify two distinct dichotomies or dualisms which Latour will identify
within the modem settlement. First, the realms of nature and culture, subject and object,
human and nonhuman are cut off from one another and purified into distinct ontological
realms. Secondly, these dual practices ofpurification on the one hand and translation on the
other are completely separated - dichotomized - by the modem settlement. On one level the
work ofpurification continues to separate nature and culture, while translation (hybridization)
continues at pace, but is completely obscured and hidden by the forced dichotomization. In a
very real sense, the right hand knows not what the left hand is doing. In light of this diagnosis,
Latour argues that we must direct our attention 'simultaneously to the work of purification
and the work of hybridization.' For once we have carried this out 'we immediately stop being
wholly modem, and our future begins to change.'57
Again, the goal for Latour has never been to fall in line with the postmodern critique,
but rather to become 'nonmodern.' In order to achieve this, science studies seeks to erode the
double dichotomization of the modem settlement, there is no doubt amongst science studies'
practitioners that the modem settlement was entirely effective in the execution of this radical
and dualistic separation. The nearly total success of creating two distinct ontological zones
between human and nonhuman is testimony to this accomplishment. But it is a success that
has been won at a great cost, and through a rather simple movement of asymmetry. Equally
important is Latour's argument that the modem Constitution has never truly happened, as we
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will explore more fully in a later section of the chapter. Moreover, this asymmetry can be
overcome because as 'soon as one outlines the symmetrical space and thereby reestablishes
the common understanding that organizes the separation of natural and political powers, one
ceases to be modern'.58
Hobbes, Boyle and the Vacuum
We may come to a deeper understanding of the modern Constitution by reviewing
one of Latour's central case studies. This is the well known 17th century debate between
political philosopher Thomas Hobbes and natural philosopher Robert Boyle. Their
gentlemanly disagreement is of great importance because it is exemplary of the early-modern
debates concerning the distribution of power; scientific, political, and even theological. What
makes this argument interesting is that the human actors in this debate are both involved in
creating the modern Constitution, yet they can be set up symmetrically rather than
asymmetrically in order to produce a critical assessment of their arguments. Latour makes
heavy use of a fascinating study by Steven Shapin and Simon Shaffer titled Leviathan and the
Air-Pump,59 a study which seeks to provide a truly comparative anthropology of these two
characters. Latour finds their study to be entirely unique in comparative anthropological
studies in that it takes science very seriously. This is because Shapin and Shaffer's work
moves in two important, and new, directions. First, they displace the historical beginning of
the divide between epistemology and sociology. And secondly, they ignore the traditional
privileging of sociological explanation over the scientific.60 Hobbes and Boyle can then be
compared through the devises of a new 'nonmodern' and comparative anthropology. 'Boyle
has a science and a political theory; Hobbes has a political theory and a science.'61 Shapin and
Shaffer manage to bring this insight out of its dichotomized obscurity by clearly illustrating
that epistemological concerns are also the concern of the social order. In opposition to the
studies that preceded theirs, Shapin and Shaffer 'are not prepared to explain the content by the
context'.62
Hobbes and Boyle present themselves as ideal candidates for the exercise of the new
comparative anthropology because they share very similar perspectives. They both want the
same things - Church, King and Parliament - yet they disagree on how scientific
experimentation and reasoning may be interpreted and allowed to inform political discourse.
While there are two obvious human actors in this drama, common to them both is a third
58 Ibid., p. 13.
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party or actant - the air pump. And here is where the debate begins as Boyle claims to have
created, through the mediation of his laboratory, a vacuum. He had undertaken several
experiments in order to prove the existence of this vacuum, ranging from the suffocation of
small animals to the employment of chicken feathers which he used to detect the absence (or
presence) of the ether his adversaries postulated. The crux of the debate hinges upon the
divergent methods of argumentation the two human actors preferred. Boyle made no
hesitation in adopting the method of argumentation known as democratic opinion. Said
otherwise, his approach is to rely upon doxa rather than apodeictic reasoning. A method
which, as Latour points out, was held in the deepest contempt by the older scholastic
tradition, but is now firmly established as the empirical style which we moderns so readily
employ today. 'Instead of seeking to ground his work in logic, mathematics or rhetoric, Boyle
relied on a parajuridical metaphor: credible, trustworthy, well-to-do witnesses gathered at the
scene of the action can attest to the existence of a fact, the matter of fact, even if they do not
know its true nature.'63 Within the artificial environment of his laboratory, Boyle produces a
phenomenon - the chicken feather does not move - and then turns to his witnesses to extract
their objective observations of the event, not their opinions.
For Boyle, it is the objects - the air-pump and chicken feather - that have constructed
the factual and objective existence of the vacuum. Importantly, the word 'constructed' is not
out ofplace in this instance. As Latour explains, Boyle answered the central question that
constructivists are asking today - 'are the facts constructed?' The answer for Boyle, according
to Latour, is simple: 'Yes, the facts are indeed constructed in the new installation of the
laboratory and through the artificial intermediary of the air pump.'64 Critical in this is Boyle's
abstinence concerning any desire to explain the 'why' ofphenomena, that is, he is careful not
to offer an interpretation of the causes. However, we may come to understand the 'nature of
facts' because we have enabled them to 'speak' through the mediation of the laboratory
environment. We have developed the facts in an environment that is under our control and
within our understanding. What is a locally constructed fact, with only local value, can now
be turned into an advantage: 'these facts will never be modified, whatever may happen
elsewhere in theory, metaphysics, religion, politics or logic'.65 The scientific fact then
becomes a 'natural' fact, made untouchable by the many tides and seasons of human culture.
In spite of their many differences, Boyle and Hobbes shared an equal desire to
preserve the Bible from free interpretation by the masses, and preserve the monarch from the
63 Ibid., p. 18.
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threat of civil war. Hobbes, however, sought to accomplish these ends through the unification
of the Body Politic - the Leviathan. It was through this contract of the Body Politic that the
Sovereign could be understood and preserved as 'that Mortal God, to which we owe, under
the Immortal God, our peace and defense'.66 Hobbes wished to suppress transcendence by
emphasizing the unity of the one Monarch who is the single 'Representer' of the
'Represented.' His interest was in suppressing the masses of this, the lower world, by
reserving any access to transcendence for the authorities alone - God and king. Civil wars
would be unavoidable as long as the rabble of commoners were free to appeal and petition to
God directly, usurping both Church and King. In line with this is the idea that inert objects,
mechanical matter, are an important component in keeping the civil peace. Just as important,
that is, as keeping the Bible out of the hands of the common folk who feel free to interpret it
as they please. For Hobbes, 'it behooves us to avoid at all costs the possibility that the
factions may invoke a higher Entity—Nature or God—which the Sovereign does not fully
control'.67 In this framework, Knowledge clearly equals Power as Latour is keen to point out.
Here we can see where Boyle and Hobbes diverge in terms of argumentation.
Whereas Boyle relied upon the opinion of observers, Hobbes instead relies upon
mathematical demonstration. For Hobbes it is only through the appeal to human reason that
we will be able to effectively silence the rabble of the multitudes. As Latour explains,
Hobbes's mathematical methodology is 'the only method of argument capable of compelling
everyone's assent; and he accomplishes this demonstration not by making transcendental
calculations, like Plato's King, but by using a purely computational instrument, the
Mechanical Brain, a computer before its time'.68 But in his clash with Boyle, Hobbes is
confronted with his greatest anxiety. That is, a rogue group of gentlemen who have come to
an agreement of opinion that there exists in their air-pump a real vacuum, free of any trace of
ether. What is more, they have dared to challenge the authorities by invoking an appeal to
nonhuman Nature, and phenomena they have observed with wholly fallible human senses.
The Royal Society must now be stopped, for if 'you allow experiments to produce their own
matters of fact, and if these allow the vacuum to be infiltrated into the air pump and, from
there into natural philosophy, then you will divide authority again.. .Knowledge and Power
will be separated once more'.69 Such are the anxieties of Thomas Hobbes.
A Truly Comparative Anthropology
66 The quote is from Hobbes' Leviathan (1651), quoted in Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 18.
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We should take a moment to review what Shapin and Schaffer, and now Latour, have
accomplished in this study of Boyle and Hobbes. Their unique accomplishment is to have
produced a truly comparative anthropology. As Latour writes:
For the first time in science studies, all ideas pertaining to God, the King, Matter,
Miracles and Morality are translated, transcribed, and forced to pass through the
practice of making an instrument work. Before Shapin and Schaffer, other historians
of science had studied scientific practice; other historians had studied the religious,
political and cultural context of science. No one, before Shapin and Schaffer, had
been capable of doing both at once.70
Here the old school of contextualist explanation has been left far behind. No longer are we
limited to starting from a pre-conceived idea that a macro-social explanation exists, and can
therefore explain why Hobbes and Boyle believed what they respectively believed concerning
the outcome of the air pump experiments. Shapin and Schaffer were instead concerned with
explaining how a suffocating bird and an air pump - both nonhumans - could somehow
'translate, displace, transport, distort all the other controversies, in such a way that those who
master the pump also master the King, God, and the entire context'?71 Theirs is a study that
traces the birth of a new entity, a new quasi-object, born in an English laboratory in the
middle of the seventeenth century. And in so doing, they reveal the very real foundations of
scientific practice. They reject talk of a reality that is somehow 'outside' while human
subjectivity is 'inside', but rather firmly ground scientific reality in the networks and practices
that create it. And this is what, according to Latour, makes Shapin and Schaffer true
comparative anthropologists. They are able to account for the insertion of nonhumans - air
pumps, feathers and dead birds - into the human collective, into human society. This is one of
the central insights of science studies which we will develop more thoroughly throughout the
remainder of this study. That is, we live in collectives not Societies.72 The social bond we
experience 'comes from objects fabricated in laboratories; ideas have been replaced by
practices, apodeitic reasoning by a controlled doxa, and universal agreement by groups of
colleagues'.73
What this serves to reveal, in part, is Boyle's insistence that things (nonhumans)
should be allowed to testify in social affairs through the mediation of the laboratory. What is
new about this is that previously 'the witness had always been human or divine—never
nonhuman. The texts had been written by men or inspired by God—never inspired or written
70 Ibid., p. 20.
71 Ibid., p. 21.
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by nonhumans.'74 But now the 'courts ofjustice' were opened up to the nonhuman as well.
The entirety of the collective is now opened up to a new actor/actant that was created in the
midst of this new burgeoning Constitution. The effect of this is made plain by Latour who
explains that 'nonhumans, lacking souls but endowed with meaning, are even more reliable
than ordinary mortals, to whom will is attributed but who lack the capacity to indicate
phenomena in a reliable way'.75 There is no doubt that the nonhumans are entirely inert, and
therefore do not possess the ability to consciously will an action. They are, however, entirely
capable of 'speaking,' 'signaling,' and 'showing' through the mediation of laboratory
technology. The rational gentlemen (in this era, anyway) huddled into the laboratory are
allowed to witness events and then speak on the behalf of the nonvocal-nonhuman. As their
behavior has now become meaningful, the nonhumans are genuinely allowed to testify, and
the scientist is genuinely enabled to represent their 'voice'.
The Contested Role ofthe Sciences
Now we may briefly make clear the differences between Boyle and Hobbes in terms
of their understanding of scientific interpretation. As we have already said, they both wanted
the same things preserved - Church, King, and Parliament - yet they end up rivals. The core
of the discrepancy resides in Hobbes's opposition to allowing any appeal to an entity deemed
to be higher than the king's civil authority. In light of this, we can see that Hobbes wanted to
box-out God by casting the divine into an utterly distant and closed-off transcendence. The
Sovereign, for Hobbes, must be the sole processor of access to both Nature and the
transcendent God. But the Sovereign is never more than the sum of the people, the Republic
itself. Therefore, totalitarianism is avoided due to the king's inability to dismantle this
Leviathan which is the very base ofpower within the Republic. But what can threaten this
order is the dangerous division of authority. If Boyle and his gentlemen observers are allowed
to carry on allowing 'experiments to produce their own matters of fact' - in this case the
existence of the vacuum - then we open up a court of appeal that is above the civil authority.
Knowledge and Power are separated and we begin to 'see double.'76 Even once Boyle has
suffocated a number of birds and severely challenged the 'ether hypothesis' with a chicken
feather, Hobbes continues with a new argument. Hobbes 'retuses to admit that the
phenomenon he is talking about can be produced on a scale other than that of the Republic as
a whole'.77 For Hobbes, the constructed facts of the laboratory cannot be allowed to speak
with authority. Whereas for Boyle, the laboratory-created fact should carry the highest
74 Ibid., p. 23.
75 Ibid., p. 23.
76 Ibid., p. 20.
77 Ibid., p. 22.
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authority, as it is an authority which ultimately rests on the highest court of appeal -
nonhuman, universal, Nature.
It is here that we find the source of Hobbes's anger. If the destiny of humans is now
opened to the testimony of nonhumans, thereby allowing countless voices to rush into the law
courts, the entirety of the old system ofpower will collapse into anarchy. Why? Because for
Hobbes, ours is a monist society, Knowledge and Power must be held together as one and the
same. However, as we now know this doomsday preached by Hobbes has not materialized.
Societies have not (all) plummeted into disarray. But what is it that holds back the anarchy?
What is perhaps one of Latour's more profound insights can now be identified in his
response to this question. Here Latour argues that a relative peace has been maintained
throughout the revolution by cutting off, or making opaque, all the networks (relationships,
mediations) between humans and nonhumans. We are then left with a politics, a God, and a
society left untouched and unpolluted by a seemingly overwhelming Nature. The modem
Constitution that both Boyle and Hobbes were participants in creating has produced what
Latour calls the 'double artifact of the laboratory and the Leviathan' - 'a division ofpower
between the two protagonists, to Hobbes, the politics and to Boyle, the sciences'.78 And here I
believe Latour's diagnosis is particularly insightful. For what he distinguishes in this milieu is
the odd development of parallel projects that are at the same time totally divergent. As Latour
so lucidly explains:
Boyle is not simply creating a scientific discourse while Hobbes is doing the same
thing for politics; Boyle is creating a political discourse from which politics is to be
excluded, while Hobbes is imagining a scientific politics from which experimental
science has to be excluded. In other words, they are inventing our modem world, a
world in which the representation of things through the intermediary of the laboratory
is forever dissociated from the representation of citizens through the intermediary of
the social contract.79
The modem Constitution is the reification of these two points of view, or rather more
accurately, points of blindness. It is, in fact, a double blindness that is created due to the
bracketing ofpolitical (human) representation and scientific (nonhuman) representation, and
making them entirely opaque to one another. The term 'representation' is the same in both
usages, yet the controversy between Boyle and Hobbes has rendered the two meanings of
'representation' irreconcilable. Scientists represent the nonhumans, but science cannot be
political; politicians represent the people, but politicians are not allowed to appeal to the
nonhumans spoken for by the scientists and their technology.80 What we are left with is a
science purified ofpolitics and a politics purified of science. The debate has now boiled down
to its elements.
78 Ibid., p. 25.
79 Ibid., p. 27.
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Here the components reveal themselves as two poles of a continuum, social forces on
one side, and mechanized natural forces on the other. Scientists speak for the multitude of
nonhumans, politicians speak on the behalf of the multitude of humans. In the end, both are
representatives of the many. To hold to this view of representation, is to hold to a
'symmetrical' understanding of both human and nonhuman representation - that is, political
and scientific representation. Importantly, this symmetrical understanding was still intact in
the middle of the seventeenth century. It was clearly held that scientists (humans) had to
speak for the 'facts' of the nonhumans. The facts of scientists were not yet purified into a
transcendent realm where the nonhuman or natural facts were thought to 'speak for
themselves' with no mediation of laboratory or human spokesperson. But according to
Latour, this is exactly what has happened with the success of the modern Constitution. The
common origin of these two forms of the same type of representation has been totally lost.
Scientists are no-longer spokespersons for the nonhumans as their networks ofmediation
have become entirely eclipsed. Under the modern Constitution there are only believed to be
spokespersons on the side of humans, that is, the politicians are the only ones still
'representing' in the old understanding of the word. Soon after Boyle and Hobbes, 'the word
'representation' will take on two different meanings, according to whether elected agents or
things are at stake. Epistemology and political science will go their opposite ways.'81
III. The Guarantees of the Modern Constitution
For Latour, modernity is a paradoxical settlement. It is paradoxical because of its
hybridizing and mixing of elements on the one hand, and then a radical purification of
elements on the other. It is precisely this profound paradox that has been revealed in Shapin
and Shaffer's comparative study of Boyle and Hobbes. On the one hand they are redefining
the hermeneutics of facts, scientific politics, scientific discourse and even theology. Together
they describe how God, King, spirits and angels should act, how nature should be represented
and how the people can be kept in check. While on the other hand, they make no strict
demarcation 'between a pure social force and pure natural mechanism'.82 But as the project of
modernization moves on from Boyle and Hobbes, this demarcation becomes more and more
pronounced and reified. One of Latour's most useful accomplishments is to be found in his
elucidation of this effort to reify the new movement ofmodernity into an actual Constitution
that, like any other constitution, offers a number of specific guarantees. We will now take a




brief look at each of these guarantees, which have been to this point implicit, in an effort to
now make them explicit.
The first guarantee of the modem Constitution is found in its ontological purification
ofNature. For the modem thinker, society does not make Nature; rather, Nature is seen as
preexistent - transcendent in a sense - and universally present in untainted form waiting for
humans to discover its secrets.83 This is the political Nature which Hobbcs sought to preserve
through the singular representation of the Sovereign God and King. Ifwe limit the
representation ofNature to one single representative (God, and King) who speaks on the
behalfof the whole Leviathan, then this purified and untainted Natural realm remains
transcendent and free of politics.
The second guarantee follows closely in line with the first. If the first guarantee
successfully maintains a transcendent and purified Nature, then the same will be tme of
society; that is, only humans will be seen to 'construct society and freely determine their own
destiny'.84 Again, it is only nonhumans who may be implicated in the construction ofNature,
while Society is strictly limited to human participants. We can now see that the two realms
have been effectively dichotomized (polemicized) through the first two guarantees of the
modem Constitution.
Yet, as Latour warns, these two guarantees cannot be taken in isolation for the one
supports the other. Ifwe were to conceive of a Nature made solely by nonhumans and leave it
at that, then Nature's very transcendence would overwhelm us, we the humble and ultimately
immanent humans. Nature would also be forever outside of our sphere of existence, foreign
and remote. Similarly, a Society constructed purely upon the backs of humans would be only
the most artificial of entities. As Latour remarks; 'Its very immanence destroys it at once in
the war of every man against every man.'85 These scenarios are only logical when we take
each of the guarantees on their own rather than as a coherent whole. As the entire corpus of
Latour's work and the work ofmany others within science studies has shown, these two
guarantees were created together rather than in isolation. They are, in fact, polemical, yet they
were created to be just that. Therefore, Latour will argue in Pandora's Hope that all attempts
to overcome this dichotomy between subject and object are doomed to failure. Furthermore,
'all attempts to reuse it positively, negatively, or dialectically have failed'. And the reasons
for this failure are clear: the dichotomy 'is made not to be overcome, and only this
impossibility provides objects and subjects with their cutting edges'.86 As the two guarantees






Latour, Pandora's Hope, p. 294.
92
the world,' there is no hope in creating peace between the two. Latour summarizes; 'The
object is there to protect the subject from falling into inhumanity; the subject is there to
protect the object from drifting into inhumanity.'87 Due to the ultimately polemical nature of
this dualism, Latour's project is not one that seeks to heal the modem Constitution's
dichotomization of subject and object, Society and Nature, but rather to by-pass the
dichotomy all together - basically, to ignore it.
The first two guarantees are ultimately contradictory. In one breath Boyle is
admittedly constructing facts in the lab, and in the other he is discovering Nature, pure and
untainted. At the same time, Hobbes is busy building a social Leviathan through the purified
force of Sociality, but all the time looking for Natural facts (nonhumans) to support and
sustain the project. Latour then points out, that in order to prevent a destructive spiral into
schizophrenia, the modem Constitution must offer a third guarantee. This stipulates that 'there
shall exist a complete separation between the natural world (constmcted, nevertheless, by
man) and the social world (sustained, nevertheless, by things); secondly, there shall exist a
total separation between the work of hybrids and the work ofpurification'.88 This is the
second dichotomy of the modem Constitution. On the surface of things, Society and Nature
are kept at arms length, but underneath there continues the proliferation (translation) of
hybrids and quasi-objects. This is a proliferation that is, however, totally obscured by the
second dichotomy - the work of purification is kept completely separate from the work of
mediation (hybrid making).
The Fourth Guarantee: God Crossed-Out
The first three guarantees revolve around a perceived need to keep Nature and
Society at opposite and purified poles ofmodem forms of thought. There is, however, a
fourth guarantee within the modem Constitution which seeks to disarm the 'God question' in
its theorization of the origins of both Nature and Society. Latour argues, in close proximity to
Gunton, that for the Constitution to work properly God had to be evacuated, 'as if by an air
pump', from the duality of social and natural constmction. The idea was not to challenge
belief in a creator God as a whole, but rather to purify Nature and Society from divine
interference all the while preserving God as an actual Being. The followers of Hobbes would
take on the task of extracting God's presence from Nature, while the followers of Boyle
would endeavor to rid Society of any divine origin.89 Here God is withdrawn to a distant
heaven and boxed-in as the mere origin ofNatural Law while the Laws of the Republic are
left to form their own origins and destiny. In Latour's words, 'God becomes the crossed-out
87 Ibid., p. 294.
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God ofmetaphysics, as different from the premodern God of the Christians as the Nature
constructed in the laboratory is the ancient phusis or the Society invented by sociologists from
the old anthropological collective and its crowds of nonhumans.'90
The modem God, as Latour sees it, is the infinitely distant and transcendent God who
would only be called back to earth in order to settle conflicts between Natural Laws and the
laws of the Republic. In this sense God can be held at arms-length allowing modem persons
to be atheists yet still religious as God is held in reserve to settle matters of dispute. Here,
humanity has privileged itself to a point where it is humans alone who may re-invite God into
an immanence He once fully controlled. 'Spirituality was re-invented: the all-powerful God
could descend into men's heart of hearts without intervening in any way in their external
affairs.'91 Here we witness the birth of a Christian demiurge God who was proposed and
sustained by the Deistic thought of the European Enlightenment. Scriptures were now
interpreted only figuratively by the Sovereign, and belief in miracles was largely abandoned.
Probably one of the greatest examples of this was the Jeffersonian Bible of the early
nineteenth century, which omitted all that could be considered miraculous intervention into
the realm ofNature. The outcome was belief in a God who was expelled into pure
transcendence, waiting to be invited into this world through the wholly individual and
spiritual religion ofmodem men. God was now an absent God who was unable to meddle in
science or society, but could be appealed to by the individual heart of the pious believer.
Modem man was therefore able to be both atheist and pious Christian simultaneously.
The four guarantees of the modem Constitution conjoin to create a threefold
transcendence and a threefold immanence which brackets in all possibilities. Latour cleverly
explains the useful paradox the modems have created: 'They have not made Nature; they
make Society; they make Nature; they have not made Society; they have not made either, God
has made everything; God has made nothing, they have made everything.'92 Here the modem
Constitution revels itself as being closely akin to certain political constitutions which require
the separation of governmental duties and powers. The modem Constitution is itself a series
of checks and balances and final veto power rests in the fourth guarantee - the crossed-out
God. For the Modem, God is the totally remote divinity who is paradoxically impotent in
affairs of immanence, yet can be appealed to as sovereign judge in matters of contradiction
between the first two guarantees.
The Strength ofthe Modern Constitution
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., p. 34.
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It is these four Constitutional guarantees that make up the unique power and quality
of the modern era. What stands out as a central element in all of this is the idea that the
modern Constitution makes it impossible to witness the proliferation of hybrids or quasi-
objects. For Latour it is the work ofmediation which makes for this fertile environment where
hybrids are allowed to multiply, yet the various dichotomizations of the Constitutional
guarantees have obscured the hybrids to the point where they are no longer representable.
This does not mean that hybridization is not happening, but on the contrary
the modern Constitution allows the expanded proliferation of the hybrids whose
existence, whose very possibility, it denies. By playing three times in a row on the
same alteration between transcendence and immanence, the moderns can mobilize
Nature, objectify the social, and feel the spiritual presence of God, even while firmly
maintaining that Nature escapes us, that Society is our own work, and that God no
longer intervenes.93
Today we tend to think ofpostmodems as philosophers with hammers, the most brutal of
iconoclasts ready to smash all belief into shards. However, the moderns, armed with their
sharp Constitution, were (are) similarly able to smash the old powers into mere superstition
by employing the material causality which those powers obscured. Throughout its
development, modernity would mature into a movement which sought to quash all ideological
pollution through a strict delineation ofwhat constitutes Nature, with the help of the natural
sciences, and later by doing the same for Society, through the advent of the sociological
sciences. In between the two movements the hybrid was lost. The second group of
Enlightenment thinkers, Latour writes, 'too often saw an unacceptable blend that needed to be
purified by carefully separating the part that belonged to things themselves and the part that
could be attributed to the functioning of the economy, the unconscious, language, or
symbols.'94 With the new and exciting present ofpurified realms in hand, the old, backwards,
and confusing yesterday could be seen as a completely separate history. Modernity could now
understand itself as a radical break, a revolution in time, by which all other times were to be
judged and differentiated. Once modernity had arisen from the confused and superstitious
past, all that came before it was simply classified as the epithetical 'premodern.'
Indeed, the moderns were an invincible force. They could critique and debunk all
ideological claims to power through the appeal to Natural Law, unveiled by natural science,
and at the very same time, they could employ the human sciences to debunk any
naturalization, or false power, which the natural sciences sought to claim. Whereas the 'Old
Regime' of the premoderns was hopelessly bogged down in its utter confusion of natural
phenomena and human passions, the enlightened Moderns would not be so duped. Armed
with their new Constitution they would be able to sharply delineate the old 'illegitimate
93 Ibid, (emphasis in the original)
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mixtures' and submit them to purification 'by separating natural mechanisms from passions,
interests or ignorance.'95 This was the unprecedented advantage of the moderns and their
Constitution. They could easily switch principles as they saw fit, without the slightest
accusation of contradiction. The hybridity and collectivity of human and nonhuman realms
could be papered-over until the two were made entirely opaque to one another. As Latour puts
it, everything is mixed up in the middle, 'everything passes between the two, translation
networks, but this space does not exist, it has no place. It is unthinkable, the unconscious of
the moderns'.96 With the delicate and detailed links between nonhumans and humans made
invisible and unimportant, the moderns were free to evangelize the world with the new faith!
Colonialism gained a new moral thrust to liberate the premoderns from their superstitious
confusing ofNature and Culture, nonhumans and humans.
IV. A Revolution That Never Happened
Latour is probably best known for his provocative and seemingly paradoxical claim
that the modern world is one which has never truly been. His book We Have Never Been
Modern makes this claim quite lucid. His point, however, is not to argue that the modern
Constitution has done nothing to change the world in which we live, but rather to stress that
modernity has never actually functioned according to its own rules of conduct. In practice,
modernity 'has never separated the three regions of Being' which it tried so hard to purify into
discreet regions. This is due to the clever fact it could always rely upon its Constitutional
ability to shift between immanence and transcendence in regards to all three 'regions of
Being' - human, nonhuman, and God. For the moderns, the 'practice of translation has
always been different from the practices ofpurification'.97 But this is a maneuver which has
prevented the moderns from seeing themselves as existing in any continuity with those they
now deemed 'premodern'. Not until recently have the inheritors ofmodernity been able to see
themselves in comparative fashion with the premoderns, or 'nonmoderns' as Latour prefers.
In making the claim that the moderns have never truly been modern, Latour is not
pretending that they are so confused as to be blind to what they are doing. He does not wish to
be iconoclastic or in anyway debunking of the modern project, but rather to simply state what
it is that they actually fulfill in practice. Latour claims that there is no 'false consciousness
involved' on the parts of the moderns, as they are explicit about their dichotomization of
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mediation together.98 What is different about Latour's exposition of the modern Constitution
is his willingness to make explicit the connections between these two sets of practices.
It is one of the most perplexing paradoxes of the modern Constitution that it worked
to obscure mediation and hybridity, yet created a fertile ground for the proliferation of these
hybridizing practices. Scientific mediation and laboratory practices allowed for a mobilization
of nonhumans that had never before been seen. Humans and nonhumans could be mobilized
on a far wider scale than history had ever witnessed. With laboratory techniques such as the
air pump, there could now be a vacuum created (artificially) in every laboratory across the
world. The vacuum, in Boyle's mind, could now permit the universal definition ofNatural
Laws, the causality of God (or lack thereof), and could settle disputes among revolutionary
movements and monarchies. The contracts between humans and nonhumans would enjoy an
unprecedented multiplication. Although human and nonhuman were separated and purified
and held apart, their networks (hybridizing contracts) could be multiplied and extended across
vast distances. Latour makes it clear that
the modems think they have succeeded in such an expansion only because they have
carefully separated Nature and Society (and bracketed God), whereas they have
succeeded only because they have mixed together much greater masses of humans
and nonhumans, without bracketing anything and without mling out any
combination!99
Purification was never the sole seat of success for the modem project as they would wish to
see it. But rather, it was the obscured proliferation ofmediation, mobilization, hybridization
and the expansion of scale that granted them this great success. The one practice could not
have lived without the other. But it took a nonmodem vision to see what was going on
beneath the surface and thereby add the two halves to one another.
When Latour insists that 'we have never been modem,' he is proposing that the first
two guarantees of the Constitution have never been truly and fully employed. We have never
been able to completely separate the natural realm from the social. In reality, it is the contrary
that has occurred; the Constitution has actually 'accelerated the socialization of nonhumans,
because it never allows them to appear as elements of "real society.'"100 We have a choice,
says Latour, we can either defend the modem work ofpurification or we can choose to study
the twinned work ofpurification and mediation together. Once we begin to follow this route
of adding the two halves ofmodernity together, we then cease to be fully modem - we in fact
become nonmodem. The goal for Latour has never been to become an effective postmodern.
On the contrary, Latour, like Gunton, sees this project as a mere 'symptom' rather than a
desirable solution. Postmodernity is still all too dependent upon the modem Constitution, or
98 Ibid., p. 40.
99 Ibid., p. 41.
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rather, parasitic upon it. The postmodern has simply lost faith in the ability of the modem's
Constitutional guarantees, yet continues to work within its foundations. Postmodern thought
has failed to retrace 'the path ofmodernity all the way back to the various bifurications that
started this impossible project in the first place. It feels the same nostalgia as modernism,
except it tries to take on, as positive features, the overwhelming failures of the rationalist
project.'101
Kant and the Entrenchment ofa One-Dimensional Science
The skirmishes between Boyle and Hobbes are just one early example of the many
debates that would contribute to the solidification of the modem Constitution. Doubtless,
these arguments can be seen to stretch further back than our seventeenth century combatants.
In fact, in Pandora's Hope, Latour outlines a similar debate between Socrates and Callicles
concerning their differing ideas about political representation in the Agora ofAthens. But as
could be expected, the other central figure in the solidification of the modem Constitution's
guarantees has been Immanuel Kant. It is worth taking some time now to illustrate Latour's
understanding of Kant's contribution to the modem settlement. This exercise will aid in our
comparison with Gunton who found Kant also to be deeply responsible for our modem state
of alienation and fragmentation. Like Gunton in the last chapter, Latour finds Kant to be
culpable in his formulation of the 'Copernican Revolution.' But as Latour sees it, this was not
so much a scientific revolution as it was a 'scientific nightmare'.
For Latour, what Kant's Critique established was nothing less than the 'yardstick' by
which all subsequent debate concerning the nature of human knowing would be measured.
For it is from him that we have found ourselves in the midst of a one-dimensional science.
The continuum of this one-dimensional science is flanked by the two dichotomous poles of
Nature and Society. The repercussions of the establishment of these two extremes have had a
detrimental effect on the current debates which have been described popularly, and
regrettably so, as the 'science wars.' Latour argues that all scientific debate is now plotted
along this yardstick which Kant had cemented into the modem sciences and has since
revealed itself in our current impasse between the 'two cultures'. Again, the yardstick is one
which stretches between the diametrically opposed poles ofNature and Society, natural
sciences and social sciences. Nature occupies the right hand side while Society has entrenched
itself on the left. 'If one goes from left to right then one has to be a social constructivists; if on
the contrary, one goes from right to left, then one has to be a closet realist.'102 Along this
continuum there exists no opportunity for true communion between the two poles, only
differing mixtures between the two purified realms is possible.
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Kant's reasoning for establishing this dichotomous yardstick was essentially
polemical in trajectory. For what Kant sought to accomplish was the complete separation of
objects and subjects. As Latour explains
Kant rejected at the two poles—Things-in-themselves on the one hand, the
Transcendental Ego on the other—the resources that, when put together, would
account for knowledge. This was the foundation of the Critique that made us modern,
more modern. To be sure, empirical scientific knowledge appeared in the middle, but
this middle, the phenomenon, was understood only as the meeting point of the two
purified sets of resources coming from the subject pole or from the object pole.103
The middle of the yardstick, where empirical scientific knowledge would appear, consisted
only of a single point of contact between these two purified extremes. It is at this meeting
point where the clash between object (Nature) and the subject (Society) produced that
strangest of entities known to Kant as the 'phenomena.' Ever since Kant's polemical
separation of the two dichotomous poles, both philosophers and sociologists have fought to
seize control over the subject end of the yardstick, since it was the ultimate focus-point of
Kant's Copernican revolution. In their haste, Latour points out, both sides of the yardstick
missed the fact that it makes little difference 'whether the elected ruler was Kant's Ego,
Durkheim's macro-Society, Foucault's epistemes, Dewey's praxis, Wittgenstein's language
games, collectives of scientists, brains and neurons, minds, or cognitive structures—as long as
this one ruler capitalized all the explanatory resources and had the object turning around it'.104
It is in this sense that Kant's dichotomizing of the two poles necessitated a push towards
reductionism that overwhelmed the many rival scientific schools. The effect was to obscure
the basic framework of the Critique that forced the polemical stance in the first place.
Latour points to a second reason why Kant's yardstick of uni-dimensional science
carried such a wide influence into the modern Constitution. This may be found in the fact that
Kant's framework was heavily asymmetrical in its construction. For it was the subject - as
Latour says, the 'Sun' of the Copernican revolution - that took up the place of privilege
amongst the many lifeless and a-historical objects which revolved around its singular and
objective gaze. There was little concern for creating any new understandings of the object
itself. 'It really seemed that if one could occupy the right-hand side of the yardstick, much of
the left-hand side would be explained.'105 So while the philosophers and sociologist clamored
to occupy the focus ofKant's 'Sun' - the subject - the Things-in-themselves were left
untouched and unquestioned. They were there simply to be formed and molded by the many
categories which Kant outlined in his Critique. Idealism was the constant threat that could








nonhuman was left to be external, a-historical, and entirely purged of the social. This further
served to effectively preserve the transcendentiality of human reason thereby avoiding any
slippage into an unchecked idealism. As long as Nature was pure and objectified, and thereby
containing no pollution of the social, human knowledge was safeguarded.
It is this asymmetry which has become one of the primary points of debate within the
small field of science studies today. It was in the mid 1970's that science studies, or more
specifically the SSK approach of the Edinburgh school, began to question this asymmetrical
and dichotomous opposition between the poles ofNature and Society. In the next section we
will take a close look at the genesis of this important question. Furthermore, we will review
how the initial challenges have been critiqued and amended by Latour and the French school
of science studies. The principle of symmetry and its recent offspring have sparked a heated
debate within science studies that should not be ignored. By reviewing this debate, we will
come closer to grasping the central concerns of science studies and its potential application to
a theological accounting ofpersons and things.
V. The Principle of Symmetry
As we have seen, the modern Constitution forced us into making the sometimes
violent distinction between subjects and objects, or as science studies has re-labeled them,
humans and nonhumans. Here we are given purification with one hand while mediation is
forced with the other. As Latour and others have so clearly shown, this state ofaffairs makes
it nearly impossible for any anthropological study ofmodern man/woman. The modern
Constitution was always becoming entangled in its own inability to deal with the sciences and
the technologies they produced. Therefore anthropologists did not know how to handle these
strange beings that inhabited a world purified into a dichotomous Nature and Society, thus
they were forced to set sail for those who still inhabited the 'premodern' world. The problem,
according to Latour, is due to an inherent asymmetry within the social sciences themselves.
They had now settled on an impossibility that 'rules out studying objects of nature, limiting
the extent of its inquiries exclusively to cultures.'106 Herein lies the crippling asymmetry, the
social sciences - and anthropology in particular - have been unable to cope with the modern's
secret hybridization of nature and society. Whereas the 'premoderns' of the world were
perpetually stuck in a pattern of completely confusing nature and society in all of their
practices. How could anthropology then stand a chance of becoming truly comparative within
this modernist atmosphere? How can you compare purification with total confusion? For
anthropology to become truly comparative, that is, able to move from moderns to premoderns
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and back again, it would have to adopt a methodological model that could overcome the
asymmetry of the older model. Thus was born the 'first principle of symmetry.'
The First Principle ofSymmetry
With the publication ofKnowledge and Social Imagery in 1976, David Bloor of the
Edinburgh School, deeply disturbed traditionalists within the field of sociology of scientific
knowledge by insisting that both error and truth must be given equal footing in the field's
methodology. At the outset of the book, Bloor questioned traditional SSK's pessimism
concerning its ability to coherently investigate and explain the very content of scientific
knowledge. Bloor's stance was clear, all 'knowledge, whether it be in the empirical sciences
or even in mathematics, should be treated, through and through, as material for
investigation'.107 In doing this the sociologist should adopt a symmetrical view of all claims
to a truthful state of affairs within the natural sciences. That is to say, we should not limit our
investigations to truth claims that have withstood historical scrutiny alone. We should,
instead, give equal consideration to scientific claims that have since been proven to be false
conclusions. The reason for this is relatively simple, for what we are left with today is a world
where only the victors in scientific debate still remain. The victors have effectively silenced
the losers to the effect that error is seen as having always been socially explainable, while
truth appears to be self-explanatory and a-historical - truth has become 'black-boxed' to the
effect that it has lost its historical pedigree. Isabelle Stengers explains that 'we are the heirs of
the winners, we re-create, with regard to the past, a narrative in which arguments internal to a
scientific community would be sufficient to designate these winners; it is because these
arguments convince us as heirs that we retrospectively attribute to them the power to have
made the difference.'108
Before the radical break ofBloor's symmetry, only 'naive beliefs,' for instance a
belief in angels, could be explained through sociological investigation, whereas rigid truths,
like Newton's gravity, were off-limits to sociological scrutiny. All of scientific history was
split into two groups, illusion on the one hand, and absolute truth on the other. Counter to this,
a symmetrical account of the sociology of scientific knowledge would compel us to also
weigh the accounts of the losers by seeking identical causes for both true and false,
'fabricated' and 'real,' claims to truth. Sociological scrutiny would now be required to give a
parallel or symmetrical accounting of both winners and losers. Latour explains that it is in the
107 Bloor, Knowledge andSocial Imagery, 2nd (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
1976 [1991]), p. 3.
108 Isabelle Stengers, The Invention ofModern Science, Trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis and
London: University ofMinnesota Press, 2000), pp. 8-9.
101
revealing of 'this double standard' that 'we recognize the split in anthropology between the
sciences, which were not open to study, and ethnosciences, which were'.109
The blame for this 'double standard,' as Latour sees it, can be firmly placed at the feet
of the epistemologists who long ago created this foundational model of asymmetry between
true and false sciences. Latourwill forcefully argue that it is the 'towering epistemologists' -
especially those of the French tradition - that are the real villains in this drama. It is they who
have rejected a symmetrical anthropology, and have thereby forced an epistemological break
between 'true' and 'false' beliefs. The epistemologists have insisted that ideology and
scientific truth must be held apart at all costs ifwe are to have any hope of accessing absolute
truth. But how are we to understand scientific practice if the quasi-objects that it produces are
forever ripped from the networks that give them their actual meaning? Once this
epistemological break is made, the quasi-object dies leaving only a mute and opaque object -
an object with no history, no blood ties, and no ideological 'pollution'. Here again the
principle of symmetry breaks in to reestablish some semblance of continuity and history for
the 'object' of scientific scrutiny. Yet Latour's protest rings clear, for what this insistence -
this Modern insistence - obscures, is the path taken by the proliferation of quasi-objects
which the Modern settlement is so skilled at producing. Therefore, it is the epistemologists
who have made opaque the actual practice of science along with technological and political
practice as we will see later in this chapter. Michel Serres has made these points about
epistemology clear in his summation; 'The only pure myth is the idea of a science devoid of
all myth.'110 For the historian of science, explanations of scientific failure must be equally
applicable to scientific successes. Ifwe are to account for science's successes, we must be
able to use the same criteria for explaining its failures.
As we have seen, Bloor's principle of symmetry radically revised the SSK field. All
that came before it now appeared as so much anathema, with its convenient employment of
epistemological breaks. Without a legitimate recourse to apriori distinctions between 'hard'
and 'soft' sciences, SSK could now begin to bring some form of peace between sociologists
who study belief systems and those who studied the sciences.111 We can imagine the profound
impact this would have on anthropological studies. Remembering that under the asymmetrical
account of the epistemologists, only falsehood could be explained sociologically while truths
were purified and elevated into the realm of a-historical Nature. Anthropologists, the so-called
'soft' scientists, were forced to seek out the premodems of the world in order to go and
separate out their tangled web of false beliefs concerning Nature. This is because they were
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thought to be the only ones worthy of study since it was they, the premoderns, who were not
living in accordance with the epistemological break. Theirs was still a world of fetishized
natural 'objects' waiting to be shattered by the indelible hammers of the modern
anthropologist. But what the principle of symmetry served to accomplish was a reawakening
of anthropologists. Now that Nature could no longer be used to explain truth or falsehood, and
this task had been handed over to sociological explanations alone, the anthropologist was now
free to study the sciences and technologies of his or her own kind - the modern. As Latour
explains, the anthropologist 'is no longer required to limit himself to cultures, since Nature -
or, rather, natures - have become similarly accessible to study.'"2
The first principle of symmetry was indeed a breakthrough for its time, but voices of
dissent began to grow in the 1980's, particularly in France, due in large part to the influence
of Latour and Michel Callon's work. Latour's point of issue is rather simple, the first
principle of symmetry is not symmetrical, in fact, it is distinctly asymmetrical! In the old
settlement of the epistemologists, truth correlated to Natural reality, while falsehood could be
explained through sociological explanation of varying interests and epistemes. This was
obviously an asymmetrical account. The first principle of symmetry, on the other hand,
sought to bring both truth and falsehood under a single program of scrutiny and explanation -
sociology, interests, epistemes. Latour explains that the principle of symmetry 'is
asymmetrical not because it separates ideology and science, as epistemologists do, but
because it brackets offNature and makes the 'Society' pole carry the full weight of
explanation. Constructivist where Nature is concerned, it is realistic about society.'"3
Latour argued that the Society which Bloor now adopted as the rule of all explanation
was just as constructed as the Nature it would seek to explain. It follows that ifwe demand to
be realists about Society, then we must extend the same courtesy, so to speak, to Nature. Ifwe
are to maintain a constructivist view of one pole, the Natural, while proclaiming to be realists
when speaking of the other, Society, we then cease to give a truly symmetrical account.
Latour ties these observations back into his diagnosis of the failed modern Constitution. He
insists that we 'must be able to understand simultaneously how Nature and Society are
immanent—in the work ofmediation—and transcendent—after the work ofpurification'."4
The dual poles ofNature and Society should not be the sure foundations from which we are
obliged to initiate our attempts to understand the quasi-object, for it is these separate poles
which we are trying to explain in the first place. The purified realms of the epistemologists
have served only to obscure the solution. For Latour, Nature and Society are the late comers
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in this drama. They appear as sources of explanation, for the epistemologists, only after the
quasi-object has stabilized into an object that may be purified into the realm ofNature, an
object of external reality, or as subject within Society. The goal is to situate ourselves before
we can 'clearly delineate subjects and objects, goals and functions, form and matter...Fully
fledged human subjects and respectable objects out there in the world' cannot be our starting
point, but rather, our point of arrival.115
The GeneralizedPrinciple ofSymmetry
Ifwe are to come to a better understanding of the quasi-object - the hybrid of the
modern constitution that was always hidden in practice - we must seek a symmetry that
begins with the quasi-object itself. Said differently, what we need is an anthropology that is
itself truly symmetrical in its focus. This is whatMichel Callon has deemed the 'principle of
generalized symmetry: the anthropologist has to position himself at the median point where
he can follow the attribution of both nonhuman and human properties'.116 Latour describes
this same movement towards the center of Kant's one-dimensional science (his yardstick) as
the 'counter-Copernican revolution.' Now that we have defined the two polemically opposed
ends of Kant's continuum, the subject pole and the object pole, we can now move on to
investigate how Latour and others within science studies have sought to modify Kant's
settlement as well as Bloor's symmetry, without leaving the terrafirma of scientific practice.
The first move of the counter-Copernican revolution, or the generalized principle of
symmetry, is essentially ontological. Latour asks us to 'make one more turn after the social'
by modifying Bloor's principle of symmetry. We will recall that Bloor's principle stipulated
that truth and error should both be subjected and explained through sociological methodology.
His was an approach which crowded the subject end ofKant's spectrum. This principle
effectively abandoned the Natural pole, allowing it to fall exclusively under sociological
interpretation. As Latour argues, it was hardly symmetrical, but rather, entirely asymmetrical.
Therefore, the first move for a generalized principle of symmetry must be to 'force the two
poles, Nature and Society, to shift into the center and to fuse into one another.'117 The fusing
of these two poles, however, is no simple operation considering they have been polemically
dichotomized for several centuries. As we will recall, the object pole (Nature) was purified in
order to guarantee the transcendent form of human knowledge. That which is Natural, could
never be tainted with the pollution of human (subjective) passions. Knowledge could never be
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seen as human-made or socially constructed ifwe had a pure object pole to which we could
appeal for transcendence. Again, the subject pole was preserved in a vacuum for similar
reasons. For it was the subject which guaranteed that all knowledge was human-made,
whether the subject is defined as transcendental Ego, society, subject, mind, or any of the
other legion of pretenders to the throne. 'In addition, the very distinction between the two
poles—the distinction which Kant made so sharp—warranted that those two contradictory
guarantees would not be confused, because the two transcendences—that of the object "out
there" and that of the subject/society "up there"—are sources of authority only ifthey are as
far apart as possible,'"8 These are, as we reviewed earlier, the failed guarantees of the
Modern Constitution. Therefore, ifwe are to force these two poles together in a new
generalized principle of symmetry, we must seek to understand this overwhelmingly
important 'middle-ground' between the two poles.
As we take up this 'median point,' the point between humans and nonhumans, the
reality of the quasi-object once again comes into view. This once 'non-place' of the modern
Constitution now becomes the central player in our movement towards understanding what
the modern Constitution has always sought to make invisible. This new and notably un-
polemic methodology may now take up this middle-ground as its fulcrum. This 'no-man's-
land' between modernity's subjects and objects will now become the natural home for the
'nonmodern' inhabitant, as Latour describes it. Thus it is from where the mediation of quasi-
objects was once obfuscated, now arises a means for coming to grips with the mysterious
two-sidedness of the modern Constitution.
Returning to the case of a comparative anthropology, we may now pause to consider
what this may look like in the nonmodern context of generalized symmetry. The
anthropologist, or ethnologist, of the past would head out to analyze the cultural intricacies of
a particular people. The researcher would then employ a rather singularized analytical tool to
carryout these studies, spanning, for instance, from a culture's farming practices to their
ancestral mythology. Latour points out that the ethnologist is bold enough to use this
monochromatic web of interpretation because she is convinced that her job is to interpret the
mere representations with which these people have created their society. The Natural world -
that is, a natural and purified world - m which these people inhabit, is the same universal
Nature that the modern ethnologist will find in any and every culture around the globe. This is
because Nature, for the ethnologist, 'remains unique, external and universal. But ifwe
suppose the two positions—the one that the ethnologist occupies effortlessly in order to study
cultures and the one that we have made a great effort to define in order to study our own
118
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nature—then comparative anthropology becomes possible, if not easy.'119 The ethnologist
may no-longer occupy a privileged vacuum that is somehow outside of culture and inside the
purified Nature from which truth may be extracted. Instead, the ethnologist may now employ
a truly comparative anthropology by contrasting what Latour has called 'natures-cultures.'
Important to this, is the promise it holds for unraveling the ever-present pitfall of relativism.
VI. Towards a Nonmodern Constitution
In Colin Gunton we have seen that the late-modem world is deeply in need of a
renewed theology of creation and culture that is fully Trinitarian. For him, the answer to
alienation and fragmentation is to be found in a thoroughgoing relating of God and world,
persons and nonpersons, in such a way as to maintain the integrity of the one and the many.
For Latour the answer to the modem Constitution's many pitfalls is to be found in a concerted
effort to become nonmodern. We must come to realize that modernity was little more than a
clever smokescreen which sought to play a polemical Nature against a polemical Society, all
the while keeping God in a distant judge's chair. Now that we have come to see through the
smokescreen and realize that translation has never ceased we will begin to become distinctly
nonmodem. Thus we may now begin to outline what Latour has called a nonmodem
constitution. But as he so often has emphasized, we are not seeking to be more clever or more
critical than the modem and postmodern critiques. In other words, we certainly do not need
another form of iconoclasm or a debunking 'era of suspicion.' What nonmodemism entails,
for Latour, is a 'retrospective attitude, which deploys instead ofunveiling, ads instead of
subtracting, fraternizes instead of denouncing, sorts out instead of debunking.'120 Unlike the
postmodems, nonmodems do not carry hammers - they are not iconoclasts. But as Latour
insists; 'A nonmodem is anyone who takes simultaneously into account the modems'
Constitution and the populations of hybrids that that Constitution rejects and allows to
proliferate.'121 This is the positive definition of the nonmodem project. If the reality is that we
have never been modem, and for that matter have never been critical, then why start now? If
we have never tmly left the old anthropological mix of the 'premodern,' then why spend our
days being wholly critical of the modem?
Quasi-Objects and Quasi-Subjects
The first step towards recognizing the nonmodem milieu would consist in the
recognition of the hybrids and quasi-objects which the modem Constitution so eagerly
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obscured. Here we should pause in the interest ofmaking clear what is meant by the term
'quasi-object' in Latour's usage. Remembering our earliest example of the ozone hole, we can
now try to see how this quasi-object would fit into the Constitution of the moderns. Following
the regulations of their first three guarantees, the modern would be forced to see all the
elements (networks) which compose this strange being in purified realms. So-called 'human
elements' would go to the social scientists, while the 'natural elements' would be preserved
for the natural scientists. But is the ozone hole, global warming, or mad cow disease purely
the outcome of human deeds? Or are these hybrids purely the outcome ofpurely natural
processes? Can we classify them as purely local phenomena or purely global phenomena?
What the modern Constitution had to categorize through 'seeing double' can now be seen as a
continuous (networked) whole by the nonmodern milieu. The quasi-object is all of these
things - natural, social, human, nonhuman, local and global. It was after all, the moderns who
created this fertile soil for the proliferation of the hybrid that has now saturated the modem
framework. But now the nonmodern task is to offer these hybrids a new ontology that resists
the forced pigeon-holing of the modems.
The quasi-object and the quasi-subject, therefore, resist the specified and polarized
interests of the natural scientist and the social scientist who are stuck within the modem
disease of 'seeing double.' Interested in debunking the beliefs of the common people, social
scientists have been too concerned with portraying the object as the mere receptacle of 'false'
human projections. They could only see the object as the mere tabula rasa for human
projections, desires, and passions. Yet there is also a second movement within the social
scientist camp which seeks to debunk the human beliefthat we are free subjects. Here the
social scientist, who once saw the object as the passive recipient of human categories, now
steps in to declare the object's ultimate power over the subject. The subject 'has become
powerless, shaped in turn by the powerful objective forces that completely determine its
action'.122 The double sightedness of the modem Constitution leaves society in either too
strong a position over the object or in too weak a position - the middle ground is lost. This
has left us with the undesirable solution of dualism, where thinkers offer us alternating
options between 'hard' and 'soft' notions ofNature and Society. Nonmodemism, through the
quasi-object/subject, seeks to upset this dualist paradigm by insisting that we 'are not forever
trapped in a boring alternation between objects or matter and subjects and symbols. We are
not limited to "not only.. .but also" explanations'.123
Certainly, there have been countless attempts at overcoming the dualist paradigm. We
have reviewed the Edinburgh School's attempts and have concluded that they were noble
indeed, but have ultimately fallen short on several fronts. Latour has also systematically
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rejected other projects such as phenomenology, the incommensurability ofHabermas, and the
project of dialectics. Although we will not dig into each of these in turn, we will to make
short mention of Latour's response to the latter for it has held some sway in recent theological
formulations of the nature/culture relationship.124 Dialectical reasoning, for Latour, has
attempted to link the dual poles of the modern Constitution simply by filling the middle
ground with 'as many arrows and feedback loops as one wishes' but it does not 'relocate the
quasi-object or quasi-subject' that Latour sees as the heart of the nonmodern Constitution.125
Essentially, dialectics circles around the quasi-object/subject with its numerous loops and
spirals, without ever really touching on the hybrid itself. Dialectics entirely misses the middle
ground by circling the peripheries which the modern constitution has solidified. In the final
estimation, dialectics remains all too modern for Latour.
The quasi-object and quasi-subject exist between the two poles of the modern
Constitution, but also 'below' it. They are far more socialized than the hard extreme of the
natural sciences, which is to say that they exist in the 'collective' of the middle ground. Nor
are these quasi-objects the blank tabula rasa upon which society might project its desires,
anxieties, and constructions. As Latour points out, the quasi-object is 'much more real,
nonhuman and objective than those shapeless screens on which society—for unknown
reasons—needed to be "projected."'126 Coming to terms with the quasi-object/subject has put
science studies in a position where we might now be able to reconsider the place of the
nonhumans in our hybridized collectives.
The Nonmodern Guarantees
As we have seen, the quasi-object or hybrid is the lifeblood of nonmodern thought.
Therefore, Latour's first stipulation in regard to a nonmodern Constitution is that it would
commit to the full representation of the quasi-object. This stands in heavy opposition to the
modern Constitution's third guarantee. Remembering that this guarantee demanded the
complete separation between Natural and Social worlds, and secondly between the work of
hybrids and the work ofpurification. It was this third guarantee of the modern Constitution
that allowed for the black-boxing of the quasi-object. But here in the nonmodern constitution
the first guarantee will act to reinforce the inseparability of quasi-objects and quasi-subjects.
As Latour explains
Every concept, every institution, every practice that interferes with the continuous
deployment of collectives and their experimentation with hybrids will be deemed
dangerous, harmful, and—we may as well say it—immoral. The work of mediation
124 Here I am referring primarily to Peter Scott's application ofMarxist dialectics in the nature/culture
relationship in his recent study titled A Political Theology ofNature, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
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becomes the very centre of the double power, natural and social. The networks come
out of hiding.127
As the networks of quasi-objects and quasi-subjects are brought out of obscurity, the middle
ground - the non-place of the modern Constitution - takes on a new importance. Yet we must
also be careful, Latour warns, as we do not wish to once again become premoderns. In the
premodern understanding, all things both natural and social had to correspond directly, to the
effect ofmaking large scale experimentation utterly impossible. In this sense we want to
preserve one of the modern Constitution's major precepts: 'the separability of a nature that no
one has constructed—transcendence—and the freedom ofmanceuver of a society that is of
our own making—immanence'.128 This is, however, only to be understood in a qualified sense
as we wish to maintain this distinction without the clandestine duplicity of the modern
Constitution's third guarantee.
What is desired, according to Latour, is the maintenance of the modern Constitution's
first two guarantees, but without the obfuscating action of the third guarantee. This seemingly
undesirable movement can be achieved once we have made it explicit that the transcendence
ofNature and the immanence of Society is the sole product of the work ofmediation. This is,
of course, contrary to what the moderns claimed. But as the nonmodern sees it, both nature
and society are the 'products' (loosely interpreted) of the durable and irreversible work of
translation and mediation. This allows for a nature (now with a lower-case 'n') that we have
not 'made,' and a society that we can change; 'there are indeed indisputable scientific facts,
and free citizens, but once they are viewed in a nonmodern light they become the double
consequence of a practice that is now visible in its continuity'.129
This moves us into a position where we might begin to define the second guarantee of
Latour's nonmodern Constitution. This guarantee seeks to hold the first two guarantees of the
modern Constitution in an inseparable tandem, whereas the moderns sought to purify them
into distinct realms. As the first guarantee of the nonmodern Constitution sought to free all
the networks and quasi-objects from the black-boxing of the modern, this second guarantee
seeks to preserve their 'freedom of manceuver.' Therefore, Latour does not argue that the
moderns were completely off the mark as they sought to objectify nonhumans and preserve
free societies. 'They were mistaken only in their certainty that that double production required
an absolute distinction between the two terms and the continual repression of the work of
mediation.'130 The life-blood of the modern project was precisely the action which they
denied - the work ofmediation.






The third nonmodern guarantee revolves around a new understanding of history and
time. As we have seen, the modern Constitution was locked into recognizing only three
specific entities within its cosmos: subjects, objects, and the 'crossed-out God'. Within this
constellation it was only human history that could be understood as being in anyway
contingent. As we have already seen, all of history was understood in relation to the modern
'revolution', and all that came before it was deemed to be merely 'premodern.' The modern
understanding of time was thus strictly linear, flat and predictable. In the nonmodern view,
this simply is not the case. Time is not, nor has it ever been the steady, predictable flow of
homogenous associations. As Latour explains; 'If time depends on associations, associations
do not depend on time.'131 In other words, if associations are heterogeneous rather than
homogenous, then so too will time be something other than a coherent and smooth flow. We
return to this interesting nonmodern concept of time in chapter four, where it is given a more
complete treatment along with spacing and placing.
But for now, and in light of this revised understanding of the time and place of
objects, we may now seek to give a brief definition of the third guarantee of the nonmodern
constitution. This guarantee maintains that 'freedom is redefined as a capacity ofhybrids that
no longer depend on a homogenous temporal flow.'132 We are now free to combine
heterogeneous associations of humans and nonhumans without having to pigeonhole them
into the Old Regime's choices of 'archaism and modernization, the local and the global, the
cultural and the universal, the natural and the social'.133 We should take notice that this is a
move away from reserving freedom for the social pole of the continuum alone. Again, we will
return to this aspect of nonmodernity for a more complete treatment in chapter four.
The fourth guarantee of the new nonmodern Constitution is the one Latour esteems as
possibly being the most important of them all. We will remember that the fourth guarantee of
the modern Constitution revolved around the 'crossing-out' ofGod, as he was seen to be
banished to a wholly distant transcendence so as to be incapable ofmeddling in immanent
affairs, save for the most extreme of conflicts. Here the fourth guarantee of the nonmodem
would seek to liberate God from his distant imprisonment. As Latour explains: 'The question
of God is reopened, and the nonmoderns no longer have to try to generalize the improbable
metaphysics of the moderns that forced them to believe in belief.'134 The intention is that this
will open up a space where the once hidden proliferation of hybrids will now be officially
recognized and regulated. Moreover, Latour insists that this may be a time and place where
132 Ibid.
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we might extend the practice of democracy to things themselves, rather than to the human
subject alone.135 This is, as he has termed it, a 'parliament of things.'
The Parliament of Things: A Nonmodern Anthropology
Now that the quasi-objects have been brought into the light of day, no-longer resigned
to living beneath the modern Constitution's opaque shadow, we may begin to imagine what
Latour has termed the 'Parliament of Things.' These discoveries of science studies have been
forced to patiently await the development of an anthropology capable of absorbing these new
imbroglios - the obscured hybrids. As the modern settlement depended on a strict division of
human and nonhuman worlds, the nonmodern constitution of science studies has done much
to move closer towards a nonmodern anthropology that is truly comparative. Again, this is not
a movement towards a debunking of science, as many of the opponents of science studies
have charged. But rather, as Latour insists:
When we amend the Constitution, we continue to believe in the sciences, but instead
of taking their objectivity, their truth, their coldness, their extraterritoriality—qualities
they have never had, except after the arbitrary withdrawal of epistemology—we
retain what has always been most interesting about them: their daring, their
experimentation, their uncertainty, their warmth, their incongruous blend of hybrids,
their crazy ability to reconstitute their social bond.136
Therefore, science will maintain a place within the new parliament of things, but it will be a
science with a new and immanent history. It will not be the God-like or transcendent practice
of years past.137 In Boyle's parliament, things (nonhumans) required human representation to
intermediate on their behalf. As we have seen, these passive, gentlemanly, witnesses simply
reported what the things would have said if they could speak for themselves. Hobbes, on the
other hand, invested his interests in the singular representation of the masses of human
subjects who could not all speak at once; therefore the Sovereign was essential to the
parliament of people. Again, the Sovereign was thought to be a gentleman who would speak
only that which the people would speak if all could be heard at once.
The breakdown crept in, as Latour points out, once we began to question whether the
scientists and the Sovereign were translating or betraying their masses of humans and
nonhumans. If the scientists were wrong, we would lose the nonhumans and fall into human
argumentation alone. If the Sovereign was dishonest, we would lose societal representation
and be forced back into a state ofNature - man against man.138 But ifwe could keep to the
135 Latour has recently attempted a full elucidation of what this might look like in his book titled
Politics ofNature: How to Bring the Sciences Into Democracy.
136
Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 142.
137 Scattered throughout Latour's work a distinction is made between two types of science; science one
and science two. Science one is the science of the Enlightenment, while science two is the more
realistic and modest science he has described in the preceding quotation.
138 Ibid., p. 143.
Ill
two spheres of representation - human and nonhuman - as far apart as possible, then there
would be no harm in carrying on with a 'double sightedness.' This left the moderns with no
way of knowing who was honest and who was betraying the parliaments they represented.
A Parliament of Things, which depends upon a nonmodern anthropology, will reject
this division of duties. Representation will not be separated into two purified realms. Instead,
the Parliament of Things will adopt a singular mode of representing both humans and
nonhumans, reuniting that which was forced to opposite poles by the modem Constitution.
Undoubtedly, the nonmodern constitution will encourage the sidelining of traditional
concerns of the epistemologists. In their anxiety ridden grasping for an immediate world 'out
there,' the epistemologists have tried to evacuate all mediation and translation from scientific
practice, both natural and political. But in the Parliament of Things intermediaries, translators,
and hybrids will no longer be seen as the polluting entities they were once considered by the
epistemologists. We must recognize that suspicions regarding scientific representation had
grown out of the modem belief that Nature could only become immediately accessible if all
traces of the social were evacuated from its forms ofmediation. The scientists wanted the
social at arms length, while the sociologists wanted objects set in their properly distant place.
A nonmodem Parliament of Things will instead seek to register both forms of representation
as a single entity. As Latour exclaims; 'Let us again take up the two representatives and the
double doubt about the faithfulness of the representatives, and we shall have defined the
Parliament of things.'139
Within this new nonmodem parliament the mediator will reign as king. Naked,
transcendent, unmediated tmths will be forever banished, but so too will the bare-boned
subject-citizen who has been purified of all inhumanity. 'Natures are present, but with their
representatives, scientists who speak in their name. Societies are present, but with the objects
that have been serving as their ballast from time immemorial.'140 All that was formerly
obscured by the modem constitution is now brought into the light of day. The networks of
hybridized quasi-objects/subjects now have the parliament to themselves as it is they who
need to be represented as they defy and transgress the fictional 'purified realms' of the
modem Constitution. As Latour is keen to point out, this is not a revolution. It is rather,
simply ratifying what we have always done in practice but could not recognize due to the
official Constitutional guarantees. The Parliament of Things simply rejoins the two-halves of
the constitution which Boyle and Hobbes sought to dichotomize.





It is to be expected that a writer as prolific, flamboyant, and altogether ubiquitous as
Latour has become, would inevitably be subjected to a number of criticisms. To be certain,
one of the central tasks of this thesis is to subject Latour to a specifically theological critique
which we pursue in the next chapter. But for now we may do well to simply highlight a
number of the more common criticisms which have been lodged against Latour and his
'French' brand of science studies. Here we will focus on just three of the more common
criticisms.
We have already alluded to the first and most common criticism which, upon my own
reading, is based upon a common misunderstanding, or in some cases, an intentional
misrepresentation of Latour's work. This has to do with the widely held notion - primarily
amongst scientific realists - that Latour's work represents a kind of radical 'social
constructivism' or merely a faddish antirealism in the vein ofmainstream postmodern
thought. This is, however, a gross distortion of Latour's project. As Steven C. Ward has
argued, Latour's approach is more clearly understood as and 'attempt to offer a view of
science that is void ofboth modem realist optimism and postmodern relativist pessimism. As
such, it is neither a realist vindication of the progress of science or an antirealist denigration
of all foundations.'141 As Ward makes clear, Latour's project is not centrally concerned with
iconoclasm, but rather with explaining the success of the sciences by appealing neither to
realism nor relativism. The continuing problem, or point of confusion, for many scientific
realists, however, has to do with Latour's consistent denial that science is the only means of
capturing reality. 'Science is not', for Latour, 'the supreme modem way of knowing simply
because of its philosophical, ideational, or theoretical supremacy, but because it is a powerful
associational network containing a strong and expansive web of heterogeneous actants.'142
Upon my reading of these criticisms, it appears quite clear that those who continue to accuse
Latour of being a radical 'social constructivist' or anti-rationalist continue to address only his
earlier work, but particularly his Laboratory Life, which in its first publication carried the
words 'social construction' in its subtitle. Latour has since recanted his early usage of the
term and I believe his critics would do well to give his more recent work a fair reading as he
clearly rejects the mainstream understanding of 'social' constmctivism.
Benton and Craib have lodged a second criticism concerning Latour's nonmodern
terminological inventions such as 'hybridity', 'quasi-object', and 'quasi-subject'. According
to these authors ' [tjhese terms get such meaning as they have only in terms of theirprior
understanding of what "subjects", "objects" and the "pure" elements of the "hybrid" are.'
Moreover, they add that 'Latour contravenes his own methodology in the very act of defining
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his most basic ideas.'143 In other words, it is argued that Latour subverts his own nonmodern
program by continuing to rely on modernity's 'purified' concepts to explain his own position.
Again, I do not take this criticism to be a terminal blow to the nonmodern project as a whole.
To be certain, Latour has identified this very issue within his own work, as he has frequently
lamented the fact that the terminology which modernity has given us is wholly inadequate to
the task. Hence Latour and others within the French School have engaged in long etymologies
of candidate words for incorporation into the nonmodern project such as 'fact', 'factish',
'translation', 'enrollment', etc. These etymological considerations clearly saturate Latour's
more recent work, thus it is a point of criticism ofwhich Latour is fully aware and
continuously re-addresses in nearly every new book he publishes. In fact, Latour has now
taken to adding a glossary of terms to his books in order to help the reader navigate the re¬
invented language of the nonmodern theorist.
Finally, Latour's account of nonhuman agency/actancy has been widely
misunderstood and misrepresented as being overly anthropomorphic. We return to this point
in the remaining chapters, but for now we may briefly rehearse the common compliant. Again
we may turn to Benton and Craib, who have argued this point by returning to Latour's work
from the 1980's - but particularly his Science in Action - where they accuse him of reducing
nonhuman things, such as wind acting on a windmill, 'to a conscious quasi-human
interlocutor, with its own interests and capacity for compromise.'144 The point has been made
frequently enough that Latour has, in his more recent work - Pandora's Hope in particular -
addressed many of these concerns. Again, I find it rather surprising, and altogether unfair, that
Latour's critics continue to return to his earliest works in order to construct a portrayal of his
work that is much easier to critique than his more philosophically rigorous recent work. We
return to Latour's concept of nonhuman agency/actancy in the remaining chapters. To be
certain, Latour has been careful to avoid the anthropomorphism which Benton and Craib have
located in his earliest work.
Conclusion
In the end, Latour offers us a new politics and a new understanding of the sciences,
both social and natural, where the construction of reality (the collective) is the product of a
multiplicity ofmediations, both human and nonhuman, social and material. We will recall that
one of Latour's central propositions revolves around the adoption of a new type of
anthropology - that is, an anthropology which employs the generalized principle of symmetry
- which claims the middle ground between the proliferations of the modern Constitution's
dualisms. Within this new mode of thinking 'the anthropologist has a position to himself at
143 Benton and Craib, Philosophy ofSocial Science, p. 71.
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the median point where he can follow the attribution of both nonhuman and human
properties'.145 The modern Constitution has served to obscure this 'median point' or 'middle
ground' between the opposite poles of a purified Nature and Society. Latour refers to this
point as the 'no-man's-land' or the 'non-place' of the modern project. It is this place which
was black-boxed and made opaque, thereby shrouding the mediations and hybridizations
which made the modern project so successful. This newfound place ofmediation 'is far from
empty: quasi-objects, quasi-subjects, proliferate in it. No longer unthinkable, it becomes the
terrain of all the empirical studies carried out on the networks'.146
Newly re-claimed for and by the nonmodern constitution, this onetime 'non-place'
has been transformed into the central point of concern for science studies and a number of
other disciplines and sub-disciplines. Human geographers have for many years been
concerned with this median point - which as science studies has shown, is less a point and
more a plane - and has worked with varying degrees of success to bring it out of its modern
obscurity. Many human geographers have now begun to turn their focus upon this median
point or plane, in order to establish theoretical and practical links between geography's
traditional 'physical' trajectory and the challenges of the social sciences. Therefore, we may
envision human geographers as ones who have built their project of inquiry within this
mediating plane, this 'non-place,' between the polemicized Nature and Society of the modern
Constitution. Many theorists within the field of human geography have answered the
modernist depiction of the mediating point/plane as a 'no-man's-land' or 'non-place' with
their own geographically informed antidote. The geographical concept ofplace orplacing has
a long pedigree within geographical thought, yet it has been only recently that geographers
have begun to incorporate the ideas flourishing within science studies with their own. We turn
to the elucidation of this nonmodem spatiality in chapter 4, but first we must take time to
critically compare the projects of Latour and Gunton in a sustained fashion.
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Part II - A Mutual Critique
116
Chapter 3
Trinitarian Theology and the Nonmodern Collective: Comparing the two
Projects
Introduction
Gunton's theological trinitarianism and Latour's nonmodern collective share several
commonalities in their desire to understand the dynamism which exists between humans and
the multiplicity of nonhumans with whom they share a collective existence. Moreover, each
of our interlocutors are invested in understanding the theological possibilities, or
requirements, that accompany these theories - yet as a theologian, Gunton is clearly the more
dedicated in this regard. A detailed comparison of the two projects would, I believe, provide
an extremely fertile climate for better refining our theological concepts concerning human-
nonhuman relationality, but it would also help to correct and deepen some of the theological
concerns germane to science studies. It is surprising that there have been few, if any, detailed
theological evaluations of Latour's work, especially in light of the fact that it so frequently
ventures into theological concerns. This is testament both to the post-disciplinary nature of
Latour's vision, but also to the broad scope which concerns recent philosophical and
constructive theologies. Such a detailed comparison is also called for on the account that
Latour began his scholarly vocation as a theologian and has continued to see important
parallels between religious and scientific discourse. One may characterize Latour as a 'student
of science' who is continually bumping up against theological issues, whereas Gunton is a
theologian consistently trying to interact with the field of science studies.1 In this chapter I
propose a constructive comparison of these parallel projects, all the while working to
elucidate some possible areas of crossover and mutual illumination. Ofparticular concern
will be an interest in using Latour to reveal some of the important blindspots in Gunton's
theology, yet we are also interested in correcting much of Latour's theological suggestions by
way ofGunton's important trinitarian insights.2
In order to give some structure to our comparison of the trinitarian and nonmodern
projects I have selected a number ofpoints for discussion, each ofwhich will better enable us
1 One can find throughout Gunton's work scattered references and approving allusions to the field of
philosophy of science, but particularly the work of fellow Englishmen, Michael Polanyi, whom he
often quoted and engaged with great approval.
2 It is perhaps worth mentioning that Prof. Gunton kindly took the time to meet with me for a
discussion of this thesis topic concerning Latour and a theology of 'placing' on 28th of February, 2002,
at the University ofEdinburgh, New College. During this meeting I asked if he was familiar with the
work ofBruno Latour and he indicated that he had not heard of him. After more than an hour of
discussion, Prof. Gunton appeared very interested in reading Latour's work, often comparing him to
Michael Polanyi, and left with a list of Latour's book titles. I do not know if he subsequently read
anything of Latour's. But I might also mention that he was very interested in the geographical concept
ofplace, but was again unfamiliar with the literature.
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to understand the deep relationality that exists between humans, nonhumans, and God. First,
we briefly review some of the commonalities to be found in our author's diagnosis of our
modern inheritance. This section is rather brief since the points of convergence and
divergence will continue to be illustrated throughout the chapter. Secondly, understanding
that both Gunton and Latour are deeply invested in constructing ways of climbing out of the
many pitfalls ofmodernity I have chosen to arrange a comparison of the two projects around
three closely related themes - ontology and otherness, mediations and relations, and the
location of unity. Finally, in the last section of this chapter we offer a mutual critique of both
projects as we attempt to illustrate a number of blindspots or pitfalls inherent to both the
nonmodem and trinitarian projects.
I. Diagnosing the Modern
Ontological andEpistemological Alienation
We may begin with a brief comparison ofboth Gunton and Latour's respective
estimations ofmodernity and its cultural and theological fallout. In an effort to avoid simply
restating that which we covered in-depth in the first two chapters, we are here concerned with
beginning to make explicit the strengths and weakness to be found in each of our
interlocutors. In this it will become clear that our authors share very similar concerns
regarding the cultural fragmentation which modernity has produced. Yet there are also a
number of important differences between our authors which, I believe, serve only to betray
their disciplinary backgrounds and respective agendas. Gunton is clearly more interested in
uncovering the role which poor theologies of creation have played in creating our modern
state of alienation and fragmentation. For Gunton, our response to modernity and its bankrupt
theologies should be both theological and trinitarian in nature. Latour, on the other hand,
takes a more holistic vision in his construction of a full-blown modem Constitution and its
antidote in the shape of his nonmodem constitution - although it is, admittedly, a constitution
with something of a theological component. Coming to understand the modem predicament
from the perspective of a 'student of science', Latour is clearly less concerned with
theological movements and has instead opted to focus on the establishment and continuing
role of the 'two' sciences - 'natural' and 'human'.
What is clear from the first two chapters is that our authors agree on the basic origins
of the modem predicament, and hold equal disdain for all its postmodern symptoms, but
especially those concerned with critique and radical relativism. Similarly, both of our authors
are concerned to address the dualisms, or the 'double-minding', which the Enlightenment has
engendered in Western culture. The modem opposition between belief and tmth has been one
of these shared targets for correction. As Gunton writes in his Enlightenment andAlienation,
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it was the early moderns who turned Augustine's injunction; 'unless you believe you will not
understand', into the epistemologist's mantra; 'Ifyou believe you will not understand'.3
Signaling the rise ofhyper-rationalism and its attendant forms of scientism, modernity has
now spawned something of a paradox: 'there emerges both a Hericlitean flux and its alter ego,
the totalitarian state that rushes in to fill the social and political vacuum'. And as Gunton
glosses; 'The modern Protagoras is not the friend of freedom and plurality that he appears to
be.'4 Latour would certainly agree with the diagnosis adding that; 'Reality is an object of
belief only for those who have started down this impossible cascade of (modern) settlements,
always tumbling into a worse and more radical solution.'5 Thus both of our interlocutors have
based the modern predicament - to varying degrees - in the realms of ontology,
epistemology, theology, and a flawed politics of nature.
Finally, both of our thinkers lament, in their own ways, the modern push towards the
fragmentation of culture. Gunton, for instance, indicates that Kant's great legacy can be found
in his forcing the realms of science, ethics and art into such radically separated fields of
experience that the study, or even the possibility, of a meaningful universe falls deeply into
question. 'Without a measure of integration of our knowledge, ethics and experience of
beauty', Gunton writes, 'we are not fully what we might be.'6 Latour certainly shares this
concern, but adds depth to the claim that it is to Kant that we owe our now warring cultures of
'natural' and 'social' sciences. Our authors are also deeply consumed with what they see as
the perverse modern notion that there is a 'world out there' which is somehow cutoff from
humans. Both authors trace this to the rise of an epistemology of doubt, but while Gunton is
more concerned to find its theological pedigree, Latour is much more concerned to find
philosophical and political ways out of our modem predicament. As seems to be so often the
case, Latour is much more rigorous in his search for finding the very practical and specific
ways in which we might reunite the human and nonhuman worlds that were rudely severed by
the modem's Constitution. Whereas Gunton's great contribution has been to outline the
beginnings of a trinitarian theology capable of embracing that which the modems could not -
namely, both the one and the many simultaneously. The respective strengths and weakness of
each approach are made even more explicit as we turn to consider each author's appreciation
of the theological currents which would aid in the shaping ofmodernity.
The Displaced and Crossed-Out God
3 Gunton, Enlightenment andAlienation, p. 3-4.
4
Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, p. 112.
5
Latour, Pandora's Hope, p. 14.
6
Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, p. 115-116.
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We have seen in the preceding chapters that both projects, Gunton and Latour's, have
sought to identify the Enlightenment's tendency to distance God from the immanent affairs of
the created realm. Both of our authors are concerned to elucidate the damaging effect which a
'distanced' or 'crossed-out' God has had on modern culture and piety. So let us begin with
one point of agreement. Both Gunton and Latour understand that the distancing of God from
the immanent sphere has resulted in the individualization and internalization of faith. The
genesis of this distancing, as we have reviewed, was to be found in the modern movement to
'free' humanity from the overwhelming determination of an omnipotent God. For Latour, this
initiated the reinvention of spirituality: 'the all powerful God could descend into men's hearts
without intervening in any way in their external affairs.'7 Gunton would certainly agree with
Latour's evaluation, where in his discussion of the problem of the one and the many he
related theologies which posited an omnipotent, monistic, and hegemonic deity with human
longings to be free of totalitarian rule. Thus Gunton will insist that 'much modem social and
political thought can be understood as the revolt of the many against the one, and at the same
time that of humanity against divinity.'8 Ultimately, Latour will go as far as to say that this
modem drive for human freedom would constitute a 'ban on theology' altogether.9
Although it is less pronounced in Gunton than in Latour, there is also an indication
made by both authors concerning the modem tendency to trade on the immanence and
transcendence ofGod in regard to nature. As modernity expelled God from the immanent
sphere, thereby losing its source of unity, a new unity of a very different and impersonal kind
'returns insidiously and unnoticed through the backdoor.'10 For Latour, these 'surrogate
divinities' present themselves in the guise ofmovements such as evolutionism, sociobiology,
and psychological behaviorism.11 As we reviewed in the first chapter, Gunton will also relate
this movement to a spatial metaphor of God's relation to the world. Flere modernity's habit
was to first spatially cast God to an unreachable transcendence only to return Him to a
pantheistic immanence in late-modernity - from deism to pantheism.
I would like to employ these points of general agreement to highlight two important
points of contrast between our two authors. Moreover, these two points will serve to illustrate
one strength and one weakness in each of our author's diagnosis, and subsequent mitigating
proposals for remedying our modern state of alienation and fragmentation. By pausing now to
review these points of mutual critique, as they apply to our author's understandings of the
modern's God, we will then be able to trace these strengths and weaknesses throughout the
chapter.
7
Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 33.
8
Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, p. 27.
9
Latour, Pandora's Hope, p. 298.
10
Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, p. 35.
11 Ibid.
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We begin with what I find to be Gunton's great strength and Latour's great weakness.
As an academic theologian of creation and culture, Gunton has clearly done more to illustrate
the theological roots of our modern alienation. We have seen him trace the impetus for
modernity to inadequate theologies of God and creation, which ultimately obscured the
trinitarian shape of God's relationship to the world. This is the result of what he has called the
'Babylonian captivity' of the Christian doctrine of creation, where God's mediated relation to
the world through his 'two hands' was largely diminished in Western theology. The contrast
to Latour is rather subtle upon first glance, but reveals itself quite starkly in Latour's neglect
of a counter-theology in his proposed nonmodern constitution. Where both authors are
concerned to highlight the bankruptcy ofmodern theologies, Gunton will go on to develop a
deeply detailed counter-theology built upon a Patristic-inspired 'fully trinitarian' doctrine of
God and creation. Latour, on the other hand, after highlighting the effect the Enlightenment
would have on theology, offers little of any direction on how theology may be reconceived in
a nonmodern fashion. His suggestions concerning theology after modernity, in his We Have
Never Been Modern, amount to little more than the claim that the question of God is now 're¬
opened'. We will return to address Latour's neglect of theology in the section concerned with
unity and the God-world relationship later in this chapter. There we will begin to see that
Latour's more recent theological musings have begun to take on a rather pantheistic leaning.
Secondly, I intend to illustrate throughout this chapter that Latour's great strength
tends to be Gunton's great weakness. Whereas Latour falls short in terms of positive
theological proposals as we emerge from modernity, his great strength has been to illustrate
how the 'crossed-out God' ofmodernity served to obscure the work ofmediation, translation,
and hybridization. Said differently, Latour has provided a much deeper account of how the
role of the quasi-object has been overshadowed by modernity's theological maneuvering.
While he may be weak in terms of offering a theological framework for becoming
nonmodern, Latour's great strength has been to achieve something which Gunton was
ultimately, in my estimation, unable to fully achieve. That is, a thoroughgoing account of
'horizontal' relationally between humans and nonhumans. Gunton, for his part, is not at all
unaware of the problem, but here I will begin to submit the argument that his is a theology
which is still all too captivated by the 'social' pole of the modem dichotomy and thereby
neglects the extremely important role of the nonhuman/nonpersonal. His continued emphasis
on the social and political outworkings (here almost entirely limited to human persons) of
modernity and the ancient problem of 'the one and the many' is, I believe, representative of
his work overall.
It is, therefore, clear that Latour's work represents a much greater willingness and
ability to take nonhuman action into full consideration. However, we shall also illustrate how
Latour's theological proposals tend to overcompensate for the modem displacement of the
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divine. Gunton's trinitarian understanding of the God-world relationship is, in my view,
highly amenable to Latour's nonmodern vision and will serve to correct his pantheistic
tendencies. But before attempting something of a detailed mutual critique, we will continue to
elucidate a number ofpoints of convergence and divergence between the two projects. In
order to do this we will now focus on each of our authors constructive projects as they relate
to a number ofunifying themes organized around human/nonhuman relationality: ontology
and otherness, mediation and relation, as well as unity and multiplicity. Treating these
questions of ontology, relationality and unity in some abstraction from one another is
admittedly somewhat artificial, as they inherently grow out of one another. But for the sake of
clarity we will here address each of these themes in turn.
II. Ontology and Otherness
As we begin to elucidate some of the important differences between trinitarian and
nonmodem approaches, it will be helpful ifwe begin with the basic question concerning the
ontological distinctions each makes concerning the human and nonhuman realms. The
importance of such a distinction has been made clear in much of the recent philosophical and
theological reflections on human embeddedness in the nonhuman realm. Most often we find
that it is the Deep Ecology ofArne Naess and his philosophical offspring, and their
developing notion of an 'ecological self, that is at the center of the critique. Ecofeminist
philosopher, Val Plumwood, has argued convincingly that the deep ecological notion of
'cosmological identification' goes much too far in eroding the ontological distinction between
human and nonhuman entities - a position many feminist thinkers are unwilling to accept.12
The risks associated with this 'indistinguishablity account', as Plumwood has termed it, have
recently been made clear in the work of several theologians concerned with human
embeddedness. As Peter Scott indicates, a self such as this 'never meets resistance for it
operates with no genuine account of otherness or difference'.13 Ultimately what is risked is a
fall into the totalitarianism which Gunton was so concerned to avoid. Ifwe are too willing to
find a total identification between human selves (persons) and their nonhuman contexts, we
come to adopt a relationality that ultimately offends the otherness - the space - which
maintains the particularity of both. In the end, many of the recent 'spiritual ecologies', 'deep
ecologies', and 'new age ecologies' that populate the discussion ultimately fail to escape this
modern predicament. As Gunton might argue, they serve only to represent the modern process
of self-assertion into places where God once resided, and in doing so fall prey to the modern
12 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery ofNature, (London: Routledge, 1993).
13 Peter Scott, A Political Theology ofNature, (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2003), p. 80.
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'temptation to seek unity and stability above all'.14 Moreover, as Scott points out, the
movement is not just one towards totalitarianism, but also toward the anthropocentrism which
Deep Ecologists first sought to avoid.15 We must then ask how it is, if at all, that Latour and
Gunton seek to maintain this distinction (otherness) between human and nonhuman being.
We will begin by evaluating Gunton's stance on this important issue since so much of
his position has already been formulated. In fact, Gunton's entire body ofwork contains the
continuous occupation ofmaintaining the otherness and particularity which constitutes
'beings and realms' as distinctively themselves. This is the issue which the problem of the
One and the many sought to highlight in ancient, modern, and now late-modern cultures. We
have seen that modern thought, through its cascades of philosophical and theological
fragmentation, has found much difficulty in navigating between particularity and
homogeneity - the One and the many. Lacking a sound philosophy of the substantiality of the
material particular (the ontological question) and the human ability to register that
substantiality (the epistemological question), modernity has failed to fully appreciate the
otherness-in-relation which is so characteristic of a trinitarian theology. Moreover, we have
seen that for Gunton, otherness - the distinct being of things - is only to be found in the midst
of a relationality analogically derived from a trinitarian ontology.
I would like to return to this important concept of relationality for a more thorough
treatment in the next section, but in the interest of clarity and comparison we will briefly
review the differences which Gunton finds amongst 'beings and realms', but particularly God,
humans, and nonhumans. The first differentiation is, of course, the important distinction
between God and world - a term Gunton uses to signify all that which is not God. The
differentiation between God and world is, as we have seen, absolutely critical for a doctrine of
creation. This is why the doctrine of creation ex nihilo remains such an important element of
the Christian confession, for it establishes the otherness and non-necessity of the creation. Or
as Gunton would say, recalling his dispute with Robert Jenson, it maintains the space in
which God and world can be distinctively themselves. Moreover, this guards us against that
other modern tendency towards a pantheism which ultimately erodes particularity into
undifferentiated unity. 'If the world is creation, then it has its own particular being, even if
that being is not separable from its relation to its maker and redeemer.'16
Now we may consider the ontological distinctions which Gunton draws amongst the
created order. We have just reviewed that its first trait is to be found in that is other than the
Creator. This implies that to 'be created involves spatial and temporal limitation, so that
living autonomously within the bounds of the created order - living according to the law of
14
Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, p. 21.
15
Scott, A Political Theology ofNature, p. 85.
16
Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, p. 166.
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spatial and temporal being - involves the acceptance of limitation'.17 But we have also seen
that Gunton makes another differentiation within the created realm between personal/social
beings, namely humans, and the non-personal/non-social realm of nonhumans. This is a
distinction which is critical for Gunton: 'The danger here, so widely apparent, is of a failure
to coordinate the two, to recognize the differences between person and world, while
respecting the proper being and status of the natural world.'18
Before considering the nonhuman creation, let us recall the differentiation which
exists amongst personal (human) beings. First, we will remember that to be a person is
certainly not to be a radical individual. Personal individualism, as Gunton argues, was merely
a myth ofmodern culture. Moreover, it is a myth born out of the modern severing of
individual minds from the 'outside world'. Ifwe are to be free, the moderns insisted, then we
must be free from one another. Against this modern view of individuality which engenders
nothing but alienation, Gunton has argued for a renewed appreciation of the theological and
trinitarian basis ofpersonhood ushered in by the Cappadocian fathers. Like the divine
hypostasis found in the trinity, we acquire our personhood - or distinct personal being - only
in relation to like others. Again, we will say more about this relationality in the next section.
Now concerning the differentiation - the otherness - between human and nonhuman
realms, we will recall four categories of differentiation we identified at the end of chapter one.
First, Gunton argues that nonhumans do not participate in the marks of personhood. What this
means is that nonhumans are unable to 'transcend themselves', 'act', or 'think' beyond their
immediate circumstance. This means that nonhumans do not participate in the imago dei as do
human persons. This lack of the imago dei implicates three further points of differentiation.
Thus secondly, we may say that persons find their distinct being (otherness) in social forms of
relationality. This cannot be said of the nonhuman/nonpersonal realm. We will remember that
for Gunton, sociality consists of the personal capacity to express love and freedom, and this
simply cannot be said of nonhumans. Thirdly, whereas it can be said that human persons are
free in their relations with one another, it can only be said that nonhumans are contingent.
This means that nonhumans enjoy their own particular otherness, but they ultimately rely on
human persons for their ontological and eschatological destiny. It is through these stringent
lines of demarcation that the otherness of 'beings and realms' is maintained.
In consideration of the sweeping review of Latour's diagnosis of the modern
Constitution and its nonmodern antidote offered in the previous chapter, it is - perhaps - by
now clear that Latour's interest in otherness will be much different than that ofGunton.
Rather than demarcate the differentiation that exists between nature (nonhumans), subjects
(humans), and God, Latour is far more interested in going back to the moment when all of
17 Ibid., p. 170.
18 Ibid., p. 173.
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these realms were fractured and purified into distinct ontological realms. And more
importantly Latour is interested in determining the motivations behind this violent
purification. We have already reviewed the contribution of one ofmodernity's primary
statesman, Immanuel Kant. His 'yardstick' which posited a Subject purified to the left and a
Nature purified to the right, leaving only the phenomenon in the middle, is perhaps one of the
primary moments in this fracturing of the realms. It was at this, and other important
moments, that the two sciences were inaugurated and the 'transcendental Ego' - the 'Sun' of
the Copernican revolution - would give shape to a nature that ultimately escapes us. Later the
transcendental Ego would be replaced by a cascade of new pretenders that were supposed to
shape our perception ofNature: 'Society', 'Self, 'Mind', 'epistemes', etc. Now it was not
only 'the mind disconnected from the world, but each culture was disconnected from the
others'.19 Yet the task of identifying the pressures which led to this epistemological crisis
remain to be identified. Why were we seemingly forced to take a fork in the road which led to
the birth of Subjects and Objects and an unsurpassable gap between the two?
In Pandora's Hope, Latour offers a more detailed account of how this modern
obsession with epistemological certainty came about. For him it comes down to the ancient
political problem concerning how to silence the non-expert masses - what Socrates called the
'ten thousand fools' - who threatened the rule of reason with their brute strength. In an effort
to avoid mob rule, Latour argues that politics required something which allowed - or
forcefully required - universal assent, for it was only in this way that reason could rule over
brute force. For politics to work we must 'depend on something that has no human origin, no
trace of humanity, something that is purely, blindly, and coldly outside of the City'.20 What
was needed was a universal and entirely inhuman Nature which could serve as the highest
court of appeal. As Latour explains:
The idea of a completely outside world dreamed up by the epistemologists is the only
way, in the eyes of the moralists, to avoid falling prey to mob rule. Only inhumanity
will quash inhumanity. But how is it possible to imagine an outside world? Has any
one ever heard of such a bizarre oddity? No problem. We will make the world a
spectacle seenfrom the inside.21
The 'mind in a vat' of the epistemologists serves this function of preserving a Nature that is
totally outside of us (Society), yet remains connected to it through a single 'artificial conduit'.
Thus as we saw in the last chapter, Latour defines modernity as the era which sought
to artificially purify subjects, objects, and even God, into ontological realms totally alien to
one another. In fact, we might say that whereas for Gunton the preservation of otherness is the
highest of virtues, for Latour it is the 'blackbox' to be illuminated and then ultimately ignored
19
Latour, Pandora's Hope, p. 7.
20 Ibid., p. 13.
21
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in the interest of finding the 'networks' ofhybridity which transgress this otherness. This is
the ultimate goal for a science studies which does not lack reality because it never dreamed of
'dominating the people'.22 A politics such as this will also no longer participate in the 'science
wars' since it will no longer engage in the dispute between the natural sciences and the social
sciences for ultimate control of the unruly mob. For Latour, neither one of the sciences can
win a war of subjects and objects which were established in polemic opposition in the first
place - their definitions are only to be found in their opposition to one another. As the
nonmodern settlement and the parliament of things suggest:
Humans and nonhumans are enough for us (the practitioners of nonmodern science
studies). We do not need a social world to break the back of objective reality, nor an
objective reality to silence the mob. It is quite simple, even though it may sound
incredible in these times of the science wars: we are not at war.23
What is clear in all of this is Latour's initiation of an ontological movement - that will be
closely followed by an anti-epistemological movement reviewed later in the chapter - of
refusing to recognize the politicized Subject and Object, and instead seeking to recognize only
humans, nonhumans, networks and quasi-objects.
We can now attempt to identify a number of points of conflict and convergence in
Gunton and Latour's respective formulations of otherness. First, we have seen that whereas
Gunton takes as one ofhis primary concerns the maintenance of otherness amongst beings
and realms, Latour identifies the purification of subject and object as the heart of the confused
modern condition. For Latour otherness - in regard to subject and object - has been our
primary problem, for Gunton it is the goal. But secondly, we must be careful to understand
the terminology used by each ofour interlocutors. In this we must ask: Are Gunton's persons
and non-persons the same as Latour's humans and nonhumansl Are they intended to serve
the same function ofupsetting the subject-object dichotomy? On the surface Gunton's change
of terminology does not appear as deliberate as Latour's well considered refusal to recognize
subjects and objects. But we will continue to return to this important issue throughout the
chapter. Third, we will have to return to the theological propositions found interspersed in the
work of Latour. We have seen that Gunton's eagerness to preserve the transcendence ofGod
is maintained in the interest of preserving His otherness from the creation. In doing this, as
Gunton argues, the reality of both creaturely and divine realms is preserved. At the end of this
chapter we will challenge Latour's under-developed theology on this precise point. Finally, at
the end of this chapter we will return to the objections made by Val Plumwood in her





if they are able to preserve the 'space of ones own' that is need for particularity - personal or
otherwise - to be preserved amongst unity.
As we have already indicated, this is a somewhat artificial discussion concerning
otherness or differentiation in Gunton and Latour. For each of our thinkers it is in many
senses an impossibility to speak of stable and particular ontologies without at the same time
speaking of relationality or mediation between the multiplicity of particulars which populate
reality. We will therefore move quickly to consider the differing accounts ofmediation and
relation in Gunton's trinitarian and Latour's nonmodern projects.
III. Mediation and Relation
We can say of both Latour and Gunton that they locate much ofmodernity's
problems in a chronic inability to fully appreciate relationality or the mediation which exists
between beings, entities, or realms. Latour places the emphasis on transecting the many
mediations which exist between humans and nonhumans. Moreover, Latour is primarily
interested, but not exclusively, in tracing the multiplicity ofmediations which take place in
the practice of the sciences. Gunton on the other hand takes interest in defining the mediation
between God and the world in the first instance, human and other humans in the second, and
finally in human and nonhuman relations. In this section we seek a deeper understanding of
the critical issue of relationality in the trinitarian and nonmodern approaches. But due to the
deep complexity of each project's account ofmediation, and in the interest of clarity, this time
we will need to consider each in its own distinct section.
III.A. Gunton's Theology ofMediation: The Son andHoly Spirit
We have already seen that modernity is strikingly paradoxical in its trading on
favoring either the one or the many. Often its tide would turn to towards a homogenization or
forced unity of all things in an effort to cast off distinctly modern forms of alienation. The
particularity of things, as Gunton has argued, was often seen as an abhorrent element of
reality, and has thus been attacked on many fronts: philosophical, theological, political, social,
and even commercial.24 But as Gunton highlights, it is an appreciation of the particularity and
multiplicity of reality that needs to be thoughtfully formulated in our contemporary theology
of creation and culture. In fact, he will argue that 'a theology giving central place to
particularity is precisely what the modern age needs'.25
Yet a theology which seeks to regain an appreciation ofparticularity must be careful
to avoid the pitfalls of that medieval theologian who championed particularity: John Duns
24
Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, ch. 2. Gunton highlights the homogenizing forces at work
in modem advertising campaigns that have sought to globalize brand names.
25 Ibid., p. 181.
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Scotus. As we reviewed in chapter one, Scotus worked to relocate the form of things from the
'mind' of God back into the created order itself. By emphasizing creation as the outgrowth of
God's omnipotent will, Scotus was able to re-emphasize the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and
give a renewed solidity to things-in-themselves - material particularity once again came to
populate reality. But the pitfall of all this is to be found in Scotus' successor, William of
Ockham, who was less able to maintain the world's continuing relation to this omnipotent
Creator. Ockham's negative achievement was to effectively relocate unity in the arbitrary will
of the human agent, thereby eliminating the role ofGod as the unifying factor in the cosmos.
The effect of this nominalist theology was to introduce an appreciation of the material
particular, but this was bought at the expense of the crucial relationality between particulars.
Therefore, as Gunton insists, ifwe are going to re-affirm particularity it must be tempered
with an equal amount of relationalify. This exercise will necessarily entail a rigorous theology
ofmediation which, for Gunton, is to be found in the work of the Son and the Holy Spirit - as
Irenaeus would say, God's 'two hands'.
Throughout Gunton's theological program one finds repeated reference to the
mediating work of the Son and the Holy Spirit towards and amongst the creation. In the first
chapter of this thesis we reviewed in some detail the shape of trinitarian relationality and the
'space' required to maintain the distinct being of the three divine hypostases. Similarly, we
reviewed the mediated relationality that exists to maintain the distinct otherness of God and
world. There we learned ofGunton's deep commitment to understanding pneumatology and
christology from a strictly trinitarian perspective. In this section we take up the important task
of elucidating Gunton's understanding of the work of the Son and Spirit within the creation
itself. In the interest of clarity we will consider the mediating action of the Son and the Spirit
in separate sections. This is, of course, a purely practical matter and should not be taken as a
general severing of divine action. Gunton is surely correct to insist that 'all divine action,
whether in creation, salvation or final redemption is the action of God the Father; but it is all
equally brought about by his two hands, the Son and the Spirit.'26
Mediation ofthe Spirit
Gunton has identified what he understands to be the two central elements of a
theology of the Holy Spirit. First, the Spirit's work has largely to do with the transgressing of
boundaries. Here we find the Spirit drawing into relation 'beings and realms' which are
usually seen to be polarized and separated. In 'scripture', Gunton writes, 'God's being spirit
appears to refer to the capacity of the creator to cross ontological boundaries'.27 While the
God/world relationship is probably the first among these boundaries that are being
26
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transgressed, we must also notice the boundaries between creaturely realms - the 'horizontal'
relations of the creation - are similarly being transgressed. As we have seen in chapter one,
for Gunton the Spirit is the divine hypostasis responsible for animating the relation-in-
otherness that is the Triune being, both immanently and economically - in Godself and in his
actions in the creaturely realm. As Gunton explains, 'by perfecting the communion of the
Trinity, the Spirit is the Spirit of holiness, first in God himself and then in the world,'28 As we
will see more clearly later in the chapter, what Gunton means by his use of the term 'world' is
here not altogether clear. It could be that he is speaking to both personal and non-personal
beings, but the more likely intent is that he is speaking of the personal in the first instance,
and to the non-personal only by means of the personal.
Gunton will go on to add another layer of depth, or qualification, to this first
characteristic of the Spirit by describing the specific action which takes place in the work of
the Spirit. As Gunton explains, the Spirit of God is that which
relates to one another beings and realms that are opposed or separate. That which is or
has spirit is able to be open to that which is other than itself, to move into relation
with the other...The result of this movement is that by his Spirit God enables the
creation to be open to him.29
Here we see that it is the third person of the Trinity which brings God into relation with the
creation, and similarly brings spirit-filled humanity into relation with its Creator. The Old
Testament frequently speaks of humans being given the Spirit, the divine ruach, which
'opens' humanity up to relationship with the Creator. Again it is the Spirit who 'makes room'
for the other within its midst. Although we should take the words 'makes room' as largely
metaphorical, there is present in this understanding of Spirit an underlying spatial realization.
That is, the Spirit does seem to act as the transgressor of spatial (geographical) boundaries.
Gunton points out that Paul's insistence that he is 'absent in body but present in spirit'
suggests that the Spirit enables created beings to transgress spatial boundaries, however in a
limited sense.30 But central to all of this, we see the Spirit as that which 'opens out' persons to
one another and to their Creator. This is the heart of Gunton's theology ofmediation where
the Spirit works as 'the power ofGod in action over against that which is not God', as is
characteristic ofmany of the New Testament accounts of the Spirit's work.31 We will have
more to say of the 'opening out' which the Spirit enables later in the chapter as it is altogether
unclear if the non-human/non-personal realm can be said to participate in the 'opening out' of
the Spirit.
28 Ibid., p. 120. (emphasis added)
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The second characteristic of the Spirit is to be found in its maintenance and
preservation ofparticularity. Importantly, we do not find that the Spirit works to bring
'beings and realms' into such a close proximity that the end result is ontological
indistinguishability. Instead we see the Spirit working to perfect the multiplicity of 'beings
and realms' into their own concrete, and real, particularity. Within Gunton's theology the
Spirit is that which both maintains the integrity of the multiplicity of particulars while
simultaneously transgressing alienating forms of particularity which lack relationality. As the
third person of the Trinity, the Spirit resists the homogenization ofparticulars into an
oppressive and overarching unity. This particularizing, yet relational action of the Spirit can,
according to Gunton, be found throughout the scriptures. First, it is to be found working in the
relationship between the three persons of the Trinity. The Spirit, Gunton writes, 'is the one,
the personal other, by whom Jesus is related to his Father and to those with whom he had to
do'.32 Importantly, we can also find the Spirit at work in creaturely relationships as well, but
here again the emphasis is placed by Gunton on the human creation. The Spirit works within
the Christian community freeing each ofus to be inducted into a 'new—particular—network
of relationships: first with God through faith in Christ, and then with others in the community
ofChrist'.33
Closely related to this particularizing action is Gunton's understanding of the Holy
Spirit as the perfecting cause of creation. This is an insight which he has taken from the
theologies ofBasil of Caesarea and to a lesser extent John Calvin. 'The Spirit as the
perfecting cause of the creation is the one who enables things to become what they are created
to be; to fulfil their created purpose of giving glory to God in their perfecting.'34 In this sense
the Spirit is the 'eschatological person of the Trinity' working to bring creatures into their
fulfillment in the Creator.35 It is through the Spirit that creatures are enabled to become what
they were truly intended to be. We may now see that this third characteristic is intimately tied
to the first two; without relationality and particularity nothing would have its own being, its
own reality that could find its ultimate and particular purpose of giving praise and glory to its
Creator. This action of the Spirit is not, however, carried out in abstraction from the Son.
Indeed, as is true of all acts belonging to the Triune persons, we may distinguish their
economic functions, but we may not separate them - ultimately they are all actions of the
One God. Thus Gunton, referencing Ephesians 1.10, will argue that '[i]t is the function of the
32
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Spirit as the perfecting cause "to unite things in Christ, things in heaven and things on
earth"'36
The Spirit's perfecting action is also closely related to the freedom which particularity
suggests. In this regard Gunton appeals to 2 Cor. 3.17 for scriptural support: 'where the Spirit
of the Lord is, there is liberty'.37 This is the freedom of being liberated as a distinct other,
fully enabled to find ones divinely intended and particular being. Here it is important that we
note, once again, the continuity Gunton finds between the immanent and economic Trinities
in regard to the Spirit as perfecting cause. The Spirit is first understood to be the perfecting
cause within the 'eternal' or immanent Trinity itself. In the dynamism of the three persons of
the Trinity, it is the role of the Spirit to maintain - to perfect, to free - the 'divine communion
by being the dynamic of the Father's and Son's being who they distinctly are.'38 But secondly,
the perfecting character of the Spirit is turned outwards towards 'the world to create, to
redeem, and to perfect.'39 As the perfecting cause within creation - the 'outward' movement
of the Spirit - we find that the freedom which perfection implies is, according to Gunton, to
be limited to the realm ofpersons. As we have already seen in chapter one, Gunton has made
freedom the sole preserve of persons - human and divine - insisting that we qualify non-
personal freedom with the term 'contingent'. This distinction, once again, is made in order to
maintain his claim that as the bearers of the imago dei, human persons are uniquely enabled to
offer up the creation in praise of the Creator. It necessarily follows that non-personal beings
are, for Gunton, unable to realize their own destiny apart from human persons. We will see
this understanding of the relationship between human persons and non-personal creation
expressed once again in Gunton's understanding of the 'cultural mandate' we review below.
For now, let us emphasize the point that Gunton does not go so far as to propose spirit
as a transcendental mark of all being. Here he recognizes the pitfall of Hegel's scheme which
represents the opposite of the modern tendency which we have found in the nominalist
theologians. For them the problem was located in a particularity without relationality, but in
Hegel we begin to find relationality without particularity. The problem begins with Hegel's
desire to find spirit at work in all things cultural and historical, thereby making all things in
effect spirit. The pitfall associated with this is clear: all matter becomes eternalized leading to
the absorption of all materiality into the being ofGod.40 What is risked is a sudden and radical
expansion of God's being into the creation itself. Again, we see the pantheistic outworkings
of the modernizing project which sees particularity as an intolerable element of reality. As
Gunton points out, the totalizing movement of the spirit results in the abolition of time, space,
36 Gunton, Theology through the Theologians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), p. 121.
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and materiality in the Hegelian framework. This is, in fact, a modalism of the spirit, and
thereby betrays the heart of the problem - namely an insufficient doctrine of the Trinity.
Without a sufficient understanding ofGod as three and One in perfect loving perichoretic
relations, as the orthodox understanding of the Trinity maintains, Hegel's framework falls
into a faulty modalistic understanding ofGod and world as pure spirit, and the Father and Son
become merely 'temporary' manifestations. Once again, the problem encompasses the overall
modern - or late-modem - tendency to collapse God and world into an undifferentiated
whole.
Finally, ifwe are to speak ofmediation we must, as Gunton insists, maintain two
important currents of thought - substantiality and relationality. This is because ifwe are to
avoid the modem tendency to affirm a 'particularity without relation and a relationality
without particularity'41, we must affirm that all things find their substantiality - their
particular existence - in relation rather than in spite of it. It is 'in dependence upon a God
understood substantially and not abstractly' that we are to find the substantiality, or the
concreteness, of all things.42 Gunton proposes this understanding of substantiality and relation
in opposition to those theologies and philosophies which privilege notions of relationality
over and above substantiality, or ontology. Here Gunton is taking aim at theologies of relation
like that of Sallie McFague who appears to adopt an 'idealizing' notion of relationality. Hers
is a notion of relationality in 'which things can be known only in terms of their relation to us,
or rather as they appear to us'.43 Relationality of this sort only serves to undermine
substantiality in its tendency towards idealism. We must have both relationality and
substantiality. So important is the notion of substance that Gunton will go so far as to propose
it as 'a kind of transcendental' - that is, a universal mark of all being 44
The Spirit and the Non-human /Non-personal
In consideration of the goal of this chapter which is to focus on the 'horizontal'
relations within creation, it is appropriate that we now focus on Gunton's understanding of the
role of the Spirit amongst the non-personal/non-human creation. Here we discover the
important claim that spirit, or perhaps the work of the Spirit,45 is to be limited to personal
entities alone. For Gunton, spirit 'has to do with that unique feature of persons,' - divine and





43 Ibid., p. 194, f. 18. Here Gunton is referring to McFague's Metaphorical Theology. Models ofGod
in Religious Language, (London: SCM Press, 1983).
44 Ibid., p. 207.
45 Part of the problem in understanding Gunton's pneumatology has do with his frequent shifting
between speaking of the Spirit (the person of the Trinity) and a more generalized spirit (lowercase's')
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and the place in which they are set'.46 It is in this context that we must speak once again of the
ability of the Spirit to enact the 'opening out' of particular beings which we mentioned earlier.
As persons who have spirit we are enabled to be dynamically 'open' to that which is other. In
us, Gunton states, the Spirit 'enables a form of perichoresis to take place, between mind and
world, world and God'.47 In this instance it appears to be the work of the Spirit to enable
human persons to become 'open' to the non-human/non-personal creation. Here the distinct
line of agency or causality (the force, perhaps, of initiating the relationship) is from the
human to the non-human. But later Gunton will refer to 'the world's openness to human
knowledge, action and art' - suggesting that perhaps there may be something of an 'opening'
effect of spirit (or the Spirit) within the non-personal realm.48 Yet when Gunton speaks of the
non-human world being 'open' to human persons it is altogether unclear as to whether we
may attribute this to the Spirit directly, recalling that he has already said that spirit is the
unique feature ofpersons.49 Therefore the term 'open', as Gunton applies it to the non-
human/non-personal realm, seems to imply a kind of preparation for human initiated relation.
Here we must highlight the fact that concerning the work of the Spirit, Gunton clearly
delimits the agency which 'openness' through the Spirit implies, to the narrowly defined
realm of the 'personal'. We are then left with an understanding of spirit-enabled relationality
that is largely one-way or uni-directional in character. The reasoning behind such a limitation
is plain. Aware of the Hegelian pitfall we reviewed earlier, Gunton is at pains to make the
point that 'God is spirit, while finite persons have spirit—and things [nonhumans] neither are
nor have spirit'.50 For while humans are free to love and relate to the other in ways that can be
both enslaving and redeeming, the nonhuman creation cannot exercise any such agency in
relationship towards another. We find then, a distinct routing of nonhuman agency in
Gunton's pneumatology. The perichoresis-like action which the Spirit bestows upon persons
- human and divine - merely 'opens' the nonhuman to receiving the person-initiated
relationality. The movement of relationality is distinctly one-way, originating either with God
or human persons. As Gunton insists, the Spirit is not a universal mark of being, but rather
works to quality the realm of persons alone. Again, in maintaining this otherness between
Spirit and world, Gunton is here heading offwhat he sees to be the certain threat of
pantheism. This is why he has often argued that the 'Spirit is better identified in terms of
46
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transcendence than of immanence. The Spirit may be active within the world, but he does not
become identical with any part of the world.'51
But one may ask whether Gunton has offended his own rule when in The One the
Three and the Many he appears to say the precise opposite: 'If both persons and things, for all
their crucial ontological differences, alike receive the shape of their being from the
particularizing Spirit, we can no longer, in the tradition beginning with Descartes, treat matter
as merely the intrinsically meaningless object of our instrumentality, as tends to be the way of
both modernism and late modernism.'52 What are we to make of these clearly contradictory
statements concerning the work of the Spirit? I would suggest that these statements betray an
internal conflict within Gunton's overall pneumatology as it pertains to the creation. As we
have seen, he is greatly concerned to avoid identifying the Spirit or spirit, with the creation in
general. On the other hand, he is also concerned to make the claim that all of created
particulars - personal and non-personal - participate in a universal relationality or
perichoresis. Where Gunton seems to lose his way is in giving some account ofwhat it is that
embodies, maintains, or mediates this universal relationality. Anxious to avoid identifying the
Spirit with non-personal creation universally or as a general field of force, Gunton has left us
only with something of a grey area within his pneumatology. Yet ifwe are to speak on the
balance of Gunton's claims in this matter, we must conclude that on the whole Gunton
understands the Spirit to be most closely associated with human persons who are 'opened out'
by the Spirit to God, other humans, and to the nonhuman creation.
In sum, there is little indication in Gunton's theology of the Spirit that we may be
justified in speaking of the Spirit's work as that of bringing nonhuman/nonpersonal creation
into relation with human persons. The line of agency is always from the human/social sphere
out to the nonhuman/nonsocial sphere. What can be found of the Spirit's work in nonpersonal
creation is more generally attributed to a bringing into relation nonhuman creation and
Godself so as to sustain, perfect, and particularize the creation in direct relation to God.
Hence, the Spirit's mediating role is not found to move from nonpersons to human persons,
but only from nonpersons to the divine persons. Moreover, at the points in Gunton's theology
where one may detect some hint of nonhuman agency being expressed or exercised towards
the human/social realm, we find that this hint of agency is not attributed to the Spirit directly.
Instead, Gunton will attribute this extremely mild form of nonhuman agency to a generally
conceived perichoretic nature amongst all created things. Thus the personal action of the
Spirit is sidelined, and a generally conceived field ofperichoretic relations is introduced in
those very few instances where the nonhuman realm is understood to exert some force upon
human persons.
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There is, perhaps, one hint within Gunton's theology which may suggest this to be a
general rule rather than a universal claim. Or alternatively, it may be that this final example
serves only to further indicate Gunton's own confusion on the topic. This argument aside, in
one further study of the Holy Spirit Gunton argues that 'we must say that whenever the
created order, in any of its levels or aspects, is able to praise its maker, there is the agency of
the Spirit'.53 He does not, however, explain in any deeper sense what is meant by this. One
commentator has taken this to mean that Gunton does see room for non-personal creation's
agency in worshiping the creator.54 Yet judging from Gunton's more directed comments on
the issue I do not take this to be his meaning in this instance. At best this seems to be a
momentary lapse from Gunton's overall understanding of the Spirit's role in worship. As we
will discover in the next and subsequent sections of his chapter, he goes to great lengths to
maintain agency, of any sort, as the sole preserve of those he considers persons - even the
agency expressed in worship.
Spirit, Creation, and the Cultural Mandate
Since we are here concerned primarily with 'horizontal' relations - relations amongst
created beings - we must also address the work of the Spirit within human culture. For
Gunton, human culture consists in 'all the things that human beings do to, with, and in that
created world'.55 Culture is not, for Gunton, merely the symbolic worlds particular to human
beings which many social sciences seek to understand, but rather the intimate interaction of
human beings in and with the non-personal world. Therefore, in speaking of human culture,
Gunton is concerned to highlight the ways in which relationality or mediation exists between
humans and the creation, through the Spirit. Yet once again, we will see that it is a
relationality that is distinctly one-way in character.
In what was perhaps his final reflection on the role of the Spirit within human
commerce with creation, Gunton first makes clear that the effect of sin has not served to route
the Spirit's power within creation. The Spirit, he explains, 'may be affected but is by no
means constrained or constricted by the Fall'.56 Secondly, Gunton seeks to draw-out the many
forms ofworship, which as he argues, represent a communal and cultural interaction with the
material in ways that reenact God's historic acts of creating and redeeming. Worship is then a
form of human culture in which specific forms 'of symbolic actions place human life in
53
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relation to God, human social order and the material world'.57 Certainly we may say that the
Lord's Supper is a paradigmatic example of this spirit-filled worship relating - in a
redemptive way - humans and materiality through the cultural products of the bread and the
wine.
In an attempt to widen our understanding of the Spirit's mediating role in human
creative or cultural activity, Gunton references Paul's account of the role which humans and
human culture plays within the created order as a whole. Gunton sites Romans 8:21, which
sets 'churchly culture' in relation to the material: 'in the hope that the whole creation will be
liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the glorious freedom of the children of
God'. Furthermore, in an interesting passage Gunton questions whether we might be justified
in speaking more generally of the work of human hands being empowered by the Spirit. Here
he draws on other scriptural evidence such as that found in Exodus 31:3-9 where the chief
craftsman of the tabernacle is seen to have been enabled with 'skill, ability and knowledge in
all kinds of crafts...' (Ex. 31:3) by the Spirit ofGod.58 Passages such as these encourage
Gunton to ask whether we are justified in seeking a more general account of human cultural
action - that is, human interaction with the non-personal - being enabled and enlivened by the
Spirit of God. Furthermore, he will argue that this step can be made through the lens of the
'cultural mandate' which is 'the divine command' God has placed on humanity 'to make
something of the world'. For Gunton this represents a 'command so to engage with the
created order as to enable it to join the human species in praise of its creator'.59 To be sure,
this 'cultural mandate' is at the heart of his understanding of that often troublesome passage
from Genesis concerning human dominion over creation - our dominium terrae.
We return to Gunton's understanding of the proper human exercise of dominion as it
is granted to the bearers of the image ofGod later in the chapter. For now we must further
pursue the issues this raises concerning the Spirit's mediation between persons and non-
persons. For instance, does this mean that we are now free to speak of the Spirit as deeply
involved in human artifice amongst the material? Can we speak of the Spirit in terms of
human cultural practices such as the arts, technology, scientific practice, architecture, or even
city planning? It appears that for Gunton the answer is a qualified yes, ifwe speak of the
action of the Spirit in the more general terms of creatureiy perichoresis. We will recall from
the first chapter that Gunton finds perichoresis - a term we know only from reflecting on the
Trinitarian being of God - to be a transcendental mark of all being. We will also remember
'that perichoresis, properly understood, is the foe, not the agent, of homogeneity. Both things
and relations are various, just as the Father, Son and Spirit are personally distinct and
1U1U., p. iUl.
58 Ibid.
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constituted so by the form of their relatedness.'60 And when applying the concept of
perichoresis to the created world, we must do so in the carefully qualified and analogical style
we reviewed in Gunton's discussions of the immanent and economic trinities in the first
chapter.
In an interesting example of this taken from The One the Three and the Many, Gunton
actually speaks ofperichoretic relations taking place within our culture's deep attachment to
one of the 20th century's most widely embraced technologies - the motor car. Our car-
enthralled culture has evolved to such a degree that we now find the 'motor car shapes our
relations with each other and the world for good and ill and in all dimensions of our being'.61
The relationships which have developed around this technology have grown into a many-
sided social, cultural, and environmental matrix that is reciprocating in nature. The car has
radically reshaped city planning, social habits and conventions, and even personal being.
Therefore we can find within this socio-material dynamic a mutual constitution of people,
society, technology, and even environmental change in something approaching reciprocal
fashion. Gunton concludes with the interesting comment that the automobile is then 'a symbol
of our perichoresis for both good and ill with each other and the world: with the way in which
all things are what they are in relations ofmutual constitutiveness with all other things.'62
This general concept of a perichoresis of all things, will be very important once we
turn to consider the mediations and translations which Latour traces through the practice of
the sciences. But for now we may conclude this section on the mediation of the Spirit by
reiterating that it is through the Spirit that all things are perfected - that is, related back to
God through Christ. Yet we must also remember that for Gunton, non-personal entities do not
have spirit but they may be shaped by human hands, offered in worship, and further perfected,
through the hands of Spirit-enlivened persons. This for Gunton is the 'cultural mandate'
which all humans share in. It is through human activity in the arts, sciences, and other cultural
endeavors that the non-personal creation may be brought up into the broader process of
human life and 'be offered to the Father in Christ and through the Spirit'.63 We have also seen
in this single, and largely uncharacteristic, example of the motor-car, that Gunton attributes
any reciprocation in relation which would suggest a diminished form of agency on behalf of a
nonhuman entity (the motor-car) to our mutual submersion in perichoretic relationality. What
is to be highlighted in this is the fact that this relationality - a seemingly multidirectional
relationality - is not attributed to the Spirit, but rather, to a generally conceived relational and
perichoretic fabric.
60 Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, p. 172.






We have seen that in Gunton's theology of the Spirit there is no nature which holds
its own being and telos outside of its relation to the Creator. And whereas it is the Spirit who
is seen to be the agent of the perfecting of creation, it is through Christ that the creation is
held together: 'he is its principle of immanence, the person through whom all things came to
be, in whom they hold together and to whom they are directed'.64 Therefore, we must also
seek out the incarnational dimension ofmediation ifwe are to avoid the pitfall ofHegel. A
truly trinitarian account will follow Irenaeus by seeking to establish mediation through both
'hands' ofGod, the Son and the Spirit. Thus we must now follow Gunton's recognition that a
theology of the Spirit can only be explored 'through the lens provided by Jesus Christ'.65 The
reason for this is to be found in the fact that it was the incarnation ofChrist which initiated the
redemption and reconciliation of 'all things'. Yet Gunton is at pains to make clear that the
'Word who became man' did so 'first for human salvation and only after that for the
reconciliation of all things' - that is, the non-personal creation.66 In this section we are
concerned with elucidating something of Jesus' horizontal relationality within the created
order. This is not to neglect the 'vertical' relations ofChrist since neither the 'vertical' nor the
'horizontal' can be taken in abstraction from one another.67 Moreover, we have already, in
chapter 1, reviewed Gunton's understanding of Christ's 'vertical' relationality as expressed in
his debate with Robert Jenson. And now in our effort to elucidate these 'horizontal' relations
we will draw primarily from Gunton's Christ and Creation, a book which is hailed by many
as perhaps his best effort.
In this book Gunton argues that Christology, properly conceived, must be buttressed
more fully by the place of the Holy Spirit in Jesus' humanity than theologians such as Karl
Barth were able to maintain. Thus we will come to see once again that it is somewhat artificial
to speak ofChrist and Spirit in abstraction from one another - although we have tried, to
some degree, to do that here in the interest of clarity. The relation between Holy Spirit and
Christ is to be found in this: 'The distinctive work of the Spirit is, through Christ, to perfect
the creation. The function of the Spirit in relation to Jesus is, accordingly, as the perfector of
his humanity.'68 According to Gunton, a conception such as this helps to prevent the Western
tendency to diminish both the Spirit and the humanity of Jesus, by making particular
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reference to their mutual trinitarian being. Ifwe are able to maintain the humanity of Christ
through reference to the perfecting action of the Spirit we are much better able to avoid this
Western pitfall. Moreover, it encourages the view that Christ's saving action, while still fully
divine, is carried out within created time and space as a truly human being, thus avoiding the
Arian heresy.
Incarnation and the Human Directedness ofCreation
The humanity of Christ, perfected and particularized through the Spirit, is very
instructive for our task of outlining the horizontal relationality which the incarnation affected
amongst the creation. By maintaining the humanity of Jesus, along side his divinity, we are
enabled to find continuity between our own human relationality and that of the second Adam:
he is, as Gunton says, 'indeed part of the created order, and although his humanity is that of
the Son, it is no less than ours part of the general network of relationality of created being—
and that means being on the way to dissolution in meaninglessness'.69 That creation has been
impacted by human sin is central to the incarnation and subsequent atonement and
redemption. As Gunton argues, the creation is in need of redemption due to the loss of
integrity which the fall initiated amongst all creation. He uses the metaphor of 'pollution' to
capture the breakdown in vertical and horizontal relations which has engendered
disorientation within the networks of created relationality. And since the fall was the result of
human sin, it is 'appropriate that the first fruits of redemption should be the free, obedient and
loving self-offering of this true human life to God the Father'.70 Thus to understand the Son's
work amongst the fallen networks of created relationality we must first establish his
continuity with the creation, as well as his obedience to the Father through the Spirit.
But are we justified in claiming that the work of Christ is truly cosmic in its reach, or
are we to limit its redemptive impact to the personal-human sphere alone? It is on this note
that Gunton highlights the hidden virtues of the anthropocentric outlook we found earlier in
his understanding of the 'cultural mandate'. By understanding Christ's work of redemption as
directed towards personal-humanity in the first instance, and towards non-personal creation in
the second, we remind ourselves that it is we humans who are at the center of the creation's
'pollution' problem. Moreover, as the Word became incarnate, he did so as a distinctly human
being for the reconstitution of all created being. What is to be avoided, Gunton insists, 'is not
all anthropocentrism, but the tearing apart of creation and redemption, so that redemption
comes to appear to consist in salvation out of and apart from the rest of the world'.71 We then
find that it is the personal-human creation that is at the center of God's redemptive action






within the world. Gunton will argue further that 'Creation is represented before God first by
Christ and then, in dependence upon him, by us'.72 We are then justified in understanding
something of a 'cosmic Christ', but this is meaningless if not tempered with the centrality of
human persons - as Gunton says, the non-personal is 'peripheral' to God's overall action in
the world.73
We will find in this a clear continuity with Gunton's theology of the Spirit where it
was learned that only human-persons have the perfecting and particularizing spirit, whilst
non-persons participate in the work of the spirit through human-initiated action. Therefore,
Gunton will write: 'God the Father through his Spirit shapes this representative sample of the
natural world [humanity] for the sake of the remainder of it.'74 The point is one which
embraces the christological and eschatological dimensions of the Sprit's work. It is
christological because it is here that we find the incarnation as representative of the Father's
use of the creation through the Spirit to form the flesh of the Redeemer. This is a point which,
for Gunton, affirms the special status of the human creation as we reflect the image ofGod
throughout all of creation. And it is eschatological on the basis that wherever the Spirit is
found, there the true telos of creation is present. Gunton might summarize thusly: 'It is Christ
to whom all creation moves, and therefore to Christ that the Spirit directs his eschatological
work.. .The action of the Spirit is distinct but not separate from that of the Son, for he brings
the creation to the Father through the Son.'75
Horizontal Relations andResurrection
What is clear for Gunton is that the man Jesus was both fully divine and fully human,
and being human, he took upon himself the materiality of a creature. To be a human creature
also implicates a number of 'horizontal' relations which maintain us in our particularly human
personhood. 'To be a creature', Gunton argues, 'is to be constituted by, and to constitute,
other finite beings existing in time and space.'76 Christology must therefore take materiality
very seriously. And to his great credit, this is a point which Gunton is rather occupied with
giving its full justice. He highlights the fact that as a human person, Jesus would be
constituted through relations of a social (personal) kind as well as through a web of relations
with the non-personal world.
For Gunton there is no other event which more dramatically belonged to Jesus'
horizontal relationality than his resurrection, whereas the ascension belongs most fully to his
72 Ibid., p. 34.
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'vertical' relations.77 To be clear, we see here that Gunton finds the resurrection to entail the
immanence ofChrist, whilst the ascension should move us towards his transcendence. It was,
in fact, the horizontal (immanent) relations which were to bring about his death. Furthermore,
we may understand that his relations with certain groups of people, individuals, and the
material world as a whole, were what made him who he was and directed the events of his life
and ultimate death. 'In that respect', Gunton explains, 'Jesus was as we are, a creature in
relations of'horizontal' reciprocal constitution with other people and the world.'78
For all of our similarities and continuities with the man Jesus, there remain some
important differences. To begin with, Gunton makes it clear that the quality of Jesus'
relationality, both vertical and horizontal, is very different to our own. As we are now
speaking to the horizontal relationality of Jesus', we may certainly conclude that his
relationship to the world is different in the sense of being ultimately redemptive. 'As bound
up with the world as any other human being, he is yet its Lord and redeemer, recalling it from
its bondage to decay so that it may participate in its true directedness.'79 And closely related
to this is the fact that in the resurrection of Jesus, we find his relationality to be both
redemptive and universal. We do not mean to suggest something of a 'cosmic Christ' by
using the term 'universal' in this instance. Rather, it is a term used to indicate that through his
resurrection, the 'horizontal' relations of the risen Jesus are 'brought into some kind of a
constitutive relation with all creation.'80 Through his resurrection there is also pronounced
and 'eschatological judgment on all things' which carries distinctly ontological repercussions.
What follows, Gunton claims, is a transformation of the flesh of Jesus 'into the conditions of
the age to come', thereby bringing about the restoration of the cosmos.81 It is after the
resurrection that creation achieves its destiny in its being 'gathered to him' through the Spirit.
This is in the first instance the redemption of the human creation, but involves other
things in its relationality. As we have seen, we humans are the centre of the world's
problems, and only by our redirection will the whole creation be set free.82
It is then through the resurrection of Christ's material body that he is made the 'first fruits' or
'the first born among many' (Rom 8:29), through which the remainder of creation may be
brought into a perfected redemption. But according to Gunton, it is those who were created in
the image of God who are the first to be moved by the Spirit into a new ontological perfection
within the risen Jesus.
In this we find that it is not only the resurrection we must speak of but also of the
ascension. For it is in this event that the resurrection is completed through the taking up of
77 Ibid., p. 60.
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Christ and the opening of a new relation between heaven and earth. It is in this way that
Christ - through whom the world was created - comes into relation with the world in space
and time to redeem the complex networks of relationality that had been so impacted by the
fall. By taking up spatial and temporal form through the Son and Spirit, creation has been
reordered towards God. In the telling words of Gunton: 'It is not therefore something which
holds things together, but someone: the one through whom, in the unity of the Father and the
Spirit, all things have their being.'83
As a concluding point on this section concerning Gunton's vision ofmediation, we
may now try to summarize the meaning, or the significance, of the Son and the Spirit in terms
of our creaturely space and time. The important points to be made here have been implicit in
all that we have now reviewed in Gunton's trinitarian theology of creation and culture. What
the incarnation ofChrist, and his subsequent death, resurrection and ascension - all
particularized, perfected, and empowered through the Spirit - has accomplished is nothing
less than the complete reordering of all creaturely reality. Moreover, by approaching the
incarnation within a trinitarian frame of understanding - as the patristic Fathers did so long
ago - we come to see that the mediating and redeeming work of Son and Spirit will have both
a 'vertical' and 'horizontal' impact on space-time. In the 'vertical' trajectory a trinitarian
understanding of the incarnation will reveal that space and time are not containers, as the
ancients believed, where God is banished to an unreachable transcendence. But as Thomas
Torrance has illustrated, a trinitarian understanding of the incarnation allows us, as it did the
Fathers, to envision a relational dynamic between God and world where the distinct being of
each is in no way threatened.84
Secondly we may consider the 'horizontal' space-time implications of the
incarnation. As Gunton explains; 'What is realized in the incarnate involvement of the Son in
time and space is the redirection of the creation to its original destiny, a destiny that was from
the beginning in Christ, for all creation is through and to the Son.'85 Thus it is through God's
'two hands' that space and time are affirmed and set on the path ofultimate redemption and
reconciliation to the One from whom it originated. As the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' relations
most clearly intersect in the Son we may conclude with the realization that it is through the
incarnation, again conceived in trinitarian fashion, that we may understand the world as
ultimately real. Without a trinitarian understanding of creation, as reveled in the incarnation,
we would ultimately collapse either into an idealism, where the world amounts to little more
than a collective projection, or into a world-denying pantheism. 'It is because God the Father
83
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creates through the Son and the Spirit, his two hands.. .that we can conceive a world that is
both real in itself, and yet only itself in relation to its creator.'86
III.B Latour on Mediation, Actancy, and Networking
We will remember from the previous chapter that Latour locates the power of the
moderns in their constitutional guarantees, the first two of which rendered the towering
Subjects and Objects into polemic opposition. The third guarantee of the modem Constitution
served to render the work ofmediation and hybridization between the two dichotomized poles
completely opaque. The outcome for modernity was that quasi-objects, hybrids, and the
networks which exist amongst the collective were rendered invisible and unrepresentable. Yet
we also learned that this lack of representation did not limit the continuance ofmediation and
hybridization. In fact, modernity served to dramatically increase the work ofmediation and
hybridization amongst the collective, all the while denying that such a mediation was taking
place. This is, as we have seen, why Latour can make the claim that 'we have never been
modem' - we have never ceased to multiply more and more hybrid networks of quasi-objects.
Therefore, it is by way of a nonmodem constitution that Latour intends to shine light into the
abandoned 'middle kingdom' which the modem Constitution fought so hard to keep black-
boxed. By replacing Subjects and Objects with the nonmodem pairing of humans and
nonhumans, Latour intends to show how they can now 'exchange properties, in order to
compose in common the raw material of the collective'. By seeking out the heterogeneous
networks of humans and nonhumans we will again 'make it possible to fill up the collective
with beings endowed with will, freedom, speech, and real existence'.87 In this section we take
up the task of elucidating the ways in which Latour finds a dynamic mediation taking place
between humans and their nonhuman counterparts. In this we will certainly find points of
convergence and divergence with the account ofmediation we found in Gunton. But as we
might expect, Latour's accounting is much less concerned with matters theological.
We may begin this exercise by asking of Latour what is meant in his discourse by the
term 'mediationas there are some important differences to be found between his usage and
that ofGunton who is more apt to use the term 'relation' when considering what he calls
'horizontal' relations. It is perhaps best to begin by locating the work ofmediation - the term
work here serves to communicate the dynamism ofmediation, rather than static qualities.
First, we can locate the work ofmediation in the practice of the sciences, both 'natural' and
'social'. As Latour explains;
The active locus of science, portrayed in the past by stressing its two extremities, the
Mind and the World, has shifted to the middle ground, to the humble instruments,
86 Ibid., p. 75.
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tools, visualizations skills, writing practices, focusing techniques, and what has been
called "re-presentation". Through all these efforts, the mediation has eaten up two
extremities: the representing Mind and the represented World.88
Immediately we find that, for Latour, mediations sit at the very heart ofwhat the modem
Constitution strived to obscure. Moreover, we find that mediations are often material,
technical, or inscriptive, but never are they merely cold objects or purified subjects.
Mediations as we will see, are what 'vascularize' the nonmodern collective. Here the sciences
will no longer seek to obscure the mediations which are their lifeblood, but rather, seek the
multiplication ofmediators.
Secondly, mediators are never to be understood as simple intermediaries that transmit
pure forms ofNature or Society. Therefore, in the interest of highlighting the meaning of
mediation, Latour will often contrast it to the work of an intermediary. Blind to tme
mediations, modems saw only intermediaries that were always fully defined by what caused
them, in a fashion similar to the dialectics ofMarx or Hegel. In these systems of thought there
is much said ofmediations between Nature and Society, or Nature and Spirit, 'yet the
countless mediations with which it peoples its grandiose history are only intermediaries that
transmit pure ontological qualities'.89 In the end, intermediaries simply transfer the modem
Constitutional guarantee of a purified Nature and Society - that is, they simply transport
energy from one of the two purified poles. Thus intermediaries in the modem mode leave us
with a hybridity that is no more than the mixture of two ontologically purified forms. Or as
Latour explains, when confronted with a hybrid the modem thinker would first determine the
intermediaries, then beginning from the poles of the modem 'yardstick', would then work
their way towards the middle - 'the place of the phenomena in Kant's great narrative'.90 It
was in this way that the modems would deny tme mediation by then seeking out which parts
were Social/subjective and which were Natural/objective. The end result is much less
mediation than it is fragmentation. Mediation, as we will see, is far more ontologically radical
than the mere intermediaries of the modem Constitution.
Whereas intermediaries are fully defined by their causes, mediations always exceed
their conditions, their inputs and outputs.91 They will instead carry what Latourwill call
'variable ontologies', not merely social nor merely natural, they cannot be understood
asymmetrically. Following Latour we shall turn to the example of Boyle's air pump once
again. A common historical evaluation of the Boyle-Hobbes controversy would have little
interest in the pump itself 'except to make it emerge miraculously from the Heaven of Ideas to
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establish their chronology'.92 In the modern settlement there is little of any 'historicity of
things', only humans were seen to populate the realm of history. Therefore, scientist and
epistemologists who study the controversy 'will describe the physics of the vacuum without
paying the slightest attention to England, or even to Boyle'.93 The first evaluation will
ultimately produce English society (the left pole) as the determining factor; the latter will
offer the indelible 'Laws ofNature' (the right pole) as the determining factor. Only by tracing
the intermediaries of pump, Royal Society, witnesses, feathers, and leaky seals, are we to
reconnect the two poles which the moderns dichotomized. Here in the modern mode we will
notice that there is no variable ontology. 'To explain our air pump, we simply plunged a hand
alternately either into the urn that contains for all eternity the beings ofNature, or into the one
that contains the sempiternal mainsprings of the social world.'94 The intermediaries of this
story simply transport energy from one of the two ontological categories that carry any weight
in the modem schema.
A nonmodern evaluation, as we have seen, must act symmetrically and begin in the
middle with the mediations and mediators themselves. This will necessarily involve an
abandonment of the two powers at the dichotomized poles. Nature and Society are no longer
the basis of explanation that never required explanation or justification in themselves. Instead;
Nature will emerge altered from Boyle's laboratory, and so will English society; but
Boyle and Hobbes will also change in the same degree. Such metamorphoses are
incomprehensible if only two beings, Nature and Society have existed since time
immemorial, or if the first remains eternal while the second is stirred up by history.
These metamorphoses become explicable, on the contrary, if we redistribute essence
to all the entities that make up history. 95
Yet in doing this, as Latour insists, we will discover that the intermediaries are much more
than that - they are in fact mediators. They are 'actors endowed with the capacity to translate
what they transport, to redefine it, redeploy it, and also to betray it'.96 In doing this we add
history to once Natural things, thereby making them truly contingent.
Actancy and TechnologicalMediation
It would be very difficult to fully understand the Latourian concept ofmediation
without speaking equally to the issue of nonhuman agency (or actancy) as well. And ifwe are
to do this effectively we must now seek to outline one of Latour's most successful
methodological offspring. At the beginning of chapter two we eluded to the important
'academic style' which Latour andMichel Callon are credited with inspiring through their
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nonmodern thinking. Actor-Network Theory (ANT), as it was originally termed, grew out the
desire to capture a nonmodem notion ofmediation and generalized symmetry within - to
begin with - sociological theory.97 The ANT approach(s) has now grown to colonize sub-
fields in many disciplines including anthropology, economics, history, technology studies,
feminist studies, and human geography to name just a few. In the next chapter we will look
more deeply at the spatial and temporal aspects of the actor-network by studying the adoption
ofANT amongst human geographers. But here we are concerned to offer only a general
outline of the ANT 'style' and its appreciation of heterogeneity, networks,
performance/practice and the material mediations which exist amongst the collective
(parliament of things).
Actor-network theory is very closely akin to Latour's nonmodem project as whole.
As John Law has explained, ANT 'is a ruthless application of semiotics. It tells that entities
take their form and acquire their attributes as a result of their relations with other entities.'98
Essentially all apriori ontological distinctions are done away with - subjects/objects,
structure/agency, knowledge/belief. In ANT, as it is with Latour's work as whole, essences,
ontologies, divisions, distinctions, and even agency are always the result ofwork, practice,
relations and actions that are mediated along heterogeneous associations. Never are ontologies
and divisions to be found given in a 'state of nature', or 'in the order of things'. Instead,
ontologies within the ANT framework can only be outlined once the materially heterogeneous
networks of relationality have been traced through the space-time which they produce - the
focus of chapter four. This is what Law and others have called the 'relational materiality' or
the 'semiotics ofmateriality' of the ANT approach(s). Again, according to Law; '[ANT] takes
the semiotic insight, that of the relationality of entities, the notion that they are produced in
relations, and applies this ruthlessly to all the materials—and not simply to those that are
linguistic.''99 This is, in sum, the generalized principle of symmetry realized in methodological
practice. The outcome allows ANT theorists 'not to alternate between natural realism and
social realism but to obtain nature and society as twin results of another activity, one that is
more interesting' - namely the building of heterogeneous networks ofmediators.100
Once we have thrown away the Kantian 'yardstick' new possibilities of action are
unlocked from the Subject sphere and redistributed throughout the heterogeneous networks of
97 Latour has recently suggested that the name Actor-Network Theory is misleading on many levels and
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mediators who are always more-than human. By following the practices of the sciences -
'science in action' - the ANT theorist is no longer limited to assigning agency to 'humans-
amongst-themselves' alone, but also to the nonhumans who mediate and actually 'exchange
properties' with humans within the tangle of networks. As Latour argues; 'Once we enter the
realm of engineers and craftsmen, no unmediated action is possible.'101 Yet this requires a
very different understanding of techniques than has been allowed in the modern Constitution
which was far too concerned with sorting techniques and artifacts into the object pole of the
dichotomy. Therefore, Latour suggests four ways in which techniques should be understood
within the ANT or nonmodern perspectives.
First, Latour will insist that we define 'technical action as the form of delegation that
allows us to mobilize in an interaction movements which have been executed earlier, farther
away, and by other actanA' - a term we will describe in more detail below - 'as though they
are still present and available to us now'.102 There are, perhaps, two further points that we
may draw from this. We see here that technical action makes present other actants who are
now absent. The actions of another have been made durable through time and space. Again,
the space-times which ANT draws from this understanding of 'sociotechnical' networks will
be the focus of the next chapter. But secondly, this suggests that without technical action and
its artifacts - its things - human society would be on its own. Without all of these nonhumans
populating our collective and mediating relations and actions from far away in space and
time, we would be limited to pure social interaction. This point is a critical one and will be the
focus of the next section, where we briefly discuss Latour's 'missing masses' and simian
societies.
Secondly, Latour's understanding of technical action will require the rejection of the
traditional Homo faber view of human technical practice. The traditional view understood
technical action 'as the imposition of a form consciously planned in advance onto some
shapeless matter'. But as Latour argues, this 'should be replaced by a much more oblique,
although more accurate, definition' of technical action 'as the socialization of non-humans'.103
Therefore, it is not the case that humans have, through techniques, some kind of unmediated
access to a nature that is 'outside' of us and is wholly passive to our action. Holding to such a
fictional notion would only serve to reproduce the 'great divide' which the Enlightenment had
cemented into the modern Constitution.
Third, Latour is interested in challenging the traditional Homo faber myth which
understood humans to be in complete control of the objects of their design. Instead, he argues
101
Latour, Pandora's Hope, p. 175.
102
Latour, "Pragmatogonies: a mythical account of how humans and nonhumans swap properties,"
American Behavioural Scientist 37 (1994), p. 792. (emphasis added)
103 Ibid.
147
that we must seek out the ways in which an exchange ofhuman and nonhumanproperties
takes place in the midst of technical action. If this is fully accomplished we will be much
closer to achieving the comparative anthropology which was sought in the last chapter. This
claim is based on the realization that once we highlight and trace the heterogeneous networks
which proliferated under the modern Constitution's radar, we may then begin to compare
modern collectives and traditional (nonmodern or premodern) collectives. This is impossible
as long as we continue to posit a 'great divide' between humans-among-themselves (Society)
and things-among-themselves (Nature).
The fourth dimension of re-conceiving technical action in nonmodern terms has to do
with a redefinition ofwhat it is that constitutes sociality altogether. But this is a much larger
topic which deserves its own section below. For now, let us seek only to gain a deeper
understanding of two of Latour's major arguments on this topic of technical mediation. First
we will seek to better grasp his proposition that it is through technological action that humans
and nonhumans exchange properties. Secondly, we will seek to better outline his
understanding ofwhat constitutes nonhuman actancy.
Exchanging Properties amongstHumans andNonhumans
Ifwe are to witness the 'swapping' or the 'folding' of properties between humans and
nonhumans, as Latour maintains, we must abandon our apriori definitions of subjects and
objects. Again, this is the generalized principle of symmetry in action, where we begin in the
middle and 'under' the Kantian 'yardstick', seeking instead to begin with the mediations and
networks themselves. Thus we must abandon the 'civil war' of the modern's Subjects and
Objects and instead seek out the exchange of properties amongst humans and nonhumans. In
Pandora's Hope, Latour uses the American 'gun rights' debate to form his case study
concerning the exchange of human and nonhuman properties.
The argument takes its form in the opposing views of gun ownership advocates the
NRA (National Rifle Association) and those of the gun control advocates who want strict
laws limiting gun ownership. As the advocates of gun control cry; 'Guns kill people', the
NRA cries in return; 'Guns don't kill people; people kill people'.104 Latour breaks this
impasse down into materialist and sociological positions. The advocates of gun control are
offering a materialist account; good citizens can be transformed into something else by
simply carrying this material artifact - the gun. But the NRA advocate is offering a
sociological account; the gun does nothing in itself, it is simply a tool which neutrally
mediates the will of its human carrier.105 In the materialist account both human and nonhuman
are seen to be actors/actants within the drama. The material artifact actually adds something
104
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into the interaction - an innocent citizen can become, or is transformed into, a criminal.
'Materialists thus make the intriguing suggestion that our qualities as subjects, our
competences, our personalities, depend on what we hold in our hands.'106 However, the NRA
advocate cannot be so bold as to claim that the gun plays no part within this drama. Instead
they will offer a moralist account. The gun does not change the moral state of the person
holding the gun, but rather makes an already corrupt or decent person more efficient at
carrying out the task of killing or incapacitating. 'Thus the NRA sociologists make the
troubling suggestion that we can master techniques, that techniques are nothing more than
pliable and diligent slaves.'107
Who then is responsible for the act of killing? Does the gun add anything more to the
act of killing other than pure efficiency? Is the gun a pure technological mediator of an always
human agency? Once again, Latour will seek to answer these questions symmetrically. In
doing this we must not seek out apriori agencies in human and nonhuman participants.
Instead we must treat both the human and the gun as potential actors within the drama. In this
way we are able to speak of the way in which aprogram ofaction comes up against some
form of interference (an anti-program). As Latour cites in the glossary to Pandora's Hope,
these are:
Terms from the sociology of technology which have been used to give technical
artifacts their active and often polemical character. Each device anticipates what other
actors, humans or nonhumans, may do (programs of action), but these anticipated
actions may not occur because those other actors have different programs—anti-
programs from the point of view of the first actor. Hence the artifact becomes the
frontline of a controversy between programs and anti-programs. 108
We then have Agent 1 (our human) who has its own goal - perhaps to survive a potentially
violent altercation lawfully, or to make an unlawful killing more efficient. To do this Agent 1
falls back on Agent 2 'and enlists the gun or is enlisted by it—it does not matter which—and
a third agent emerges from the fusion of the other two'.109
What do we call this third agent? Is it a 'gun-man', a 'man-gun'? And how might the
materialist and sociological accounts hold? Here Latour argues that for the NRA's
sociological account to succeed Agent l's program of action (its goal to be a good citizen)
would have to meet Agent 2's program of action (the gun's goal to be fired) thereby creating
a third agent (Agent 3, the gun-man) and survive this interference without straying form the
original goal to be a good citizen. Here the gun is merely an intermediary, a tool dominated
by human action."0 But ifAgent 3 (the gun-man) were to drift from its original goal (to be a
ibid.







good citizen) and adopts a new goal by the persuasion ofAgent 2 (the 'gun's intent, the gun's
will, the gun's script') then the materialist account holds. Here it 'is human action that is no
more than an intermediary' of the gun's program of action."1
A symmetrical account will allow us a third possibility which Latour argues is the
more commonly realized of the options. This is the creation of a new third goal (program of
action) which does not belong to either Agent 1 or Agent 2 alone. Whereas the materialist
would have us believe in the force of the gun's agency, the sociologist would have us believe
in the predominance of human agency. But what if the agency we are dealing with is a
composite: 'a citizen-gun, a gun-citizen'? Here we are left with a very different picture where
essences are not yet determined. As Latour argues:
Ifwe try to comprehend techniques while assuming that the psychological capacity of
humans is forever fixed, we will not succeed in understanding how techniques are
created nor even how they are used. You are a different person with the gun in your
hand.112
What we are here witnessing is a truly symmetrical and relational ontology. Both human and
nonhuman agents are modified by the encounter. The human is different with the gun in hand
just as the gun is different by means of being embraced by the human. Moreover, what is tme
of the human is similarly true of the nonhuman. Whereas materialists and sociologists
approached this interaction with apriori essences with which the world must comply, ANT
will seek out the technical mediations, articulations, and hybridizations which the encounter
ofmultiple programs of action produces. The goals ofboth humans and nonhumans are never
fixed. In sum: 'We must learn to attribute—redistribute—actions to many more
agents.. .Agents can be human or (like the gun) nonhuman, and each can have goals (or
functions, as engineers prefer to say)'.113 In the end we find that for Latour, agency can be
shared. Neither guns nor people kill on their own, but rather it is the 'citizen-gun' that kills.114
Latour has offered us a rather different philosophy of technology than the tradition
has allowed. Techniques, artifacts, and objects are no longer to be located in a purified realm
of 'abject objects'. Nor are these nonhumans to be considered the mere blank screens for
human projections and 'social constructions'. It is for this reason that Latour will suggest that
we leave behind the nouns 'technique' and 'technology' and instead employ the more
dynamic adjective 'technical'.115 The intention here is to lift us out of the 'legendary
kingdom' where subjects stare across a deep divide at objects of their own making. Instead we
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now have a situation where there is 'no sense in which humans may be said to exist as
humans without entering into commerce with what authorizes and enables them to exist (that
is, to act)'.116 But we also find in this a concerted refusal to distinguish between ancient
techniques (Heidegger's beloved poesis of the artisans) and the more modern (broad-scale,
inhuman, domineering) technologies. As Latour insists; 'The distinction was never more than
a prejudice.'117
Nonhuman Actancy
We have just seen how Latour seeks to diminish the polemically opposed subject and
object by redistributing agential characteristics through witnessing the dynamics of practice. It
was in this way that subjects and objects cease to fight their 'civil war' and become the far
less polemical humans and nonhumans. Yet there remains the tricky question concerning
what appears to be a common sense objection. Returning to our gun example above, one
might protest that it is still a distinctly human agency which is the predominant force.
Humans fabricate guns, pick them up, pull the trigger, and lock them away. Humans make
computers, phones, cars, and staplers, but none of these nonhumans has been known to make
a human. Therefore, it is argued that our analysis should be, according to common sense,
strictly asymmetrical rather than symmetrical.
But this, Latour argues, misses the point entirely. Certainly we have in the above
story begun with a human actor, but this prime mover encounters a second actor and the
combination of the two together produce a new 'distributed, and nested series of practices
whose sum may be possible to add up but only ifwe respect the mediating role of all the
actants mobilized in the series'.118 We might ask ourselves if it would have been possible for
the human actor to kill without the intervention of the gun. Perhaps, but this would have been
a very different action all together. Instead we must ask who are the actors here composing
this new program of action? The answer comes: 'Action is a property of associated
entities.'119 Even ifwe are to identify the human as the prime mover in this series of nested
sub-programs, in no way does this weaken the claim that it is a composition of entities whose
actancy enabled this final program of action. Rarely, if ever, do we find humans acting on
their own. It is only through and association of actants that agency is realized.120
Finally, we have now been using the term actant for some time now, and I would
like to conclude this section by briefly speaking to its evolution within science studies. Early
in its academic life ANT began to speak of nonhumans possessing a form of 'agency' which
116 Ibid., p. 192. (brackets in the original)
117 Ibid., p 194.





the modern Constitution was so incapable of recognizing. But concern would later grow
amongst ANT theorists that the term 'agency' was too loaded a term to be useful when
speaking of nonhumans. Thus it has been widely suggested, by Latour and others, that the
terms 'actant' and 'actancy' should be preferred since these lack the anthropomorphic
undertones of the term 'agency'. Moreover, the term also avoids the traditional underpinnings
of the always human interpretation of 'agency' which included qualities like consciousness,
self-awareness, rationality, language, etc. It is certainly not the goal ofANT theorists to
extend characteristics such as these to the nonhuman actant. Instead, the term actant refers to
performances that are simply not the sole preserve of humans.
The MaterialMediation ofSociety
Finally, we must outline the impact that this nonmodern understanding ofmediation
between humans and nonhumans will have on social theory as a whole. In the traditional
Durkheimian interpretation, Latour argues that society was understood to be something which
preceded individual action and lasted much longer than any single interaction. Society was
then thought to be the external corporate body which dominated and defined us as subjects. In
fact, society proves to be so transcendent that it becomes 'more real than ourselves'.121 Here
society is built upon the back of countless interactions which continuously work to repair and
maintain the social fabric. But as Latour will argue, Durkheim has offered only a tautology -
society is the primitive sui generis order that has only itself to maintain it, to 'socially
construct' itself over and over.122 Yet we must ask, once again, what shape does 'society' take
in a symmetrical, hybrid, nonmodern, or collective world? What is it that lends stability to
social interactions if it is not a sui generis social transcendence?
On this point Latour instructs us to seek out the 'missing masses' - the dark-matter of
our social fabric. These are the countless constellations of nonhumans which mediate and
stabilize social interactions amongst the collective. To further elucidate something of the
shape of human and nonhuman sociality within collectives, Latour will often take his readers
into the world of simian societies. These 'almost human' societies, as sociobologist Shirley
Strum will sometimes call them, are surprisingly rich and complicated. And now that some of
the controversy surrounding the field of sociobiology is beginning to simmer down, Latour
has argued that there is an enormous amount that can be gleaned for social theory by seeking
to better understand these fascinating simian societies.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of simian societies - at least for social theorists -
is their almost total lack of technical action and language. This opens the door for a
fascinating study of 'pure' social interaction - a 'paradise of interactionism'. As Latour has
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suggested, for social interactions to take place the sociological literature has always
presupposed a few constitutive elements. First, there must be at least two actors co-present to
one another. Second, they must be linked by some kind of communicative behavior. And
finally, the behavior of each agent must react, evolve, and be modified by the behavior of the
other in a way that is in some ways unpredictable. In other words, the emergent behaviors
must be 'more than the sum of the competencies in use by the actors before this
interaction'.123
Now, what makes simian societies a 'paradise of interactionism' is the fact that the
social order is a continuous project of immediate interactions that produces no 'totalizing or
structurating effects'.124 Social cohesion in a simian society has nothing to make it relatively
permanent or durable through time and space other than 'pure' social interaction. As Latour
explains:
For all behavior patterns that presuppose some totalization, primates other than
humans have to conduct a series of trials, that need to be ever again begun anew in
order to ensure the duration of collective effects. Deciding the direction to be
followed by the troop, for example, presupposes an evaluation of the movements of
all by all, whence emerges, at the beginning of the day, an order that no one member
has given, and that none can claim as their own. 125
We then see that simian society exists on the pure and repeated face-to-face interactions
amongst members. But is there any form ofmediation taking place? Yes, but it is a mediation
that is carried out by partners. And more importantly, each actor within the society must on a
continuous basis compose for themselves the overall social totality ofwhich they are a part.
Unlike humans, simians 'only have their bodies with which to compose the social, only their
vigilance and the active engagement of their memory to "hold" relationships together'.126
What this tends to suggest concerning 'human societies' - as this is still a problematic
term - is that there is something which adds durability, through time and space, to our human
sociality that is not present in simian societies. Moreover, human sociality is far more
dislocated, 'globalized', than the always local immediacy of simian societies. But what is it
that makes our 'societies' durable over space and through time? Or asked in the old dualistic
framework of sociology; how is structure maintained in the face of all these individual
agents? The social structuralist will argue that it is some kind ofsui generis society which is
then 'manifested' through human interactions.127 But as we have already seen, human social
life must depend on something other than the social world itself, otherwise we are left only
with the Durkheimian tautology. Others have argued that durability is to be found in the
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human capacity for symbolism. These mental projections, it is thought, span the void and take
the place of something which is absent. Thus it is through the allusion to a symbolic presence
of structure that society is made durable. Simians, it is supposed, are unable to grasp the
symbolic and thus rely on pure social immediacy. Yet Latour will ask; 'How could a brain
alone stabilize that which bodies cannot?'128
Social durability will instead require something which enables complicated sociality
to extend, shift time frames, shift spacings, and effectively go beyond the here and now. Thus
as Latour will repeatedly suggest, social theory must seek out the 'missing masses' which
hold our more-than-human sociality together - that is, it must seek out the nonhuman actants
which populate our collectives.129 That sociology has been blind to the proliferation of
nonhuman or material participation in human sociality is in no way surprising. Sociological
theory has built itself on the very foundation that it is a science without an object.
Indeed, for the human sciences, things have become untouchable since, with the exact
sciences, they became "objective." After this split, operated in the modern period,
between an objective world and a political world, things could not serve as comrades,
colleagues, partners, accomplices or associates in the weaving of social life. 130
As we have seen, the 'Great Divide' of the modern Constitution disallowed the mixing of
natural things and social things. Politics and nature were to be held at opposing poles in order
to make political discussion obsolete. It was in this way that the great unwashed masses could
never overcome the 'matters of fact' which the sciences produced and coaxed out of a
transcendent Nature. Society was never to be allowed to corrupt Nature, and Nature could
never be allowed to corrupt Society. And in the abyss between the two fell the socialized
nonhumans which spanned the gap between actor and system. 'Forgetting artifacts (in the
sense of things) has meant the creation of that other artifact (in the sense of illusion): a society
that has to be held in place with just the social.'131
ANT seeks to capture this new understanding that objects actually participate in
sociality as full-fledged social actants. But as we reviewed above, nonhumans are not to be
understood as passive tools in the hands of an always-human agency. We are not, as Latour is
fond of saying, ex nihilo creators of our own actions, potentialities, and worlds. Nonhuman
actants, through multiple associations and the 'nesting of sub-programs', make human action
possible. Primates rarely, if ever, engage objects to carryout their social interactions. Humans,
on the other hand, can rarely avoid interaction with techniques in their interactions. 'By
dislocating interaction so as to associate ourselves with non-humans, we can endure beyond
128 Ibid., p. 234.
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the present, in a matter other than our body, and we can interact at a distance - which it is
difficult for a baboon or chimpanzee to do.'132 Even the clothes we wear come from distant
places and distant times, just as the buildings we inhabit were made by hands that are no
longer present but continue to exert the influence of past actions. There are many others who
are now absent yet materially present in space and time - that is to say mediated - due to the
nearly ubiquitous artifacts which saturate our socio-material constellations. It is for this
reason that Latour can insist that 'technology is society made durable.'133
IV. Locating Trinitarian and Nonmodern Unity
Now that we have looked into the trinitarian and nonmodern accounts of ontological
differentiation and 'horizontal' mediation, we may now take up the final point of comparison
- the locating of unity. A comparison on this point will make our task of comparing these two
very different approaches to our modem and late-modem predicament much clearer by
reducing the problem ofmodernity to the basic components which Gunton identified time and
again. The problem with modernity, he insists, is nothing new. In fact, it is an ancient problem
which consumed even the earliest philosophers. What is the nature of reality? Is there a unity
to the cosmos as Parmenides postulated? Or are all things merely chaotic and in some kind of
Heraclician flux? May the God of creation perform a unifying role? Or is unity a mere
fairytale with no purchase on reality? I think much would be made clearer ifwe were to pose
the question of 'the One and the many' to our two interlocutors. Here we are concerned to
locate each of our author's account concerning the possibility for unity amongst multiplicity.
It is by now clear that we have already reviewed much ofGunton's response to this
ancient question. Modernity and late-modernity are, for Gunton, characterized by a pendulum
swinging from overly homogeneous concepts of sociality which oppress personal particularity
to the individualist societies which emphasize personal particularity over relationality. To
disrupt this modern pendulum of extremes we require a distinctly theological antidote. While
modernity can be seen as a protest against the overwhelming omnipotence of a unitarily
conceived deity, the Church must now embrace the Triune creator. For it is only through the
One God who contains within himself 'a form ofplurality in relation and creates a world
which reflects the richness of his being,' that we are able to embrace both plurality and unity
simultaneously.134
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As we witnessed in chapter one, the Cappadocian fathers were responsible for the
brilliant formulation of the trinitarian ontology which Gunton and others would like to see the
Western church now embrace more fully. By affirming the relational being of the Trinity, the
Cappadocians have given us the theological tools necessary to deal with the cultural crisis that
now faces the Western, or modem, world. Moreover, the Cappadocian achievement was also
to introduce the term perichoresis which serves to indicate something of the Triune God's
work, action, or relationality, through space and time. Indeed, perichoresis can be identified
as a universal mark of all being as it works to relate all things on a cosmic scale. Thus it is
through this understanding ofGod as Triune, and through the work of his 'two hands' that we
are to find plurality and unity within the created order. Only in this way are we able to hold
personal, material and cultural realms in relational distinction. As Gunton insists; 'if the triune
God is the source of all being, meaning and truth, we should be able to develop a theology of
the unity of culture without depriving each of its dimensions of its distinctive approach to
validity'.135
But as we have also seen, this does not require a strictly immanent God. Instead,
Gunton has argued that God must be understood as ultimately transcendent - meaning other-
than - the world which is his creation. Yet the transcendence ofGod does not limit his
activity within the 'world'. Through the mediating action of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the
One God continues to uphold, perfect and sustain the created realm. In sum, we can say that
Gunton finds unity and multiplicity in the Creator's triune being. And it is appropriate that we
will find the marks of this relational ontology within the created order itself, as we have seen
in Gunton's understanding of the economic Trinity.
Latour's approach to the ancient problem of 'the one and the many', as is now clear,
differs greatly to that ofGunton. For Latour, the loss of ancient unity in the form ofmodem
fragmentation is directly related to the modem's constitutional guarantees which polarized
subjects and objects, politics and nature, and God and world. Unlike Gunton, Latour will not
appeal to a 'Creator God' in the hope that this transcendent being may be able to push the
world back into a forced unity. Nor will he appeal to some other kind of ready-made unity to
which we can all appeal in an effort to reach political univocality. This was the failed practice
of the modems who traded on a transcendent Nature or a transcendent Society in order to find
this ready-made univocality whenever it was desired.
Unity, for Latour, never comes to us ready-made or descending from the heavens.
Instead we are to find that it is always the outgrowth of work, or constructivism, as Latour has
termed it.136 Therefore, he will argue that we must stop looking for a master who can bring
135 Ibid.
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unity to our experience. This was the preoccupation ofmodernity which continuously
searched for a master who could bring unity out ofmultiplicity. We have gone, he explains,
from a 'God of Creation to Godless Nature, from there to Homo Faber, then to structures that
make us act, fields of discourse that make us speak, anonymous fields of force in which
everything is dissolved—but we have not yet tried to have no master at a//.'137 Here we see
the beginnings of Latour's theological deviation from Gunton's trinitarian project. We will
return to this issue again in the next section. But for now let us identify the moments of unity
within Latour's nonmodem project. And here I believe there are two ways in which unity can
be found - or perhaps, 'achieved' would be a better term - within Latour's framework.
First, we have found that Latour will locate a kind ofunity, what we might call a
singular unity, in the hybrid networks themselves. Populated by the heterogeneous
associations and mediations ofboth humans and nonhumans, each network, or web of
networks, creates a unity that can span from the local to the global as long as the network
associations remain stable. I refer to this as a 'singular' unity primarily because this is not the
totalizing unity amongst all things that we are looking for. The unity found in networks is
better understood as momentary unities (plural) that could easily dissolve or rematerialize at
another time. This form of Latourian unity, as we will see, has recently been subjected to
something approaching Val Plumwood's 'indistinguishabilty' critique, but we will return to
this important point in the next section.
Secondly, unity is to be achieved as the outgrowth of apoliticalprocess that is
symmetrical in its representations. Where Gunton sees both unity and multiplicity in the
Triune creator himself, Latour will not seek to find unity in any kind of apriori whether it be
the Creator God (like the pre-moderns), a transcendent Nature (like the modems), or the
human mind (also like the modems). Instead he will insist that 'unity and multiplicity cannot
be achieved unless they are progressively pieced together by delicate negotiations'.138 This
political feature of Latour's philosophy has been at the center ofmuch of his latest work. In
his recent Politics ofNature and Pandora's Hope, Latour argues that nature is not an already
constituted unity from which political discussion can be quashed, like the transcendent Nature
posited by the Modems. Latour energetically explains:
If there is something unattainable, it is the dream of treating nature as a homogeneous
unity in order to unify the different views the sciences have of it! This would require
'social construction' of the critical sociologists. Alternatively, the term carries a very positive
connotation which seeks to capture the sense that 'reality', 'unity', or the 'world', is the result of the
sharing between many agencies/actancies that do not have full mastery of their constructions. We
return to this concept later in the section. But see Latour, "The Promises of Constructivism," in
Chasing Technoscience, Don fhde and Evan Selinger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
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us to ignore too many controversies, too much history, too much unfinished business,
too many loose ends.139
Whereas the moderns sought unity through a purified Nature and Society, the nonmodern
must give up this 'dream' scenario which will unite the peoples of the world.140 This speaks to
a Science (with a capital'S') that has exercised political power by forcing its 'matters of fact'
upon the masses who were allowed no voice in the face of the overwhelming weight of a
Nature 'out there' which was thought to be transcendent to mere sociality and political
discussion. Once again, for Latour this transcendent Nature was made possible only through
the 'crossing-out' of the Creator God who provided cosmological unity up until the early
modern period. But just as a personal interpretation of the Bible was ushered in by the
Reformation, any single reader could now 'come to reverse the established order in the name
of his own interpretation' thereby threatening the end of social order - the fear of Hobbes.141
Nature and its representatives in lab coats have merely filled the vacuum left as God was
thrown into an unreachable transcendence and replaced by the 'spiritual' God who spoke in
the silence of the individual heart. Unity was at this point privatized within the individual
'king-self, whereas it was once located in God, Church, and King - Boyle's success.
Latour does not ask us to return to the unity of a Creator God but rather to a unity that
is built, constructed, and comprised out of a political process which seeks to locate the work
of both politicians and scientists under a single parliamentary house. Although modernity has
bestowed us with a 'two house' parliament - political discussion in one house and scientific
discussion in the other house - the nonmodern must now seek to unify the two houses into a
single 'parliament of things'. Thus the practice of the sciences can no longer be kept apart
from the practice ofpolitics. This is a process which he has described as 'bringing the
sciences into democracy'.142 In sum, we can say that Latour locates our hope for a unity in a
nonmodern political and scientific process which requires the work of democracy to be
distributed symmetrically - to both humans and nonhumans. As Latour insists; 'the common
world is not behind us and ready made, like nature, but ahead of us, an immense task which
we will need to accomplish one step at a time.'143
This building of a 'common world' implicates the process of constructivism to which
we have already alluded. We can no longer appeal to any of the tailed masters which the
moderns proposed, nor can we return to the failed mastery of the Creator God of the pre-
moderns. Instead we must piece by piece, build a common collective together with all of the
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nonhuman actants who are equally responsible for the construction of our common world.
This understanding that unity must be worked towards upsets the opposition of contingency
and necessity because it by-passes this impasse altogether. Humans and nonhumans are not
separated by words and World, but are instead bound up in a single history that makes their
separation impossible. Therefore, Latour argues that 'constructivism is deeply misread if it is
seen as a debate between realism and nominalism'.144 Thus the construction or composition of
unity will require two primary questions to be asked of any entity (divinities, viruses,
technologies, etc.) which seek entry into the unified parliament (the collective, or common
world):
The relevant question for the diplomats would no longer be, "Is it or isn't it
constructed?" but rather: "how do you manufacture them?" And, above all, "How do
you verify that they are well constructed?" Here is where negotiations could begin:
with the question of the right ways to build.145
Latour's concept of constructivism is admittedly rather complex and difficult to fully grasp,
and it would perhaps require an entire chapter to even begin to describe. What is clear thus far
is that constructivism is antithetical to postmodernify's 'deconstruction' or 'social
construction'. Constructivism is nothing more than a process by which humans and
nonhuman actants are found to mutually build our collectives. And here we find the very
important roles for the sciences (now with a lowercase's') and politics (now open to the
sciences), to construct our collective 'piece by piece', all the while moving towards unity.
'We are', as Latour says, 'aiming at apolitics ofthings, not at the bygone dispute about
whether or not words refer to the world'.146
V. Revealing the Blindspots: a Mutual Critique
Now that we have reviewed the differing accounts of otherness, mediation, and unity
in both the trinitarian and nonmodem projects, we are now able to construct a critical dialogue
between the two. We will recall that at the beginning of the chapter I proposed the argument
that Latour's nonmodern thought was in need of a deeper theological vision, and that
Gunton's trinitarian theology would benefit from the insights of Latour's particular brand of
science studies. It is the burden of this final section of the chapter to begin this critical
dialogue which will be continued into part three of this thesis. Our overall goal is to now
evaluate each of our author's treatment of our three areas of comparison in an effort to better
understand the primary concern of this thesis - the deep relationalify that exists between
humans, nonhumans, and God, through space and time.
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V.A Why the Nonmodern Needs a Trinitarian Theology
In this section we will outline two critically important pitfalls of Latour's diagnosis of
modernity and his subsequent nonmodem proposals. The first of these pitfalls may be
characterized as one pertaining to 'vertical' relations, whilst the second is more concerned
with 'horizontal' matters. We begin with where we left off in the previous section, with his
understanding of nonmodern unity as the outgrowth of a symmetrical political process best
described as 'constructivism' or a 'parliament of things'. Secondly, we will subject Latour's
account of nonmodern or actor/actant-network mediation to Plumwood's critique of
'indistinguishablity'. On this account we are interested in asking whether Latour is able to
maintain the ontological otherness we discussed in the first section of this chapter.
A Purely Immanent Unity?
We have just seen that there can be found in Latour's nonmodern thought, two
potential types of unity. There are what we have called 'singular unities', as found in the
heterogeneous networks, and there is also the unity of constructivism. For the moment we
will leave these 'singular unities' to the side and turn our attention towards Latour's rejection
of the 'God of Creation' in favor of his proposed political process known as the 'parliament of
things'. We have seen that Latour strongly rejects any notion of a transcendent or ready-made
unity from which we might establish universal assent amongst the human and nonhuman
multitudes. Yet it is important that we now unravel the distinctly theological notions that
accompany his position.
At the beginning of this chapter we saw that Latour and Gunton share similar
understandings of the theological movements which accompanied modernity. Each ofour
authors has identified a distinct movement to distance God from immanent affairs, although
Gunton is also aware of the equally modern theological movement to bring God out of
transcendence and into a sometimes stifling immanence, as is found in the late-modern liberal
theologies from 'below'.147 There is, however, a notable difference in how each of them has
come to understand the motivating forces behind the banishing ofGod in early modernity.
For his part, Latour has portrayed the modern move to 'cross-out' God as solely the
result of early developments in Enlightenment philosophy itself, namely the development of
deep-seated epistemological doubt. It was this anxious grasping at a 'world out there' which
would necessitate the purification of subjects and objects and the eventual evacuation ofGod
from the natural realm. Alternatively, Gunton looks to identify a much earlier theological shift
- the rise of a monistically conceived God expressed solely as arbitrary will, and the theology
147 Gunton has most directly addressed this modem trading on theologies from 'above' and 'below' in
his books Yesterday and Today, as well as Becoming andBeing.
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of the nominalists - and then finds that the Enlightenment is itself an outgrowth of this poorly
conceived and wholly non-trinitarian theology. Indeed, the Enlightenment is for Gunton an
act of protest against this freedom-stifling theology whose roots go much further back than
Descartes, Kant, Boyle, or Hobbes. Therefore, I find Gunton to be far more convincing in
terms ofhis ability to trace the genesis of the Enlightenment to a deficient doctrine of
creation, thereby leading him to the conclusion that our response to the problems of
modernity should be equally theological in nature. We may include in this all of the careful
theological movements which Gunton has made in order to reinforce the understanding that
God remains transcendent (other-than) to the world, yet in continual relation through the
mediation of the Son and Holy Spirit. Latour, on the other hand, sees the theological move to
'cross-out' God only as the outgrowth of an earlier epistemological shift accompanied by the
rise of the sciences. By understanding the theology ofmodernity simply as an outgrowth or a
surrendering to the philosophical tides of the time serves only to diminish or completely pass-
over the role which Christian theology played in actually causing the Enlightenment protest.
In spite of this undervaluation of the early role theology played, we may still find in Latour's
full body ofwork, but especially in his work following We Have Never Been Modern, a
number of suggestions for the construction of a distinctly nonmodern theology.
Latour's theological suggestions concerning the reformation of theological discourse
in the wake ofhis nonmodern project are rather sparse. Yet we might begin by recalling
Latour's claim that the power of the moderns was to be found in their purification of the
realms ofNature, Society, and the 'crossed-out' God. 'Those agencies', Latour explains, 'had
a constitutional role to play only as long as they remained distinct.'148 Aware of the stifling
effect of an imposed and rigid unity that has not been 'constructed', 'composed', or arrived at
by 'due political process', Latour rejects the transcendent God of the pre-moderns and early-
moderns. This outright rejection is also based on an interesting theological claim which he has
made quite clear in his more recent Pandora's Hope. There he explains that God is an
unsuitable candidate for the provision ofunity simply because God is himself incapable of
'mastering' the creation which he has created ex nihilo. The passage from Pandora's Hope is
rather lengthy, but deserves quotation in full.
To be in command, to master, is a property of neither humans nor nonhumans, nor
even God. It was thought to be a property of objects and subjects, except that it never
worked: actions always overflow themselves, and gnarled entanglements always
ensued. The ban on theology, so important in the staging of the modernist
predicament, will not be lifted by a return to the God of Creation but, on the contrary,
by the realization that there is no master at all. That religion too was seized by
modernists as oil for their political war machine, that theology debased itself by
agreeing to play a role in the modernist settlement and betrayed itself even to the
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point of talking about nature "out there," the soul "in there," and society "down
there," will, I hope, serve as a source of bewilderment for the next generation.149
At this point one might want to use one of Latour's often used colloquialisms in asking: is this
not to throw the baby out with the bath water? Must we do away with the 'God of Creation'
simply because the theology of the past was seen to be oppressive? To be sure, Latour is not
hostile towards theology as a whole. Although he will sometimes make provocative quips
such as: 'if there is anything worse than dabbling with non-humans, it is to take theology
seriously'.150 Yet this does not reveal a general distaste for theological endeavors. We will
remember that Latour began his academic career as a student ofBiblical exegesis, and he has
recently reported that his next book will be specifically concerned with the topic of religious
enunciation.151 However, Latour is surely wrong to simply do away with the unifying capacity
of a Creator God with such ease and to now try 'to have no master at all'}52
It is worth noting in all of this that Latour's theological leanings seem to be along the
order of the process theologians and philosophers. Although I am unable to find in any of his
writings any direct reference to the works of the more recent process theologians, one can
often find theological pronouncements closely followed by a reference to Alfred North
Whitehead himself. The above quote concerning the non-mastery God has over his work of
creation, for instance, can be traced directly to a 'Whiteheadian' influence. As Latour
indicated earlier in the same chapter, this concept was inspired by his reading ofProcess and
Reality. 'As Whitehead so beautifully proposed, God too, is slightly overtaken by His
Creation, that is, by all that is changed and modified and altered in encountering Him...Yes,
we are made in the image of God, that is we do not know what we are doing either.'153 Thus
the small glimpses which Latour has allowed us to see in his theological stance would
indicate that he is sympathetic to the theological trajectory of Whitehead.
In keeping with the theological influence ofWhitehead there can also be found in
Latour's work suggestions of a pantheist notion ofGod's immanence. Yet here we must tread
carefully since like all dualisms, Latour is seeking to collapse or bypass the
transcendence/immanence divide all together. We will recall that the moderns constantly
traded on the transcendence and immanence of all three realms - Nature, Society, and God -
according to the needs of the moment. As we have also seen, it was from this slight-of-hand
that the modems wielded such power. However, in the nonmodem settlement transcendence
does not necessarily require a contrary. Thus the question for Latour becomes: 'How can we
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go from the transcendent/immanent crossed-out God to the God of origins who should
perhaps be called the God of below?'154 Although it is not all together clear what is meant by
the 'God of origins', it is not so difficult to discern the meaning of a 'God of below', with its
likely pantheistic understanding of the God-world relationship.
Although Latour is not as clear on these points as a theologically minded reader might
wish, it becomes apparent that all three realms must be redistributed amongst the collective.
No longer are we to speak of transcendence and immanence all the while trading on the two at
our convenience. Instead we will have three transcendent mediations without their opposite in
immanence. We thus have, according to Latour, a new understanding of transcendence that is
no longer a polemical term used to counter immanence. The 'word has to change meaning if it
is no longer an opposite term... I call this transcendence that lacks a contrary "delegation"'.155
Yet we must ask whether or not this leaves us with an understanding of God's
immediacy of the type which Gunton was so concerned to avoid - namely a pantheistic or
panentheistic immediacy. We will recall from the first chapter that one ofGunton's primary
concerns throughout his theological project was to preserve the relation-in-otherness between
God and world. Just as we must preserve the particular hypostasis (Father, Son, and Spirit)
within God's being as others in perfect loving relation, so too must we understand the
trinitarian shape ofGod's relation to the creation in terms of otherness-in-relation. As Gunton
explains; 'If the creation is to be truly creaturely, it requires its own time and space which are
given by God but not coterminous with his reality.'156 Even though Latour has attempted to
make all realms 'transcendent without opposite' it is difficult to see any appreciation for the
theological - and according to Gunton, cultural - pitfalls which this would incur. By
reducing all realms, including God, to a homogenized immanence - or as he craftily terms it,
'a transcendence without opposite' - Latour has in effect offered only a 'God from below'
approach which, I will maintain, is simply an over-reaction to the theological concessions
made to modernity during its genesis. Certainly, Latour is not a theologian and cannot be
expected to know the intricacies of trinitarian theology. However, I will argue that his
nonmodern project would be greatly enhanced through a directed conversation with the
trinitarian theology which Gunton's work represents. In the final estimation it appears that
Latour simply does not know what to do with the 'God question' after criticizing the theology
of the modems.157 Thus he has simply offered the opposite of a distant and 'crossed-out' God
without consideration of the very positive and useful trinitarian notions ofmediation between
God and world. By completely dissolving the perceived dualism between God and world, and
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then envisioning a kind ofwatered-down conception of God (who turns out to be a lot like
us), Latour has only offered what Gunton has identified time and again as an equally modern
God. We are left with a unity that is purely of our own (immanent) making thereby leaving
open the question of ethics.158
The Threat of 'Horizontal' Indistinguishability
Now that we have investigated the pitfalls associated with the 'vertical' trajectory of
Latour's nonmodernism we may now critically consider its distinct 'horizontal' aspects. We
will recall from our discussion of ontology and otherness earlier in the chapter, as well as
from our review ofGunton's project in chapter one, that wherever we find relations and
mediations there exists the attendant risk of the dissolution of difference and the loss of
particularity. If things are to be distinctly themselves - particular essences, substances, or
ontologies - there must be a space of ones own where particular being might be allowed to
flourish. In the field of environmental philosophy this point has been very clearly outlined by
Plumwood in her argument against the 'ecoself, or the 'expanded' and 'mature' self, most
clearly found in the philosophy ofArnie Naess. The ecoselfof the deep ecologists, Plumwood
argues, ultimately falls into a kind of'indistinguishability' or radical homogenization of
human and nonhuman ontologies, bringing with it a cascade of ethical and ontological
pitfalls. The selfwithout boundaries is for Plumwood an essentially 'colonizing' or
'devouring' self which, through its seemingly benign dissolution of boundaries, ends up doing
great violence to otherness.159 It is now our task to apply the same question to Latour's
account ofmediation, networking and the exchange of human and nonhuman properties. In
this we are seeking to determine whether the Latourian actor/actant-networks are finally
capable ofmaintaining the otherness-in-relation which both Plumwood and Gunton are so
concerned to maintain.
We have seen that within the nonmodern or ANT understanding of reality there is a
deep commitment to demonstrating that all entities, beings, or things - both human and
nonhuman - are the result of network effects. Thus the particular ontology of anything is here
always to be seen as the outgrowth of an ontologically prior relationship. We have also
witnessed that this understanding of relational ontology requires an appreciation for what
Latour and others have called nonhuman actancy. This brings us back to the question of those
'singular unities' which we introduced earlier in the chapter. There we saw that by extending
158 A discussion of Latour's difficult to grasp comments on what we might call a nonmodem ethics
would be well beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, it would again deserve a chapter in itself, or
perhaps more, to fully discuss.
159 'The failure to affirm difference is characteristic of the colonizing self which denies the other
through the attempt to incorporate it into the empire of the self, and which is unable to experience
sameness without erasing difference.' Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery ofNature, p. 174.
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network (relational) mediations through both humans and nonhumans, Latour has posited a
deeply relational ontological vision capable of achieving these singular unities which extend
through space.160 Yet by now inviting the Other of traditional sociology (the nonhuman) into
the social fold as fully-fledged 'socialized nonhumans', has nonmodernism risked the same
homogenization we found in its 'vertical' account, but now in the 'horizontal' trajectory? Or
to use Gunton's language, can the actor/actant-network maintain the one amongst the many?
There have been a few voices ofwarning on this very matter from within the fields of
science studies and SSK concerning this point of Latour's nonmodern constitution and ANT
as a whole. Nick Lee and Steve Brown have suggested that ANT may be so radically liberal
and democratic that it actually losses a sense of the Other altogether.161 In a later paper Lee
and Paul Stenner point out that '"belonging" on the ANT account seems to have no necessary
limit'.162 They conclude with a warning to all of their fellow ANT theorists: 'as we break
ontological boundaries and render everything 'networky', we will become insensitive to
complexity and heterogeneity ifwe forget that there is an heterogeneity between Other and
others.'163 Now that all has been assimilated into the collective, including God, it is worried
that there is tmly no Other of which we may speak. Leading theorists in the SSK camp have
suggested that the radical symmetry of the network relations also runs the risk of turning all
reality into an oscillating exchange of properties up and down the heterogeneous networks. In
this scenario, as Latour understands his critics to be suggesting, everything being in a sense
unified through network relations, nothing truly is.164
We may now briefly outline how we might expect Latour to respond to such
criticisms. Certainly, Latour has insisted that his nonmodern program is not interested in a
wholesale erasure of difference/otherness amongst human and nonhuman realms. This was
the point of his adoption of the term 'Counter Copemican Revolution' to explain his
nonmodern realization that ontology must now start in the middle of the modern 'yardstick',
or dichotomy, between a purified Nature and Society. The first move for the nonmodem is to
relocate the polemically opposed Nature and Society into the middle and to fuse them
together - that is to recognized the obscured hybridity which proliferated under the modern's
Constitution. Latour has warned us that this is a rather difficult task since it was their polemic
160 The space-times and the 'space-time compression' which these networks create will be the focus of
the next chapter.
161 Nick Lee and Steve Brown, "Otherness and the Actor Network: the Undiscovered Continent,"
American Behavioural Scientist 37 (1994). They conclude that there is a way for ANT to avoid this
charge by making an incredibly complex appeal to the philosophy of Giles Deleuze.
162 Lee and Paul Stenner, "Who Pays? Can we Pay Them Back?," in Actor Network Theory andAfter,
John Law and John Hassard (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p. 91.
163 Ibid., p. 110.
164 This is the meaning which Latour has taken from Collins and Yearly's critique of ANT,
"Epistemological Chicken", as well as Shapin's, "Following Scientists Around". Latour mentions these
critical commentaries on his work in his "One More Turn After the Social", p. 278.
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opposition that defined them in the first place. Yet once we have redistributed the modern's
Objects (created to guarantee that human knowledge was not constructed) and Subjects
(created to guarantee that our knowledge be human-made) throughout the collective we are
then able to follow the networks and mediations from the center outwards. This is the critical
ontological point for Latour, that stable humans and nonhumans are, in a sense, latecomers to
the scene. In other words, we must refuse to begin with pre-existent and ontologically purified
poles ofNature and Society and instead look to the mediations and relations in the 'Middle
Kingdom'. Only once we have traced the heterogeneous networks are we able to then shift
entities into a kind of ontological and substantial stability - either human, nonhuman, or even
divine. As Latour explains, the moderns were correct in seeking to find 'objective nonhumans
and free societies. They were mistaken only in their certainty that that double production
required an absolute distinction between the two terms and the continual repression of the
work ofmediation.'165 In sum, Latour is certainly willing to locate stable ontologies or
substances, but only after we have offered them an historical and political space in which
these entities may emerge and be further 'substantiated'.166 In Latour's own words: 'Full-
fledged human subjects and respectable objects out there in the world cannot be my starting
point; they may be my point of arrival.'167
We may at this point begin to see a potential point of conversation between Latour
and Gunton's respective accounts of'horizontal' relations. Here I would like to emphasize,
once again, that I do not believe that the nonmodern and trinitarian programs should be forced
into a kind of synthesis. The two approaches are radically different, and I am anxious to avoid
the appearance ofmaking theological claims and commitments in any way subordinate to a
largely un-theological philosophy. With this important point now clear, we may move
towards what I believe will be a mutually enlightening conversation where moments of
congruency may be identified. As we have seen, both of our authors see 'horizontal'
relationality as an important component to understanding the world - or our common realm -
and the place of both humans and nonhumans within it. Both of our authors have shown their
understanding of ontology to be deeply relational in character. Moreover, each has committed
to a program which recognizes that both humans and nonhumans are mutually constituted
through their various relations. There are however, two dramatic differences to be found in
our author's relational ontologies.
First, as we have seen, Gunton begins his relational program with what we might call
an apriori ontological categorization of persons, nonpersons, and God. These are the three
most fundamental ontological realms which Gunton is willing to identify. For him
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relationality is to be found between concrete particulars whose essences are fully known and
guaranteed - perhaps 'maintained' is a better term - by the perfecting and redeeming actions
of the Son and the Spirit. Moreover, we have characterized Gunton's overriding ontological
concern to be that ofmaintaining ontological otherness without sacrificing relationality.
Latour, on other hand, and beginning with the modern Constitution, has identified a priori
ontological purity as the primary target for critique. From his perspective it was the cementing
of an all too precious Nature and an all too precious Society into the ontological bedrock of
modernity that is the problem. Thus Latour has taken the opposite rout and declared
ontological substantiality to be an historical outgrowth of the ontologicallyprior relationality.
Secondly, as is by now clear, Latour does not base his ontological understanding in
the 'God of Creation' or any other divine source. His is not a theologically conceived
relational ontology as Gunton's clearly is. This is obvious enough. But now, rather than
pronounce a winner and a loser in this ontological conversation, I would like to simply
highlight a strength and weakness of each approach.
It appears that Latour's account of 'variable ontologies' is much more successful than
Gunton's in accounting for the particularities of human and nonhuman relationality. This is to
be expected since he takes as his methodological starting point the 'Middle Kingdom' of
hybrids and quasi-objects which the moderns obscured. Yet this has opened the way for one
considerable weakness concerning the threat of 'indistinguishability'. To my mind, it remains
deeply questionable whether the purely immanent political process of the 'parliament of
things' is capable ofmaintaining the otherness necessary to avoid the 'colonization' of the
Other which Plumwood has warned us of. Gunton is surely the more successful in his very
meticulous preservation of otherness, basing it as he has on a trinitarian understanding ofboth
God and world. Said otherwise, unlike Latour, Gunton has analogically derived his
understanding of othemess-in-relation from a distinctly transcendent source - namely the
trinitarian being of the Godhead. Moreover, ifwe are to remain trinitarian in our vision, as
this thesis is ultimately dedicated to preserving, we must not accept a mere reversal of the
modern's 'crossed-out' God and deeply polarized humans and nonhumans. A trinitarian
theology must resist the temptation to merely reunite the polarized realms ofmodernity and
instead seek out the various forms and moments of relationality (mediation) that exist
between God, humans, and nonhumans. Latour threatens to overstep this basic insight of
trinitarian theology. There are, however, deep insights to be found within Latour's nonmodern
project which may be used to challenge Gunton's theology of creation and culture. Before
moving on to the final two chapters of this thesis, we may now employ Latour's nonmodem
account ofmediation to correct some ofGunton's own blind-spots concerning
human/nonhuman relationality.
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V.B Geographical Blindspots in Gunton's Trinitarian Theology
We may now begin to outline some of the important 'geographical blindspots' which may be
identified within Gunton's overall trinitarian theology of creation and culture.'68 By using the
term 'geographical' in this instance, it is my intention to begin to highlight the often
misunderstood scope of geographical thinking as it has developed into a distinct academic
field over the last century. This will be the primary focus of part three of this thesis, but for
now we may simply remind ourselves ofwhat I began to outline in the introduction to this
thesis. By qualifying these blindspots as 'geographical' we are highlighting the fact that they
pertain to what Gunton has called 'horizontal' relations. Moreover, the term 'geographical'
serves to emphasize a number of specific points concerning 'horizontal' relationality. First, to
say that relations are geographical is to indicate that they are of a distinctly spatial nature and
thereby implicate time as well. Secondly, the term 'geographical' serves to implicate the
traditional geographical triad of space-place-nature, and to this we may add a fourth category
ofhuman/culture - thanks to the more recent work of human and cultural geographers. On
this point, to say that Gunton expresses a 'geographical' blindspot is to suggest that he is
missing something in the dynamic and spatial relations that exist between humans and
nonhumans, nature and culture. In the final two chapters of this thesis we will also see that
'geographical' relations between humans and nonhumans tend to find their locus in particular
placesIplacings. But before moving into our construction of a 'theology ofplacing', we must
illustrate these geographical blindspots within Gunton's theological program.
In fairness to Gunton's work we should begin by making it clear that he has done
much to emphasize the deep relationality that exists between humans and nonhumans. We
have seen this aspect of his theological program expressed most clearly in his account of
horizontal relationality. To be certain, many theologians have given little or no attention to
this important aspect of the doctrine of creation. Therefore, Gunton should be applauded for
these efforts. In Christ and Creation, for instance, he has himself identified some of the
blindspots inherent to the Western Christian tradition. He begins with the important
recognition that the Western theologians have been all too occupied with uncovering the
particularities of individual, as well as societal and political, redemption. Here Gunton
outlines the important insight that we, the Christians of the West, have put all of our efforts
into understanding God's relation to the social pole of the modem dichotomy, whilst greatly
neglecting 'the wider material context' in which individual persons and larger societies take
their shape.169 He goes on to explain that we have been particularly weak in trying to develop
168 It may be somewhat disingenuous to call each of these 'blindspots', considering that Gunton was
quite aware ofhis theological maneuvering which, I will argue, served to diminish the role of
nonhuman relationality.
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a theology concerned with human action within the material realm. Yet there remain points
where Gunton's own program of detailing 'how we are internally related to the world', fails to
do justice to the trinitarian model of relationality which he has employed. What I would like
to suggest is that Gunton's overall theology tends to remain all too modem in his inability to
fully appreciate the intimate relations that exist between humans and nonhumans, nature and
society. The purpose of this section will be to look at several of the main points, or
'blindspots', where Gunton's ability to register and account for human/nonhuman relations -
the 'commerce' between people and things - breaks down. Moreover, we will employ the
insights ofLatour's account of socio-material or socio-technical mediation as a point of
challenge for Gunton's trinitarian theology.
In an interesting and recent article, Edward Russell has outlined a number of
important blindspots inherent to many of the contemporary relational theological
anthropologies that now populate the field. His paper is directed primarily towards a critical
engagement with the anthropology of John Zizioulas, but he has also tied in a few general
comments concerning Gunton's anthropology which is similar in many respects. The overall
thrust of the argument has to do with the inability of these recent relational anthropologies,
based as they are on the trinitarian being ofGod, to fully register three main points; the
doctrine of sin, the discontinuity between human and divine persons, and to fully appreciate
human embodiment in the world.170 I would like to now focus on the last of these claims as it
applies to Gunton's anthropology. Although his comments are rather brief, Russell recognizes
what we have slowly been illustrating throughout this thesis. We have already seen that
Gunton understands human persons to be relational beings. Moreover, we have seen that this
has something to do with our imaging ofGod. That God is a community of persons in himself
is the basis for our claim that human persons (by analogy) are also composed and maintained
through multiple networks of relations. We have also seen that something of a hierarchy
develops in Gunton's thinking concerning the doctrine of creation and his theological
anthropology. We are first persons as we are related to the Father through the Son and the
Spirit. We said that for Gunton this relationship is both methodologically and ontologically
prior to all other relationships. Secondly, our personhood is to be found through our
relationships with other human persons. This type of relationality Gunton has (exclusively)
termed sociality. We are persons only as we are found to interact with true others-in-relation,
other human persons. Finally, our unique and particular being as persons is to be found 'in
our continuity with the remainder of creation and our necessary embodiment.'171
170 Edward Russell, "Reconsidering Relational Anthropology: A Critical Assesment of John Zizioulas's
Theological Anthropology," International Journal ofSystematic Theology 5, 2 (July 2003).
171 Gunton, The Triune Creator, p. 208.
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What Russell points out, and what I would like to add depth to presently, is the fact
that even after dedicating at least two whole books to the task of illustrating 'the way human
beings subsist in creation', Gunton has paradoxically managed only to describe 'the
continuity between human beings and creation at the most general level.'172 Although
Russell's paper is dedicated largely to the work of Zizioulas, he argues that both theologians
have been unable to truly account for human/non-human relationality because of their
combined focus on detailing the continuity between divine and human persons. Thus the
hierarchy of relations has produced something of a blindspot or the pitfall of what we might
call an exaggerated emphasis. By giving such great weight to the first two relationships - the
God/human and the human/human - Gunton has been unable to offer up an account of the
human 'commerce' with the nonhuman anywhere beyond the most general of statements.
The Non-Sociality ofNature
While I strongly agree with Russell's contention that the theological anthropologies
of Gunton and Zizioulas are too heavily weighted towards detailing continuities between
divine and human persons, I believe there are a number of other contributing factors at work
in Gunton's case that are of equal or even greater importance. Here I would like to offer one
general argument with three important supporting factors. The general point has to do with
Gunton's refusal to register non-human/non-personal participation in what he has called
sociality. We will recall from chapter one of this thesis that he has deemed sociality to consist
in the uniquely human and personal capacity to express the characteristics of love and
freedom. I believe Peter Scott has clearly identified one of the sticking points for Gunton in
this instance. The problem is to be found in Gunton's inability to see sociality as consisting in
anything other than I-Thou relationality.173 For Gunton, only persons are capable of the
intimate and reciprocating I-Thou relationality which requires the ability to exercise self-
consciousness - 'thinking and acting beyond the present'. Thus we saw that Gunton has taken
issue with Daniel Hardy in his claim that we may speak of a 'social transcendental' - that is, a
universal mark of all being. To speak ofall things as participative in sociality, as the term
'transcendental' would suggest, is for Gunton to threaten the true and distinct being of
persons and non-persons alike, ft is, in fact, to invite the indistinguishability which Plumwood
and many others have warned us of. Yet as Scott has pointed out, this is only true if I-Thou
relationality is the only way of conceiving true sociality. To be sure, Latour and many others
have shown us multiple ways in which the 'social' may be, and indeed must be, extended
beyond the narrow confines of I-Thou reciprocity. It is here that we may identify the general
basis ofGunton's inability to fully register the intimacy of personal/non-personal
172 Russell, "Reconsidering Relational Anthropology", p. 185.
173 Scott has made this point in his, A Political Theology ofNature, p. 53.
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relationality. It is, then, my contention that the looming factor in many of Gunton's
geographical blindspots is to be located in his conception of an all too precious sociality. By
jealously policing the boundaries of what may be considered social interaction or social
relationality, Gunton has closed the curtains on what could be a much fuller account of
human/non-human relationality. Moreover, a narrow understanding of sociality, such as this
one, will greatly hinder Gunton's declared goal of detailing how human persons are
'internally related to the rest of the world'.174 This general point carries three further
supporting points, or 'blindspots', within Gunton's project: an inability to register any form of
non-human agency/actancy, an overemphasis on the anthropocentric aspects of the 'cultural
mandate', and an impoverished understanding of the covenantal model of sociality. We now
take each of these in turn.
The Inability to Recognize Non-Human Agency/Actancy
As I argued earlier in this chapter, Gunton appears to be quite equivocal when
speaking of the Spirit's action within the non-personal realm. At times he appears to strictly
limit the reach of the Spirit to the personal sphere alone; 'God is spirit, while finite persons
have spirit—and things [nonhumans] neither are nor have spirit'.175 Yet in at least one other
point in his work he seems to say the precise opposite: 'Ifboth persons and things, for all
their crucial ontological differences, alike receive the shape of their being from the
particularizing Spirit' then we should not treat things as purely instrumental.176 We have also
reviewed Gunton's understanding that the Spirit is that which 'opens out' human persons. Yet
here again he appears to equivocate on whether the Spirit can be said to 'open out' the non-
personal realm in like manner - that is, in such a way as to understand nonhumans as
exercising agency/actancy in the initiation of relationality. It seems that Gunton is concerned
to maintain that non-personal creation is indeed 'open' to personal humans - the Spirit
'enables a form of perichoresis to take place, between mind and world, world and God'177 -
but in such a way as to see the relationality as being unidirectional. In other words, he wants
to be able to say that all things are perichoretically bound up in one another (without
identifying the Spirit with the non-personal), but in such a way as to jealously protect all
relational agency for human persons alone.
This is closely tied to our earlier point concerning Gunton's inability to register non-
personal participation in sociality. For him, sociality and the action of the Spirit apply to
persons capable of the forms of address which I-Thou relationality would suggest. Thus the
174 Ibid., p. 15.
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two movements are of a piece. Human persons are capable of forms of address that can be
described as I-Thou (intentional and reciprocal), and thus can be said to posses 'spirit' which
bestows the agency that is the 'opening out' of the person. Non-persons, on the other hand,
are not capable of the forms of address associated with I-Thou relationality. Therefore they
are not capable of exercising agency towards persons, nor can they be said to possess 'spirit'.
For Gunton, agency, spirit, sociality and personhood are all of a piece. To extend any one of
these characteristics to the non-personal sphere would be to invite the ontological continuity -
homogeneity, indistinguishability - that so worries him, and has been the mark of modernity
as a whole.
It is my contention that Gunton is unable to go beyond the most basic of generalities
when describing human/non-human relationality for this very reason. By refusing to
understand sociality in anyway other than I-Thou relationality - that is, relationality marked
by consciousness, intentionality, and ultimately anthropocentric agency - Gunton has been
unable to register the deeply intimate participation of the nonhuman/nonpersonal realm in
humanity and sociality as whole. To be clear this is due to his almost total inability to see any
kind of agency/actancy coming from the non-human/non-personal side of the relationhip. One
could now imagine Latour's diagnosis: Gunton's trinitarian theology remains all too modern!
Indeed, Gunton has constructed an opaque blackbox around the 'middle kingdom', that
yawning gap between the modern's polemical Nature and Society, so as to make opaque the
intimate relationality between humans and non-humans. That is to say, that nothing of all that
great of an interest happens on the non-personal side of the person/non-person relationship.
We have then a picture ofwarm spirit-enlivened persons meeting the cold and completely
passive, non-personal objects that populate reality. The non-persons are 'open' to relationality
due to the generally conceived perichoretic nature of all of creation, but the only thing of
interest would be the always human agency ofpersons. This point leads us into the second
contributing factor concerning Gunton's primary geographical blindspot.
Anthropocentric Emphasis and the Cultural Mandate
Closely related to the two earlier blindspots we have reviewed is what I take to be the
heavily anthropocentric emphasis in Gunton's theology. This is closely related to his inability
to recognize non-personal participation in sociality, as well as his routing of non-personal
agency. Both of these movements have served to diminish the non-personal creation's ability
to participate in relationality to such a degree that the human realm of creation takes up what I
consider to be a firmly anthropocentric place within the creation. This was clearly seen in
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Gunton's comments from Christ and Creation, where he argued that the non-personal is best
understood as being 'peripheral' to the human drama of redemption.178
We have also seen this expressed in Gunton's understanding of the Genesis passage
(1. 28) which assigns humanity with the task of exercising 'dominion' over the creation -
dominium terrae. There we learned that he takes this sometimes troublesome passage to be
God's 'divine command' or 'cultural mandate' for the human creation to go out and 'make
something of the world'.179 Drawing further on Romans 8:21, Gunton has argued that the
exercise of human dominion represents a 'command so to engage with the created order as to
enable it to join the human species in praise of its creator'.180 Thus it is the personal/human
creation - by virtue of our imaging the second Adam - that by interacting with the non-
personal realm fulfils the 'cultural mandate' to redeem the creation from its bondage. It is in
this way that Gunton envisions a heavily asymmetrical relation between personal and non-
personal creation, even to the point that non-personal creation is understood to be
ontologically dependent on the personal realm - 'the world is what it is by virtue of its
relation to those who bear the image ofGod.'181
Although this is certainly not the anthropocentrism which Lynn White sought to find
within Christian thought, it remains a heavily asymmetrical theological understanding of
creation. I find two primary points of contention with Gunton's strong anthropocentric
emphasis. First, it appears that Gunton has overstated the case of non-personal creation's
dependence on the human persons to such a degree that creation no longer enjoys its own true
reality outside of human cultural interaction. As counterpoint, there is also a wealth of
Biblical evidence to suggest that the non-personal creation enjoys a relationship with its
creator quite outside of its relationship with human persons. Bill McKibben has offered an
intriguing reading of the book of Job which offers a strong response to Gunton's over
emphasized anthropocentrism. Speaking specifically of God's speech to Job, McKibben
draws out a number of lessons concerning the non-personal creation. He points out that God
appears to be entirely 'untroubled by the notion of a place where no man lives', citing the
references to God's sending rain to the uninhabited regions of the earth.182 More importantly,
he argues that we can take from God's speech a strong sense that humans are just one ofmany
parts of an incredibly diverse and awesome creation. In other words, it is not humans who are
to be seen as the center of creation, but God - it is a theocentric vision. Gunton, I believe,
178 Gunton, Christ and Creation, p. 34.
179 Gunton, "The Spirit Moved Over the Face of the Waters," p. 201-202.
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oversteps this theological truth by placing far too much importance on the personal creation.
To be clear, the problem is not one of substance ofGunton's argument, but one of emphasis.
The second objection is closely related to the first and returns us to the issue of
nonhuman agency/actancy. In his depiction of the 'cultural mandate', Gunton seems to
envision human agency being exercised in such a way as to assimilate the always passive
non-personal entities into the redemptive realm of the personal. By this I mean to say that
Gunton seems to find in the redemptive human cultural activities of art, worship, and science,
an always human agency at work, so that the non-personal creation adds nothing but bulk and
passive matter to the always human cultural and artistic enterprise. Latour, as we have seen,
armed with an ability to register nonhuman actancy, has painted a very different picture of
human engagement with the nonhuman. His is an understanding of technical action or artifice
which understands a kind of human and nonhuman being in becoming. Humans do not merely
impose their artistic or technical vision onto a fully passive matter. Said otherwise, humans do
not mentally 'build' or 'project' worlds before they are lived.183 To use the Latourian
language we encountered earlier in the chapter, human 'programs of action' always encounter
nonhuman programs of actancy. The products we call 'cultural' are then to be understood as
emergent properties produced in the tangle of practice. Thus the 'cultural mandate' which
Gunton supposes, appears to rely on a totally purified human agency with no appreciation of
the non-personal additions to the final product. Artists, architects and scientists alike can
readily attest to the nonhuman additions which often complicate and redirect their respective
engagements with the material realm. Moreover, one need not ascribe anthropomorphic
agency to the non-personal in order to account for nonhuman participation in 'cultural'
creativity. In closing we may summarize all of these comments on Gunton's over-emphasis
on the 'cultural mandate' by stressing that he appears to have made humanity transcendent to
nonhuman nature in such a way as to threaten losing sight of the continuity between human
and nonhuman creation.
Loss ofthe Nonhuman Dimension ofBiblical Covenants
We may conclude this line of argumentation concerning Gunton's geographical
blindspots by referencing one clear and paradigmatic example of his consistent ability to
overlook nonhuman participation in sociality. In The One the Three and the Many, before
dispatching Hardy's claim that sociality may be understood to be a transcendental category,
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Anthropologist Tim Ingold has made this point wonderfully clear with his contrast between the
'building perspective' and the 'dwelling perspective'. His comments on this topic are also highly
amenable to Latour's nonmodern vision. See especially chapter 10 of his book The Perception ofthe
Environment: Essays in livelihood, dwelling and skill, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000). We
return to this point in chapters 4 and 5.
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Gunton claims that sociality is best understood in light of the Biblical concept of covenant.
Gunton explains:
It is significant here that the Bible has given us a word for social relations which
allows neither a purely individualist nor a merely legal constmal. It is that of
covenant. Covenant expresses above all the calling of the human race into free and
joyful partnership with God, and so with each other.184
One may locate in this summation of the social character of covenant a rather blaring
omission of the non-human/non-personal realm's participation. To be sure, not all of the
Biblical covenants are of the same type. Some are more clearly established with individual
humans (Abraham), while others are established with whole people groups (Israel). But what
is missed by Gunton is what several theologians and biblical scholars have understood as the
distinctly socio-natural content ofmany of the biblical covenants. Where Gunton has found
only a 'calling of the human race' into 'partnership with God', BernhardW. Anderson has
found a deeply non-human or 'ecological' component. Speaking to the Noachic covenant of
Gen. 8-9, Anderson finds that 'when one reads the creation story in its scriptural context it
becomes clear that God's covenant embraces the whole of creation.' Moreover, the covenant
with Noah 'is universal in the widest sense imaginable. It is fundamentally an ecological
covenant that includes not only human beings everywhere but all animals.. .and the earth
itself.185
A final example may be drawn from the covenant embodied in the land Sabbath
described in Leviticus 25. 2-5. Here we learn that as the Israelites enter the land promised to
them they are instructed to allow their fields to lay fallow every seventh year. Now the strictly
ecological benefit of allowing fields to lay fallow every seventh year is unmistakable,
especially on the type of land the Hebrew's were farming which was fragile and susceptible to
erosion, soil exhaustion and eventual desertification. Yet the benefit of the land Sabbath and
year of Jubilee runs much deeper than simply good ecological practice. In Leviticus we learn
that every fiftieth year is to be a jubilee where the land is to enjoy a special type of Sabbath,
the fields will again lay fallow, all pasture land will be returned to its original owner, and
servants or slaves will be set free. At its heart, we find the land Sabbath to consist of a cosmic
covenant, made between Yahweh, Israel, and the land itself. Moreover, it makes inescapable
the fact that the land is the Lord's, given in tmst to Israel.
The impact the jubilee will have in terms of social justice is also difficult to miss.
Here we find that there is a very definite social intent to Israel's interaction with the land -
with this place they call home. Like the land itself, every fifty years the slave will be set free
and debts forgiven. Moreover, the stranger in the land, the widow, and the poor, will all be
184
Gunton, The One the Three and the Many, p. 222. (emphasis in original)
185 Bernhard W. Anderson, From Creation to New Creation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), p.
156.
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allowed to eat what the land produces. Essentially, these are stipulations on what constitutes
neighborliness in a cosmic order that sees both nature and culture, the land and the people,
bound together in covenant and practice. Proper agricultural practice - human interaction with
the nonhuman - is inextricable from neighborliness. Or as Michael Northcott has clearly
framed the matter: 'In (this) cosmic covenant, the land is not just the context on which Israel
works out her covenant with Yahweh, but a part, a vital part, of the covenant community
itself.'186 Thus the Sabbath is not unlike the Noahic covenant before it, where Yahweh was
found to enter into covenant, not with human creation alone, but with the whole of nonhuman
creation as well - promising to never again threaten creation with destruction.
We are here very close to what has become one of several ways of speaking of nature
as inherently social. It is often argued that 'natures' and 'cultures' are inextricable from one
another when seen from within the tangled practice of everyday life. Moreover, these
covenants indicate a socio-natural vision that is highly compatible with Latour's
understanding of our 'collective' existence. It appears now that Gunton is perhaps correct in
indicating that the Bible has given us, in the form of covenant language, an appropriate model
for conceiving of social relations, yet - as Latour might say - he has altogether failed to see
the covenantal model of sociality in an appropriately 'symmetrical' fashion. We may
conclude with the observation that all of these geographical blindspots add up to a rather
pronounced risk of committing to a kind of 'social narcissism' where only humans are seen to
contribute to the dynamics of horizontal relationality.187
Conclusion
In what has been a necessarily lengthy chapter we have now seen that Gunton and
Latour's respective projects are capable of engaging in a mutually critical yet constructive
dialogue. As he have compared the two projects through the unifying themes of otherness,
mediation, and unity, we have come to see that Latour's nonmodernism is in need of a
theology and Gunton's trinitarian theology lacks an understanding of the socialization of non-
human/non-persons. Thus we leave this chapter at the level ofmutual critique with an eye to
the final two chapters of this thesis where we will attempt to constructively organize a
mediating solution around the geographical concept of place/placing. Here it will be my
intention to highlight the ways in which trinitarian theology may benefit from a largely
nonmodern concept of human and nonhuman relationality that finds its locus in the relational
and geographical concept of placing. By bringing trinitarian theology into conversation with
the dynamics of placing we may be better able to register the importance of the 'middle
186 Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996) p. 187.
187 The term belongs to Daniel W. Hardy, God's Ways with the World, p. 84.
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kingdom' which Gunton's theology is altogether incapable of describing in any detail. The
shape ofpart three ofhis thesis will then begin with a full chapter dedicated to the
development of a nonmodern-inspired concept ofplacing. In the final chapter of this thesis we
will take up the task ofappropriating the language ofnonmodern placing and applying it to a
distinctly theological and trinitarian framework.
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Part III - Placing Humans and Nonhumans
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Chapter 4
Geography, Time, and the Collective: placing the nonmodern
[W]e do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and
things. We do not live inside a void that could be colored with diverse shades of light,
we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one
another and absolutely not superimposable on one another.1
- Michel Foucault
Introduction
Through chapters 2 and 3 we have surveyed the increasingly important contributions
made by the fledgling field of science studies by focusing on the work of one of its most
prolific spokesmen, Bruno Latour. We have also reviewed some of the motivations for, and
methods of, describing a relational ontology which makes no apriori distinction between
humans and nonhumans, subjects and objects. In this effort we have also begun to see that
agency/actancy in the nonmodern constitution is understood to be a relational achievement
amongst a 'parliament of things', or a 'collective' that is constituted through networks and
associations of both humans and nonhumans. Interestingly, this work has now begun to make
a distinct impact on theorists within the various spatial sciences of geography, as well as
architecture, philosophy, environmental studies, and even museum studies. What has been of
particular interest to 'human' geographers2 is the well-known species of science studies called
actor-network theory (ANT). Most closely associated with the Latourian brand of science
studies many geographers have sought to critically adopt ANT-based insights into their
specifically spatial/placial theorizations. In this chapter we will review the interaction
between the Latourian nonmodem project (ANT) and the emerging 'hybrid' geographies
which are now beginning to populate the geographical field. We begin by focusing on the
reworking of the concepts of space and time within the nonmodern mode. We then move to
consider the wonderfully rich geographical concept ofplace/placing. Place, as we shall learn,
is a concept which emphasizes so much ofwhat has been missed in recent Christian doctrines
of creation and relational anthropologies such as that ofGunton. The concept of place/placing
is an active and dynamic means of registering the hybridity or the deep relationality that
proliferates amongst humans and nonhumans, and thereby enables us to more fully register
these critical relations which modernity served to obscure.
1 Michel Foucault, "OfOther Spaces," p. 23.
2 The use of inverted commas is intended to indicate that the term 'human' is being subjected to
increasing scrutiny within the field known as 'human geography'. Thus questioning the 'human' in
human geography will be a reigning factor throughout this chapter.
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I. Network Geographies
Geography Under the Modern Settlement
In the century just passed, the disciplinary field of geography has been polarized
along the lines of what we have seen Bruno Latour describe as the modern Constitution - that
is, the dichotomization of natural sciences and social sciences. Early in its movement towards
solidification as a legitimate university department the field of geography was greatly
influenced by the reigning school of logical positivism and attendant scientific methodology.
In its effort to achieve scientific legitimacy as a stand-alone discipline, geographers began to
focus their analysis upon 'physical' or 'empirical' phenomena, thereby leaving the 'social'
aspects of spatial differentiation in the background. It was, therefore, the field of 'physical
geography' which served to firmly establish the discipline within the permanent university
structure in the first half of the 20th century.
An early revolt against the physical and quantitative school of geography was led by
the new practitioners of 'behavioral geography'. This approach took human cognition as its
central point of interest and regarded the 'knowledge and perceptions of decision-makers as
equally or more important than the physical and economic conditions of the environment. '3
These behavioral approaches to geography can trace a lineage back to the early 1920's when
quantitative approaches held the most ground, yet it was not until the 1950's - largely through
the work ofGilbert White at the University of Chicago - that behavioral geography began to
be widely accepted throughout the discipline. Yet as Steve Pile has recently pointed out, this
brand of geography 'consistently operated through what is actually a radically unstable set of
dichotomies, such as those between external and internal worlds.. .and between Mind and
Nature.'4
In the 1970's geographers disillusioned with the failures of behaviorist approaches to
human/geographical relationships began to investigate new epistemological traditions in order
to reinvigorate the struggling geographical project. Borrowing heavily from phenomenology,
the new school of 'human geography' began to develop its own particularly humanistic
concept of the geographical triad of space-place-nature. Human geographers, such as the
preeminent Yi-Fu Tuan, began to grapple with the idea that humans can experience a 'sense
of place,' or conversely a 'sense of placelessness,' which suggested that place(s) could
somehow bear meaning and even participate in human identity. This new approach presented
3 Arild Holt-Jenson, Geography History and Concepts: A Students Guide, Third Edition (London:
Sage, 1999), p. 216.
4 Steve Pile, The Body and the City: Psychoanalysis, Space and Subjectivity (London and New York:
Routledge, 1996), p. 43.
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a strong challenged to the standing schools of positivist geography which took only
observable phenomena as a valid form of knowledge.
As early as 1953, Glenn Trewartha, a physical geographer, noted in his presidential
address to the AAG (American Association ofGeographers) that there had begun to develop a
rather unfortunate bifurication of the discipline into physical and cultural camps.5 This
lamentable rift within the discipline has continued into the present with 'physical' and
'human' geographers setting up offices on separate ends of geography faculties the world
over. Furthering the internal rift, each end of this dichotomized field has now established its
own journals for its own style of professional publication. In spite of this radical severing of
the field, much has been done in the last ten years to establish geography as a distinctly
'synthesizing' discipline. In fact, several geographical thinkers have argued that geography is
uniquely situated to effectively carryout a synthesis of the 'major branches of knowledge in
the sciences, social sciences, and humanities.'6 Human geographer Patricia Grober, in her
own recent presidential address to the AAG has insisted that human geographers 'can no
longer afford to characterize geography as exclusively or mainly a social science discipline.
We are today a hybrid', she argues, 'of science, technology, social science, and the
humanities.'7 Clearly, the tide within this once polarized discipline has now begun to shift
back towards a greater synthesis and hybridization of concern.
Towards Nonmodern Space-Times
As part of this movement towards a deeper synthesis between the two sides of the
corridor, physical and human geographers have recently begun to seek out new philosophical
frameworks which might aid in this movement towards greater synthesis. Therefore, the
relationship between human and nonhuman entities has begun to attract increasing
concentration from human geographers eager to dissolve the old dichotomy. In fact, the more
progressive forms of this reassessment of the geographical task have led towards a desire to
question and transgress the discipline's namesake - that is its designation as being 'human'.8
For several geographical theorists, particularly in Britain, the recent developments within the
field of science studies have been of increasing interest. Human/cultural geographers such as
Nigel Thrift, Sarah Whatmore, Jonathan Murdoch, and Nick Bingham along with science
studies writers (most ofwhom belong to sociology departments) like John Law, Annmarie
Mol and Kevin Hetherington are just a few of those who have been most directly dedicated to
5 Glenn Trewartha, "A Case for Population Geography," Annals ofthe Association ofAmerican
Geographers 43 (1953).




8 This task has been taken up by Sarah Whatmore, "Hybrid Geographies: Rethinking the 'Human' in
Human Geography," chap, in Human Geography Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
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bringing spatial thinking to bear on the work of Bruno Latour and others within the fold of
ANT.
As we have already indicated, much of this geographical reflection upon the insights
ofANT has revolved around its dissolution of a dualistically conceived human subjectivity
and nonhuman objectivity. As will become clear, the primary goal of this chapter is to further
elucidate this task of challenging the traditional geographical mode ofbinary thinking. There
has, however, been a more generalized realization that nonmodern thinking may greatly aid in
reinvigorating the geographer's concept of space and time altogether. In a recent geographical
exegesis of various contemporary philosophies, several geographers have come together to
investigate the multiple 'species of space' that now populate their field and the academe as a
whole. In their edited volume Thinking Space, Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift have sought to
compile a body of essays that seek to develop 'space as process and in process (that is space
and time combined in becoming).'9 The essay contribution by Bingham and Thrift in this
volume seeks to specifically assess the impact of the work ofBruno Latour and Michel Serres
as it continues to be adopted into the geographer's realm of spatial theorization.10 In this
interesting chapter the authors point out that the great contribution of these two thinkers is to
be found in that
they have sought to repopulate space and time with all the figures that have been
stripped away by an idea of abstract division, by concentrating instead on movement,
on process, on the constant hum of the world as the different elements of it are
brought into relation with one another, often in new styles and unconsidered
combinations. In other words they are attempting to rediscover the richness of the
world...'11
Certainly, for the ANT theorist, space is far more complex than the Euclidian system of fixed
points ofproximity and distance which the modems so eagerly embraced. This is the same
Euclideanism which posits that objects of three dimensions are thought to exist within a
similar three dimensional space. Objects such as these may then move through this space
without deformation as long as they do not occupy the same point/place as another object. But
for an ANT inspired approach, space is always more than the grid-like surface of the
Enlightenment thinker whose distinction between local and global relations could comfortably
remain unquestioned.
9 Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift, "Introduction," in Thinking Space, Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift
(London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 3. (emphasis and brackets are in the original)
10 Latour has often cited the work of his colleague Michel Serres as being particularly influential in his
own spatio-temporal thinking. Thus the two authors are often mentioned in the same breath by human
geographers interacting with ANT and nonmodern thinking. Latour's extremely interesting interview of
Serres has been published as Michel Serres with Bruno Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and
Time, Trans. Roxanne Lapidus (Ann Arbor: The University ofMichigan Press, 1995 [1990]).
11 Nick Bingham and Nigel Thrift, "Some New Instructions for Travelers: The Geography ofBruno
Latour and Michel Serres," in Thinking Space, p. 281. (emphasis in the original)
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What Latour and Serres have sought to achieve is a radical interrogation of our
received understanding of space and time as 'primitive terms'. This requires that we
understand that 'space and time are no longer conceived of as existing "independently as an
unshakable frame of reference inside which events and places would occur," but, conversely,
as the result of inter-action, "consequences of the ways in which bodies relate to one
another'".12 Immediately we should notice that space is here the result of relationships
(networks) established between a multiplicity of heterogeneous objects or quasi-
objects/subjects. This merits two important preliminary observations. First, this nonmodern
approach precludes any alliance between actor/actant-network theory and 'social
constructivist' approaches to space and place which geographers as a whole have too often
been tempted towards. Secondly, this approach should be strictly distinguished from similar
phenomenological and psychological descriptions of'lived' space-time - that is, 'subjective'
space-time proposed in polemic distinction to the 'objective' space-time of scientific reason
and its cold 'timeless and spaceless apparatus.'13 The pitfall of this approach, according to
Latour, is that the phenomenologist and psychologist are still operating within the dualistic
mode of the modern settlement. They have simply and uncritically adopted the opposite of the
'objective' Enlightenment ideal, opting instead to focus on the alternate pole of the purified
dichotomy - namely, the subjective.
Phenomenology deals only with the world-for-a-human-consciousness...
phenomenology leaves us with the most dramatic split in this whole sad story: a
world of science left entirely to itself, entirely cold, absolutely inhuman; and a rich
lived world of intentional stances entirely limited to humans, absolutely divorced
from what things are in and for themselves.14
In describing the world of a wind-surfer, Latour further reveals his distaste for
phenomenological accounts of 'lived worlds': Latour protests that 'he is not in a human,
subjective, psychological, mental time-space. I want no part in this painting job, where [the]
"lived" world adds false but warm colors to a real but bleak reality made ofmeasurement.'15
Clearly for Latour, the 'lived world' of the phenomenologist and psychologist does far too
little to upset the reign of the human subject.
Due to the influence ofANT and nonmodern thinking, geographers are now very
interested in unraveling the 'material relationality' through which space and time are thought
to be 'produced'. Building upon the insights ofANT, theorists within the spatial sciences are
now beginning to take notice of the once ignored ubiquity of things, objects, human and
nonhuman, which combine into variably stable and unstable networks of heterogeneous
12
Ibid., p. 289. (emphasis in the original)
13
Latour, "Trains of Thought: Piaget, Formalism and the Fifth Dimension," Common Knowledge 6, 3
(1997): p. 170.
14
Latour, Pandora's Hope, p. 9.
15
Latour, "Trains of Thought" p. 171.
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associations. But what this relational ontology does to our received notions of space is a more
complex matter altogether. John Law and Kevin Hetherington have sought to outline a few of
the spatial implications ofwhat they describe as a 'relational materiality'. They argue, with
the assistance of Latour's nonmodern project, that 'spatial phenomena', such as globalization,
are 'made by materials which are in space—but which also have spatial effects'.16 Upon this
thinking, networks ofmaterial relations create variable spaces of their own. That is, spatial
phenomena, such as global flows (economic or cultural), are produced through material
relations that are sustained on a global scale. Law and Hetherington illustrate the point with
what is now a well-known historical example within ANT circles of a heterogeneous network
in practice; that is the Portuguese spice trade with India.17 Here they trace all the socio-
material mediations (networks), the Portuguese Man ofWar ships, trading companies, maps,
compasses, trained soldiers, etc., which served to establish Portuguese power (agency) at a
distance. Yet we might equally well look at the distances, or spaces, created through
technologies and various material arrangements which produce information in our
contemporary computer-assisted networks. In both cases multiple technologies move
information with great speed thereby resulting in variable spatio-temporal outcomes. For
instance, Law and Hetherington will argue that 'the City of London is closer to Wall Street
than it is to inner-city Salford.'18 The technological - that is socio-material - relationships
between these two places have served to bring them closer in space and time. In fact, through
multiple networks these two places have created a variety of space-times particular to their
own networking.
The ImmutableMobile
In order to fully understand nonmodern space-times we must return to a concept
which received only a briefmention in chapter 2. One of Latour's most enduring
contributions to the field of science studies has been his description of the 'immutable
mobile'. Sometimes referred to simply as 'inscription,' the immutable mobile serves to denote
the work of transforming any kind of entity into a material sign. Most commonly, Latour will
describe how a scientist will enroll, mobilize, enlist, translate, inscribe, and circulate these
immutable mobiles which are nothing less than the 'life blood' of the sciences. Importantly,
this life blood consists of countless representations that are both durable and capable of
mobilization such as maps, charts, graphs, emails, academic journals, books, etc. Immutable
16 John Law and Kevin Hetherington, "Materialities, Spatialities, Globalities," in The Spaces of
Postmodernity, Michael J. Dear and Steven Flusty (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), p. 393.
17 See for instance, Law, "On the Methods of Long-Distance Control: Vessels, Navigation, and the
Portuguese Rout to India," in Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology ofKnowledge?, John Law ed.
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).
18 Law and Hetherington, "Materialities," p. 393.
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mobiles such as these will often be of such a nature that they will be easily presentable,
legible, and capable of recombination. For science to work, that is for local knowledge (truth
claims about a nonhuman or human entity that is often produced in a lone laboratory) to be
made universal, information must be translated and inscribed into some form of nonhuman
entity or media - the knowledge must be 're-represented'. Furthermore, this inscription must
be made able to travel the world (mobility) without losing its shape or changing the
information being mobilized (immutability). Local truth claims can now be mobilized and
made available for argumentation at a distance. The 'world' - nonhumans in natural science
and humans in social science - is now understood to be effectively loaded into scientific
discourse by way of translating local knowledge into various immutable mobiles.
We can now see that the immutable mobile sits near the heart of nonmodern thinking,
as it is a further means of transgressing the modem divide between epistemological and
ontological questions. Similarly, as ANT practitioners trace the immutable mobile through
and across networks, it serves to transgress the modem belief in a gap between words and
world. For instance, the philosopher of science will often demand that epistemological and
ontological questions never be confused, but as we have seen, a nonmodem account demands
that this modem dichotomy be transgressed. As Latour insists, 'ifwe were to follow the
philosophers' advice we would not understand any scientific activity, since confusing those
two supposedly separate domains is precisely what scientists spend much of their time
doing.'19 The scientists are directly implicated in the proliferation of hybrids. Therefore, the
nonmodem thinker is interested in unpacking how it is that scientists load or translate
nonhumans into human discourse in order to be ultimately persuasive. In sum, we may think
of the study of immutable mobiles as the study of the socialization of nonhumans.
The circulation or networking of these immutable mobiles effectively constitutes the
'vascularization of scientific facts'. Or as Latour puts it otherwise; 'Disciplining men and
mobilizing things, mobilizing things by disciplining men; this is a new way of convincing,
sometimes called scientific research.'20 But singular and independent immutable mobiles do
very little for the 'propping up' of scientific truth claims on their own. Therefore, the very
essence of networking is directly implicated in the idea ofwhat Latour will call 'circulating
reference' or scientific 'vascularization'. As we have already seen, and will describe in more
detail later in this chapter, this concept of the immutable mobile and circulating reference is
responsible for the 'network' portion of the ANT style. In fact, the immutable mobiles may be
understood as networks in themselves, that is, they hold together because they are networked
and supported through multiple relations. As John Law makes clear,
19
Latour, Pandora's Hope, p. 93.
20 Ibid., p. 96.
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immutable mobiles are themselves a network, an array. They are objects. But they
also pass down or through a network, held in an array of secure and stable
surroundings. If the circuit is broken then the [immutable mobile] starts to degrade,
loses its form, and turns into something else.21
This is a point we will take up again as we look further into the spatiality of networks and
network-objects (the two can hardly be separated). Moreover, it is the immutable mobile that
is capable of traveling these networks without deformation due to their ability to make
heterogeneous relations of people and things hold stable at a distance.
This leads us to what has become one of the more important points of nonmodern
spatiality; that is, space is not a natural category, it has not been established in 'the order of
things.' For the actor-network thinker, spaces and distances are created through the
'immutable mobile' and the materially-mediated relations between places. 'The argument is
that distance demands communication and interaction. Its very possibility depends on
communication or interaction. It depends on joining things up within - and thereby making -
a single space.'22 What is clear in all of this is that for the nonmodern thinker geographical
space is performed through constellations of socio-material relationality - space is the
outgrowth ofmaterially heterogeneous effects. Or as Latour himself argues, spaces and times
are the result of 'reversible and irreversible displacements ofmany types ofmobiles. They are
generated by the movements ofmobiles, they do not frame these movements.'23 Space-times
are then numerous and diverse co-existing networks that are never pre-given in the 'order of
things'. In fact, there may be as many space-times as there are types of relations or networks.
Moreover, being heterogeneous, networks cut through the full spectrum of the collective - the
'parliament of things' - drawing together elements which we often describe as purely social,
natural, spiritual, political and technical. Interestingly, Nigel Thrift has referred to this radical
refashioning of space and time as the 're-timing of space and the re-spacing of time.'24
II. Repopulating Time
Topology and the Local / Global
The nonmodern understanding of space-times further encourages us to rethink our
received modern notions of the local and the global. As we have already seen, heterogeneous
and material relationships, or networks, serve to wrinkle and fold space-times. For instance, a
single office in London's business district is certainly located in the global geographical space
which we have all experienced and are part of. Yet it is also the material things like emails,
21
Law, "Objects and Spaces," Theory, Culture, and Society 19, 5/6 (2002), p. 93.
22 Law and Hetherington, "Materialities," p. 396.
23
Latour, "Visualization and Reproduction," in Picturing Power: Visual Depiction and Social
Relations, Gordon Fyfe and John Law (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1988), p. 25.
24
Thrift, "Afterwords," Environment andPlanning D: Society and Space 18 (2000): p. 221.
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faxes, postal services, telephones, and all the other performances of these 'materially
heterogeneous links which maintain the mobilities between places, and define the distances.'25
For Serres and Latour, networked space-times are most easily understood as the folding of a
simple handkerchief. As Serres explains;
If you take a handkerchief and spread it out in order to iron it, you can see in it certain
fixed distances and proximities. If you sketch a circle in one area, you can mark out
nearby points and measure far-off distances. Then take the same handkerchief and
crumple it, by putting it in your pocket. Two distant points suddenly are close, even
superimposed. If further, you tear it in certain places, two points that were close can
become very distant. This science of nearness and rifts is called topology, while the
science of stable and well-defined distances is called metrical geometry.26
This 'topology' or 'topography' which Serres speaks of is now radically changing due to our
proliferation of hybrid collectives. The term 'topology' is itself taken from a branch of
mathematics which seeks to explore 'possible' spaces. As Law has elaborated, these spaces
would include 'what we tend to think of as 'space' in Euro-American common-sense, which
is geographical or Euclidean in character.'27 But he adds that this Euclidean space is just one
spatial possibility among many. There are, in fact, many topologies or spatial circumstances
in which objects may find their relational being. Topology is the science which then seeks to
describe these spatial, and thereby temporal, possibilities.
The enlistment or socialization of numerous nonhumans into our human collectives,
according to Latour, is now also having a dramatic impact on our understanding of scale and
distance. Relations are now being sifted into varying degrees of localization or globalization.
But as Latour points out, this is a misguided outlook as networks resist strict purification into
local/global, micro/macro categories of scale. We may take Latour's example of one rather
visible network ofboth human and nonhuman entities - a railroad - in order to flesh-out these
interesting points of topological thinking. Latour asks:
Is a railroad local or global? Neither. It is local at all points, since you always find
sleepers and railroad workers, and you have stations and automatic ticket machines
scattered along the way. Yet it is global, since it takes you from Madrid to Berlin or
from Brest to Vladivostock. However, it is not universal enough to be able to take
you just anywhere...The railroad model can be extended to all the technological
networks that we encounter daily.28
Within the nonmodern milieu we are no longer forced to choose between local and global
perspectives since the very notion of the network affords us the ability to think ofparticular
things as related globally while remaining continuously local. No longer must we oppose the
micro and the macro, local or global, but may instead follow the relational networks which
25 Law and Hetherington, "Materialities," p. 397.
26 Serres with Latour, Conversations on Science, p. 60.
27
Law, "Objects and Spaces," p. 94.
28
Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 117.
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perform an entity as strategic or less-than strategic. Strategic entities will be composed of
many strong and stable networks, while those with few associations or weak associations will
be less-strategic. This recognizes, as Latour has illustrated, that the 'prevalence of geography'
or the 'tyranny of distance' has been one of the greatest barriers to seeing all 'associations in
terms of networks'.29
We can now see that for the nonmodern thinker distinctions between local and global
are largely unhelpful and without merit. They are, in fact, a fossil of the modern settlement.
The moderns saw themselves as truly revolutionary in their privileging the universality of
sciences that were taken in abstraction from their local situation. 'They thought there really
were such things as people, ideas, situations that were local and organizations, laws, rules that
were global.'30 But like the railroad, networks are made up of a series of local interactions that
are either rather long, or rather short. Therefore, spatial scale is redirected towards the
topological. Or as Latour summarizes; 'The two extremes, local and global, are much less
interesting than the intermediary arrangements that we are calling networks.'31 Here, space
and time have been liberated from their modern position as 'Newtonian sensoria' or internal
{apriori) frames of the mind's perception. This is to say, they are no longer primitive terms,
but rather, the results of the ways in which things - bodies, people, rocks, buildings, rabbits -
relate to one another, networking and associating.
Nonmodern Timing
Space and time are extremely difficult to differentiate or speak of in abstraction from
one another. Certainly, this is a point which has not been lost to Latour and Serres. Both of
these thinkers have done much to formulate what we will continue to call a nonmodern view
of time. As we have already seen, space-time is for Serres akin to the folds of a handkerchief
- a view which closely parallels the 'origami' approach to space-times belonging to Deleuze
and Guatarri.32 Thinkers such as these insist that time cannot be easily simplified and
formalized. In fact, time, and thereby space, is produced in multiplicity. Serres helpfully
elaborates on these points in his 'conversations' with Latour, here he explains that
As we experience time...it resembles this crumpled version much more than the flat,
overly simplified one... Admittedly, we need the latter [metrical time] for
measurements, but why extrapolate from it a general theory of time? People usually
29
Latour, "On Actor-Network Theory: a Few Clarifications," Soziale Welt 47, 4 (1996), p. 371.
30
Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 120.
31 Ibid., p. 122.
32 See for instance, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (London: The Athlone Press, 1988); or Marcus Doel,
Poststructuralist Geographies: The DiabolicalArt ofSpatial Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1999).
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confuse time and the measurement of time, which is a metrical reading on a straight
line... No, time does not flow as people think it does.33
Here we are cautioned to never confuse 'classical' or 'geometrical' time with what is often
described as 'real' time. Serres will often highlight the insight which the French word for time
can provide in this instance. He explains that it is 'by chance or wisdom' that the 'French
language uses a single word, temps, for the time that passes and for the weather outside'.34
This serves to highlight the way in which our experience of time - using 'modern' language
we would say both internally (subjectively) and externally (objectively) in the natural world -
better resembles unsettled and ever-changing weather systems than it does the predictable and
incremental passage of classical time. Indeed, time can be tempestuous or rather fair.
There is also an important element ofmateriality which will aid the nonmodem
thinker in repopulating time with the whole of the collective. As Latour points out a
nonmodem understanding of time will find its fulcrum in the 'relation between transportation
and transformation.'35 These processes of transformation and transportation are deeply
entwined in the materiality which we have seen is so important to nonmodem (or ANT)
understandings of space. In his 1996 seminar paper on the topic of space-times, Latour argues
that '"time" is not something that is in the "mind" or that is in "thought" by a mind, but
something rooted in a long material and technical practice of record-keeping, itself merged
into institutions and local histories.'36 Therefore, a nonmodem sense of timing, according to
Latour, will seek to once again bypass the dichotomized notions of subjective and objective
time all together. To do this, Latour calls for the recognition of a second dimension. That is, a
dimension that will prioritize the recognition of the amount of labor or work which goes into
the act ofmoving through the web of space-time. At base, Latour sees this effort as his
attempt to bring spacing up to the same philosophical prestige as timing.
As we have seen, traditional philosophical debates concerning time were broken into
the two realms of subjective 'lived' time and objective 'real' time. But in the interest of
breaking out of this dichotomy, Latour proceeds to employ a thought experiment by telling
two parallel stories of traveling fraternal twins. One of the twins is comfortably seated on a
European bullet train and easily travels along a network which others have constructed to
express great efficiency ofmovement. The other twin, however, is said to be traveling on foot
along the same route but through the thick forest adjacent to the rail line. The second twin
must then use a hatchet to cut a path through the forest. For her, 'each centimeter has been
won over through a complicated "negotiation" with other entities, branches, snakes, sticks,
33 Serres with Latour, Conversations on Science, pp. 60-61. (emphasis in the original)
34 Serres, The Natural Contract, Trans. Elizabeth MacArthur and William Paulson (Ann Arbor: The
University ofMichigan Press, 1995), p. 27.
35
Latour, "Trains ofThought," p. 172.
36 Ibid., p. 171.
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that were all going in other directions and had other ends and goals.'37 The argument then
revolves around the different productions of space-time which each traveler will now
experience. Here timing depends upon an ontological difference rather than an 'internal'
quality of apperception, or an 'external' metric or measured time. The difference is to be
found in the divergent number and nature of heterogeneous others which each traveler
encounters along their path. To clarify the point Latour invokes the language of
'intermediary' and 'mediation' which we have just described in chapter three. Latour explains
that the timing which each traveler experiences depends on the nature of these heterogeneous
others which they encounter along the way. Latour asks:
Are they well-aligned intermediaries, making no fuss and no history and lending
themselves to a smooth passage [Like the smooth running rail network], or full
mediators defining paths and fates on their own terms? Are they more of the same—
that is intermediaries—or are they really others—that is mediators?38
The well-aligned intermediaries will gently transport the traveler relatively unchanged from
one location to the next, whereas 'full mediators' will have 'counter programs' of their own -
to use the language of the last chapter - and severely tax the body for each meter of travel. It
is here that we are to find the ontological difference between the two timings. Latour can
situate each of the twins within a second dimension - a dimension outside 'classical' and
'lived' times - where we are able to take 'into account the ratio of transformation over
transportation or else the number of mediators compared to the number of intermediaries.'39
The train traveler experiences very little transformation in relation to the distance traveled.
Moreover, this twin will experience very little physical or 'lived' aging. The space traversed
is then relatively timeless. Alternatively, the forest traveler will experience a much higher
degree of transformation in relation to transportation - time and ageing will have been
exacted upon the body as it encounters a number ofmediators rather than networked
intermediaries. Any gain in spatial transportation is then taxed with a rather hefty amount of
transformation.
We now begin to see this second dimension, the dimension of labor or work,
beginning to reveal itself in the folds of timing and spacing. The forest traveler produces a
series ofmediations as she works to cut a path and experiences the labor and transformation
involved in transportation. For him space and time are indistinguishable. Any gains of spatial
transportation bring upon a more pronounced awareness of time - this is what is often,
unhelpfully, called 'real' time. On the other hand, the train traveler literally rides upon the
work of others - engineers, conductors, technicians. His transportation is taxed with very little
transformation thereby dissolving the role of the multiple intermediaries which make his
37 Ibid.,
38 Ibid., p. 174. (the brackets and the emphasis are my own addition)
39 Ibid., p. 173.
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travel possible. Moreover, his sense of time will be far different to that of the forest traveler,
as for him 'time is like nothing,' it is merely 'lived' time. But thinking in terms ofpurely
'real' and 'lived' time only takes account of the autonomous train traveler in a world where
only he exists. All of the other entities involved in making time have faded into the
background. If the train were to break down short of its destination, cranky passengers would
quickly be made aware of the masses of silent others - human and nonhuman - who had been
responsible for their comfortable transportation without transformation. Certainly, we can say
that 'time passes or not depending on the alignment of other entities.'40 What all of this serves
to suggest is this: if other entities are necessary to our very existence, as Latour argues, then
there will exist a multiplicity of timings and spacings. We are never simply alone in our
subjective 'lived' time, but are instead wrapped up in our necessary associations with many
other persons and things, all of which contribute to the times and spaces we experience. Now
we may come to understand why Latour and Serres's philosophy of space and time is often
called the 'repopulating of space and time', for they have brought the full collective to bear on
these once absolute or internal categories. Moreover, it is for this reason that we are advised
to speak of time in terms of the dynamism which the French word le temps captures. In light
of this we will proceed by speaking of the verb timing.
III. In-Human Geographies
Nonmodern AgencyZActancy and Geography
We have now covered the spatial significance of the 'network' portion of the ANT
'style', which carries the most overtly spatial outworkings of the approach. But there remains
the extremely important, and radical, application of Latour and Callon's 'generalized
symmetry' to the geographical project. The 'actor' portion of the theory is critical, for it is
responsible for policing the boundaries ofwhat is allowed to constitute andperform agency.
Although we have already introduced the basic shape of the nonmodern understanding of
agency/actancy in chapters 2 and 3, we must now give further depth to the account in order to
understand its uniquely spatial outworkings. As we have seen, the nonmodern will
consistently stress that agency is never an internal quality possessed by an individual subject.
Instead, agents are always to be understood as relational effects. Now that we have slowly
introduced the topic of agency in the last two chapters we may now definitively outline a
number of observations concerning the attribute of agency as it is conceived within actor-
network or nonmodern thinking.
First, as we have seen above, in nonmodem thought networks are composed of a
multiplicity of things rather than always purified 'social' networks where only humans may
40 Ibid., p. 174.
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be seen to express agency. We may then conclude that humans are never able to act on their
own.41 A common-place and highly visible network, such as a railroad, will consist of
engineers, tracks, stations, manuals, passengers, money, and numerous complex machines.
Thus, the network is composed of both humans and nonhumans. It is what we might call
'materially heterogeneous'. This takes us back to Latour's understanding of societies as
'collectives' or 'parliament's of things' that are always much more than purified social
actions and negotiations. We have also seen that society, for the actor network theorist, is
composed of all the material things of the network just as it is composed of people. John Law,
reflecting Latour's 'missing masses', puts it this way: 'If human beings form a social network
it is not because they interact with other human beings. It is because they interact with human
beings and endless other materials too.'42 Indeed, ANT consists of a ruthlessly symmetrical
approach, which applies relationality to all materials and not just those who happen to possess
the capacity for language. 'Thus an agent is a spokesperson, a figurehead, or a more or less
opaque 'black box' which stands for, conceals, defines, holds in place, mobilizes and draws
on, a set of juxtaposed bits and pieces.'43
Secondly, the actor-network approach turns our attention towards performativity. By
focusing on the materially heterogeneous networks within which entities achieve their form,
ANT is similarly obliged to describe how these entities are 'performed in, by and through
those relations.'44 This carries with it a similar effect to what we have witnessed for
networked space above. That is, entities are not seen to be given in 'the order of things' -
indeed, they are nonessential. Instead, entities, of any stripe, are understood to be radically
contingent and ultimately uncertain and reversible. In an interesting study, Annemarie Mol
has argued that anaemia is actually performed in many different ways and each performance
is often seen to be closely associated with particular places.45 For instance, anaemia is not
performed in the same way in a laboratory as it is in a health clinic. For the lab technician
anaemia is performed as a low hemoglobin count, where as the doctor would see anaemia
performed through descriptions of dizziness, the appearance of the skin, and other generally
visible symptoms. This has led Mol to suggest that things - entities, agents, quasi-objects -
are 'done and enacted rather than observed.'46
41 We will recall that this is one of the main oversights we identified in Gunton's account of the
'cultural mandate' and his strong anthropological emphasis.
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Thirdly, and as we have already seen, ANT does not limit agency to the human realm
alone. Again, this accounts for ANT's recently developed regret for their early adoption of the
word 'agency' itself. The problem is that the terms 'agency' and 'actor' are too often limited
to humans alone. Latour and others have sought to rectify the regrettable adoption of these
exclusive words by replacing them with the more widely functional terms of 'actant' and
'actancy ',47 Here it may be helpful to bring the discussion back to the work of 'translation' as
ANT theorists use the term. For it is largely through translation that agency/actancy can be
extended to all sorts of things. In its essence the term acts to ferry between the purifications of
the modernist settlement. It does this by embodying all the 'transformations so typical of the
sciences; like "inscription" or "articulation".... In its linguistic and material connotations, it
refers to all the displacements through other actors whose mediation is indispensable for any
action to occur.'48 For instance, in scientific practice charts, graphs, samples, notes,
photographs, and texts are allowed (if correctly gathered) to stand as equivalent to the original
thing being evaluated. A translation has taken place in order for one actor to carry out a
further action. This is what we have seen clearly expressed in the 'immutable mobiles' we
reviewed earlier. By virtue of their ability to travel and circulate without deformation these
hybrids or socialized nonhumans are able to extend action at a distance. They are part of a
network where actancy is fully distributed amongst the heterogeneous human and nonhuman
members.
This point on translation and nonhuman actancy is critical to the overall project of
science studies, and by extension, that of human geography. Therefore, we would do well to
review just one example (or story) which Latour has offered which seeks to embody the
spatial effect of 'translation' and 'immutable mobility'. Here we will focus on his well-known
description of that uniquely frustrating artifact called the 'sleeping policeman' or 'speed
bump'. As we have seen, techniques, artifacts, and all of the material fabrications of homo
faber are, for Latour, translations of human expressions and intentions. Yet they are much
more than the 'simple denizens' upon which we load up a world of discourse. Techniques
modify the matter of expression and not simply the form.49 Such is the case when campus
engineers endeavor to translate their goal of getting cars to slow down by sticking a lump of
cement in the middle of the road. As Latour explains, the engineer's goal to get cars to slow
down is translated into a technical mediator, which in turn translates into the driver's goal of
not damaging the car's suspension. The expression of'slow down' has been changed from a
verbal command, or visible road sign, to a lump of cement in the middle of the road. What has
47
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taken place is 'a change in the very matter ofexpression' .50 Latour goes on to insist that much
of our language is incapable of expressing what has taken place in this technological
mediation of the engineer's wishes. Words like 'objectified,' 'reified,' or 'materialized' are all
too biased towards expressing the sole agency of the human, whilst the contribution of the
nonhuman is made opaque.
Here we must briefly return to Latour's account of the 'technical mediator' for this is
crucial to our point concerning distributive actancy and its geographical outworkings. We
may recall that through his multiple examples of technical mediation - we have already
reviewed the handgun example - Latour is not suggesting that technology is nothing more
than human discourse made solid in a way that can be easily re-fabricated in any number of
differing media.51 If this were indeed the case, then the transition from 'hey slow down' to the
lump of concrete would count for nothing, the technological mediator would be meaningless.
Moreover, this would simply take us back to the modern settlement where the 'material world
confronts us only to serve as a mirror for social relations and a source of entertainment for
sociologists.'52 Instead, Latour argues that technological mediation should be understood to
encompass the action of the mediators themselves. In this we may now see that the artifact is
no longer the silent and obedient intermediary between society (meaning) and nature
(material). The meaning of this translation is now, in part, 'constituted, moved, recreated,
modified, in short expressed and betrayed' by the technological mediator (the hybrid). The
'sleeping policeman' has gone from abject object to assuming 'all the dignity of a mediator, a
social actor, an agent, and active being.'53
What the moderns saw as an abject object, the nonmodern sees as a socialized
nonhuman, hybrid or actant. Michel Callon summarizes these points in stating that it 'is
precisely because human action is not only human but also unfolds, is delegated and is
formatted in networks with multiple configurations, that the diversity of the action and of the
actors is possible.'54 Or we may again witness Latour who states: 'Action is simply not a
property of humans but ofan association ofactants... .Provisional "actorial" roles may be
attributed to actants only because actants are in the process of changing competences, offering
50 Ibid.
51 It is on this particular point that Lambert Van Poolen appears to have totally misread Latour's
understanding of technological action by speaking of Latour's vision of the artifact as encompassing a
'textual' reading of the artifact. For Latour, artifacts are much more than mere 'hermenuetical texts', but
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one another new possibilities, new goals, new functions.'55 Indeed, things are full of people
and people are full of things.
Topology ofDistributedActancy
Latour and other ANT thinkers have been keen to highlight the spatio-temporal
outworkings of this nonmodern view of technological mediation or actancy. For instance,
Latour points out that in the case of the 'sleeping policeman' a triple shifting is being played
out. First, in this example there is an 'actorial' shift from engineers to a mass of concrete.
Secondly, this shift is also manifest spatially as there is now a new actant in the middle of the
road. Finally, there has taken place a temporal shift as the engineers are no longer present but
something reliable holds the enunciation of the engineers in place as they are now represented
by an artifact.56 This is what Latour calls 'shifting down'. The engineer's program of action
has been shifted down allowing a complex combination ofboth absence and presence to take
place. The engineers are not there, but their actions, their shifting down or delegation of
action is still present through the mediation of this new actant. This hybrid enacts - performs
- a new topology as it 'carries past acts', or far away acts, 'into the present and permits its
many investors to disappear while also remaining present.'57 Time and space are being
reordered through this 'distributive' or shared actancy of the heterogeneous materials which
compose the network.
There is another important element to this topology of networked spaces which
concerns the durability or stability of the network-actant. Earlier we noted that ANT thinking
implies a radical contingency in regard to spatialities and objectivity. Wc argued that these are
constituted through a material relationality that is not present in the 'order of things,' but is
rather performed through contingent heterogeneous associations. This leaves open the
question of the durability of certain networks and object/actants. For what radical contingency
suggests is that object/actants can be adopted into other networks or multiple networks
depending on the relative stability or instability of the network. When networks are strong the
objects enrolled into that network, and their relationally achieved actancy, are held in place.
Conversely, networks that are relatively unstable have a greater difficulty in maintaining the
objectivity/actancy of its heterogeneous components. Similarly, these unstable networks are
unable to consistently perform a network space. We may then say that a network-object/actant
implies a stable shape within a network space. As network actancy becomes distributed and
made durable, spatiality then becomes an aspect of network stability. Law and Mol have made
55 Ibid., p. 182. (emphasis in the original)
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the point rather concisely in stating; 'Spatiality is an aspect ofnetwork stability ',58 This is to
say that the distributed actancy of a network, if stable, produces its own topology. If the
network fails - the train jumps the tracks, or the sleeping policeman disintegrates - so to the
topology, the spacing, fails.
Finally, it should be made clear that Actor-Network Theory has done much to
destabilize Euclideanizm by emphasizing the performative character of the heterogeneous
relations which serve to compose network-objects/actants. It is also important that we notice
that ANT does not seek to completely subvert Euclidean space - that is, space of constantly
held three-dimensional coordinates. We might make this point more clearly by returning to
Latour's concept of the immutable mobile. For what the immutable mobile achieves is a
simultaneous codependency on both Euclidean and network space. According to Latour, the
immutable mobile exists in two spaces, or two topologies. The 'immutability' represents its
belonging to network-space in which it does not move (mutate or transform) or else it would
cease to be itself. For instance, if the network of software, hardware, people, and electricity -
the network - which moves an email across the Atlantic were to fail, producing a jumble of
words on the other end, the network would have failed to maintain the network-object in
network space. Similarly, if the author of a scientific paper does not conform to the practices
of scientific convention in writing her article it may prove unreadable or otherwise useless
once it reaches its destination. Again, the network would fail to hold the object/actant stable
in network space. The 'mobile' portion of the term refers to the object's ability, say the
journal article, to move through Euclidean space. Certainly, the two 'species of space' are
closely linked. As Law and Mol make clear, 'it is that immutability in network space which
affords the immutability and the mobility in Euclidean space.. .it is the interference between
the spatial systems that affords the [network-object] its specialproperties59
Nonmodern thinking approaches space as a performance between the humans and
nonhumans which inhabit the network topos. In doing this, it seeks to undermine the
reifications associated with Euclidean topologies, and reveals this spatiality and its objects as
relational performances that are caught up in a process ofbecoming. Latour neatly
summarizes these points in writing; 'The notion ofnetwork helps us to lift the tyranny of
geographers (in the modern constitution) in defining space and offers us a notion which is
neither social nor 'real' space, but associations.'60
58 John Law and Annemarie Mol, "Situating Technoscience: an Inquiry into Spatialities,"
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IV. The Human Geographical Concept of Place
At the beginning of this chapter it was indicated that human geography has
traditionally taken the triad of space, place and nature as its central area of analytical concern.
We have also highlighted the new movement towards achieving greater synthesis between
physical and human geographical approaches. Integral to this shift has been an upsurge in
theoretical debate within the social sciences and humanities concerning spatial thinking.
Furthermore, it has become altogether clear that Actor-Network Theory has been one of the
more rigorous and exciting new exchanges to have been initiated between the social sciences
and the spatial science of geography. Now that we have reviewed the spatial and temporal
outworkings of an actor/actant-network approach, it is time we gave some attention to the
other third of human geography's triad - that is, the concept ofplace.
Place in the Modern Settlement
It has been deeply inscribed within the geographical tradition that the fundamental
difference between space and place resides in the idea that place is something subjective,
human, meaningful and altogether warm. We might think, for instance, ofwarm places
saturated with projections or 'social constructions' of human desire and emotion:
grandmother's house, the church of your baptism, or childhood home. Space on the other
hand, especially Euclidean space, is thought to be something objective, meaningless, inhuman
and generally cold. Thinking of space we tend to conjure thoughts of largely meaningless
grids on a map: latitude and longitude, arbitrary political boundaries with ninety degree angles
and straight lines, or a featureless expanse of ocean. Within this dichotomy we may easily
identify what Latour has diagnosed as the fallout of the modern Constitution. Space is seen to
be populated by sheer materiality, abject objects, and meaningless nonhumans. Whilst place is
understood to be distinctly human, subjective, thoroughly social, and ultimately meaningful.
It then comes as little surprise to find that geographical interest in the concept of
place has largely fallen under the domain of human geographers. As it began to borrow
heavily from the field of phenomenology, early in the 1970's the new school of 'human
geography' began to grapple with the idea that humans can experience a 'sense of place,' or
conversely a 'sense ofplacelessness.' What this suggested was that place(s) could somehow
bear meaning and even participate in human identity. As it gained ground the new humanistic
movement presented a strong challenged to the standing school ofpositivist physical
geography which, as we have already highlighted, took only observable phenomena as a valid
form of knowledge. Today it is clear that the concept ofplace has now been firmly
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established as a central conceptual term within the field of human geography and has
henceforth spawned a legion of theoretical approaches and philosophical definitions.
Today the concept of place remains a hotly contested concept within human and
cultural geography. Yet even in this midst of this diversity, there remains a wide-spread
assumption that turning space into place - that is, investing space with meaning, or ordering
space - is purely and exclusively the expression ofhuman intervention or subjectivity. This
has led a large proportion of human geographers to assume that place is always something
which is 'socially constructed,' whereas space alone is thought to be 'real' or present 'in the
order of things'. As Kevin Hetherington has put the matter: 'Contemporary geographical
discourse only sees the difference between spaces and places and, in doing so, it has tended to
make the material world disappear and to replace it instead with culture with all its symbolism
and meaning.'61 By way of example we may mention one of the most celebrated of the early
founders of the field of human geography, Yi-Fu Tuan. In his widely read early addition to
the place conversation, Space andPlace, Tuan provides a wonderfully rich account of the
human construction and experience of various places, but in true modern fashion it seldom
leaves the confines of human 'lived worlds', in order to seek out the moments ofmaterial
participation in the act of placing.62 More recently, Marxist geographer David Harvey has
argued that places 'are social constructs and have to be read and understood as such'.63 In
even stronger words, he insists that ifwe are to 'write of "the power ofplace," as if
places.. .possess causal powers is to engage in the grossest of fetishisms; unless, that is, we
confine ourselves rigorously to the definition of place as a social process'.64 Place is here
defined in the first instance as a human projection ofmeaning, and secondly by a dialectical
movement between material and ideal. Nicholas Entrikin's The Betweenness ofPlace, stands
as a good example of a geographical concept of place which seeks to balance positivist and
phenomenological approaches. On this view, place is a concept that 'incorporates both the
existential qualities of our experience of place and also our sense of place as a natural
"object" in the world'.65 Yet even here there is little of any account of nonhuman
participation, or actancy, within the dynamism of place.
What is clear is that human geographical theories of place have been fundamentally
defined by humanist discourses. Moreover, what this approach reveals is an unquestioned
61 Kevin Hetherington, "In Place of Geometry: the materiality of place," in Ideas ofDifference: Social
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assumption that place is concerned with an agency that is all but exclusively the domain of
humans. This has been the case 'even when places are seen to be contested and open to
multiple interpretations—the current position advocated by many cultural geographers,' such
as Gillian Rose and Rob Shields.66 All of this works to suggest that the geographical concept
of place has suffered much of the same problems which have plagued the traditional
understanding of space in the modern vein of thought. This is to say that 'place' has been
purified into the realm of the subjective and humanist discourse, while space has been deemed
the sole preserve of the physical and positivist inspired approaches. Thus it was understood
that the physical geographer would find interest in the space between things, towns,
mountains, or chairs in a room - she was interested in the cold and largely meaningless
materials found within formally defined geometrical space. The human geographer was
alternatively seen to find interest in the meaning invested or 'projected' upon places by
individual human subjects or their larger collective societies. The human geographer would
then investigate a space/place for its underlying revelations of social convention or
construction. The physical geographer's tools consisted ofmeasuring devices, remote sensing,
and satellite imagery all employed to interrogate non-vocal nonhumans. Whereas the human
geographer circulated numerous surveys in order to extract impressions and feelings from the
exclusively agential humans.
Placing in the Nonmodern
Human/cultural geographers have been rather quick to embrace nonmodern thinking
in their effort to reinvigorate their working concepts of place. Interestingly, several
geographers have highlighted the general lack of attention paid by ANT theorists - within the
parent field of science studies - to the particularly geographical category of place. In fact,
several geographers have indicated that there exists a 'place-blindness' within many ANT-
based studies. One of the leading ANT-informed geographers, Nigel Thrift, has noted that
thinkers such as Latour are quite skilled at describing how things 'dwell' with us and 'haunt'
us, yet they miss how this haunting quality relates to the geographical concept ofplace in
particular. It is certainly true that ANT theorists have done much to unravel the peculiarities
ofparticular places such as laboratories, offices and even hospitals, but they have generally
failed to grasp the importance of place as a working concept that is, in a sense, portable. The
problem, as Thrift sees it, is that 'Latour and other actor network theorists often fail to see the
importance of place because they are reluctant to ascribe different competences to different
aspects of a network or to understand the role of common ground in how networks echo back
66
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and forth, often unwittingly.'67 Hence much of the ANT-based theorization of place has been
left to geographers to work out on their own. There is now, however, a growing realization
that place studies are a potentially important part of actor/actant-network thinking. This has
led theorists such as Hetherington, who is himself a sociologist by training, to lend sustained
attention to the importance of place as a general concept rather than simply approaching
specific places such as museums for study and interrogation. It is in this spirit that there is
now a developing account of what a specifically nonmodern concept of place/placing might
entail. Once again, we are not concerned here with this or that place in particular - that is to
say were are less concerned with specific places such as home, church, laboratory, nation -
but rather with the concept of place/placing that may be used to describe our collective being
of humans and nonhumans wrapped up in a dynamic common world. Equally important is the
point that we are not here concerned with 'reviving a sense of place' so as to 'reactivate the
care of the environment' as some theological commentaries on place have attempted.68
Instead we are now seeking to develop a working concept ofplace/placing that is capable of
registering the intimate relations between people and things. Thus our concept of
place/placing should always be understood as a dynamic and performative and dynamic
happening between humans and nonhumans. Thus in the final estimationty places/placings,
like spaces/spacings, are always multiple and wrapped up in a kind of relational becoming.
Further in this vein of thought, actor-network theory and nonmodern thinking have
offered a rather well articulated critique of some of the more recent, yet still modern, concepts
of place which we have just reviewed. For instance, we have seen that ANT wholly rejects
any attempt to resolve the modern dichotomization ofNature and Society through an appeal
to dialectics. As Latour will often argue, dialectical reasoning is just as faulty as the old
dualist notions which plagued the moderns. At its base, dialectical thinking tries to overcome
the dualism of the modem project not by subverting its basic constitution, but by accepting
the dichotomy of pure ontological realms and imagining a series ofmediations between the
two modem poles. Tme dialectics, according to Latour, speaks of nothing but mediations, but
in truth they are merely 'intermediaries that transmit pure ontological qualities' - the hybrid
or the quasi-objectvity of the collective is then buried even deeper.69 We may equally cite
(idles Ueleuze who insists that any 'combination of opposites tells us nothing; it forms a net
so slack that everything slips through'.70 Therefore, Latour brands the dialecticians with the
honor ofbeing 'incontestably our greatest modemizers, all the more powerful in that they
67 Thrift, "Steps to an Ecology of Place," chap, in Human Geography Today (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1999), p. 313.
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seemed in fact to have gathered up the totality of knowledge and the past and brought to bear
all the resources of the modem critique.'71 Drawing on this, we will surmise that a nonmodern
concept of place will necessarily be drastically different than that of the early human
geographers or that ofHarvey and Entrikin. According to the nonmodern geographers we will
review below, these approaches have relied too heavily upon the modem, or postmodern,
symptom of dialectical thinking.72 What we need is a nonmodem concept of place/placing
that is informed by the ANT principles ofmaterial relationality that may serve to better
register the intimate ways in which persons and places/placings 'take their form and acquire
their attributes as a result of their relations with other entities.'73 Indeed, this will ultimately
be a concept of place that is 'constructed' or 'composed', but as Latour is fond of saying, it is
certainly not 'socially constructed'!
V. Placing and the Heterogeneous Network
How then are we to bring the nonhuman back intoplacet Or posed differently, how
might we bring heterogeneous materiality back into the concept of place so as to dismpt the
reign of human subjectivity and agency? Here we will draw on the work ofANT-inspired
spatial theorists such as Hetherington and Thrift, but also their important philosophical
foremnners Michel Foucault and the intellectual team ofGiles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.
Each of these writers is interested in re-envisioning the actual composition of space and place
as heterogeneous and relational. For instance, Hetherington appeals to Foucault's example of
a ship floating upon shifting seas, which he used as an illustration in his well-known paper
titled OfOther Spaces.74 Hetherington asks us to imagine the ship to be functioning much like
place itself: 'It is something that stays in one location but moves about within networks of
agents, human and nonhuman.'75 This should sound quite similar to what we have already
reviewed of nonmodem spacing. Earlier we said that for the nomodem theorist space-times
are the relational outcome of heterogeneous materials bound up and ordered by the actants
which compose the network itself. What the ship floating upon the sea begins to illustrate is
the critical point that place/placing is a process of relationships which emerge, fold, dissipate,
rise and fall. In fact, place, for the nonmodem thinker, is less about stasis and more about the
dynamics ofplacing - a socio-material happening in space-time. It is for this reason that we
71
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have tried to avoid the exclusive use of the more static term 'place' and instead opted for the
more dynamic verb form of the word - 'placing'.
It is helpful here to recall that network-space works in tandem with Euclidean,
Cartesian and regional understandings of space. The two are not mutually exclusive
topologies. Place itself is the outcome of these two topologies intersecting and sustaining one
another. Like the ship floating upon the water, place moves, bobs, and shifts upon the ever
rearranging networks of heterogeneous materials and actants. This is to say that place/placing
is actively sustained upon network-space, and once again place/placing is itself an ordering
effect of those networked actants. Euclidean space is also at work here, since places are
ultimately reliant upon some measure of stasis within geometrical/geographical space.76 For
instance, it almost goes without saying that you can always go back to the location of
Edinburgh castle, Yosemite Valley, or your favorite cafe, that is, as long as they are not
somehow destroyed. Such would be the case if our mythical boat were to run aground, its
network relations would fail and the ship would be dispersed across Euclidean space - thus it
is no longer immutable. Therefore, immutability belongs most intimately to network-space,
while mobility and speed belong to geographical or Euclidean space. In sum, to speak of place
is to speak ofmultiple topologies creatively and dynamically intersecting.
Placing and Similitude
Hetherington considers further the necessity of understanding similitude as a
fundamental concept within our nonmodern concept ofplacing. This is a point which he has
drawn largely from Foucault's concept of 'heterotopia' or 'other place.'77 Foucault described
places that were non-discursive sites or places that were defined by tension or contrast and
whose existence established an odd socio-spatial juxtaposition. Heterotopias, such as prisons,
madhouses, and even honeymoon suites, were thought to bring together an unlikely amalgam
of unusual things and bestow upon them a singular meaning by creating a space that allows
the performance of an alternative social ordering. 'Heterotopic relationships unsettle because
they are out ofplace, their juxtaposition to a settled representation makes them appear
anomalous and uncertain.' Moreover, as Hetherington highlights, the 'meaning attached to
these uncertain sites is one derived from similitude rather than resemblance.'78 Like network-
space, heterotopias do not exist in the order of things. Instead, they become sites where an
alternate ordering is allowed to take form. Today we might think of the Glastonbury Festival
76 It is my understanding that this temporary 'stasis' of place/placings which nonmodern geographers
sometimes appeal to is not unlike what Harvey has called relative 'permanences', at least as it applies
to his own understanding of place. See his Justice, Nature and the Geography ofDifference, p. 294.
77 Each of these concepts is most clearly addressed in Michel Foucault, The Order ofThings (London:
Travistock/Routledge, 1989); and "Of Other Spaces".
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site or the many English new age traveler sites ofwhich Hetherington has produced detailed
studies as being contemporary forms of heterotopia.
Heterotopias are, however, more than just sites of difference; they are equally sites of
otherness. Like the ship floating upon the ocean, places exist in a process of boundary work.
They are not established on either side of a boundary, but rather as Hetherington insists, they
are constituted through work itself. And this is where similitude and otherness really come to
the surface in the nonmodern understanding ofplacing. For what similitude involves is 'the
juxtaposition of things not usually found together, or which have no ordered meaning together
and the ambiguity that they create in terms of representation. Similitude sets up a heterotopic
space.'79 Hetherington further suggests that it is this focus on representing similitude that is
critical to our understanding of a nonmodern concept of place. This is because 'place is the
effect of similitude, a non-representation that is mobilized through the placing of things in
complex relation to one another and the agency/power effects that are performed by those
arrangements.'80 We will have more to say on 'non-representation', a concept Hetherington
has borrowed from Thrift, in the next section.
It is here that subjectivity becomes the product ofplacing rather than the always
already formed addition to the cold and meaningless materiality of space, which modern
understandings of place have eagerly held to. Ifwe are to follow Foucault and Hetherington in
thinking of places as the effects of similitude, we are then one step closer to conceiving of
place outside of the traditional terms of human subjectivity. Here places are seen to be
dynamic movements 'through material placings, through the folding together of spaces and
things and the relations of difference established by those folds.'81 Subjectivity is not the
detached and purified entity which stands in abstraction from this process of folding relations
together, but rather, it is the outcome of this folding. This also suggests that places are never
finished products, but rather, they are always lacking and unfinished. Hetherington further
suggests that because of this, places are always odd and without structure in themselves.
Instead ofproducing an ordered structure, places, on the contrary, establish a system of
differences that requires an order. It is this ordering which the concept seeks to embody. That
is to say, place/placing is this process of ordering, which works to make sense of the
similitude. What is critical in all of this is the realization that the process of ordering/placing
is not somehow present in the 'mind in there,' or the 'world out there.' The ordering process
is to be understood as being established within the actor/actant-network, not by subjects alone,
but by the 'labour of division associated with the difference of placing.'82
Hetherington,




It is now clear that the concept of place within actor-network thinking is better
understood in its verb-form rather than its noun-form. Place/placing is a dynamic happening
from moment to moment that is always unsettled in both network-space and Euclidean space.
Thus the term place/placing should always conjure thoughts of relational dynamism and
incompleteness rather than sheer permanence or stasis. Moreover, place/placing should not be
defined by equal parts of geometric space and human mental projections or social
constructions. In fact, places should not be understood as completely fixed upon geometrical
space 'but free to move across the boundaries of geometry into some elsewhere which lies
beyond the limitations of subjective ways of representing objects and their spatial
83
distribution.' Place is not, therefore, something that stands for something else simply
because of its stasis in geometric space. Instead, place is now a relational existence of
similitude, that is a 'being in the process ofbeing placed in relation to rather than being
there.'84 What is by now clear is that the performance of place, or place as process, has
become a central idea in the nonmodern concept of place. Witness, for instance,
poststructuralist geographer Marcus Doel who has indicated that: 'Were being to be "em-
placed" or "contextualized," then it would simply be unbecoming'85 - place would, in effect,
be rest or stasis. Doel's concept of place centers entirely on the idea that 'place is an event: it
is verbal rather than nounal, a becoming rather than a being'.86
It is worth noting here the divergence between the views ofHetherington and Doel as
compared to those of Law. Recalling Law's well-known example of the Portuguese Man O'
War ships extending a network ofpower and control across vast distances, Hetherington
questions his view that networks simply allow one pre-established place (Lisbon) to effect
power in another pre-established place (Calicut). Hetherington makes the charge that this
would invoke a static view ofplace rather than the more dynamic understanding which ANT
strives to describe. Law argues that the Portuguese were able to control trade and authority in
India because they were better at enrolling extended heterogeneous networks to produce that
control (agency) at a distance. Yet ifwe are to stay true to the idea that place is constituted in
the process ofplacing, then we will see that Portugal and India are the places that they
distinctly are because of the mobile effects of the agency found within the heterogeneous
networks between them. It is the labor of folding networks together that establishes the places
as themselves. In other words, these places do not pre-exist their actual placing, they are their
placings.
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There is another important concept which has populated several of the actor/actant-
network based approaches to geographical understandings of place. This concerns the issue of
representation and place. In the preceding section we highlighted that places are constituted
through the dynamic act ofplacing. That is to say, they arrange and order various
heterogeneous networks and actants into systems of similitude and difference. But if places
are always in a state of becoming and incompleteness, then what is it that they might be able
to represent? Asked differently, what is it that signifies a place? Thrift has made this issue a
central component to his largely ANT inspired notion of place/placing. In an attempt to
address these questions, Thrift's project seeks to construct an understanding of place utilizing
a theoretical style which he calls non-representational 'theory'?1 This has led him to develop
a concept of place that, like Hetherington's, is deeply relational, dynamic and ultimately
mobile. What non-representation serves to embody is 'a sense of place in which "nothing
signifies" and which is able to "shove off to whatever's next'."88 Therefore, in this section we
will take a moment to further investigate these issues of (non-)representation and
place/placing.
Like most ideas which find their roots in ANT thinking, the question of representation
necessarily draws us back into discussions concerning Latour's immutable mobile. We will
recall that the idea of the immutable mobile was born out of the attempt to understand how
scientific knowledge could travel over long distances. Latour observed the seemingly obvious
fact that scientific data of all kinds, or knowledge, was collected, graphed, charted, and
otherwise inscribed as immutable mobiles - representations that could travel over distances
without deformation. These are knowledges which were once local, but may now travel and
be reproduced in a multiplicity of places. Hetherington and Thrift have made the point that if
these immutable mobiles are able to do this for scientific knowledge then they should apply
equally to other types of knowledge as well: 'in this instance knowledge of space, and what
we call place.'89
Indeed, places are heterogeneously assembled with the aid of these immutable
mobiles, but this has not always been a welcomed or celebrated phenomena. For decades, if
not centuries, writers have lamented a general and now global Toss of place'. We are, if these
87 The term 'theory' belongs in inverted commas because the intention for Thrift is to question what is
meant by 'theory' as a whole. See Thrift's Spatial Formations (London: SAGE Publications, 1996),
which is largely dedicated to exploring the specifics of this approach.
88 Thrift, "Steps to an Ecology of Place," chap, in Human Geography Today (Cambridge: Polity Press,
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thinkers are to be believed, in a crisis of place, and closely tied to this is a crisis of identity.90
To be certain, many theologians have picked up on this idea of a diminishing sense of place as
well.91 The argument has often centered on the growth of those immutable mobiles which we
often class as 'media'. With the advent ofprinting, books, newspapers, radio, television and
most recently the World Wide Web, we now have unprecedented access to distant places and
their meanings. This has spawned a vigorous debate concerned with assessing the impact of
'modernization,' 'globalization,' 'homogenization,' and technologically based 'space-time
compression'.92 Each of these often-discussed villains has shouldered some of the blame for
what many have considered our modem condition of 'placelessness' and the subsequent loss
of identity - personal, national, etc.. Places and their representations, as the argument goes,
are so common and widely circulated that places are becoming too similar. The world is
becoming a homogeneous wash of commercially motivated and wholly inaccurate or
disingenuous representations of place.
Interestingly, many recent geographical studies have largely rejected this general
thesis of modem 'placelessness' due to globally circulating representations. In fact, many
geographers have reasserted the importance of place despite our current climate of
technologically driven 'space-time compression' and the homogenizing effect of
globalization. Geographers Lewis Holloway and Phil Hubbard in their recent book entitled
People and Place, have flatly rejected the general thesis that places are now becoming all the
same.93 For geographers such as these the concept of a 'non-place' or of a wholesale
homogenization of places is out of the question. Indeed places are changing, but to suggest
that they are being wiped-out and rendered 'meaningless' is a step too far. After all, people
are fundamentally and constitutionally unable to exist in a 'placeless' and meaningless world.
Similarly, David Harvey - who coined the term 'space-time compression' - has suggested
that our technological breakthroughs have diminished geographical resistance to the flow of
people, things, and information. Yet he goes on to make the surprising claim that this 'does
not mean that the meaning of place has changed in social life and in certain respects the effect
has been to make place more than less important' 94 Many of these points are adopted and
added upon by Thrift in an interesting chapter titled A Hyperactive World. Here he argues that
90 As we will see in the next chapter concerning theological adoptions of place-language, discussions of
'placelessness' and the 'loss of place' have unquestionably been the focus ofmuch of the recent
investigations into place. See for example, Edward S. Casey, Getting Back Into Place; Joshua
Meyrowitz, No Sense ofPlace: The Impact ofElectronic Media on Social Behavior (New York/
London: Oxford University Press, 1985).
91 We will return to these theological accounts of the 'loss of place thesis' in the next chapter.
92 The term 'space-time compression' belongs to David Harvey but it has been picked up on by Gunton
who mentions this modem phenomenon in his The One, the Three and the Many, p. 77.
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the supporters of the 'loss of place' thesis are enthralled with an unhealthy, and ultimately
unoriginal, measure of nostalgia. In fact, Thrift concludes that such predictions of
homogenizing doom should be taken with 'a large pinch of deja vu'.95
There is now a growing case to be made for the ultimate inextricability of place and
representation. As Hetherington argues, these 'representations assemble and transform the
similitude of the materiality of space into the ordered arrangement of a place.'96 The
immutable mobiles - the representations - make a place knowable at a distance by creating an
order to a place. Each media representation, an advertisement, a film, a poem, makes a truth
claim about a particular place just as a scientific article might make a truth claim about a plot
of forest in Borneo. Moreover, it is through these networked and material representations that
we are able to establish the difference between one place and another. Here again it is not the
subjective world ofmemory, meaning, and image alone that assembles a place. But rather, it
is through the materially mediated and heterogeneous representations that this difference can
be recognized, and subsequently re-organized. This is because place, as Hetherington insists,
is about an ordering/similitude which is produced within the 'hum' ofmultiple heterogeneous
networks and associations of human and nonhuman actants.
Yet ordering or making sense of things, as Thrift is so concerned to illustrate, is
always relational, practical and based in performance. This is what his brand of 'non-
representational theory' strives to make plain. His is an ontology 'which works through things
rather than imposes itself upon them from outside or above.'97 By using the terms 'non-
representation theory,' Thrift is not supposing that the immutable mobile carries no
representation - or re-presentation - within itself. Instead, what Thrift is highlighting is the
realization that humans are unable to extract a representation of a purified non-human world
'because we are slap bang in the middle of it, co-constructing it with numerous human and
non-human others'.98 Therefore, non-representational theory insists that place is ordered,
produced, or practiced through a materially relational encounter with the world rather than
consisting of a purified mental extraction or projection from outside of it. Place is created
through 'disclosive skills' that are performative, embodied, mimetic and contingent. Clearly,
this is an approach owing much to the philosophical giants of the last century: Heidegger,
Foucault andWittgenstein.
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Another leading thinker in ANT-based geographical theorization is Sarah Whatmore
who has helpfully described this process as the 'representational moment.' By using these
terms, she is indicating that ANT does not posit a reality on the one hand and a representation
of that reality on the other. Instead, 'ANT recognizes chains of translation of varying kinds
and lengths which weave sound, vision, gesture and scent through all manner of bodies,
elements, instruments and artifacts - so that the distinctions being present and being
represented no longer exhausts, or makes sense of, the compass and possibility of social
conduct.'99 Here Whatmore makes the important observation that the representational moment
is far more than simply a visual phenomenon belonging only to the eyes, but rather that it
encompasses a more holistic sensual embodiment.
To summarize these points on placing and representation we may draw out a number
of important observations. First, nonmodern/ANT thinking in regard to the representation of
place is diametrically opposed to traditional models of representation. It rejects these on the
grounds that our re-presentations are not purely 'internal' phenomena which impress us with
some 'naturally' present reality. ANT thinkers will instead argue that it is always our
embodiedpractices that constitute our sense of the real.100 As we have just highlighted by
way ofWhatmore, place representations - or we should by now say presentations -
incorporate all of the senses and not merely the visual faculty alone.
Secondly, we can say that within an ANT-inspired view of placing, (re)presentations
- whether they are in the form of print art, film, music, poetry, literature, etc. - are not to be
understood as merely passive descriptions of those places. Instead, they have insisted that
representations themselves act upon the world or the specific place which they are
(re)presenting. It is for this reason that we may claim that representations are never
ontologically innocent. In fact, place itself constitutes what we might call a 'representational
labour of division that generates the subjects, objects, their relations, and the worlds in which
these exist.'101 Simply put, both subjects and objects are produced, ordered, practiced, and
coordinated through the process (work, labor) ofplacing. This element ofANT-based notions
of (re)presentation is clearly implicated in a process which Mol has called an ontological
politics.102 Law and Benschop explain that an 'ontological politics asks how it is that the
representational practices that make up worlds—and so the worlds made up in those
practices—co-ordinate themselves. How it is that worlds go together, or don't.'103
99 Whatmore, "Hybrid Geographies", p. 30.
100 Thrift, Spatial Formations, p. 7.
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Finally, it must be stressed that the (re)presentation of place, be it through media,
memory, dream or fantasy, is always much more than a product of the subjective/human
world alone. This is because the subjective world 'operates by assembling materials into
representations and using those representations to establish the difference between one place
and the next.'104 (Re)presentations, like immutable mobiles, make some kind of tmth claim
about the place in which they are (re)presenting - they aid in the performative ordering of the
place. We should also notice that the (re)presentation of place is itself tied up in the process of
placing. That is to say that is caught up in the creation of similitude which we reviewed
above. These two parts of the placing process are inextricable from one another. Placing
necessarily involves a labor of ordering and assembling places into 'knowable and
reproducible representations and the location of the representations in relation to others.'105 It
is through materially heterogeneous (re)presentation that places work to produce similitude
and otherness, identity and non-identity.
(Re)Placing Subjectivity: Memory, Materiality, andEvent
Remember through sounds.. .remember through smells.. .remember through
colors.. .remember through towns with fear and fascination, ofwhat was here and
what's replacing them now.106
Modest Mouse (Song Lyrics)
We have observed throughout this chapter that we are ill advised to speak of time,
space, and actors/actants as static entities given in the established order of the world. We have
instead noticed how each of these categories is better understood as a relational processes
which is 'verbal' rather than 'nounaT, an observation which has compelled us to instead
speak ofspacing, timing, acting, and nowplacing. These words serve to capture more fully
the way in which each of these processes are populated with a multiplicity of heterogeneous
quasi-objects/subjects, hybrids, and networks. Moreover, each of these terms serves to
highlight the fact that the whole of the collective is relationally implicated in each of these
processes. Thus rather than being jealously guarded exclusively for humans (modern place) or
nonhumans (modern space), the nonmodem concept of placing takes the whole of the
collective into account.107 This nonmodem concept of placing has now afforded us an
extremely useful language for speaking of the dynamic 'commerce' which exists between
humans and nonhumans. Furthermore, our nonmodem concept ofplacing has given us a way
104
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of conceiving of this geographical dynamic in way that escapes the modern tendency to see
place as static and fully 'fixed' by an always human agency/subjectivity.
Although we have done much to upset the 'reign of the human subject' in this
nonmodem concept of placing, there remains the difficult question concerning the role of
human memory in our experience of what we may call the 'placing event'. Earlier in the
chapter we made the important nonmodern observation that human subjectivity is itself a
product of the dynamic encounter between human and nonhuman. This is to say that human
subjectivity is not what meets a 'cold', passive, and altogether meaningless nonhuman world
in the placing event, it is, rather, the outcome or result of this relational event. But what are
we to make of the fact that places/placings such as homes, towns, churches, fields and forests
- and all of the human and nonhuman networks which find their dynamism within these
placings - can be left behind and, perhaps, returned to at a later time? But more importantly,
what are we to make of the fact that multiple placings remain with us in our memories of
them? Does the unique quality of human memory - setting aside for the moment the clear
possibility that many nonhuman animals share in this capacity - necessarily return us to a
heavily humanist discourse in relation to the placing event?
In order to address this concern, we will end this chapter by returning to Steinbeck's
place(ing)-narrative which we used to open the discussion in the introductory chapter of this
thesis. By returning to a concrete example of what Latour has called an 'event-producing
topos', or alternatively, a 'topos-producing event'108,1 believe we may be better able to
illustrate a nonmodem or symmetrical account of placing, as well as further delineate the role
which human memory may take within this dynamic. What we are now seeking is an account
of human memory which is able to avoid adopting the overbearingly 'modem' or 'humanist'
discourses which have served to diminish the role of nonhuman materiality in the 'event-
producing topos'. Moreover, through the employment of this single example of a placing
event - understanding that a single narrative will not necessarily capture the variety of
nonmodem argument - we may summarize and further elucidate our nonmodem concepts of
spacing, timing, placing, and acting. To be certain, placing is not a term which is easier to
grasp than time or space alone. This is because the placing event, as we have seen, actually
combines spacing, timing, and acting within the 'event-producing topos'.
We return, then, to Steinbeck's captivating narrative of the Joad family farm and its
multiple foldings and networks of human and nonhuman actants. As Steinbeck writes;
They sat and looked at it and burned it into their memories. How'll it be not to know
what land's outside the door? How ifyou wake up in the night and know - and know
the willow tree's not there? Can you live without the willow tree? Well, no, you can't.
108
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The willow tree is you. The pain on that mattress there - that dreadful pain - that's
109
you.
How might we now come to understand the willow tree, Tom Joad, the family farm, and their
multiple foldings and networkings in such a way as to capture our new found nonmodern
terms? Moreover, who or what is it that is making -performing - this place(ing); is it the
willow tree, Tom Joad, Steinbeck or all three? And once again, with all of this emphasis on
materiality and inhumanity, we will further seek to find out whether there is any 'space' for
human memory within this nonmodern account of placing.
Spacing
To begin with, we may now seek to illustrate the way in which we may speak of this
narrative in relation to our nonmodern concept ofspacing. Our first task is to highlight the
fact that all of the elements or actants - human and nonhuman alike - are folded into a
topology ofnetworked space. Here we may include the willow tree, Tom, dust, sun, and we
could even go so far as to add Steinbeck's book into the rather lengthy list of associated
actants. To be sure The Grapes ofWrath is a fictional narrative, but this hardly matters for our
purposes of illustration. Thinking of this space as topological in the first instance will liberate
us from the traditional 'tyranny of the geographer' by allowing us to define this space in terms
of heterogeneous associations rather than as a simplified and dichotomized space that forced
to conform to the polarized categories of either 'social' or 'real'. Therefore, the spacing that is
being performed through these associations is here defined as topological, heterogeneous, and
multiple.
Timing
Yet as we have made clear throughout the chapter, topological spacing always
implicates various timing(s) as well. But when we speak ofboth timing and placing - that is,
from a human perspective - we must also consider the important dynamic of human memory
and its relation to the placing event, as it must be recognized that places are often seen as
things which we return to again and again. For instance, we may leave a place for some
period of time and upon returning things may have changed materially but our memory of the
place will continue to endure through time. It is this type of dynamism between various
placings, timings, and human memory which Steinbeck is so adept at illustrating . Therefore,
we may now set out to describe the timings and memories (topos-producing events) which
this place narrative - the Joad family farm - evokes for its human inhabitants. Witness
Steinbeck's character 'Muley':
109 Steinbeck, The Grapes ofWrath, p. 101.
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I been goin' aroun' the places where stuff happened... there's the place down by the
barn where Pa got gored to death by a bull. An' his blood is right in that groun', right
now...I put my han' right on the groun' where that blood is still. An' I seen my pa
with a hole in his ches', an' I felt him shiver up against me like he done...An' all
them things is true, an' they're right in the place they happened...Place where folks
live is them folks.110
Admittedly, we are told by Steinbeck that 'Muley' is beginning to lose his sanity at this point,
'he's touched' as they say in the story. But this is an experience, a topos-producing event, to
which we can all relate. This further illustrates the worry which confronts the Joad family as
they are forced to leave behind their beloved farm and willow tree. They worry that all the
memories of joy, bitterness, and sorrow will be left as a fading memory in the rearview mirror
as they are forced to move westward. They are, in fact, anxious that all that time will be lost
along with the loss of place. For this farm had been a place/placing, a home, where the Joad
family could always return to again and again. But now their family's footprints will fade, and
tractors will gradually erase the material elements (actants) which populate this particular
place - the blood soaked ground and the willow tree which serve to perform this specific
place(ing) - will ultimately loose their immutable character and the place(ing) will itself take
up new spacings and timings and will become part of new networks.
But even if the family farm is plowed-under and made into an industrial farming
operation, the place will remain an element of the Joad family identity as it is remembered by
each family member throughout their lives. This is a point which is, of course, obvious
enough as it has been widely recognized that places and our memory of places are intimately
associated with our sense of personal identity and history.111 Therefore, we are once again
confronted with the extreme difficulty of separating spacing and timing into neat and purified
zones. A picture, a smell, a sound, could easily transport Tom back to this placing that is
distant in both time and space, but close at hand in his memory of this place(ing).
It is also clear that we only know of placing because we are able to return to the same
place over and over. Indeed, places (often) stay the same as we are free to come and go at
leisure. As Muley returns to the spot where his father was killed by a bull, the place - and all
of its heterogeneous networks, material or otherwise - itself becomes a fold in time, it has
actually become a part of time. The material elements of the barn and blood-soaked ground
are made as much a part of time as are the days, weeks, and years it may have been since the
incident (topos-producing event) actually happened. As Latour points out, it is only by
walking away from the place once again that the wanderer may 'conclude that this is a place
110 John Steinbeck, The Grapes ofWrath, p. 57-58.
111 None have made this specific point clearer than Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics ofSpace (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1969). Although as Hetherington has argued, Bachelard's commentary seldom escapes
the humanist subject: "In Place of Geometry", p. 197.
212
and not only a date.'112 Thus we are reminded once more of the immutable mobile - or in this
case immutable immobile - or rather, an object or artifact that remains relatively immutable in
a particular place. We, like Tom Joad, can compare the irreversibility of our aging bodies to
the reversibility of the willow tree's size. But here we must once again take special notice of
the nonmodern emphasis on the labor or work that is involved in the production of these
spacings and timings. For it is by returning to that place - the tree, the blood-soaked ground -
that it is worked into space rather than time alone. The event, the place, has been spaced,113 If
these nonhuman materials were not immutable to some degree, if they aged at the same tempo
as our bodies, we would be unable to measure the reversibility of shape. We would, in fact, be
unable to register the coming and going from a place - trees and barns would simply
deteriorate at the same rate as our bodies. Therefore, without memory and material
immutability the world would be a complete non-place of purified, perhaps static, space and
time for the human observer.
We must, however, exercise extreme caution on these points concerned with
elucidating the role of human memory in the dynamic ofplacing, as it may appear that we are
here arguing that placing is somehow wholly dependant upon the human subject. To be
certain, this is not the suggestion that I am here trying make. While I have clearly made the
opposite claim - namely, that human subjectivity is relationally dependant on the multiplicity
of nonhumans with whom we share our being -1 am not here suggesting that the dynamism
ofplacing is in anyway dependant upon human subjects. There have, of course, been a
number of human geographers - largely in the 'modern' mold we reviewed above - who have
strongly made this claim. Take for instance the words of geographer David Sack who in his
widely read book, Homo Geographicus, has developed a rather complex 'geographical
framework' ofwhich place is a major component. Concerning his concept of'place' Sack
clearly argues that' [t]he effects and even the existence of place (but not space) rely on human
agency or the self.114
There are, I believe, two things worth noting in regard to Sack's claim. First, we will
notice here the clear vestiges of the modern dichotomy between space and place we reviewed
earlier in the chapter. Take for instance Sack's insistence thatplace is an impossibility
without the participation of a distinctly human subject, whereas space is still considered to be
the 'cold' and brute materiality which populates the Euclidean dimensions. Secondly, by
insisting that place is dependant upon human subjects, Sack along with the many other
'modern' geographers who hold equally to this dualistic vision, must then address the
112
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question of whether or not 'place' can be said to exist where there is no human subject
present. Aware of this objection, Sack is compelled to offer what I take to be a thoroughly
'modern' distinction between what he calls 'primary' and 'secondary' places. 'Primary
places', Sack explains, 'involve human actions and intentions and have the capacity to change
things.' These 'primary places' are 'more artifactual or culturally constructed than secondary
place' and are thus 'virtually ubiquitous in human experience'. 'Secondary places' are those
few remaining corners of the globe which - if any such region may be truly said to exist -
have not yet felt the presence or impact of humans. As might be expected, Sack's main
example of a secondary place is the thoroughly modem notion of'wilderness'. 'Secondary
places', as Sack argues, 'simply exist, but if they become a part of our culture, they soon will
most likely become primary by acquiring meaning and social rules.'115 Sack's dualistic
distinction between primary and secondary place is closely married to his related concepts of
'first' and 'second' nature. 'First' nature most closely approximates the wildemess-like
'secondary place' as it has to do with a 'nature' that is not yet 'infiltrated by additional sets of
human elements'. But since 'place contains social relations and meaning. Place transforms
nature into a "second" nature, and subjects it to the structure and dynamics ofplace...
Somewhere along the continuum the meaning of nature is altered as it becomes a part of
place. Place turns it into a "second" nature.'116
A nonmodem account ofplacing avoids having to make this distinction between
'primary' and 'secondary' place, as well as 'first' and 'second' nature, by refusing to marry
the concept of placing to a modem humanistic, and ultimately dualistic, discourse such as that
of David Sack. This return to a humanist-dominated discourse can be avoided by holding to
two important nonmodem precepts, each of which falls short of denying the human capacity
for place memory. These include the nonmodem commitment to a symmetrical epistemology
and ontology as well as a symmetrical account of nonhuman actancy. What is needed is a
symmetrical account which begins in the 'middle kingdom' and not with the dichotomized
poles of 'warm' human subjects encountering 'cold' nonhuman objects. Thus ifwe are to
affirm a nonmodem and symmetrical account of placing that resists the dominance of a
humanistic discourse, yet is still capable of recognizing the (relatively) unique role which
human memory will often play in this process, we must return to the issue of nonhuman
actancy.
Acting
Returning again to Steinbeck's narrative of a topos-producing event, we may now
address more closely the role which nonhuman materials play within this dynamic. 'In this
115 Ibid., p. 32.
116 Ibid., 180.
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too we have to consider not just the thinking, remembering subject but a heterogeneous
materiality that is the fabric of such a memory.'117 Thus we must rejoin Hetherington by
posing an important question concerning a nonmodem understanding of this place-memory
relationship. That is: 'To what extent, therefore, can this be seen as an effect ofmaterials?'118
A question closely paralleling this would ask 'who are the actants in this placing'?
Certainly, we would not say that the willow tree, the barn, or the blood-soaked
ground are capable of remembering their genesis or their history through metrical time. But
what we must insist upon is the understanding that the placing event would be unthinkable,
indeed impossible, without these heterogeneous materials exercising their own form of
'actancy'. We will once again elaborate these points by way ofMuley's bam and blood-
soaked ground. The bam was probably built decades ago, and we know that his father
tragically died in this very spot when Muley was just a boy. But who or what has provided the
labor of the placing event - who or what are the actants in this placing? Or posed differently,
what is it that makes this a 'topos-producing event' for Muley? According to Latour the
answer is rather simple. Place is created through 'the [connection] of actions taking place in
different sites and times by various actants' - both human and nonhuman.119 The wood for the
bam probably came from another state, since Oklahoma had few trees. The planks were likely
cut in an Eastern sawmill by immigrant workers using coal-fired machines. The nails may
have been crafted in a neighboring town with steel from Pennsylvania. All of these materials
'reach out' and connect in the folds of the spacings and timings they each serve to network
and mediate. Moreover, they encompass and enclose the labor of numerous actants who are
now distant in metrical time and space, but close at hand in network space-time. Or as
Hetherington has put the matter, 'the construction of place is impossible to conceive without
taking into account the translating effects of the material actants involved.'120 Thus while the
actual event of the tragic death ofMuley's father has 'produced the topos', it is the materiality
of this placing and the immutability of these nonhumans that has prompted a kind of 'return'
to the space-time place-event. In order to avoid a return to a humanist-dominated discourse of
place we must then remember the 'importance of the materiality of place in the process of
remembering... Materials are the texture of our memories and it is through their effects that
places come to be.'121 In this nonmodern scenario of place-memory we lose the distinctly
human agency upon which modem notions of place depend. Furthermore, what this
nonmodem vision of an 'event-producing topos' embodies is the universally held notion -
whether we think it superstitious, silly, or profound - that places, things, materials mediate
117
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and make present others who may be distant or even deceased. From this seemingly universal
realization, Thrift has spoken of places and things as carrying a 'haunting' quality.122
Finally, we may simply reiterate the importance of three things in this placing-event
dynamic; material immutability, the mutability of the human body, and subsequent returning.
As Latour has illustrated, placings such as Muley's become a relational matrix of networks
dispersed in time, space and action that are maintained through returning. For it is by coming
back to a site that an event-producing topos is finally instituted. The barn and blood-soaked
ground maintains its ordering, it 'occupies space, creates a landscape...not because it is a spot
"in" space, but because it is itself the event connecting interactions on a large spread of space-
time-actants. Here history was locally made and traditions continuously kept it in place. Thus
there is a place.'123 Stemming from this point is a near total negation of 'internal', and
thoroughly human, mental qualities. The event of placing is heterogeneous in character,
thereby involving the whole spectrum of nonmodern actants, both human and nonhuman. All
of these entities are here performing and carrying out the work of the space-time event of
placing. This is why we will never 'encounter time and space, but a multiplicity of
interactions with actants having their own timing, spacing, goals, means and ends.'124 Or as
Hetherington summarizes; 'There is human agency but there are other forms of agency too,
without which places cannot be.'125
Conclusion
Unlike the modern vision of space, time and place, nonmodern understandings seek to
transgress and bypass the traditional dichotomization of subject and object, or lived and real.
Within the distinctly nonmodern approach each of these terms has been reformulated to
incorporate a 'fifth dimension' ofprocess, performance, work, or labor. Therefore, we now
speak of space, time and place in their verb form: spacing, timing and placing. Yet these are
terms which are rendered meaningless without considering an extremely important fourth
term - acting. That is, acting which is not the sole possession of the human world, but is
rather extended to the whole of the collective. This is what the nonmodem theorists have
termed actancy. These shifts have led us to further examine the labor involved in the acts of
spacing, timing, placing. We have concluded that in the nonmodem framework, places are
socio-materially constituted through a process of ordering and similitude. The act ofplacing
will then incorporate three processes. First, placing is constituted or performed by the folding
of heterogeneous materials into a network of actants. Secondly, it is marked by a process of
122 See especially his article "Afterwords", where he speaks to the 'haunting' qualities of his recently
deceased father's personal effects.
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ordering - placing - these heterogeneous networks so that 'they can be known and
represented through immutable mobiles'.126 Finally, it is through returning to places
remembered that they are firmly established in both space and time, drawing the once
dichotomized entities into something approaching a peaceful communion. It is then, the work
between memory and materiality that orders and places the networks of quasi-subjects and
quasi-objects. In the final estimation, we now have the beginnings of a workable concept of
place/placing which is general enough - in the sense that we are not talking about specific
places - to intimately account for our multifaceted and deeply relational commerce with the
world. Worth stressing is the point that our account ofplacing emphasizes that the commerce
between humans and nonhumans is always much more than one-way in character. Within a
nonmodern concept ofplacing, materials, artifacts, techniques, in fact, all manner of
nonhuman is understood to actively participate in the event of placing. Our very being in the
world, is bound up with a host of others who are always much more than merely human. In
the final chapter we turn our attention towards applying a nonmodern concept of placing to a
trinitarian framework in the interest of healing some of the geographical blindspots which we
have identified in Gunton's theology of creation and culture
126 Ibid., p. 192.
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Chapter 5
Towards a Trinitarian Theology of Placing
Finding the intellectual conditions for truth-telling about God's presence in our
interweaving will give us a means of combating the illegitimate division of human
thoughts, of human beings and cultures, as well as the illegitimate separation of
human beings from nature, by discovering the way in which God is present through
the interweaving of human beings, cultures and nature.1
- Daniel W. Hardy
Introduction
In the preceding chapters we have traced Gunton and Latour's respective accounts of
our Western culture's modern or late-modern condition. We have also described their
respective positive programs for mitigating the Enlightenment's cultural fallout which each of
our interlocutors has identified as a movement towards greater cultural fragmentation,
alienation, and homogenization. In chapter 3 we used the concepts of otherness, mediation
and unity, to elucidate the main strengths and weaknesses of each approach, trinitarian and
nonmodern respectively. In the final analysis it was concluded that Latour's nonmodern
project struggles to maintain otherness in both the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' trajectories. On
this point we noted that Latour's nonmodern theological proposals amounted to little more
than the polar opposite ofmodernity's 'crossed-out' God of the margins. By rejecting the
distant 'creator God' of the modern Constitution, Latour has offered only a generalized 'God
of below' approach which appears to be little more than an otherness-denying pantheism. In
the same vein we found that Latour's account ofunity is to be found in the purely immanent
political movement towards the piece by piece 'composition' of a 'common world'. We
further concluded that it was Latour's great strength to offer a detailed account of how we
may understand human and nonhuman entities to be intimately bound up and mutually
constituted through a truly symmetrical and networked account of actancy. Yet once again, it
was argued that Latour's nonmodern vision lacked an adequate account of how otherness
might be maintained amongst these 'horizontal' relations. We further concluded that Latour's
'horizontal' account ultimately threatened to submerge humans and nonhumans into a kind of
ontological indistinguishability. In Gunton's trinitarian theology of creation and culture, we
found his great strength to be Latour's weakness. The maintenance of otherness amongst
beings and realms is for Gunton, an absolute priority. We have also identified in Gunton's
project a much deeper appreciation for the Enlightenment's theological pedigree than
Latour's diagnosis of the modern Constitution was able to account for. To be certain, Gunton
1
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- through his trinitarian vision of creation and culture - has provided a far superior account of
how we may conceive ofGod's differentiation from the world, whilst still maintaining an
intimate account of his continued relation to creation as it is mediated through his 'two
hands'. In both the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' trajectories, Gunton's trinitarian account deeply
stresses the otherness of beings and realms. However, we have also argued that Gunton's
account of 'horizontal' otherness appears to be stressed to a point where, despite his stated
intentions, he is only able to offer the most general account of human and nonhuman
relationality. In the final estimation, Gunton has very little to say concerning the details of
human and nonhuman relationality. We attributed this 'geographical blindspot' to Gunton's
refusal to identity the terms sociality, agency, spirit, and personhood with anything other than
what he has strictly defined as the personal realm.
Our task in the fifth and final chapter of this thesis is to now bring these concerns
together into what I am calling a trinitarian theology ofplacing. In chapter 4 we reviewed the
truly unique concept ofplacing that is now coming out ofANT or nonmodem inspired
reformulations of the geographical concept ofplace. It was also in chapter 4 that we began to
formulate a detailed account of how we may begin to register and understand the deep
relationality that exists between humans and their nonhuman, yet socialized, partners. But
most importantly, the nonmodern understanding ofplacing does not shroud the important
contributions which nonhumans add to the dynamic and relational becoming which a concept
ofplacing seeks to capture. In other words, our nonmodem concept ofplacing clearly
preserves a role for nonhuman actancy. Hence, our overall purpose in this chapter is to
elucidate how a theological and trinitarian appropriation of the concept of placing may help us
to navigate the pitfalls attendant to both Latour's nonmodernism and Gunton's trinitarian
theology. This will necessarily involve something of a divergence from the great majority of
the theologies of place that have recently begun to populate the theological literature. Thus,
we will begin with a review of the shape of recent theological engagement with the
geographical concept of place. We will then move to consider a number of important but
lingering issues concerning a trinitarian (and largely orthodox) theology's compatibility with
the 'nature as social' thesis and the recognition of nonhuman sociality and actancy. We then
move on to outline what a specifically trinitarian theology of placing might entail.
I. Recent Theologies of Place
The geographical concept of place has recently enjoyed a rather wide-ranging
adoption into the broad spectrum of theological study. Of the several recent theological
studies which have sought to incorporate a concept ofplace within a distinctly Christian
framework, the work ofPhillip Sheldrake and John Inge stand out for being the more
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substantial of the group.2 Although each of these studies has been published in the new
millennium, there have been a few earlier theological engagements with the concept ofplace,
or a 'sense ofplace', which I understand to be paradigmatic of the overall direction of the
discussion thus far. This rather brief discussion is certainly not intended to be an exhaustive
overview of the interdisciplinary exchange up to this point. Here my intention is to merely
highlight the ways in which I see my own proposals in this chapter to be a constructive and
unique addition to the emerging theo-geographical conversation.
The Loss ofPlace Thesis
The overriding concern common to nearly all of the recent theological interactions
with the concept of place is to be found in their combined focus on what they considered to be
the modern erosion of a unique 'sense of place'. This widespread concern that the
particularities of place(s) are being eroded on a global scale - or that place has simply become
uninteresting to modern Westerners - has been eagerly adopted by a litany of Christian
theologians and writers. In fact, there is little doubt that this Toss of place thesis' has been the
primary point of contact between the place-literature and Christian thought up until this point.
In one of the earliest formulations of this view by a Christian scholar, Walter Bruggemann's
widely celebrated book The Land, began with these words:
The sense of being lost, displaced, and homeless is pervasive in contemporary
culture. The yearning to belong somewhere, to have a home, to be in a safe place, is a
deep and moving pursuit. Loss of place and yearning for place are dominant images.
They may be understood in terms of sociological displacement, as Americans have
become a "nation of strangers," highly mobile and rootless, as our entire social fabric
becomes an artifact designed for obsolescence.. .3
Bruggemann then sets out to illustrate that a 'sense ofplace' is indeed an important aspect of
faith. Moreover, he applies this idea to Old Testament studies by way of emphasizing that the
'[l]and is a central, ifnot the central theme of biblical faith.'4 Bruggemann does not, however,
draw very heavily upon the work of human or cultural geographers for this study, and
therefore this work does not represent a major engagement with the place-literature.
In what was another early effort to appropriate this type of place-language for an
expressly theological purpose, Oliver O'Donovan set about to develop a Christian response to
what he identified as our Western culture's fading 'sense ofplace'. In a paper appropriately
titled 'The Loss ofa Sense ofPlace', O'Donovan identifies three major theological and
philosophical contributing factors to this overall movement towards the homogenization of
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space/place. First, he identifies Western philosophy's unwillingness to identify 'spirit', either
human or divine, with spatio-temporal constraint. He further explains that 'the spiritual
realm', after Plotinus, 'is indivisible: it is wholly present wherever it is present. It is not
somewhere, but it is everywhere-, and that not being present in space, but by space being
present in it.'5 Thus it has come to pass that 'spirit', 'Mind', and 'soul' were understood to be
without spatial extension, thereby initiating a cascade effect which served to diminish the
importance of embodiment and local relations. Secondly, he highlights the theological
concern ofChristianity, as a universal belief, to avoid being bound to particular holy places.
We may then see these first two points come into a kind of convergence in Western
Christianity. Not only has spirit, Mind and soul been made 'spaceless', but so to has the
Christian West become 'placeless' as it promotes a vision of universal encounter with the
divine. The final contributing factor has to do with our Western capitalist notions of land as
economic resource which has resulted in a severing of community ties with their local place.
Here it is thought that as land became a commodity in the West, along with it was lost a
particular commitment to any single place on the map.
Following O'Donovan we find the loss of place thesis clearly expressed in Geoffrey
Lilburne's theological engagement with the concept ofplace in his A Sense ofPlace: A
Christian Theology ofthe Land. For Lilburne, a 'sense of place' develops into three distinct
yet related concerns. First, like Bruggemann and O'Donovan before him, Lilburne finds our
modern culture to be moving towards placelessness: 'In the transition to our mobile, urban
life style, we have moved away from a sense ofplace.. .we have sought the freedom of space
at the expense of the places of roots, commitment, and community.'6 Drawing on this loss of
place thesis, Lilburne moves to consider the idea that what is lacking in our modem culture is
a sense ofplace as sacred space. He argues that 'the recovery of a sense ofplace may be the
means whereby the functions of sacred space can be regained in our secular culture.'7 We will
again see this connection between the loss ofplace thesis, and a counter movement towards
what we might call a re-sacralization of place, expressed in the later projects of Sheldrake and
Inge. The third concern ofLilburne is, however, unique to his project alone. Here he uses the
loss of a sense of place thesis to argue that the 'Christification of holy space' - the title to
chapter five of his book - may be employed in an effort to heal our global environmental
crisis. More than any of the other authors we will review, Lilbume will deeply tie a sense of
5 Oliver O'Donovan, "The Loss of a Sense of Place," Irish Theological Quarterly, 55 (1989), p. 43.
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place or placelessness to our environmental consciousness.8 'It is something of this quality of
a life "in place'", Lilburne explains, 'that we see at the root of the solution to our
environmental crisis and that we seek to recover for contemporary consciousness.'9
Phillip Sheldrake's Spaces for the Sacredmay also be located under the 'loss of
place' category. He begins his study by lightly detailing what he calls the Western crisis of
place, as he finds it clearly expressed in our culture's rootlessness. Moreover, Sheldrake
identifies our crisis of place as being particularly 'social' in character. We are a culture, he
writes, where 'mobility is now understood to be a freedom bought by money and education.
Remaining in the same place has come to symbolize a lack of choice, an entrapment, which is
the lot of the poor, the elderly and people with handicaps.'10 He goes on to highlight the
equally commonly held belief that our modern information technologies have added to our
growing sense ofplacelessness. 'Rather than a "global village" with its strong communitarian
imagery and locality, media and information technology are just as likely to create
communities with no sense ofplace.'11
John Inge's addition to the theological engagement with the place-literature
represents what is perhaps the most sustained attempt yet published. Drawing heavily on
Edward Casey's two lengthy volumes on the philosophical history of the concept of place,12
the great bulk of Inge's work takes up the loss of place thesis as its primary concern. In fact,
he opens his study with these words: 'This book argues that place is very much more
significant than is generally recognized.'13 Continuing in this vein, Inge observes that 'there
has been what might be termed a "loss of place" in human experience for very many people in
the recent past.'14 In order to counter act this loss of place, Inge turns to the Old Testament
scriptures in order to illustrate that particular places - or what he considers to be the concept
of place as a whole - is a critical component to understanding the Old Testament narrative. In
what is perhaps the overriding contribution which Inge is attempting to add to the Christian
understanding ofplace, he proposes that we adopt a 'relational view ofplace'. Although the
terminology here used by Inge to describe place as 'relational' may initially sound very much
like the nonmodern view ofplacing we reviewed in the last chapter, the differences between
the two types of relationality are, in fact, quite vast. For Inge, a relational view of place is
intended to embody the idea that 'there is a threefold relationship between God, his people,
8
Theologian Steven Bouma-Prediger has recently made similar connections between a sense of place
and a deepened environmental consciousness in chapter 1 of his book For the Beauty ofthe Earth
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001).
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10 Sheldrake, Spaces for the Sacred, p. 8.
11 Ibid., p. 9.
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and place.'15 The relationality which Inge seeks to encompass in this 'relational view ofplace'
has much less to do with human/nonhuman relations, but more to do with God's practice of
revealing himself or becoming particularly present in specific places. Thus, Inge argues that it
is due to the universalizing currents ofmodernity that the particular places where we once
experienced God have come to lose their overall importance amongst modem Western
culture.
There is, then, a rather stark contrast between the 'relational view ofplace' which
Inge has proposed and what we have reviewed as a nonmodern understanding ofplacing. In
the final estimation 'relational' is, for Inge, a term which applies to place only in the sense
that God relates to humans through the mediation of particular places. This leads into Inge's
second primary proposal for combating our modem culture's loss of a 'sense of place'. Here
he argues for a 'sacramental' concept ofplace which will allow us to speak ofplaces as 'the
seat of relations', not between humans and the nonhuman creation, but 'between God and
world'.16 Therefore, I find Inge's contribution to the place conversation to be far too
concerned with what we have called 'vertical' relations to specific places - churches, shrines,
pilgrimage routes - and not at all concerned with speaking to the 'horizontal' relations with
which this thesis is primarily concerned. In Inge's study the only interesting questions
concerning place have centrally to do with seeking out where we may truthfully speak of
God's presence becoming manifest to his people. In fact, Inge criticizes the work of Geoffery
Lilburne for suggesting that we might consider more than just human activity as the
'qualifying' event which establishes space as place.17 Once again, it appears that Inge is
working with a very narrow concept ofplace where the only actors of any real interest are
God and humans - a wholly 'modem' vision indeed.
It is perhaps by now clear that I have found these studies which adopt the Toss of
place thesis' as their starting point to have, in several important respects, stunted the
theological conversation with the geographic concept ofplace. As we have already seen,
geographers of a more nonmodern mind-set argue that these proclamations of the modem
Toss ofplace' are really nothing new and may well 'have reached their historical sell-by
date', to use Thrift's telling phrase.18 Moreover, it often appears that these worries of growing
placelessness and homogenization are marked by a sometimes unhealthy measure of
nostalgia. Although there is certainly something of importance to be found within the loss of
place thesis there are at least three important counterpoints to be made.
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The first point is clearly anecdotal, but I have now taught an undergraduate university
course on the geographical concept of place for more than three years and I am consistently
surprised to witness my students' reactions, which are often quite angry, to this loss of place
thesis. Many of these students grew up in what could easily be classified as 'cookie-cutter'
suburban sprawl which is often singled out in the Toss of place' literature for being a
paradigmatic example of this modern homogenization of place. Yet, many people who grew
up in these places insist that they are anything but 'placeless' (in the modern understanding),
as even a MacDonald's or a cement storm drain can become a deeply meaningful 'event
producing topos' - to use Latour's terminology.19 Therefore, I do not entirely share in this
anxious sense of a looming or continuing loss of place. There remains, even in the United
States - considered by many to be the epitome ofmodernization and homogenization - a
diverse spectrum of human experience, culture, landscape, accents, political philosophies,
culinary traditions, and a multiplicity of 'senses of place'. It may also be that individual
understandings of the issue are largely generational in nature.20 But what is all together certain
is that our varying 'senses of place' or 'placelessness' will differ greatly amongst cultures at
various levels of socio-economic or cultural shift. But to push the diversity of place language
into the either/or conversation of the loss ofplace thesis, will ultimately serve only to
diminish the concept's wonderfully diverse utility to a Christian theology.
Secondly, by speaking of the concept ofplace in the language of a 'sense of place' we
risk turning the entirety of the concept's utility into a purely quantitative and subjective
category. Either you have a 'strong sense of place' or you have 'no sense of place'. In this
formulation, emplacement is not only an exclusively human category but also a category set
on a sliding scale ofquantity. What this tends to suggest, as we have seen geographers
Hubbard and Holloway argue in the last chapter, is that humans could actually exist in a
19 For my course titled People, Place andNature, I took to showing a recent documentary on the socio-
historical development of skateboarding in the Southern Califomian suburb of Venice Beach. The
documentary Dog Town and Z-Boys, traces a small group ofmisfit teens who were growing up
amongst the decaying dregs ofmodem architecture and city planning in 1970's Venice Beach. The
film's makers, almost unwittingly, slowly reveal how a group of'down and out' kids was ultimately
able to develop a deep 'sense of place' and belonging even amongst the rotting decay of urban planning
gone terribly awry. To use the nonmodem language of ANT-inspired geographers, this group of kids
learned to 'perform' this seemingly 'non-place' into a rich landscape ofmovement and beauty through
the art of skateboarding. They in fact 'performed' their concrete environment in such a way that it
became, for them, a sea of concrete waves which were no less meaningful (or soulfully felt) than the
real ocean waves just a block away. Human geographer Ian Borden has recorded many of these similar
observations in his book Skateboarding and the City: Architecture and the Body (Oxford: Berg
Publishers, 2001).
20 This was one of the many conclusions arrived at by the Calvin College Christian Scholar's Seminar
group "Christian Environmentalism with/out Boundaries", a seminar of which I was a participant in the
summer of 2003. After three weeks of lively debate amongst Christian theologians, geographers, and
ecologists, many of us concluded that there tends to be a generational gap between those who fear a
steady loss of place (the older generations) and those who do not share in this anxiety (largely the
younger generations). In fact, many of the younger scholars in attendance felt strongly that a degree of
'placelessness' was an important element to the development of an individual's ethical consciousness.
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'placeless' world. But certainly this is not the case, as we tend to act upon our placings just as
they act upon us, no matter where we are or how strongly we feel attached to a particular
place. We are placed simply by virtue of our being embodied entities in the midst of a
material existence with others - human, nonhuman, and divine.
Thirdly, 1 have grown rather allergic to the theological adoption of this loss of place
thesis simply because it serves to cement into our minds a singular understanding of how the
concept of place/placing may be employed. For instance, the projects of Lilburne, Sheldrake
and Inge begin with the general idea that a 'sense of place' is being lost in our culture, thus
each of these projects moves into a program which may be described as a general push
towards the re-sacralization or re-enchantment of place. In fact, a large portion of each of
these author's books is dedicated to questioning how we may speak of God's presence in
various yet specific places, with particular attention paid to the universal and particular
outworkings of such a concern. Here the main points of inquiry are expressed as such; Are we
justified in speaking of a ubiquitous presence? And may we understand God to be more
potently present in particular places at particular times rather than others? What is the cause
of this presence? And is God present in the material place or in the people gathered in the
place? In sum, these studies find the re-sacralization or re-enchantment of place to be the only
in-road for a theology of place. Whilst this project may be noble in its own right, I believe it
deeply limits our understanding of place, and more importantly, it does not do justice to the
wider body of geographical literature.
All of the major theological engagements with the geographical concept of place
which we have reviewed thus far have begun with what I have called the Toss of place thesis'.
Moreover, the majority of these projects - Lilbume's and Sheldrake's may be exceptions, in a
very limited sense - has moved in a direction where place is portrayed as a category most
appropriately applied to humans and God, whereas the material world's role is largely
secondary, as it fades into a kind of scenery upon which human categories may be painted.
Even the term itself, a 'sense ofplace', carries idealizing and ephemeral undertones which do
not give credit to material or nonhuman participation in the dynamism of placing. Thus, by
concentrating on the loss of place thesis as its main entry into the place literature, these recent
theologies of place have, on the whole, remained well within the modern mode we outlined in
chapter 4. However, I do not wish to overstate the case, as we will see there are some
indications that this is true generally rather than exclusively. We may further elucidate the
point by briefly looking more closely at some of these author's basic definitions of space and
place.
Defining Space and Place in the Theo-Geographical Literature
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We may first look to O'Donovan, who after lamenting our Western culture's lack of
relationship with specific places goes on to offer his definition of what constitutes the
difference between space and place. It is my sense that he has remained clearly within what
we have called the 'modem' understanding of space and place when he writes:
"Place" differs from "space", in that space is prior to culture or inhabitation, whereas
place is the way we come to experience space when we have made our home in it. A
"place", therefore, is the fruit of civilization, an area of space that has been
distinguished from other areas by the inhabitation of a community...To think of a
place is at once to think of a natural space on the one hand and of the community that
is defined in relation to it in the other...Human existence evokes place out of space
by virtue of the distinctive combination of mobility and rootedness which
characterises our species.21
The overriding point to be made here is that place is, for O'Donovan, a phenomenon almost
wholly attributed to human intentionality. 'Places' are full of cultural or communal meaning,
whereas 'space' is that which exists where human communities have not yet stored up a
cultural narrative. Moreover, it is an always human agency which serves to evoke 'place out
of space'. In what appears to be true modem style, place is merely space that has been 'filled
up' with warm layers of human meaning. In part two of the paper O'Donovan draws on the
Good Samaritan parable to continue his largely humanist understanding of place. Here he
correlates place to a space where inter-human encounters of 'neighborliness' are found.
Where the Samaritan meets the Jew, a once non-place in a sea ofundifferentiated space, there
place is created. All we need to point out in this place-making scenario is that for O'Donovan
the actors involved are clearly human and exclusively so.
Although he remains deeply within a discourse limited to the 'sense of place' or Toss
ofplace' trajectory, Lilbumc has initiated within theology the beginnings ofwhat we may
identify as a nonmodern understanding of place. For instance, he will argue that 'a sense of
place is as much a function of the nature of the places themselves as it is of human activity.'22
The only problem is that he offers very little to support the statement with any detailed
account of nonhuman participation in place making. Moreover, he appears to blend Christian
theology with Aboriginal spirituality without giving much of any explanation as to how the
two might be compatible. It is, however, a commendable first step towards bringing
theological engagement with the concept of place out of a purely humanist discourse.
In the case of Sheldrake, one is rather hard-pressed to locate a consistent or well
defined definition of either space or place. It then appears that he has done more to simply
elucidate the troublesome nature of the terms by drawing on several contrasting views without
ever suggesting a specific direction out of the confusion. But we may identify a few clarifying
remarks within his work. To begin with, Sheldrake defines place as such: 'The concept of
21
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place refers not simply to geographical location but to a dialectical relationship between
environment and human narrative. Place is space that has the capacity to be remembered and
to evoke what is most precious.'23 Judging solely from this definition it would appear that
Sheldrake does indeed tend to lean towards a rather 'modern' notion ofplace and space. I
base this claim on the fact that here Sheldrake does not seem to be challenging the modem
notions of nature 'out there' and human narrative or subjectivity 'in there'. Although the
appeal to dialectics is initially forgivable, Sheldrake will go on to suppose place to be more
clearly a product of social construction. Later he writes that' [pjhysical places are vital
sources ofmetaphors for our social constmctions of reality.'24
In what appears to be a complete turnaround from these earlier definitions, Sheldrake
later moves to consider a definition of place that is much closer to the nonmodem
understanding. For instance, he will explain that '[ajlthough place is a human construct, it is
equally vital not to lose sight of the fact that natural features are a part of the
interrelationships that go to make up place.' Then in a comment that is even more deserving
of celebration, Sheldrake states that the 'physical landscape is a partner, and an active rather
than purely passive partner, in the conversation that creates the nature of a place.'25 While the
allusions to nonhuman agency are encouraging, what is lacking in his work is the same thing
we found lacking in Lilbume's, that is, a thorough account of the details involved in this
mutual participation (human and nonhuman) in the dynamic of place-making. In fact, through
the very next pages following this revelation, Sheldrake appears to fall back into a human
dominated discourse as he explains the relationship ofmemory to place. Although memory
plays a large part in the nonmodem concept ofplacing, Sheldrake's account appears to fall
back into the distinctly modem understanding of a human subjectivity that 'projects' and
paints the nonhuman materiality of a place with warm layers of human semiotic 'text'.26 The
agency involved in what we are now calling placing returns, for Sheldrake, to the purely
human sphere. In the final estimation, however, Sheldrake offers surprisingly little help in
sorting out what the concept of place actually entails.
John Inge's understanding of place adds very little to what O'Donovan observed
more than thirteen years earlier. He begins his book by offering his basic definitions of the
two categories of space and place. Here he explains that
"space" is more abstract than "place". What begins as undifferentiated space becomes
place as we get to know it better and endow it with value...What is undifferentiated
space becomes for us significant place by virtue of our familiarity with it. The two
terms might be thought of as tending towards opposite ends of the spectrum which
23 Sheldrake, Spacesfor the Sacred, p. 1.
24 Ibid., p. 4.




has the local at one end and the infinite at the other. Spaces are what are filled with
places.27
We find in this very little, if any, deviation from what we have called the 'modern'
understandings of space and place. Once again, place is like a container to be filled with
human significance alone. Moreover, as we have already highlighted, Inge's program is
marked almost exclusively by an effort to understand God's relationship to humans in specific
places - a re-sacralization or re-enchantment of place. In the final analysis, there is in Inge's
work, little of any attempt to voice the relationality between humans and nonhumans which a
nonmodern understanding of placing seeks to embody as a matter of priority.
Shortcomings ofthe Recent Theologies ofPlace
We may now ask whether or not any of these theological appropriations of the
geographical concept of place have brought us any closer to determining, with any measure of
detail, how we as human creatures are 'internally related to the world' as Gunton was so
concerned, but ultimately unable, to account for. It is my view that these theo-geographical
concepts of place have done very little in this regard and I will propose five central reasons
for this overall failure. The first two have already been made rather explicit. First, by focusing
on the loss of place thesis as their starting point, we have seen these theological
appropriations of place take a very narrow view of how the concept may be employed to
enlighten theological concepts and concerns.
Secondly, we have seen that these recent theologies of place have done very little to
challenge the modern notions of space and place which we reviewed in chapter 4. For nearly
all of these studies, place is little more than space invested with unidirectional human
significance, meaning, and agency. This strongly suggests that these theologies of place have
employed what Tim Ingold has dubbed the 'building perspective'.28 The 'building
perspective' is very similar to the modern understanding of place which we have already
reviewed. Moreover, nonmodern geographers such as Thrift, have eagerly embraced Ingold's
description of the 'building perspective' as a useful illustration ofwhat they are trying to get
away from in their own geographical theories. Thrift has summarized Ingold's
characterization of the modern 'building perspective' quite succinctly.
This is the view that human beings are engaged in building discursive worlds by
actively constructing webs of significance which are laid out over a physical
substrate. In other words, human beings are located in a terrain which appears as a set
of phenomena to which representations must be affixed prior to any attempt at
engagement.. .in the building perspective, space and time are neutral grids, or perhaps
containers, over which and in which meaning is 'placed'.29
27
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What this distinctly modern view of place (the 'building perspective') serves to accomplish is
the complete obfuscation of the relationality which populates the 'middle kingdom' which
Latour has described. In other words, it simply further dichotomizes nature and culture. This
leads us directly into my final three points.
The third point of contention we may lodge against these recent theological
appropriations ofplace-language, is the critical realization that these studies are actually
speaking more to the geographical concept of 'locale' or 'location' than they are to a tmly
geographical concept of'placeThe confusion or conflation of 'place' and 'locale' is, as
Holt-Jenson has recently claimed, strikingly common amongst many geographers, but more
so amongst many social theorists, such as Anthony Giddens, who have been concerned to
incorporate elements of spatiality into their sociological theories.30 The substitution of the
term 'place' for what more closely approximates 'locale' is, perhaps, most clearly expressed
in Inge's effort to theologically appropriate geographical language. As we have seen, Inge's
project is primarily occupied with the purpose of stressing that particular 'places' are indeed
significant to the human encounter with God. This leads Inge to the conclusion that we should
then seek out a re-enchantment or re-sacralization of these particular places. This particular
use of the term 'place' is in fact very close to the much criticized 'locale' which Giddens has
frequently employed. Here 'locale', or 'place' for Inge, is a spatial concept which refers
merely to 'space as providing the physical setting for interaction'.31 In this scenario, and that
of the majority of these theologies ofplace, what is being stressed is not an inherently
relational becoming between the whole of the collective (place/placing), but rather, a singular
locale/location which is thought to carryparticular significance.
Fourth, these theo-geographical projects have entirely missed the opportunity to use
the concept ofplace as a means for challenging our received 'modem' notions of nature and
society, objects and subjects, humans and nonhumans. It is here, in contrast to Inge, that we
are to find the tme utility of the 'relationality' which the concept ofplace/placing seeks to
register.32 This further serves to illustrate that these studies are still enthrall to the modem and
humanist notion of place which we have already described. But there is in fact, a 'new
geography', as the editors ofPatterned Ground: Entanglements ofNature and Culture, have
recently explained. This is a geography which seeks to register and appreciate that the 'world
30 Arild Holt-Jenson, Geography History and Concepts, p. 127.
31 Ibid., p. 149.
321 find it somewhat perplexing that Inge has proposed a 'relational concept ofplace' in such a way as
to suggest that place could be conceived otherwise. For the geographers of today, the term 'place'
cannot be conceived without first thinking of relationality. In fact, 'place' is geographical shorthand for
relational dynamism. This point only adds weight to my earlier claim that Inge is actually working with
the more simplified concept of 'locale' or 'locality' than he is with the incredibly rich geographical
concept of'place'.
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is now patterned by both human and nonhuman processes' which are bound up in a kind of
mutual becoming.33 Moreover, the 'new' geographical studies which this volume embodies
try to 'take seriously the entanglements - the invisible hyphens - between nature and culture,
human and nonhuman.'34 It is this kind of relationality that is at the heart ofwhat I have called
the nonmodem concept ofplacing. What the nonmodern concept ofplacing strives for is a
total re-thinking of the dynamic relationality between people and things, not necessarily in an
effort to reignite an 'environmental awakening' in the manner of Lilbume, or to re-enchant
spaces in the manner Sheldrake and Inge, but rather, to help us to better understand what
Gunton was ultimately unable to formulate - namely, how we are 'internally related to the
world'.
The final major reason why I believe these recent theologies of place ultimately fail to
bring us any closer to an understanding of our internal relations to the world is due to their
near total lack of a trinitarian vision. Out of all of these recent theological works on the topic
of place only Sheldrake gives any mention to specifically trinitarian concepts. Yet, even on
the occasion that he does mention trinitarian concepts it is only to indicate that God is present
to the creation or to highlight, as Gunton has, how the trinitarian shape of creation redirects
our understanding of universals and particulars. To be certain Lilburne, Sheldrake and Inge
have all described the significance of the incarnation for their theological adoptions of place-
language. Each of them has, in their own way, indicated that the incarnation is our basis for
understanding 'the divine indwelling in all material reality'.35 For his part, Inge uses the
incarnation as the basis for considering our personal embodiment, which necessarily entails
that we will always be located in a specific place.36 Moreover, I understand each of these
authors to be using the incarnation as a means of arguing that God's love, or presence, is
indeed particular rather than homogeneously universal. But what is missing in all of these
accounts is any mention of the Holy Spirit beyond the most general of comments. Indeed, the
Spirit has not even been listed in the index of any of these books. Nor is there any systematic
attempt, in any of these works, to bring the relational dynamism of trinitarian ontology to bear
on the process ofplacing. I find this omission to be somewhat perplexing considering the fact
that trinitarian theology, such as that ofGunton, offers a wonderfully rich theological
vocabulary for envisioning the deep relationality which the concept of place/placing embodies
- or should embody. With the one exception where Sheldrake has briefly employed trinitarian
language to describe the 'vertical' relationship to particular places, the Trinity goes without
mention in the vast majority of these works.
33
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At least one important exception may be found to this overall trajectory of recent
theological adoptions ofplace-language. In his recent A Political Theology ofNature, Peter
Scott has adopted place language in order to flesh-out his concept of relations within the
'common realm' ofGod, humans and nature. While Scott's utilization of place is not in my
view entirely 'modem', I have left his account of place out of this general critique of recent
theologies of place for several reasons. First, the concept of place as it emerges in his vision
of the common realm does not, in my view, account for a major engagement with the
geographical concept of place. Although place emerges as a definite theme in his book, Scott
has only committed a few sub-chapters to the topic which culminate in a proposal for a
'eucharistic place' in the final chapter. My second point is that Scott has drawn almost
exclusively from David Harvey's Marxists and dialectical understanding of place in order to
develop his own theological account of place. As we have seen in previous chapters, for this
reason alone, ANT inspired geographers would likely classify Scott's approach as distinctly
modem. Thirdly, due to his altogether brief encounter with the concept of place as it is used in
the geographical literature, and his total reliance on just one geographical commentator, I
remain ambivalent about the overall merit of his commentary on place. That is to say, I find
his concept of place to be rather limited in its overall application. I believe the root of this
ambivalence is to be found in the realization that Scott, more often than not, employs place-
talk to speak to people's attachments to specific places, and whether these places may be
considered politically liberatory or economically equitable. In this vein of thought the
significance of place is once again to be found largely in people's 'sense' or 'attachment' to
specific places - it is perhaps in this sense that we may consider Scott's theological account of
place to remain in the distinctly modem mode . Thus, place is seen by Scott to be 'a
privileged location where people seek to connect with the environment as a locus of
community'.37
This might very well be a noble project in itself, but the concept ofplacing which I
am attempting to outline in part 3 of this thesis takes a rather different direction. My concern
is not with an account of place as a 'privileged location' - Scott will later privilege the
locations of church and Eucharist - but rather, with an account of the dynamic interaction
between people and things no matter .what the specific 'location' or circumstances in which
they may find themselves. Therefore, my account will admittedly have little to do with
specific 'locations' or 'privileged places' that are either libratory or oppressive. My concern is
to describe, in trinitarian terms, the unavoidable process ofplacing which all embodied being
is engaged in producing by virtue of the inherently relational nature of all things. Finally, I
have left Scott's account out of this main section of recent theologies of place since it is my
37
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intention to engage with his theology of 'the common realm' more fully in what remains of
this chapter. In what follows I am particularly concerned to draw on Scott's theological
account of sociality as a transcendental as well as his insistence on a theological appreciation
of nonhuman agency which is clearly counter to Gunton's theological understanding.
To conclude this section we may summarize that these recent theologies of place -
barring Scott's account in a limited sense - suffer many of the same 'geographical blindspots'
we have outlined in relation to Gunton's theology as a whole. In what remains of this chapter
I will attempt to give a more full account ofhow trinitarian concepts may be used to
invigorate the 'horizontal' relationality which the concept of placing seeks to embody. By
bringing a nonmodern concept of placing into conversation with trinitarian theology it is my
hope that we may be able to use these two accounts - trinitarian and nonmodern - to speak
more deeply about the relationality that exists between humans and nonhumans, as well as the
role of God's two hands within this dynamic. But before detailing a specifically trinitarian
theology ofplacing, we must further consider the compatibility between theology and the
nonmodern notions of the socialization ofnonhumans and of nonhuman actancy.
II. Theology and Nonmodern Sociality/Actancy: Nature and Culture Re-Mixed
Ifwe are to propose a truly nonmodern theology of placing that resists what we have
identified as the modern 'building perspective' ofplace, we must reconsider the important
issues of nonhuman sociality and nonhuman agency/actancy. For at the heart of a nonmodern
account ofplacing, we find a fundamental questioning of our received understandings of a
purified Nature and Society, and purified Objects and Subjects. And as we have now seen,
recent theologies ofplace have done little of anything to question these jealously protected
(and purified) ontological realms, and are thus unable to provide a detailed account of the
multidirectional relationality which nonmodern placing seeks to register. Moreover, we have
also seen that Gunton was ultimately unable to affirm nonhuman actancy, nor could he affirm
nonhuman participation in sociality, and was thereby unable to deeply challenge our received
modern notions of nature and society. Thus before moving on to construct a specifically
trinitarian account ofplacing, we must return to these important and closely related questions
which Latour's project has raised for a theology which seeks to speak of both creation and
culture without polarization. This section is, therefore, dedicated to making the case that a
trinitarian theology of creation and culture must indeed embrace some account of nonhuman
participation in sociality and nonhuman actancy.
As we have already seen, Gunton has denied nonhuman/nonpersonal entry into what
he has termed sociality, agency, spirit andpersonhood. We have also directly tied this
position ofGunton's into his altogether unwavering understanding of sociality in a strict 'I-
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Thou' form. But we may now ask whether or not this is a position which a Christian theology
must affirm. Therefore, we now ask the question: Does a Christian theology require that
sociality be understood in the strict and limiting terms of I-Thou relationality, thereby
preserving social interaction solely for divine and human persons?
As indicated above, I would now like to draw on Scott's theological accounting of
nonhuman participation in sociality, as he has presented a rather strong case in his recent A
Political Theology ofNature. Moreover, I find three primary reasons why a deeper
engagement with Scott's work would prove fruitful for our current project. First, Scott's book
is one of the very few theological attempts to take seriously the fact that our received notions
of nature and culture are deeply problematic. Secondly, he has attempted to address this
problem from a distinctly trinitarian perspective. Finally, Scott appears to have drawn deeply
from the work ofGunton, yet he has been able to construct a much more detailed account of
'horizontal' relationality than Gunton was able to provide.
Scott's addition to the nature/society debate within Christian theology is an extremely
insightful and much needed addition to the conversation. What is notable in this study is that
Scott, not unlike Gunton before him, closely ties together the fragmentation of nature and
humanity with the displacement of the Triune God which medieval nominalism and the
Enlightenment both served to instigate. The movements of fragmentation are, for Scott, all of
a piece. As God was distanced from the world in the Enlightenment, so too was humanity
separated from nature. Thus Scott will describe his project 'as a theological attempt to
overcome this double alienation of God from the world and humanity from nature.'38 In a
very similar fashion to the overall trajectory of this thesis, he further proposes to focus on 'the
interaction between humanity and non-human nature', that is to say, 'nature as it enters or
impinges upon the social sphere, in political and social description.'39 A major component to
this re-relating ofGod and world, humans and nature, is directed towards achieving what we
have seen Gunton reject - namely the recognition of nature as possessing the marks of agency
and sociality. A close review of his book, however, soon reveals that he is much stronger on
making a case for nonhuman participation in sociality than he is in making a case for
nonhuman agency. We will first consider Scott's theological justifications for claiming that
nature does indeed participate in sociality.
Trinitarian Justificationfor Nonhuman Sociality
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To begin with, Scott picks up on Gunton's earlier project of outlining what he called
'open transcendentals' or Trinitarian transcendentals'.40 We will recall from his disagreement
with Daniel Hardy that Gunton has rejected sociality as a transcendental concept - for him it
is not appropriately classed as a universal mark of all being, but is rather, a characteristic
unique to the realm of persons. For Gunton, only relationality as a transcendental category
may be attributed to the nonhuman sphere of nature.41 Scott challenges Gunton on this point
and will instead propose four transcendentals of his own: becoming, unity, sociality, and
openness. While the transcendental of becoming appears to be applied to the Godhead as a
whole, Scott will more specifically apply 'unity to the creator, sociality to the Word/Logos
and openness to the Spirit.'42 'Such transcendentals', Scott explains, 'are general terms which,
"before" knowledge and ontology, specify the general characteristics of reality.'43 Thus, for
Scott the transcendental of sociality may be applied generally to God, humans and nonhuman
nature. We may now ask what justifies the inclusion of nonhuman nature in the realm of
sociality.
For Scott, the 'foundation and rationale' of the whole transcendental project is to be
located firmly within the resurrection of Jesus Christ. From this understanding we find that
the universal mark of sociality is to find its distinct focus in Christology. This is because
the resurrection of Jesus Christ is God's promise to the covenantal character of social
humanity in nature; humanity and nature share the important feature of the
transcendentality of sociality. Thus the promise of the continuation of solidarity even
through death pertains also to nature. The promise of God the Father in Jesus Christ
grants a future to that which is social. For nature also is social. Hence, if the act of
election by God the Father in the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the election of social
humanity, then that same act of God is the election of social nature.44
By basing the sociality of nonhuman nature on the resurrection of Jesus Christ, Scott has
argued that nonhuman nature is itself incorporated into the resurrection by virtue of its
common sociality with humanity. 'Nature is redeemed in the vicarious action ofChrist not on
the grounds that it forms the natural conditions of human life but because it is social. '45 Here
Scott is consciously trying to move beyond the more common assumption, like that of Jurgen
40 Gunlon outlines his transcendental project most clearly in his The One the Three and the Many, Ch.
5. It is also worth noting that Gunton appears to have largely dropped the project of developing 'open'
or 'Trinitarian transcendentals' subsequent to the publication of The One the Three and the Many. In a
personal conversation he indicated that there was no specific reason behind this and he further
indicated that he remained convinced of the utility and wisdom of such a project.
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Moltmann, that the nonhuman creation is brought into transforming relation to the
resurrection by way of Christ's material embodiment rather than through the shared sociality
of humans and nonhumans. But this also raises the question of whether it may also be said of
God - as the notion of transcendentality would suggest - that he too is marked by sociality.
On this point, Scott argues that sociality does indeed apply to the Triune God, but that it is a
different type of sociality than that found in human and nonhuman nature. For Scott, the
difference is located in the realization that when attributed to the Triune God sociality is
expressedperfectly. 'God is unitive, social, open and becoming perfectly but creatures
participate in the transcendentals asymmetrically, for the cause of these transcendentals in
creatures is God.'46 As Scott argues, the human and nonhuman creation are thereby 'invited to
imitate' (rather than participate in) the perfect sociality of the Triune God. But we may not
claim to fully understand the sociality ofGod as it is 'ambiguous and opaque', yet 'on
account of Jesus Christ, we may attribute creaturely sociality to the Godhead
metaphorically.'47 Thus, it is through Christ, and not through an imagined participation in the
immanent Trinity, that we may come to understand that all of creation is asymmetrically
marked by the transcendental of sociality.48
After making the claim that all creaturely being participates in sociality via
Christological considerations, Scott then moves into a number of further qualifying remarks
on what he has called an 'ontology of the ecosociaT. The term 'ecosocial' is used by Scott to
indicate that he is speaking to 'the interaction that occurs between humanity and nature' - the
'horizontal' relations in Gunton's terms.49 We then find that these qualifying points to the
ecosocial ontology fall under the categories ofsociality, spatiality, and temporality. What
these concepts serve to reinforce is the ultimate 'reality, otherness and proximity of nature in
relation to un/natural humanity.' Moreover, Scott argues that he has drawn these concepts
from their Christological source in the 'life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.'50 It is at
this point that we begin to see what Scott intends to communicate in his claim that both
human and nonhuman nature share in the transcendental mark of sociality. Unlike the I-Thou
relationality which Gunton strongly adhered to as the litmus test for sociality, Scott will
instead see social relations taking shape in the process of work. 'A social ontology thereby
46 Ibid, p. 51.
47 Ibid., p. 51. Scott emphasizes the point that our attribution of sociality to the Godhead is
'metaphorical' simply because we cannot fully understand what we mean when we say that the
immanent Trinity is marked by sociality.
481 take this point to be one of the main differences between the account of Samuel M. Powell and that
ofPeter Scott. Powell has framed his argument of creation's reflection of the trinitarian notions of
othemess-in-relation with the concept of'participating in God' rather than Scott's 'imitation' language.
Powell does, however, qualify the point of 'participation' with the same 'asymmetrical' language which
Scott employs. See Powell's Participating in God: Creation and Trinity (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
2003).
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specifies exchanges, transactions, interdependencies and interactions.'51 We find in this a very
similar 'ecosocial ontology' to that of Latour and the ANT theorists who have put a point of
emphasis on the various processes of performance, labor, work, translation, and the
heterogeneous networking of associations of humans and nonhumans. In fact, Scott closely
echoes the proclamations of the nonmodern constitution in declaring; 'Nature is in nobis; we
are in nature.'52
Yet before offering a deeper comparison between Scott's ecosocial ontology and the
nonmodern understanding of the socialization ofnonhumans, we must review the other two
qualifying characteristics which Scott will apply to his vision of creaturely sociality. The first
of these qualifying characteristics is spatiality. Here the term 'spatiality' is used to suggest the
ultimate reality of both human and nonhuman nature - they have their own real and distinct
being - as well as their non-necessity or contingency in relation to God. By emphasizing the
spatiality of nature as its contingence, Scott asserts that' [n]o claims can be made that God
validates, at the social or political level, certain configurations ofhumanity or nature as
"natural".'53 Furthermore, spatiality will also suggest that God continues to bless and preserve
the creation so as to maintain its 'stability and continuity' - that is, its unity. 'Hence,
humanity is placed by God into a real, natural context; the natural conditions of human life
are real (however much they may be ignored in practice). The stability of nature is extra
nos.,5A
The second qualifying characteristic of the ecosocial ontology which Scott has
proposed is temporality. The qualifying addition of temporality is primarily intended to
protect against the privileging of space over time. Thus by stressing the temporality of the
ecosocial ontology, Scott 'insists on the historicity ofnature at all levels: cosmological,
biological, social.'55 Temporality further suggests that 'specific differentiations and
determinations can emerge and disappear within God's ordering of the world.'56 Thus we find
in these two qualifications of sociality - spatiality and temporality - that human and
nonhuman nature are secured in both otherness and temporal becoming. Scott will later
indicate that this represents his 'attempt to present afresh the material commitments of
Colossians 1.16-17: " — all things have been created through him and for him. He himself is
before all things, and in him all things hold together" (NRSV).'57
Finally, we may highlight the important point which Scott delineates concerning unity
(a transcendental) and differentiation within the creaturely realm. Here Scott argues that all
51 Ibid.
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creatures are created through Christ, and therefore find their unity in Him. But as creatures
they are also marked by sociality, spatiality, and temporality, and therefore must be
understood to exist within a 'differentiated whole'. Hence, Scott will argue that 'all parts and
wholes participate, as social, in a unity which disassembles and recomposes into wholes and
parts through the temporal and spatial dynamics of creatureliness.'58 We may then find within
the creaturely realm both dynamism and orderliness which are capable of transformation in
their process of becoming. Moreover, according to Scott, the agency behind this dynamism
and transformational ordering is to be traced to Jesus Christ.
There are at least three points which I find of particular value in Scott's understanding
of sociality as a transcendental mark of all being. First, through his careful theological
account of sociality we come to see that 'humanity is "in" nature. Ifwe must think in spatial
images', Scott explains, 'we have not a humanity alongside nature but rather a humanity
placed, in its societies, in the societies of nature.'59 Although I do not find in Scott's work a
specific concern with dispatching what we have seen Tim Ingold call 'the building
perspective', or with adopting what Thrift has termed a 'non-representational theory', it
appears that Scott's theologically based vision of a common sociality between humans and
nonhumans might be able to significantly aid in the creation of a trinitarian concept ofplacing
which is deeply suspicious of the building perspective. Secondly, I also believe that Scott's
vision of a transcendental sociality qualified by spatiality and temporality - as well as his
judgment that this is based on the sociality of Jesus Christ and the resurrection - is highly
amenable to Gunton's own trinitarian theology of the 'spatiality' ofGod and world, which he
eventually developed through his dialogue with Robert Jenson. Even though he was unwilling
to identify nature with sociality, Gunton did ultimately affirm the idea that we may be able to
conceive of creation taking place 'in' Christ.60 In Fact, both Scott and Gunton have based
their similar claims concerning the spatiality of Christ on Colossians 1:16. Therefore, it seems
quite clear that Scott has gleaned much from Gunton's trinitarian theology, and that of Jenson.
Thirdly, although I find Scott to be rather opaque concerning his basic idea ofwhat sociality
actually consists of, we have seen that it has something to do with work - it takes shape in
'exchanges, transactions, interdependencies and interactions.'61 By understanding sociality -
again, qualified by spatiahty and temporality - as a process of exchange and transaction
between human and nonhuman societies, we now have a point of conversation between
trinitarian theology and Latour's nonmodern collective.
Trinitarian andNonmodern Understandings ofNonhuman Sociality
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., p. 181.
60 Gunton, "Creation and Mediation in the Theology of Robert," p. 91-92.
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Rather than abandon our primary interlocutors to fully investigate the particularities
of Scott's political theology of nature - which is clearly not our primary concern - we must
now return to the nonmodern notion of the 'socialization of nature' in order to identify points
of compatibility with Scott's theological understanding of sociality. It is worth noting at this
point that Scott has not engaged with the work of Latour, or the wider scope ofANT theorists,
in any of his work that I am aware of. Latour does, however, receive one briefmention in A
Political Theology ofNature, but on the whole Scott has chosen to engage with a number of
other political ecologies - deep ecology, ecofeminism, social ecology, Marxist/socialist
ecology - rather than that of actor/actant-network theory.62 Therefore, we may now seek to
briefly outline points of convergence and divergence between Scott's theological vision of
transcendental sociality and Latour's 'networky' nonmodern vision.
Although the accounts of nonhuman sociality in Scott and Latour are rather different
in methodology - one theological and one philosophical or ethnographic - it is important that
we are aware of the commonalities and discontinuities of these two programs. What is
particularly notable is the specific way in which Latour's science studies came to the
conclusion that nonhuman nature does indeed participate in sociality. Without diving into too
much redundancy, we may recall that science studies came to recognize nonhuman sociality
in its effort to by-pass the dichotomous modern poles from which scientific explanation was
obliged to start - either the 'natural' pole of objects (natural realism) or the 'social' pole of
subjects (social realism). Through his historical illustration of Boyle and Hobbes, Latour has
claimed that modernity's 'natural realists' and 'social constructivists' have something rather
profound in common - they are both unable to imagine nature and culture in a non-
dichotomous way. Hence, in order to by-pass modernity's polemical Subjects and Objects, the
practice of the nonmodern constitution is to first shift the modem's Nature and Society back
into the obfuscated 'Middle Kingdom'. By shifting modernity's Nature and Society into the
middle ground and reducing them both to the non-polemical 'humans' and 'nonhumans',
nonmodern thought has robbed 'natural realists' and 'social constructivists' of their polemical
-powers. This leveling of humans and nonhumans to a single transcendence is what we have
described as Latour's 'generalized principle of symmetry'. Within the single nonmodern
-transcendence of humans and nonhumans, all ontological activity has been redistributed to all
-the actants within a network or collective. No longer must we always begin at one of the two
capitalized poles of the modem 'yardstick'. Instead, we may now begin in the middle, the
once 'non-place' of the modem Constitution. Here we are no longer forced to choose between
62 The reference to Latour comes on p. 224 where Scott discusses his vision of a 'democracy of the
commons'. Upon my reading it appears that Scott may well have drawn heavily from Latour's vision of
-a 'Parliament of things' where he argues for the admission ofnonhumans to a collective democracy,
-but Scott does not seem to indicate any direct affiliation with Latour's wider nonmodern theory.
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'things-in-themselves' or 'humans-in-themselves', as we now have a collective of networked
humans and nonhumans that truly mediate action rather than serve as mere intermediaries.
The main point in all of this, as it applies to Scott's vision of the sociality of nonhuman
nature, is that within the nonmodern vision, things, materials, artifacts, become socialized
nonhumans who then mediate action - they are true hybrids or quasi-subject/objects
composed of both human and nonhuman qualities.
This highlights a point where Latour's project may be seen to be more radical than
that of Scott, but it also indicates a parallel point where nonmodernism may be considered to
be more conservative than Scott's 'common realm'. We will begin by detailing the more
modest point of Latour's project. This has to do with the question of whether 'nature' - again,
Latour rarely uses the word, while Scott and Gunton appear to use it almost exclusively - may
be considered to be social prior to human interaction. For Scott, Christological considerations
have led him to the conclusion that nature is indeed social in such a way as to be independent
of humanity, but not independent of God. To be clear, Scott understands nature to be 'social'
even when it is seen to be relatively untouched by humanity.63 On the other hand, for Latour,
there is little sense in speaking of 'nature' as social in and of itself. The first problem has to
do with terminology; 'nature' and 'society', as we have seen, are not apriori ontological
categories within nonmodern thought. ANT will instead reduce all beings down to 'mere'
humans and nonhumans and then talk about their exchanging of properties, their
hybridization, and their networking. Only once we have followed the networks to their
termination may we identify something called 'nature' and something called 'society'.
Moreover, it becomes nonsensical for the nonmodern to speak of stable ontological realms
prior to relationship. We then find that 'nature' is not in itself 'social' nor are 'humans' to be
understood as 'social' in themselves. Only within the networked dynamism of the 'middle
kingdom' may we begin to sort out the socialization of humans and nonhumans. For the
nonmodern, we do not have two apriori quantities - nature and society - these are only the
outcomes of a tangled networking of humans and nonhumans.
It is for this reason that we may argue that Scott's project is in one important sense
more radical than Latour's. For Scott, nature is social in and of itself through its participation
(election) in the redeeming action ofChrist. Whereas for Latour, this claim would make little
sense since it retains a kind ofbinary conception. For Latour, there is no hope for 'sociality' -
as the moderns understood it - to exist outside of the interaction (translations, associations,
mediations) between humans and nonhumans. To be sure, however, 'nature' for the ANT
theorists, has a kind of 'sociality' all of its own. Latour, for instance, has studied the pure
'interactionism' of simian societies. Moreover, there is no doubt that 'nature' contains within
63 Even this presents something of a difficulty since Scott, 1 think correctly, would argue that we would
be hard-pressed to find any 'natural' area that is free of human impact or interference.
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itself systems of exchange and regulation all of its own, wholly outside of any reliance on
humans. But again, it makes little sense to speak of this in abstraction from humanity. We too
are part of that 'natural' dynamism. Thus, sociality is only to be understood as the outgrowth
of human/nonhuman engagement. Nature and society are not giants sitting at opposite poles
from one another; but rather, they together grow outwards from the 'middle kingdom' where
being is always dynamic, practiced, performed, and altogether tangled.
This also serves to highlight the greater radicalism of the nonmodern ontology to that
of Scott's common realm. For Latour, the point ofANT thinking is to begin our thinking from
the middle ground where humans and nonhumans - not 'nature' and 'society' - meet in the
tangle of practice. Within this meeting point we may begin to witness the hybridization, or the
'socialization', of humans and nonhumans into a collective and networked existence. Within
this dynamism we may begin to recognize the 'swapping of properties' between humans and
nonhumans, where nonhumans are slowly brought (translated, enlisted) into the social fabric,
thereby lending their immutability, mobility, and stability to social forms. It is clear that Scott
has little of anything to say about this middle ground. Hence, the question we may pose to
Scott and his vision of sociality as transcendental: Is this transcendental vision capable of
registering the continuously multiplying hybrids which now populate the 'common realm'?
At issue between Scott's vision of an 'ecosicial ontology' and Latour's heterogeneous
networks of human and nonhuman actants is the basic shape of how each of them envisions
the dynamic of human/nonhuman sociality to take place. The mode of interaction depicted by
Scott often looks very much like two independent types of sociality (human societies and
nonhuman societies) that are then superimposed upon one another, but only for a time, and
then retreat back to their appropriate (modern) corners thereby preserving otherness. Upon a
nonmodern reading this may be traced back to Scott's heavy reliance on describing
human/nonhuman relationality in terms ofMarxian dialectical relations. Take for instance
Scott's portrayal of 'humanity and nature as interacting in a series of overlapping
"societies".'64 We may also witness his language of 'interlocking societies': 'it is vitally
necessary', Scott explains, 'to see humanity as placed in the middle of nature through a series
of interlocking societies which relate to other - natural - societies'.651 find Scott's language
in this regard to be rather confusing. On the one hand he has portrayed two types of society,
one 'human' and one 'ecological', which then meet as they tend to overlap one another. But
the actual mode of this interaction remains, according to nonmodern thinking, all too modern
in its commitment to dialectical 'intermediaries'. We will recall that the nonmodern scorn for
dialectical thinking had to do with its inability to register true hybridity as it instead opted for
64
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mere 'intermediaries that transmit pure ontological qualities' of subjectivity or objectivity.66
The true dialectical and 'intermediary' shape of Scott's account comes to the surface of his
argument as he attempts to account for the co-participation of nature's societies in human
sociality. The argument begins with great promise:
To speak of society from the perspective of the social transcendental is thereby
always to maintain nature as co-participant: through all projects, non-human nature is
active. ...however society is organized, every transformative activity has nature as
co-participant; all practices are co-constituted by nature. We should therefore speak
of the mutual, shaping and irreducible interrelationality of all things in sociality.67
Here we may applaud Scott as he stresses the important point that nonhuman nature is co-
participant (actively) in sociality, thereby reinforcing the inseparability ofhuman sociality
with nonhuman sociality. It appears, however, that Scott's argument begins to lose ground in
his follow-up statements.
Indeed, we might say: nature lies between people. On this view, ecological nature is
the 'in-between', the middle of life. In the interstices, the joints of human living,
nature is always already present. Nature is not then in the middle of life but is that
middle...In theological theorizing we need to understand nature as that which is in-
between. Nature, we may affirm, is a dialectical concept: it demands an account of
68
humanity in nature, yet as differentiated from nature.
Manifest here is the great strength and weakness of a dialectical understanding of
human/nature dynamism. The strength is to be found in the dialectician's ability to affirm a
type of relationality between humans and 'nature', but to then always retreat back into
purified ontological zones - people here, nature there, and otherness is preserved. It is little
wonder that dialectical thinking has been of such great interest to theologians anxious to
affirm relationality-in-otherness amongst human and nonhuman creatures without risking
mixing the two. However, what is lost in this dialectical reasoning is a deeper account ofwhat
is happening in the 'in-between' which Scott speaks of. Moreover, it is ofparticular interest
that it is always 'nature' or 'ecological nature' (ontologically distinct or 'pure') that is 'in-
between'. Here there is no provision made for an account ofhybridity, quasi-objectivity, or
the socio-materiality which we see the practitioners of science studies so deeply concerned to
detail. For Scott, there seems only to be human sociality grafted over natural sociality, never a
-mixing or 'swapping ofproperties', but rather, only an ontologically untouched nature 'in-
between' humans. Upon my reading, Scott seems to play it safe by keeping at arms-length the
truly tangled practices ofhuman-being-in-the-world. As humans meet the material world - as
-they continuously do by virtue of their necessary embodiment - the boundary work attendant
-to their relational dynamism is not as ontologically hygienic as his account of 'ecological
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nature' 'in-between' humanity would suggest. This gets at the heart of where Scott's project
may be seen to be much more conservative than that of the Latour.
This further serves to indicate a second observation having to do with Scott's rather
sparse account of nonhuman agency. It may well be that his commitment to conceiving
'horizontal' relationality in dialectical (intermediary) terms, accounts for his lack of any in-
depth comment on nonhuman actancy. Scott begins his project with declarations that the
'account ofTrinitarian totality' which he is proposing - the 'common realm' - 'is deeply
indebted to ecofeminism's account of nature as active subject in the dynamic of encounter.'69
In light of this he will often appeal to a general 'natural agency' present in the nonhuman
realm. Hence, Scott maintains the theologically bold stance that 'there is no society without
natural agency', yet in practice he has surprisingly little to say about the particularities of how
this 'natural agency' is actually expressed.70 Furthermore, in what I take to be a baffling
contradiction, Scott has seemingly 'mythologized' some of the primary biblical evidence for
making the claim that nonhuman nature is indeed agential. As we have seen in chapter 3,
Scott criticizes Gunton's (uncharacteristic) claim that we may, on occasion, understand
nonhuman creation as being capable ofpraising God - however, for Gunton, this is by way of
the Spirit's agency and not that of the nonhuman creation. Although the agency of nonhuman
creation is a theme carried throughout the Old Testament, as illustrated in the passages which
describe nonhuman creation praising the Creator in the Psalms, or witnessing to covenants,
Scott will respond that he is 'unsure what it can mean to say that.. .inorganic nature praises
God.'71 It is surprising that Scott would so strongly claim that his 'political theology of
nature' rests on a concept of nature as agential, but then goes on to provide little, if any,
account of how this is to be specifically understood.
We have already seen that Latour's nonmodern thought and ANT both offer a much
deeper account of nonhuman agency/actancy than Scott is ultimately able to provide.
Moreover, unlike Scott's dialectics, Latour's ontology is capable of registering the quasi-
natural and quasi-social entities which populate the middle ground which has been obscured
in both modernist and dialectical understandings of relationality. In fact, what the nonmodern
or ANT forms of relational ontology encourage is what we have found to be the mark of
trinitarian ontology as a whole - that is, a trinitarian theology cured of the geographical
blindspots we have found in Gunton - namely that beings are always the outcome of a prior
relationality. That is to say that entities are always composed through a multitude of prior
relations, to such an extent, that we cannot speak of particular ontologies without equally
speaking of relationality - indeed, relationality is a transcendental. The focus in nonmodern
69 Ibid., p. 107.
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thought, as it is in trinitarian dynamics, is then placed on heterogeneous associations rather
than the separations which may still be found latent in the Marxian dialectics which Scott
readily employs.
Therefore, in what remains of this thesis I will attempt to bring what may be
considered to be a 'low-flying' or 'weak' form ofANT's account of networked relationality
and actancy to bear on a specifically trinitarian account ofplacing. Fully aware of the risk of
homogenization or ontological continuity attendant to any consideration of socio-material
hybridity, I believe a trinitarian account of networked relationality may be able to go a step
further in detailing the dynamics of human/nonhuman relationality than Scott and Gunton's
projects are ultimately able to attain. By placing a 'weak' ANT account within a trinitarian
framework, we may be able to maintain the desirable measure of otherness-in-relation
between humans and things, yet still account for the ontological 'messiness' that is involved
in such intimate relationality. But what is perhaps even more needed, is an account of
human/nonhuman relationality that takes into account the socio-material mediations and
space-times which technical actions and the production of immutable mobiles necessarily
create. In both Scott and Gunton's understandings of human/nonhuman relationality, little is
said of the 'imbroglios' and 'hybrids' which inhabit the middle-ground. For Scott, as we have
seen, it is only 'nature' or 'ecological nature' which is 'in-between' humans. For the ANT
theorist, on the other hand, the space 'in-between' is populated with a multitude ofhybrid
mediators who are always in the process of swapping 'social' and 'natural' qualities.
Before moving on, however, we must make more clear the meaning of the terms
'low-flying' or 'weak' versions ofANT or nonmodern thought. To begin, we have already
seen that nonmodern thinking starts with the assumption that actors in a network of relations
will always be more than human. Yet, as we have argued in chapter 3, attendant to the
stronger forms of ANT - those which tend to find anthropomorphic characteristics in
nonhuman actants - there is the distinct threat of losing any sense of ontological otherness or
stability. These 'strong' forms of ANT then incur the 'problem of instilling a great
indifference between the countless things of the world.. .which arises when they end up being
.portrayed as potentially all the same,'72 What a 'weak' or 'modest' version ofANT will
affirm is that imbroglios, rhizomes, and hybrids do indeed proliferate, but we may still be able
to locate a unique place for human subjectivity and agency, such as uniquely human forms of
-praise and worship, as well as modes of relationality marked by Gunton's emphasis on love
and freedom. What is strongly denied is that these anthropomorphic qualities bar nonhuman
iparticipation within the dynamic of sociality or agency/actancy. Moreover, we here reject a
ipurified notion of human subjectivity which does not understand the human capacity for
72 Eric Laurier and Chris Philo, "X-Morphising: A Review Essay ofAramis," Environment and
-Planning A 31 (1999): p. 1061.
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memory, action, or subjectivity as being the direct result of our heterogeneous networking.
Also rejected is Gunton's equivocation on the role of the Spirit within the nonhuman realm -
a point we return to below. Moreover, a 'weak' form of ANT or nonmodern thought will be
willing to recognize that some processes or networks are more human than nonhuman, more
'social' than 'natural', or visa versa.
It is in this sense that I believe Scott is correct in stating that' [tjhere is no denying
that the incarnation of the Logos in human form privileges the human in a certain way: for the
human person is the greatest concentration of the capacity to be social.'73 But again, even
'weak' forms ofANT will deny a purified human sociality, or a human agency that is not
conceived as a distributive effect ofmany actants that are both human and nonhuman. In light
of this, we thereby reject Gunton's strong anthropocentric understanding of the 'cultural
mandate', as well as the moderate dialectics of Scott, which are unable to account for this
distributed actancy. We have also already witnessed something of a 'weak' version ofANT in
the previous chapter as we sought the preservation of human subjectivity in the process of
placing by appealing to human memory. Although we will also recall that this was a form of
subjectivity which could not be separated from nonhuman actancy - that is to say that human
memory is often, if not always, materially-based within the nonhuman actants themselves.
Thus, there remain vestiges of asymmetry in the following account, but we have certainly
come a long way from the modern vision of transcendent binaries and dualisms which both
Gunton and Latour have reviewed in detail.
We may now seek to outline how a nonmodern account of socio-material networking
may be applied to Gunton's trinitarian vision. In this effort it will be necessary at several
points to gently amended Gunton's trinitarian account in order to make up for what we have
identified as his primary 'geographical blindspots'. Moreover, I believe that this will
principally require that we address Gunton's rather limited pneumatology more than any other
aspect of his trinitarian vision. But to be clear, our purpose, again, is not to uncritically force
trinitarian theology into the mold ofANT, but rather to position the two approaches in a
mutually enlightening conversation.
III. Placing Humans and Nonhumans in a Trinitarian and Geographical
Dynamic
In what follows we take up the task ofapplying the trinitarian and transcendental
projects ofGunton, Hardy and Scott to the 'weak' actor/actant-network ontology we have
seen expressed in Latour's nonmodern thought. In doing so, however, we reject three specific
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currents in Latour's thought. The first is Latour's denial of a transcendent (other-than) God of
creation from whom unity finds its locus. Attendant to this, we secondly reject Latour's
understanding ofunity as a purely immanent political process of negotiating a 'common
world'. Within the trinitarian framework we are here proposing, and in line with Gunton and
Scott's commitments to Colossians 1.16, unity is to be attributed to the Triune God and the
unifying locus of the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus Christ. To be certain, the trinitarian
theology ofplacing which we are now proposing will insist that human and nonhuman
relations cannot be fully conceived without seeing both in their proper relation to the Triune
God of creation. Third, we will attempt to protect against the threat of ontological
homogeneity present in the 'stronger' forms ofANT by placing horizontal 'networked'
relationality in a specifically trinitarian framework which works to respect and preserve
relationality-in-otherness, yet without losing the capacity to register the depths (and
'messiness') of this 'horizontal' relationality. In other words, a theology ofplacingwill not
privilege the detailing of otherness over and above an account of true relationality. Therefore,
we equally reject Gunton's inability to register nonhuman/nonpersonal actancy and
participation in sociality, and his attendant emphasis on a strongly conceived 'cultural
mandate'. Moreover, we have also seen that Gunton was unable to understand agency as
consisting in anything other than 'personal agency'. This served to set in motion a cascade of
qualifications which ultimately served to further sever humanity from its nonhuman social
partners. In the end, as we have seen, Gunton has only been able to affirm human/nonhuman
relationality in the most general of terms.
Once again drawing on the account ofplacing we have outlined in chapter 4, our task
is to now speak of the placing of humans and nonhumans in a trinitarian and geographical
dynamic. Here relations between humans and nonhumans are to be seen as much more than
the uni-directionality of the earlier theologies of place which we reviewed at the beginning of
this chapter. Rejecting the very modern 'building perspective' of these earlier studies, here
both humans and nonhumans will be found to share a distributed actancy amongst a collective
of heterogeneous associations enlivened, and made possible, by the mediating and sustaining
work of Son and Spirit.
Trinity, Spacing, and Timing
Our first concern is to simply illustrate the compatibility of the nonmodern
understanding of spacing and timing which we outlined in chapter 4, with a trinitarian
understanding of space-time which we may discern in the discussion between Gunton,
Jenson, and now Scott. To be sure, the two approaches - trinitarian and nonmodem - to
describing the dynamics of space-times have much in common. Take for instance, Gunton's
rejection of the modern Newtonian understandings of space and time as absolute. 'The effect
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of the spatialising of time', Gunton argues, 'is to treat it as reversible, like a machine.'74 The
outgrowth of this modern mechanistic understanding of space-time was a certain portrayal of
the universe as ultimately static and thereby reversible. The effect in theology was to be found
in the development of an understanding that the end of time would simply be a return to the
beginning - in the end space and time are merely wound backwards to the garden paradise.
The problem with these modem notions of absolute space and time, according to Gunton, is to
be found in their inability to register 'indeterminacy or contingence, relativity and tme
dynamism. '75 Thus we see that Gunton, much like the nonmodem spatial theorists in chapter
4, is concerned to understand space-time as a deeply relational and dynamic category. Later,
Gunton will reinforce the relational character of time in such a way as to echo the movement
to depopulate' space and time we have found in nonmodem thought. Here Gunton explains
that '[t]ime, as the concept in terms of which we focus one central aspect ofwhat is real,
has.. .both a reality - albeit a relational reality that takes its being from those things that have
their being in it - and a determinate end.'76 Here Gunton adds the one amendment concerning
the Christian understanding that time and space are ultimately finite - they will indeed come
to an end. But the core of his argument is very much like that of the nonmodems. Time and
space must not be viewed as mechanisms or containers, but rather, as a relational dynamic
amongst all of the created particulars which populate reality. As Gunton says: 'Space, like
time, is a function of the created world.'77
We have also seen that space and time come to a rather tricky crossroads as we seek
to inquire into the relationship of God to the world. In chapter 1 we reviewed Gunton's
dispute with Robert Jenson on this very point. There it was revealed that Gunton places a
definite emphasis on maintaining the otherness of God to the world which he has created. To
lose the otherness of the Creator to the creation is to lose the firm and distinct reality of space
and time as belonging to a reality which is truly their own. Therefore, in Gunton's trinitarian
theology ofGod and creation, the preservation of 'space' between the persons of the Trinity,
as well as between God and the world, are closely tied together. If relations between God and
world are to be free from the threat of pantheism, Gunton has argued God must be understood
as fully Triune. This has led him to the conclusion that creation should not be understood to
exist 'in God simpliciter', but rather, that it would be preferential 'to say that creation takes
place within Christ'.78 The effect this would have on Gunton's understanding of space and
time as a whole is to be found in his claim the God is intimately involved in the structures of
space and time, and therefore we cannot think of God as merely the negative abstraction of
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space and time. Instead, God is to be understood as intimately involved in the structures of
creaturely space and time, yet differentiated through the mediation of his 'two hands, the Son
and the Spirit. As Gunton explains
Space and time are not continuous with God, which means that they are, as created
realities, in some way functions of there being a created order. They are real - created
- yet relative, relative to there being things which are what they are by virtue of their
relation to God and to one anther in space and time. It follows, second, that this
universe of related things, taking shape in time and space, is constituted in relation to
God through his creating Son and perfecting Spirit, and so also remains open to more
things than reductionist science imagines to be possible...79
Although Gunton does not take the relational dimensions of space-times to the same lengths
which the nonmodem theorists have - as seen in their accounts of socio-material networks
and immutable mobiles - we find in his understanding an important parallel of the relational
dynamism which goes into the fabric of space-time production. Moreover, we find in Gunton
the important theological claim that space and time are themselves constituted in the dynamic
relationality of 'God through his creating Son and the perfecting Spirit'. Created space and
time may only be themselves - distinctly real and other-than God - by way of their
continuing relation to the creator. 'The conclusion to be drawn is that ifwe see the world
outside its relation to God, we do not see it properly.'80
The trinitarian vision of space and time presented here, by way of Gunton, carries
with it an important point of convergence with ANT thinking, but also an important critique
of Latour's nonmodern vision. We will begin with the latter, by recalling Latour's nonmodern
theological antidote to the 'crossed-out' God of the modems. We will remember that Latour
has offered only the polar opposite of the 'crossed-out' modem God of 'above' by instead
posing a purely immanent God of'below' who is no longer master of his own creation. It is
here that a trinitarian understanding of the God/world relationship would greatly aid in the
construction of a nonmodem theology that seeks to do more than simply propose the opposite
of the modem's distanced God. Therefore, the trinitarian theology ofplacing that we are now
outlining will hold firmly to Gunton's account of the spatio-temporal outworkings of a fully
trinitarian theology of creation. To be sure, God is no longer the 'displaced' and radically
deistic God ofmodernity, nor is God collapsed into the creation itself, as Latour's attempt to
construct a nonmodem theology would suggest. A trinitarian vision will instead emphasize
the othemess-in-relation between God and world which ultimately does full justice to the
dynamic relationship which the Triune God maintains with the creation through the Son and
the Spirit. Gunton is surely correct in his insistence that creation must be other-than the
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creator, but he is also correct in his insistence that creation be understood to remain in relation
to God through the trinitarian mediation of Son and Spirit.
Not to be missed in all of this is the final important point of convergence between
nonmodern and trinitarian understandings of space-time. Here we may highlight that both
projects affirm the preservation of space as it inheres within things themselves. For both
trinitarian and nonmodern understandings, space is not purely understood as an 'internal'
transcendental quality of the mind, as in Kant, but rather, as a necessary apriori for the
existence and maintenance of otherness. But as we have just seen, Latour has failed to
understand the important theological point made by Gunton that for space-time to be truly
real there must be an account of the distinct otherness between God and world. As Gunton
has argued, pantheistic understandings of the God/world relationship erase the reality of space
and time as distinctly their own. The result being that both 'vertical' and 'horizontal'
spatiality (otherness) is sacrificed. What is needed is a space of one's own; for God, for the
world, and all of the many human and nonhuman particulars which populate space-times. Or
as Scott has put the matter: 'As independent, space - the way that things are ordered for
agents - may be understood as the condition of otherness and of the relations that pertain
between others.'81
Trinity and Socio-Material Mediation
Now that we have illustrated the points of compatibility between trinitarian and
nonmodern space-times, we may now attempt to apply the trinitarian vision of Gunton and
others to the socio-material networks and nonmodern ontologies which we have reviewed
throughout this thesis. Here we are particularly concerned to illustrate how the socio-material
mediations we reviewed in chapters 3 and 4 may be reconceived in true trinitarian fashion.
For this to be effective we must be able to affirm nonhuman participation in sociality as we
have argued with the help of Scott in the previous section. Similarly, we must also be able to
affirm some form of nonhuman actancy, here conceived through a 'weak' version ofANT.
Our task is then to outline how Gunton's account of horizontal mediation through Son and
Spirit may be carefully married to Latour's account of socio-material relationality. If
successful, this effort would go a long way towards constructing a trinitarian concept of
placing that may be used to heal the geographical blindspots inherent to Gunton's trinitarian
theology of creation and culture. Equally so, this project will also greatly aid in protecting
against Latour's primary difficulty ofmaintaining otherness amongst God, humans and
nonhumans within his 'common world', 'collective', or 'parliament of things'.
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At the beginning of this chapter we learned that recent theologies of place have
generally lacked a specifically trinitarian account of relationality. And as a direct outgrowth
of this oversight, we have also seen that these theologies have lacked any detailed account of
how the Spirit may be seen to work within the dynamic relationality which constitutes our
emplacement orplacing. These recent theo-geographical accounts of place have instead been
heavily focused on detailing the geographical significance of the incarnation and resurrection
ofChrist with little of any reference given to the Spirit's particularizing and mediating work
within the nonhuman realm. It is then my understanding that pneumatological concerns are at
the heart of Gunton's many geographical blindspots. It is for this reason that in what remains
of the chapter we will focus primarily on how the Spirit may be understood to take part in the
work of placing.
In chapters 1 and 3, we learned of two main features ofGunton's pneumatology.
First, as the third person of the Trinity, the work of the Holy Spirit has largely to do with the
transgressing of ontological boundaries. Secondly, we have seen that the Spirit should be
understood as the 'perfecting cause' of creation. Upon this first understanding, part of the
Spirit's dynamism is to be found in his/her ability to bring into relation 'beings and realms'
which are often thought to be ontologically distinct. Gunton applies this first to the immanent
trinitarian relations where he maintains that it is the Spirit who perfects the communion of the
Triune persons. Secondly, the work of the Spirit may be found in bringing God and world into
dynamic relationship economically. And thirdly, the work of the Spirit may be understood as
an 'opening out' of persons to one another and to God. It is on this point that we noticed that
Gunton is altogether unclear concerning the way in which the Spirit may be found to work
within the nonhuman/nonpersonal realm. This is due to the fact that Gunton has, at times,
strictly limited the work of the Spirit to the realm ofpersons alone - 'God is spirit, while
finite persons have spirit—and things [nonhumans] neither are nor have spirit' .82 As we have
seen in chapter 3, this opens up a seeming contradiction in Gunton's theology. On the one
hand he is concerned to make the claim that all of creation participates in relationality [a
transcendental], and he will at times speak of the 'openness' of the creation 'to the human
mind', but this is never clearly attributed to the work of the Spirit.83 We have also seen that
Gunton's pneumatological concern is to be found in his understanding that any attribution of
the Spirit to the nonhuman/nonpersonal sphere will result in a cascade of negative effects, all
of which revolve around the threat of pantheism.
In order to avoid the threat ofpantheism which he finds attendant to any attempt to
relate the Spirit to the nonhuman realm, Gunton will instead attribute nonhuman relationality
to a more general account of an analogical application ofperichoresis to the whole of
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creation.84 Upon my reading, this appears to be a clever sleight of hand on Gunton's part, as
he appears to be equivocating on whether or not the Spirit may be seen to be at work in the
'opening out' of the creation, or whether this preparedness for human initiated relationality is
merely the outgrowth of a cosmic - and nonpersonal - movement of perichoresis. To be clear,
it appears that Gunton wants to achieve two things: to affirm the relational character of all
creation, but to also avoid identifying the Spirit with this relationality as it applies to the
nonhuman realm. It then appears that Gunton has passed on the job of animating nonhuman
relationality, or the 'opening out' of the nonhuman, to a more generalized background
movement of cosmic perichoresis.
We then see that Gunton's understanding of nonhuman relationality is ultimately
based on a generalized account of perichoresis which he appears to use as a kind of 'stand-in'
animus for his notion of nonhuman participation in, or 'openness' to, relationality. But as
many critics of Gunton's work have illustrated, the whole concept of applying the ancient
Greek usage of the termperichoresis - sometimes translated as mutual indwelling without
confusion - to relations outside of the internal taxis of the Triune persons, is at best, a risky
stretch of the Cappadocian concept.85 In fact, most commentators would scarcely agree with
Gunton's more modest application of perichoresis to the internal taxis of the Triune persons.
While Ayres has argued that Gunton has simply misappropriated the Cappadocian concept as
a whole, Karen Kilby has gone further in arguing that nearly all theological attempts to utilize
the concept of perichoresis amount to little more than a 'projection' of human conceived
categories onto God. Although I am not quite as prepared to totally do away with the concept
of perichoresis as some of Gunton's critics, I do believe that this delegation of nonhuman
relationality to an impersonal and generalized background of perichoresis, rather than to the
personal work of the Spirit, puts Gunton's project on a rather unstable footing.
Taking Gunton's concerns of pantheism as well-founded yet altogether
overemphasized, we may now ask whether it is possible to find a way of speaking of the
Spirit's interaction with the nonhuman/nonpersonal realm in such a way that will allow for a
'weak' form of nonhuman actancy and socialization, but still protect against the Spirit
becoming completely identified with the material realm. As we have seen, Gunton is able to
find the Spirit at work in human cultural interaction with the material. But now we may ask
whether we might go further and affirm - without equivocation - that the Spirit 'opens out'
the nonhuman in a way which allows for nonhuman actancy to be registered. This raises two
84 Ibid., p. 163-179.
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important follow-up questions. First, what does the role of the Spirit look like once we have
come to the conclusion that agency need not be understood in the strictly anthropomorphic
terms of intentionality, consciousness, and language? And secondly, how might we conceive
of the Spirit's dynamism taking place within human/nonhuman relations now that
participation in social relationality is no longer the sole preserve of persons?
Towards A Pneumatology ofPlacing
In an attempt to move beyond Gunton's limited pneumatology, we may now critically
draw on the pneumatologies of Daniel Hardy and Peter Scott, among others, who have been
much more willing to find the Spirit at work in the nonhuman realm. We have already seen
that Gunton and Hardy came to disagreement on the point ofwhether or not sociality may be
construed as a universal mark ofall being. We have since come to the conclusion that Hardy
was on much firmer ground in his understanding that sociality is indeed a transcendental mark
of all things. In like fashion, I believe Hardy is again in better standing on pneumatological
concerns as well. In a fascinating paper titled 'The Spirit ofGod in Creation and
Reconciliation', Hardy sets out to investigate 'the relation of the Trinitarian God to the
dynamics of humanity and nature' with a specific emphasis placed on the role of the Spirit
within this dynamism.86 In order to initiate this task, Hardy begins by setting out what may be
taken to be nothing less than a prolegomena to a theology ofplacing. Although he does not
use the geographical language we have employed in this thesis, Hardy begins with a
description of what he calls our 'contextuality'. Clarifying the point, he explains that
'"context" does not indicate that which surrounds us, as if that were distinct from us, as if it
were an envelope in which we are contained.' It is instead intended to indicate 'the
interweaving of human subjects with their cultures and the natural world'.87 Here we find that
Hardy, from the very outset, has seemingly rejected the modern 'building perspective'. We
find, then, that humans are not to be understood as aliens dropped amongst a world of
nonhuman things which simply rotate around human subjects. Instead, 'contextuality' serves
to indicate that humans are always interwoven into a single multi-textured fabric with a
spectrum of nonhuman partners. But Hardy also appears to lose some ground with his
qualifying statement concerning our 'contextualtity' as he argues that it is 'a mental, ifnot
also a cultural, construct, one which serves to tidy up the often confusing mixture of
situations in which we find ourselves.'88 Hardy is, however, clearly aware that there are
pitfalls attendant to any appeal to theories of 'social construction', admitting that there 'is
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some danger' that we may in fact 'lose the vibrancy of the very mixture which we seek to
clarify' by making such an appeal.89
We may now pursue the question concerning how Hardy understands the Triune God
to be participative in the dynamism which he describes as the 'interweaving' of humans,
nonhumans and God. He begins by seeking out what he calls a 'true poesis' which
understands the Triune God to be performative of the truth, for it is within the Trinitarian
dynamism that we are to find the 'intellectual conditions' appropriate to registering our
'interweaving'.90 And in light of the realization that our poesis - our 'song of reality' - is
indeed dynamic and performed through God's own dynamism, we must also abandon the
supposition that reality is composed of 'fixed orders of being'. 'It is a strange irony', Hardy
explains, 'that theology has been only half-purged of the notions of fixed orders of being
which arise from God's creation.'91 Upon my reading, this begins to reveal a close proximity
to the nonmodern understanding of the radical contingency of all things. The world is not
composed of strict orders of being but is rather a network of dynamics, which 'opens up the
possibility that God, human beings and nature interact dynamically in ways to which our
habits of thought blind us.'92 Like the nonmodern theorist, Hardy has committed theology to a
program interested in registering the 'rhythms' of relational dynamism, rather than simply
seeking out static forms of ontology which populate a fixed reality composed of various
orders of being.
Following from this dynamic and performative vision of contextuality, Hardy - in
agreement with Gunton - argues that we must not posit a strict severing of the immanent and
economic Trinity. This is to say that the dynamic life of God immanently, must not be
severed from God's outward movement economically. What this further suggests, for Hardy,
is that God's economic involvement in our contextuality is never to be understood as
fragmented amongst the three persons of the Trinity. As Hardy argues:
The activity of God on the contextuality of the world is not to be confined to the
presence of Christ, but it is not simply to be identified with the Holy Spirit either. The
activity of God in the contextuality of the world requires recognition that the
operation of the Holy Spirit achieves its consistency by following the initial
conditions which we conventionally identify as the 'Father' and the congruence with
the world which we identify the 'Son'.93
God's dynamic and triune being is then understood to be the source from which the many
possibilities for life find their beginning. Yet Hardy also makes clear that when we speak of
God's economic dynamism within our own contextualization, we must speak of both the Son
89 Ibid.
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and the Spirit. 'Thus, from the implicit relationality of "the Father", the Spirit can be seen to
generate the fullness of the Father through the Son and through the Son's work in the
world.'94 For Hardy, it is the triune God who is the dynamic source of our contextualization
and our interweaving of humans, nonhumans, and God. Hence, it is also through the Son and
the Spirit that we are to find unity. Not a unity that is forced upon us from the outside - the
hegemonic unity which modernity was right to protest - but rather, a unity that is performed
actively through the dynamism of our immanent contextualization and interweaving. This
gives us a vision ofparticularities that are always interwoven - we might say networked - so
as to remain particular, yet also woven into the wider tapestry of 'contextual weaving'. 'So it
can be said that the conditions for the full contextual interweaving of human beings and other
animate creatures, as well as nature itself, are already actively present in the contextuality of
human life, and that we are here only uncovering what already is by God's grace, so that it
may be performed more fully.'95 We find here that Hardy has begun to move towards
expanding the action of the Spirit towards the networking of humans and nonhumans, both
animate and inanimate. But I do not, however, detect in this work ofHardy's a concern for
making a full case for nonhuman agency/actancy. In his vision of contextual interweaving,
enlivened by Son and Spirit, the 'engine' of the dynamism seems to be most fully placed in
the Son and the Spirit themselves. In other words, the work of the Spirit does not appear to be
responsible for an 'opening out' of inanimate nature in such a way as to allow for the type of
nonhuman actancy which the nonmodem thinker might be concerned to locate.
Peter Scott appears to take a step closer in his detailing of an 'ecological
pneumatology' based on a 'pneumatology of fellowship'. For Scott, like Gunton and Hardy
before him, the actions of the Spirit should not be separated from the work of the Son. This is
because the 'actions of the Spirit, co-working with the Word, relate the movements of
encounter through the spatio-temporal field of sociality.' The particular action of the Spirit,
which Scott singles out, is the work of bringing different beings into a kind of relationship
which he has called 'fellowship'. 'Through the practices towards fellowship, which are the
gift of the Spirit, and the enjoyment of fellowship, which is the life of the Spirit, the presence
of the Spirit is to be understood.'96 We will take particular notice that this is quite close to
Gunton's understanding that the Spirit's work is to bring into relation 'beings and realms'
which are often thought to be ontologically distinct or even opposite. But unlike Gunton, and
even Hardy, Scott is much more willing to find the Spirit at work amongst the nonhuman
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being through the Word. As Scott writes; 'By the Word yet in the Spirit, creatures are placed
in a material order which is premised upon fellowship and oriented towards fellowship.'97
What is perhaps most intriguing in Scott's 'ecological pneumatology' is his insistence
that the fellowship which the Spirit bestows is not to be found exclusively in human agents,
but also in nonhuman agents. We find within this two points of particular note when
compared to the pneumatology ofGunton. The first point has to do with what we have
consistently seen as Gunton's inability to recognize nonhuman agency, whereas Scott has
declared it to be one of the distinguishing marks ofhis political theology of nature - yet we
have also seen that Scott has given very little direction on how this nonhuman agency is to be
specifically understood. Secondly, here Scott has clearly extended the work of the Spirit into
the nonhuman realm, and without the equivocations or the dubious appeals to the
Cappadocian concept ofperichoresis which we have identified in Gunton. As Scott argues:
To speak of fellowship in the Spirit across the common realm is, of course, to speak
of communion between creator and creatures: difference indeed! Which means, of
course, that, if the fellowship is granted by the gift of the Spirit between God's
Trinity and human creatures, the difference between creatures and creator cannot be
used to exclude the non-human from participation in fellowship. The fellowship
bestowed by Creator Spiritus knows no such arbitrary restriction.98
Drawing on the pneumatology of Jurgen Moltmann, Geoffrey Wainwright, and Michael
Welker, Scott further argues that the Spirit works to bring into fellowship all of God's
creation, both human and nonhuman. And as the giver of fellowship, the Spirit is also to be
understood as the source of the vast diversity of life. 'Diversity is thereby not alien to the
project of creation. Instead, diversity is to be sourced to the giving of the Spirit.'99 Scott
further argues that it would be illogical to then limit the Spirit's work of differentiation to the
human sphere alone. We may then, following Wainwright, understand the third person of the
Trinity as Creator Spiritus. And following Welker, we are also justified in understanding that
the 'benefits of the Spirit are not for humans only but are also for "spatial and temporal,
proximate and distant environments".'100 To be certain, we have here the beginnings of a
pneumatology much better suited to registering the dynamics of human and nonhuman
placing than Gunton was ultimately able to offer.
Scott has also picked up on the transcendental concept of 'openness' or the 'opening
out' which we have reviewed in Gunton. We will recall that it was here that we identified one
ofGunton's primary equivocations, or points where his argument becomes rather opaque, as
it was unclear as to whether or not he affirmed that the Spirit enacted an 'opening out' of
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nonhuman entities. We concluded, however, that it was clear in Gunton's case that the
nonhuman particulars were not to be understood as 'open' in such a way as to allow for
nonhuman agency/actancy. For Gunton, agency or the ability to exert an effect on another, is
the sole preserve of persons divine and human. But Scott has offered a bit more clarity on this
point through a twofold movement. First, by insisting upon the combined sociality of humans
and nonhumans, and then by coupling 'openness' with the social forms of relationality found
in human and nonhuman sociality, Scott is able to affirm that the work of the Holy Spirit is to
'open out' both human and nonhuman entities. In other words, by expanding sociality to the
nonhuman realm, Scott has been able to apply the transcendental of 'openness' to both human
and nonhuman sociality. To be social is, then, to be empowered towards an 'openness' to that
which is other-than. To say that 'openness' is a transcendental mark of all being, is to insist
that the Spirit works to 'open out' particulars in order to be socially available to another,
whether that other is human, nonhuman, or divine. In sum, all things participate in relations
which may be deemed social, and this sociality is empowered through an openness which is
the gift of the Holy Spirit. What is also ofparticular note in this formulation is that Scott has
not, in any sense, delegated the work ofnonhuman 'opening' to a generalized account of
cosmic perichoresis, as we have seen in Gunton's account. In Scott's pneumatological vision,
we may understand nonhuman 'openness' and sociality to be the outcome of the personal
activity of the Spirit. Borrowing the words ofElizabeth Johnson, Scott argues that 'the Spirit
may therefore be understood as eschatological movement in and towards the openness of
creaturely reality: "the Spirit characteristically sets up bonds of kinship among all creatures,
human and non-human alike, all ofwhom are energized by this one Source".'101
We may now ask how this expanded role of the Spirit's action in the nonhuman
realm, which we have gleaned from Hardy and Scott, may now be re-envisioned through a
nonmodern account of socio-material or socio-technical mediation - that is to say, through a
network ontology. This further step beyond both Hardy and Scott is necessary due to the fact
that each of them has failed to account for the multiplicity of hybrids which the practitioners
of science studies have made the central focus of their field. Although Hardy has done much
to redirect our attention towards understanding our intimate 'contextuality', his account lacks
two important points. Missing in Hardy's pneumatology is an account of nonhuman actancy,
as well as a detailed account of the multiplicity of socio-technical hybrids which populate our
collective existence. We found the same to be true of Scott's account of the 'common realm'.
Although Scott was able to improve upon Hardy's pneumatology by insisting upon nonhuman
agency, Scott has done little of anything to add any depth to this important claim, as he has
remained altogether mute on how nonhuman agency is to be understood. We have also traced
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this persistent inability to register the 'hybridity' of humans and nonhumans in Scott's project
to his consistent reliance on Marxian dialectics. Thus, by seeking to build upon the expanded
pneumatological understanding of these two theologians, we may now attempt to speak of the
Spirit's work within the obfuscated 'middle kingdom' which has been the focus of the
nonmodem thinker. If successful, we will be much closer to our goal of constructing a
trinitarian and nonmodern concept of placing.
A Pneumatologyfor the Middle Kingdom
A start can be made by seeking to build upon the trinitarian theologies ofHardy and
Scott, by beginning to consider the work of the Spirit to be more directly involved in the
socio-material mediation between people and things, humans and nonhumans, agents and
actants. What is required is a very definite account of the Spirit's 'opening out' of nonhuman
entities in such a way as to allow for the recognition of nonhuman actancy within this
dynamism. We have already seen that for both Hardy and Scott, the Spirit is more directly
associated with the 'opening out' ofnonhuman nature than Gunton - anxious to avoid any
hints ofpantheism - was able to affirm. But are we now justified in applying this
transcendental principle of openness to hybrid (socio-technical) entities as well? To be clear,
we have seen that both Hardy and Scott have identified 'openness' as a Spirit-bestowed
transcendental mark of all being - human, nonhuman, and divine. The problem, however, is
that we have only seen this applied to 'ecological nature' or 'nonhuman nature' - that is, to a
seemingly 'purified' nature. But what happens when we apply the principle of Spirit-
bestowed 'openness' to the socio-material (or hybrid) networks of the nonmodern thinker? It
is my position that in doing this we are given a much deeper account of Hardy's
'contextuality', Scott's 'ecosocial ontology', and Gunton's wish to understand our 'internal'
relatedness to the world. In a very real sense, we begin to find a way of speaking theologically
of the socio-material 'humming' or 'vibrations' of a world which suddenly becomes much
more rich and textured than the modern's polarized world ofwarm Subjects and cold Objects.
Through a theo-geographical concept ofplacing which seeks to locate the work of the Spirit's
'opening out' more directly in the nonhuman sphere, we begin to understand that we do not
live in societies which stare out at a distant nature, or up at a distant God. Instead, we begin to
see that we are not human without the socio-material and trinitarian relational networks of
which we are a part.
It is for this reason that I believe the recent theologies of place, which we have
reviewed above, have been rather impoverished in their near total lack of trinitarian concern.
As we have seen, these recent theologies of place have almost totally neglected
pneumatological concerns, opting instead to focus exclusively on the geographic outworkings
of the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus Christ. As important as this may be, a theology of
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placing must also seek to register the 'opening out' of nonhuman particulars - be they
'natural', 'ecological', 'technical', or 'artificial' - so as to allow for nonhuman actancy, and
full nonhuman participation in sociality. To be clear, this means that it is the work of the
Spirit to prepare ('open') all things - human, nonhuman, and divine - in such a way that
relational agency/actancy is no longer the sole preserve ofpersons alone. As long as a
theology of placing lacks an account of the Spirit's work in 'opening out' nonhuman
particulars it will remain an impoverished, and distinctly modern, account of our
'interweaving' of humans, nonhumans and God. This is the very problem we have continued
to trace in Gunton's geographical blindspots throughout this thesis. In his haste to avoid all
notes of pantheism, Gunton has been far too jealous in his policing of ontological boundaries,
to such an extent, that he has little to say about the intimate relationality between people and
things which he so often claimed to be seeking out. This has become distinctly manifest in his
over-pronounced concern to limit sociality, agency, and spirit to the realm of persons alone.
When coupled with a nonmodem understanding of human/nonhuman placing, the
pneumatological expansion I am here proposing is, in fact, rather modest. Surprisingly, this
would require only a small correction, or addition, to the projects of the three theologians we
have drawn from in the present section. Gunton, as we have seen, came very close to painting
a similar picture in his description of the constellations ofperichoretic relations which enmesh
our culture through its love affair with that ubiquitous modern hybrid - the motor car. It was
here that Gunton made the very nonmodern argument that the 'motor car shapes our relations
with each other and the world for good and ill and in all dimensions of our being'.
Continuing, Gunton writes: 'It is thus a symbol ofour perichoresis for both good and for ill
with each other and the world: with the way in which all things are what they are in relations
ofmutual constitutiveness with all other beings.'102 Similarly, drawing on Exodus 31:3-9,
Gunton has indicated that there is some truth to speaking of the Spirit's involvement in human
creative interaction with nonhuman materiality. We have also seen that Gunton has
appropriated this understanding of Spirit-enlivened interaction with the nonhuman for his
concept of the 'cultural mandate'. On this point Gunton argued that it is through the Spirit that
human persons are able 'to engage with the created order as to enable it to join the human
species in praise of its creator'.103 But a nonmodem and trinitarian concept ofplacing will
further insist, along with Hardy and Scott, that we understand the work of the Spirit to also
consist in the 'opening out' of the nonhuman materiality in such a way as to allow for
nonhuman actancy to be expressed in the process of technological or artistic action. We need
not, and must not, jealously limit the Spirit's work of 'opening out' to personal entities alone.
In a theology of placing we must be equally able to speak of the nonhuman's agential
102
Gunton, The One the Three, p. 178.
103 Ibid., pp. 201-202.
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openness to the personal realm as well. In conclusion I will offer two summary points on how
a symmetrical and trinitarian pneumatology may be positively employed so as to allow the
agential 'openness' of nonhuman entities to be more fully registered.
The first suggestion will take us back to our earlier discussion concerning social-
technical mediation and nonhuman actancy which we addressed in chapter 3 (III. B). We will
first recall that 'mediators' are, for the nonmodern, to be strictly contrasted with what Latour
has identified as modern 'intermediaries'. Whereas the moderns recognized only
intermediaries - relations which ferried between pure ontological forms of either Nature or
Society - the nonmodern is equipped to now seek out truly hybrid or asymmetrical
mediations which carry a 'variable ontology'. Mediators, unlike modern intermediaries, are
variable in that they are capable of actually exchanging properties between humans and
nonhumans through the dynamism of their heterogeneous networking. For Latour this
realization requires a new language for expressing the process of human engagement with
nonhuman materiality - what he calls 'technical action'. In chapter four we catalogued four
specific ways in which Latour has reconceived technical action in nonmodem and
symmetrical terms which, as we argued in chapter 4, avoid Gunton's habit of pitting
exclusively agential humans against merely passive nonhumans. For the nonmodern thinker
we must be able to speak equally of the nonhuman's contribution to the act of technical
engagement or formation. As we have already seen Latour forcefully argue, we must find a
new nonmodem language which will allow us to speak symmetrically ofboth human and
nonhuman additions - exchanges, foldings, actancies, and translations - to the production of
the technical hybrid.
But how might we be able to speak, specifically, of the Spirit's work within the
production of this 'middle kingdom' where essences are ultimately variable, hybridized, and
altogether 'messy'. As we have seen in the handgun example in chapter 3, the socio-technical
hybrid - the handgun - is understood symmetrically as being itself an imbroglio of human
and nonhuman characteristics or properties. The handgun is composed through the technical
'folding' of human and nonhuman qualities, with the result being that this socio-technical
mediator actually carries its own 'program of action', its own 'script', the agency/actancy of
which cannot be traced back to a purely human or nonhuman source. Without the nonhuman
materiality of the immutable gun metal, human action - or human sociality for that matter -
would fade into 'pure interactionism' or pure immediacy. Importantly, it is the gun's metal,
plastic, springs, powder, hinges, and firing pin which all combine to make a new 'program of
action' that is both mobile and immutable. Now populating the once obfuscated 'middle
kingdom', technical hybrids are no longer to be understood as merely 'abject objects', but
rather, as full mediators who are ontologically variable and hybrid. These observations have
led us to speak of agency/actancy as 'a property of associated entities' that are always both
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human and nonhuman.'04 Humans, as we have repeated many times now, simply do not act on
their own as if in a vacuum. Humans, along with our social fabric as a whole, rely heavily on
our multitudes of socialized nonhuman partners who enable us to act and extend the social
fabric in space and time, duration and distance. It is here, within this 'rhizome-like' ontology,
that we must be able to speak confidently of the Spirit's ability to transgress ontological
boundaries and 'open-out' both humans and nonhumans in a symmetrical fashion so as to
make true hybridity ultimately conceivable. To 'open-out', as we are here applying the term
to both humans and nonhumans, is to prepare or enable two or more unlike others to
participate multidirectionally in each others being. To be absolutely clear we must stress that
here the work of'opening-out' instigates a shared or relationally achieved actancy. Thus,
unlike the pneumatologies of Gunton, Hardy, and Scott, a nonmodern 'eco-social
pneumatology' will locate the 'opening-out' which is the work of the Spirit at the very heart
of the 'folding' or 'networking' of humans and nonhumans, rather than in a still purified
'human society' which happens to overlap with an equally pure 'ecological society'.
Secondly, we are now able to state more clearly the role of the Spirit within the
dynamic and relational process which we have called placing. For the purpose of illustration
we may here, once again, return to our example of the Joad family farm which we have taken
from Steinbeck's The Grapes ofWrath. Leaving this place/placing which had been a home to
the Joad family for generations is not only sad, it becomes for them an ontological crisis: 'Can
you live without the willow tree? Well, no, you can't. The willow tree is you. The pain on that
mattress there - that dreadful pain - that's you.'105 For the humanist geographer, cast in the
modern mold we have already described, a place-narrative such as this would easily lend
itself to a heavily humanist analysis - place is merely space filled with human emotional
attachment - human passions, social constructions, warm layers of humanity painted over an
indifferent and totally passive willow tree. Under the modern paradigm the nonhumans of the
story are reduced to mere scenery, standing ready to passively accept human 'social'
projections. But the nonmodern and trinitarian concept ofplacing that we have detailed in this
thesis will tell a very different story. As we begin to look upon the same family farm, but now
with nonmodern eyes, we begin to see both the humans and the nonhumans in a symmetrical
fashion. No longer reduced to the role of a wholly passive tabula rasa waiting to be painted
with human projections, we may now see the Joad family, the willow tree, the bam, and the
blood-soaked ground as actants who are sharing in a vibrant relational becoming which we
have namedplacing. Through the relational dynamic of placing, we may now understand
each of the entities involved, human and nonhuman alike, as being uniquely and mutually
constituted through their heterogeneous networking. Once again, we may now highlight that it
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is to the work of the Spirit that we may attribute the relational and agential 'openness' of all
the actants in this placing, both human and nonhuman. Due to the openness which the Spirit
affords we may now, through the trinitarian and nonmodern language of placing, speak of the
mutual and multidirectional relationality of these heterogeneous and ontologically constitutive
relationships. Without this openness which is shared amongst both human and the nonhuman
entities we would be locked into a wholly modern and distinctly asymmetrical discourse
which is unable to account for the fullness of our internal relations with the whole of creation.
Spacing, Placing, and Person-Making
In seeking to find the Spirit at work in the 'opening out' of both human and
nonhuman entities, we equally affirm Gunton's insistence that; '[b]oth persons and things are
hypostatic in the sense of being substantial particulars, and rendered such by the patterns of
relations that constitute them what they distinctively are: with God in the first instance and
with other temporally and spatially related particulars in the second.'106 Yet, by marrying a
nonmodern concept ofplacing with Gunton's trinitarian anthropology and doctrine of
creation, we are now able to heal many of the geographical blindspots which we have
identified in his program. This is particularly true of his account of a relational anthropology.
As we have seen, in Gunton's anthropology there developed a hierarchy of relationships of
which human/nonhuman relationships were of the least importance, and thereby received the
least detail. Here Gunton focused primarily on detailing the continuity between divine and
human persons, and only secondarily on interpersonal 'social relations'. But when we couple
Gunton's trinitarian vision with a vibrant concept of placing, human/nonhuman relationality
begins to come out of the shadows. By lending detailed attention to a theo-geographical
concept of placing that is both trinitarian and nonmodern, we are no longer obliged to
approach nonhumanity as the mere 'abject objects' of traditional sociology which saw them
as little more than projection screens for human meanings, human texts, and human social
constructions. Instead, we begin to find that human personhood is itself an absolute
impossibility - indeed, without its 'vertical' relationship - but also without the multiplicity of
nonhuman partners with whom we share our collective existence. We find, in fact, that human
sociality is impossible without the constellations of socialized nonhumans who lend their
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We began this thesis with the singular concern of developing a theological language
suitable to the task of registering the deep relational dynamism which is believed to exist
between human persons and the constellations of nonhuman things - 'natural' things,
'technical' things, and 'artificial' things - which not only populate our lives but also
intimately participate in them as well. In the interest of fulfilling this task we adopted in Part I
of this thesis a thoroughly interdisciplinary approach which sought to draw from the fields of
trinitarian theology, science studies, as well as the geographical sciences. We further adopted
as our primary interlocutors the trinitarian theology of Colin Gunton and the science studies
of Bruno Latour. Both theorists, as we have seen, are deeply critical of modernity and its ill
effects - social, religious, and philosophical. Thus we began this study by detailing how each
of these thinkers has diagnosed the many pitfalls which followed in the wake of the
development ofmodem thought. Central to them both we found a pronounced distaste for the
distance which the Enlightenment had created between humans, nonhumans, and God. This
movement towards a greater and greater fragmentation of these realms motivated each of our
interlocutors to construct their own positive programs for healing the many ills which modem
fragmentation had ushered in.
In part II of this thesis we offered a critical comparison of these constructive
programs, Gunton's trinitarian theology of creation and culture and Latour's nonmodem
constitution. As we have now seen, lacking the logic of trinitarian relationality, nonmodem
thinking strove to develop an ontology based on material relationality that ultimately ended
up threatening its ability to affirm the particular reality of the many. We have also seen that
Latour's nonmodem thought was equally unable to handle the 'God question' in his
nonmodem counter program to modernity. Rather than seek to affirm the othemess-in-relation
of God and world, Latour has instead only been able to propose the polar opposite of
modernity's 'crossed-out' God. In the end we are given a God who is ultimately not unlike
humans, as he is portrayed as one who is unable to fully master his own creation. As we have
seen, orthodox trinitarian theology rejects the notion of a collapse between God and world, as
well as the notion that God has lost control of creation as a whole. Therefore, Gunton is
certainly correct to identify modernity's inability to properly balance between the God of
deism and the God of pantheism. What our late-modem world now requires is a vision of God
which is able to affirm both otherness and relation, unity and multiplicity. By following
Gunton in his trinitarian understanding of 'vertical' and 'horizontal' relations we have been
able to heal Latour's inability to affirm the otherness of relations in both of the 'vertical' and
'horizontal' trajectories.
Yet we have also identified a number of shortcomings in Gunton's trinitarian
theology of creation and culture. We have seen that Gunton has retained a number of dualistic
currents which Latour has been able to accurately identify in modernity as a whole. Primary
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amongst these is Gunton's wholesale inability to affirm nonhuman participation in sociality
due to his strict adherence to an I-Thou form of sociality. As we have seen, this geographical
blindspot is closely followed by two more shortcomings. First, Gunton has largely limited
relational agency to human and divine persons alone, and is therefore unable to offer much of
any detail concerning human/nonhuman relationality. And secondly, this has led Gunton to
affirm a strongly anthropocentric emphasis in his understanding of the 'cultural mandate'.
What we have been able to illustrate with the help of Latour, is that it is terribly misguided to
speak of sociality without equally speaking of nonhuman participation. In fact, as Latour has
argued, without material participation in sociality human inter-personal relations would be
reduced to pure interactionism. It is for this reason that the practitioners of science studies can
boldly claim that 'there is no humanity without inhumanity/' That is to say that we humans
simply could not maintain our wonderfully complex and persistent forms of sociality without
the constellations of socio-material mediators which circulate throughout our collectives.
Part III sought to bring both of our interlocutors into a deep conversation with the
dynamic field of 'human' geographical thought, but particularly the concept of place/placing.
It was here that we began to elucidate the fascinating crossover which is taking place between
nonmodern theorists from science studies and the growing contingent of geographical
theorists who are now seeking to question the human-dominated discourses of their field. We
concluded in this that the concept of place as it has operated in the shadow of the modern
constitution is altogether inadequate to the task of expressing the intimate relationality we
seek amongst humans, nonhumans, and the triune God. We thus proposed in its stead the
developing nonmodern concept of placing which seeks to apply the nonmodern principles of
symmetry, nonhuman actancy, and relational ontology.
In this chapter we have now briefly reviewed several of the recent theological
attempts to appropriate the geographical concept of place in order to reinvigorate theological
concepts in need of a spatial theory. Here we concluded that these recent geo-theologies
which claimed to adopt the human geographical concept of place were, in fact, working more
closely to the geographical concept of locale than they were place.
Moving into the truly positive conclusions of this thesis we then moved to consider
the theological and trinitarian justifications for speaking of nonhumans as participating in the
marks of sociality. It was in this vein that we concluded that the trinitarian theologian need
not follow Gunton's limitation of social interaction to the strict confines I-Thou relationality.
Again with the help of Scott, we argued on trinitarian and Christological grounds for the
admittance of nonhumans into the realm of the social, but came to a disagreement with Scott
on the specifics of this nonhuman sociality. It was on this point that it was argued that the
trinitarian vision of nonhuman sociality in both Scott and Hardy did not do enough to account
for nonhuman actancy and the hybridity that is achieved in the 'middle kingdom' where
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humans and nonhumans may be found to exchange properties. In an effort to remedy this lack
of a trinitarian account of the ontological 'messiness' which exists in this middle kingdom, we
then sought to emphasize - in distinction to Gunton, Hardy and Scott - the role of the Spirit in
the 'opening-out' of both humans and nonhumans. Here the argument focused on the
relational actancy which the Spirit enlivens in both humans and nonhumans as it works to also
preserve these beings in a relationally achieved otherness.
It is then a fundamental theological truth that in light of the Trinity everything,
indeed, begins to look very different. This is particularly true of our renewed concept of
placing. By understanding nonhuman actancy as the outgrowth of perichoretic and Spirit-
enlivened socio-material mediations, we are now able to envision a deeper account of human
dwelling in the world than Gunton was able to fully realize on his own. No longer may we
divide the creation into a dualistic pairing of agential persons on one side, and purely passive
nonpersons on the other. Instead we are left with the understanding that humans are rarely, if
ever, able to act on their own. To be human is always to be wrapped up in overlapping
constellations of networked relationships of humans and nonhumans, people and things, each
acting on one another in the dynamic and mediated foldings of multiple spacings, timings,
and most of all, particular placings that mutually constitute us in our own particular being.
This is, however, always to be understood as the outcome of the work of Son and Spirit,
dynamically holding all things in mutually constitutive relation without sacrificing the
substantiality of the one or the many.
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